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Mr. Tyrie: A moment ago, the right hon. Gentleman mentioned the deal that was struck between the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party before the election. Now that he can see all the long grass growing up between him
and the creation of a Joint Committee, does he have any regrets about the Liberal Democrats' decision to go along with Labour's plans on Lords reform?
Mr. Maclennan: No, none. So far, so good. The House of Lords has been improved by the measures that have already been enacted. That highly significant development would not have taken place in the lifetime of a single Parliament if the whole question of the ultimate future and disposition of the House of Lords had been embarked upon without prior agreement on the small print. It has been helpful to have had that collaboration up to this point, and I see no reason why it should not be constructively continued. Indeed, I would hope that it could be constructively continued across all the parties, because consensus will make for success.
From interventions that we have had in the debate, it is clear that there is little prospect of consensus on the Wakeham recommendations. Lord Wakeham seems to have been too constrained in interpreting his remit. He has been over-burdened by what appeared to be the generally accepted belief that the reformed House should not seek to displace the pre-eminence of this Chamber after the fact. When I gave evidence to the commission and was questioned on the point by Lord Butler, the former Cabinet Secretary--who is perhaps not the last word on the workings of democracy, although he knows a lot about the constitution--I said that this Chamber's pre-eminence was guaranteed by virtue of the fact that it provides the Government. The Prime Minister comes from this Chamber and it has control of supply, which no one has suggested should change.
This Chamber's pre-eminence is not threatened by the creation of a second effective Chamber of Parliament that does what this Chamber has not done, cannot do or would prefer to be done elsewhere. The reality is that this Chamber would regard many matters thus. I have mentioned already, for example, the treaty power. If the House of Lords were to have that power, it might be argued that that was tampering with the supremacy of this Chamber and its right to consider treaty making. However, I do not criticise Lord Wakeham for being inconsistent in that, any more than I criticise him directly for the multiple inconsistencies with which his report is littered, the most serious of which relates to the issue of election.
Mr. Kaufman: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman agrees with the commission's recommendation--I did not have time in my speech to say that I also agreed with it--of a special procedure under which the second Chamber could examine treaties in a way that this House does not have time to do. However, that has nothing to do with the question of the supremacy of this Chamber. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) were here, he would mount his hobby horse about the royal prerogative, because that is what treaties come under.
Mr. Maclennan: I am glad to have support from the right hon. Gentleman whenever he feels able to give it. Indeed, he makes my point that the commission did not focus on many areas in which it would be possible to strengthen the powers of a second Chamber and give it a useful function in our constitution that in no way diminished the effectiveness or operations of this House.
Another example, which my party recommended for consideration, was the system of public appointments, which is also another example of the Government's power to act by way of the royal prerogative. We suggested that, for some significant public appointments with considerable political importance--perhaps, the chairman of the BBC or the heads of executive agencies, such as the Prison Service--it would be desirable that they be scrutinised ex ante, before Ministers impose them on the system. It might be argued that that would remove long-standing powers from this House to scrutinise Ministers with those responsibilities.
Mrs. Dunwoody: If we are to extend such a service, surely it should be Select Committees, as recommended by the Liaison Committee, that have the right to examine such appointments. They have the expertise and the breadth of vision, as well as being politically balanced.
Mr. Maclennan: That is an arguable point, and I do not necessarily quarrel with it. It might make some sense to have a division of labour in such matters. In some areas, it would make more sense for this House to consider public appointments and, in others, this House might be happy to allow consideration to be conducted in the other place. However, this House should not deceive itself that it is capable of doing the full work of oversight of the actions of Government, or that it has shown any ability to discharge adequately the oversight of subordinate legislation, for example. Here again, the need to strengthen the powers of the upper House is palpable, evident and demonstrable, and I regret that Wakeham did so little to take on board that opportunity. The commission suggested that the existing power to reject statutory instruments altogether should be replaced by a diminished power to hold up their consideration or enactment. However, I did not find that to be profound or advanced thinking about how to improve the operation of our legislative process.
There are many internal contradictions in this incoherent report. It is not logically compelling, nor does it show a perception of how things are done in other countries; indeed, it is highly insular in its approach. The main weakness is in its inability to come to terms with the issue of democracy. I find it impossible to divine what the commission thought it was doing in that respect.
In the report, the commission attempted to put forward the case that the recommendations in total would, in some way, make the House of Lords more democratic because the membership as a whole, excluding Cross Benchers, would reflect the balance of political opinion within the country as expressed at the most recent general election and because the regional Members would be proportionately representative of public opinion within their respective regions. The one missing word is election.
