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Mr. Mates: The right hon. Gentleman says that the security services felt uncomfortable about the criticism expressed in the Mitrokhin report; no doubt that is true, but does he not agree that the report should be seen in context? Even though we are only extremely rarely able to report the agencies' successes, we know about them. Although in the Mitrokhin report we criticised the things that went wrong, the members of the Committee are well aware that things go right on many occasions, but that, because of the nature of the work, the outside world cannot be told.

Mr. Straw: I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those words, which carry the greater authority coming as they do from a member of the Committee. Those of us who work directly with the agencies day to day would agree strongly with him. It is true of any organisation that its mistakes are more often noticed than its successes celebrated, but it is all the more true of the agencies because of the secret environment in which they operate.

The unpredictability of the post-cold-war era has thrown up different challenges, such as the global concerns of terrorism, weapons proliferation and drugs. Keeping up with, and setting up a credible defence against, today's dynamically changing threats and targets is a tough challenge. The agencies have approached those new priorities with imagination and dedication.

The agencies have scored real successes. Their achievements include helping the law enforcement agencies target drug trades, frustrating the ambitions of those regimes that seek to acquire the technology for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons achievements and frustrating those with terrorist agendas, all of which have been significant and effective as well as crucial to saving lives.

The Security Service has demonstrated great flexibility in responding to existing threats to national security and adapting to new challenges. We must all be encouraged by developments in Northern Ireland, but the recent attack on Hammersmith bridge demonstrates that the threat from dissident republican elements intent on wrecking the peace process remains real. Countering that threat therefore continues to be a high priority for the service, which makes an essential contribution to frustrating the aims of such terrorist groups and other terrorist organisations that pose a threat to UK interests.

The Security Service is a key player in countering the threat to the critical national infrastructure posed by malicious electronic attack. The National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre was established in December 1999 to provide a single point of access to the

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Government's arrangements for encouraging improved defences against electronic attack. I am confident that the Security Service is an effective organisation and that accountability and oversight of the service's activities are adequate. During the three years that I have held my office, I have come to admire greatly the many staff of the service whom I have met, and the leadership of its director general, Stephen Lander, who was knighted in the birthday honours.

It is appropriate at this point to take the opportunity to inform hon. Members that the Prime Minister and I have agreed with the Director General of the Security Service that his term of appointment be extended to October 2002. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to receive the approbation of the House, and am sure that members of the ISC will commend this arrangement.

As the House knows, although I am responsible for the Security Service, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is directly responsible for the two other intelligence services, the Secret Intelligence Service and Government communications headquarters, Cheltenham. GCHQ has played an increasing, and increasingly effective, role in the war against organised crime, co-operating closely with the law enforcement agencies. It too has a prime role in safeguarding the critical national infrastructure that I mentioned earlier.

The SIS relies for its effectiveness on a world-leading reputation for secrecy and trust, as well as for great expertise and professionalism. That reputation is the service's most effective tool in convincing those who might help this country--sometimes at risk to their own lives, often at risk to their livelihoods and in dangerous situations--that their secrets and personal security are safeguarded. The SIS continues to make a special, and often vital, contribution to a range of international challenges faced by Government. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will, of course, speak at greater length about the work of the agencies for which he is responsible when he comes to wind up the debate.

I know that many hon. Members want to contribute to this important debate, and it is right that we have set aside parliamentary time for them to do so. I commend the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee to the House, and look forward to continuing to work with it to ensure that we draw the right balance between scrutiny and secrecy, which is essential to maintain the effectiveness of these unique and crucial national assets.

1.53 pm

Miss Ann Widdecombe (Maidstone and The Weald): I should like to add the agreement of the Opposition to the Home Secretary's tribute to the men and women who work in our intelligence and security services. As he rightly observed, the vast majority of them do so behind the scenes without public recognition. Their task is difficult and sometimes dangerous, yet, for reasons that we all appreciate, the full story is not told, and sometimes never can be. I also congratulate Stephen Lander on his honour, and on the extension of his contract.

The security services' work is of the utmost importance, and recent events have shown that we must remain vigilant. The murder of Brigadier Stephen Saunders in Athens was a dreadful reminder that terrorist organisations continue to flourish, even in the member states of the European Union. The Hammersmith bridge

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bomb and yesterday's explosion in Belfast pointed to a possible resurgence in terrorist activity connected to Northern Ireland.

As the Intelligence and Security Committee's latest annual report states, the threat to this country and its armed forces from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in the middle and far east, remains significant and is growing. The agencies also have important roles to play in the fight against drugs and organised crime, which, sadly, remain significant forces of evil in our society. That is the national and global context in which the services and their staff have to operate.

I also pay tribute to the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee and to its Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King). We are indeed fortunate to have such an accomplished and experienced person as my right hon. Friend serving in that position. It is particularly encouraging that the Committee has won, and retained, the confidence of the services themselves. No doubt my right hon. Friend, when taking up his post, did not envisage the high media profile that the job has brought him in recent days, and I shall now turn to the reason for that media interest in the security and intelligence services.

I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House are grateful to the Committee for the way in which it conducted the Mitrokhin inquiry, and I should also like to put on record the Opposition's heartfelt thanks to Vasili Mitrokhin, who undertook his work at tremendous risk. I wish to associate the Opposition with the Committee's conclusion that Mr. Mitrokhin

is a man of remarkable commitment and courage, who risked imprisonment or death in his determination that the truth should be told.

It is to the credit of the Secret Intelligence Service that it realised the value of the material that Mr. Mitrokhin was offering, and brought him and his family to this country. However, the way in which his valuable intelligence material was subsequently handled by this country's security and intelligence services gives cause for concern. It is said that the US President may have known about that British intelligence coup before the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major).

There are lessons to be learned from the Mitrokhin inquiry report, and I personally find it regrettable that confessed traitors such as Melita Norwood will never be prosecuted for betraying their country. There were undoubtedly serious failings in the system, and we can all hope that those will not recur.

In a November 1998 debate, the Home Secretary refuted the assertion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir N. Fowler) that it was unusual for Whitehall Departments to work closely together. My right hon. Friend mentioned the Pinochet case in that respect, but his comments are borne out equally well, if not more so, by the Mitrokhin case, despite the Home Secretary's denial.

One of the most unfortunate aspects was that we had to learn about the whole affair through leaks to the media, and there are still a number of unanswered questions. Will the Home Secretary now--I shall give way to him when I have finished this point, as I do not think that he has answered it fully on previous occasions--tell the House why, despite the fact that he knew in December 1998 that

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details of the Norwood case would be published, he failed to make a statement to the House until those details had already been made public?

When I put that question to the Home Secretary on 26 October 1999, he argued that he could not have made a statement because he was waiting for the Attorney- General's decision on whether to prosecute Mrs. Norwood. He said that he was asked

why I did not inform Parliament when I was first told of plans to publish the Mitrokhin archive. As I said, I was told that in December 1998.

He went on to say:

before the Attorney-General and the prosecutors could decide, she--

that means me--

was inviting me to announce that consideration of prosecution was in train. That . . . would have been wholly improper.--[Official Report, 26 October 1999; Vol. 336, c. 830-31.]

However, the Attorney-General's decision, in so far as it was a decision, was made on 22 March 1999, so for six months we heard nothing whatever from the Home Secretary. The right hon. Gentleman--and, for that matter, the Foreign Secretary--must have known that the matter would shortly come into the public domain via the media, but publication was allowed to take place before a statement was made to the House. Indeed, the information was drip-fed to us by the press--as I put it at the time, we were practically having a spy a day--when the House could have been informed much earlier.

Does the Home Secretary think that the House and the country had a right to know about those matters from the Government before details of the Mitrokhin archive and the Melita Norwood case appeared in the newspapers? I ask that question not to make a partisan point, but to try to clarify the Home Secretary's view on the important issue of the procedure in such cases.

It is amazing that the Prime Minister, who, after all, has overall responsibility for those matters, was not even told about the Melita Norwood case until the day before the story broke in The Times last September. Whatever the Home Secretary may say, there appears to have been a complete lack of co-ordination. Why was the Foreign Secretary informed of the publication project in October 1997, the Prime Minister in December 1997, but the Home Secretary not until December 1998? Was there any co-ordination between their offices--or, indeed, between them personally?

It appears from paragraphs 22 and 56 of the Committee's report that the relevant chapters of the book were not cleared by the Home Secretary or the Attorney-General, so why did the Foreign Secretary approve the book for publication on 21 April last year? In doing so, did he seek the views of the Home Secretary or the Attorney-General, or was he misinformed that the passages had, in fact, been cleared? It is also a matter of concern that the publication criteria set down in 1996 by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the then Foreign Secretary, were not followed. That was one of a number of significant failures in the Departments of State themselves.

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I find it hard to believe, as paragraphs 59 and 60 of the report state, that when it was realised last summer that the details would come out in the press, the

media lines to take were being developed by the working group with support from the FCO and the Home Office. The Home Secretary saw the press lines in the week prior to the . . . story appearing in the Times. The Foreign Secretary did not see them.


Once the story broke Ministers were unable to use the prepared press lines because they were inadequate.

That simply beggars belief. It is clear from the Committee's report, which is excellent and does it credit, that there were many serious failures--but we need not go further over the details.

It is doubly unfortunate that the failures involved sensitive, indeed unique, material such as that provided by Mr. Mitrokhin. Those failures have distracted attention from Mr. Mitrokhin's actions, which, as I have said, deserve the highest praise. In the light of the Committee's report, the Government have decided to put in place measures to try to rectify the deficiencies, and I can only hope that the situation that has been described to us will never recur. It did no one any credit.

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