We are talking about an appointed agency, although I am not clear who is doing the appointing. There has been a degree of coy embarrassment over that issue. So far, an executive search firm of a distinguished firm of accountants has been asked to come up with some names of people who might themselves be thought suitable to make appointments. This is putting democracy at two removes from the people, upon whom it rests. Perhaps the "Oxford English Dictionary" has the best definition of democracy--government based upon the people, either exercised directly or by agents elected by the people. It is sad that that
is so signally missing from the document. Sadly, that corrupts the whole, and "corrupt" is not too strong a word. It vitiates the strength of the argument that a reformed House of Lords could be more effective and capable of holding the executive arm of Government to account.It vitiates it because people appointed in that way have no more authority than the man in the street to call in question what is being done by the Government. The man in the street has as much right--although he may not have the soapbox from which to project his views--as anyone appointed for the purpose. The absence of a commitment to democracy in the document is self-serving and oligarchic in its thrust, rather than democratic as it ought to be.
The commission is not even coherent about its views on election. It recommends that there should be an elected element, although there is a signal lack of clarity as to how many or what proportion there should be. It proposes an elected element is because it has recognised--indeed, it cited the experience of taking evidence in Newcastle--that people in the regions and nations would not find their interests acceptably represented by people who had been chosen to do so from the outside.
There was an entirely accurate perception that it had to be people elected from the regions who were to constitute the voice of the regions if that were an important objective. So far as the UK as a whole is concerned, the same argument should appertain. If the voice or the interests of the country is to be expressed, it had best be done by people elected for the purpose.
I fear that the Leader of the House was somewhat distracted by the issue of the dual mandate during her opening remarks. It is patronising and, frankly, wrong to assume that if people are elected for a purpose that is established by constitutional statute and is different from the functions of this House, they are incapable of discharging that role without seeking to arrogate to themselves an entirely different role. Those making that case cannot have studied what happens in other countries or they would recognise the frailty of that point of view.
The Bundestag has two Chambers and the powers of the Bundesrat are totally different from those of the first Chamber--and, it may be thought, not so significant. However, throughout its entire history, the Bundesrat has not tried to claw to itself powers that have been given to the other Chamber. In the United States, there is not a continuing struggle for power or to redraw the lines of duties between the Senate and Congress. If there is a constitutional instrument establishing and defining the new and different roles of the second Chamber, I see no reason why those elected to it will not accept that that is their function and carry it out accordingly.
The argument was been put to me by Lord Butler that we might not get the right people elected into the upper House; we might get the kind of people who would be happy only if they became Ministers in the Government. Therefore, they would be frustrated by their role. That shows the mentality of the ivory tower so to describe the political interests of people of this country.
Many people do not aspire to be members of the Government but are interested in public service. Many people go into local government because they would prefer to represent the interests of their community--and do something about it--at that level. Some people come
into this House with no desire to be Ministers, although they are perhaps somewhat fewer than once was the case. However, it is certainly true that not everyone elected to the House of Commons aspires to be the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary or even the Leader of the House.There is a role for people of a different type from those currently elected to this House in the sort of second Chamber that is envisaged, with revising functions that are amplified by other, new tasks that are appropriate. I do not know about the hon. Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone), but I strongly suspect that he feels fulfilled at his election to lead the new authority in London; it may even have been his long-term goal. I think that many people would regard election to the sort of deliberative second Chamber that I have advocated to be a highly desirable way of giving public service.
The report is deeply disappointing, especially as its lack of principle and imagination has stalled the process and made progress much harder. However, I hope that the Government will recognise that the job of reforming the upper House remains half done and needs to be taken forward. It is unrealistic to imagine that, even if this Parliament runs its full course--which some suggest is unlikely--we could have the relevant legislation on the statute book before its end.
It has been suggested that that legislation was promised in a debate. I do not know whether it was and, frankly, I never thought that any legislative proposals would surface in this Parliament, although I hoped that they would do so early in the next Parliament. I am not at all clear that it would be right for such legislation to appear in this Parliament: the reform of one of our two Houses is a matter of fundamental importance that ought to be put to the British people in a referendum or general election, with specific proposals for consideration and approval. That opportunity still exists.
If there is to be consensus, we must go back to the drawing board. Regrettably, we have not received much help from Lord Wakeham. A Joint Committee of the two Houses might do better. The proper time to establish such a Committee may not be now, as was suggested by the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young). I can see some attractions in that option, but I can see also that the next Parliament will be more inclined to act on recommendations drawn from a Committee established by hon. Members in that Parliament. There is therefore a valid case for delay at this time. I should be delighted to discuss these matters with other hon. Members, in any forum that they care to choose.
I shall conclude, as this is a short debate.
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