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Mr. Campbell-Savours: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will emphasise that it is he who speaks for the Committee. When journalists telephone its members, they should not be offended when we tell them--to put it bluntly--where to get off, because we simply do not talk. The Chairman talks on behalf of the Committee, and they should always approach the Chairman.
Mr. King: I thank the hon. Gentleman.
As was said earlier, the Committee seeks to maintain the seamlessness--the Government constantly strive to achieve a similarly seamless appearance--that enables it to speak with one voice. Difficult decisions, or judgments, must often be made on what can or cannot be said about certain issues. I am sure that the Home Secretary and others--such as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard)--who have held his post know that the problem is remembering what is public. I hope to take on that responsibility for the Committee when trying to make the necessary judgment, and I hope that we strike reasonable balances.
I have spoken of the contribution that the Committee can make. I am grateful for the support that the Government have given to the developments that we have achieved in the evolution of the system. We take considerable interest in the expenditure of the agencies. I am afraid that the number of asterisks that appear in our report representing the details of that expenditure must be pretty frustrating for the ordinary reader, but every asterisk represents information that we hold as a Committee. We have examined the expenditure involved, and have been able to identify it. For instance, one heading relating to the Secret Intelligence Service relates to the cost of running agents. That is the degree of detail that we examine.
We are grateful for the assistance of the National Audit Office, which was not originally envisaged in the legislation. It has already done valuable work, and I think
that its contribution will continue to grow. The investigator to whom the Home Secretary referred represents an addition to that valuable work. I pay tribute to another supporter of the Committee's work--the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, who has been very helpful in certain circumstances.The most recent and obvious evolution of our work is represented by what we did in regard to Mitrokhin. I do not want to add a great deal to what I have already said about our report in press announcements: the hon. Member for Rother Valley has said a fair amount about it, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald drew attention to certain matters of concern. However, I want to stress the importance of putting the issue in context.
My hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) spoke of the need to recognise the successes of the agencies. This has been one of the few instances in which success has been manifest and public. The fact that there has been some confusion about publication, and the fact that there have been some failures in regard to prosecution and other matters, must not be allowed to detract from the overall understanding that this was a remarkable and outstanding intelligence success. I believe that the Federal Bureau of Investigation claimed that it was the largest pool of counter-intelligence material that it had ever received, and the Central Intelligence Agency paid similar tribute to the help that it had been given in the identification of people who had been betraying national interests in the United States and many other countries.
The tributes paid to the SIS's exfiltration of Mr. Mitrokhin, his family and his material, and the pursuit by the Security Service of a number of the leads that arose from it, mark important and praiseworthy achievements, but we must never forget Mr. Mitrokhin himself--an extraordinary man, whom the Committee had the privilege to meet and interview about his work, and about the remarkable archive that he produced. It has given us an unparalleled understanding of the nature of the KGB and its activities over the years. We believe that there is more material to be published, which will of course be of great interest to those concerned with the history of espionage and intelligence in other countries over recent years.
Nevertheless, the achievements of the Mitrokhin report should not blind us to the fact that mistakes were made in its handling. Lessons must be learned. Those are the principles that guided us. We appreciated the Government's early recognition that mistakes had been made once matters came to light, and we believe that the steps that were taken were appropriate to meet our initial criticisms.
There is one question that I am asked most often in interviews, and on more public occasions. There is a latent suspicion that we do not really need the agencies. Why do we spend nearly £1 billion on them? Did not this world of espionage pass with the end of the cold war?
In the foreword to our 1998-99 report, we referred to the various areas in which intelligence is critical. We referred, for instance, to the need for support for our military forces in actions overseas, and, in particular, to Kosovo. Since then we have seen the events in East Timor and, most recently, in Sierra Leone. We now consider the issues involved in weapons proliferation, and the increasing concern felt in Washington about national missile defence against the risk of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. The importance of the agencies' task in trying to counter some of those challenges is all too real.Only yesterday, I read a comment in a defence journal about Kazakhstan, whose Defence Minister has admitted that the country has not the slightest idea how many weapons it has. In earlier days, Kazakhstan had a certain relevance to Soviet missile and nuclear activities. It is now trying to conduct an inventory. The report that I read alleged that 40 Mig 21s had been smuggled to North Korea from Kazakhstan. Admittedly it is an elderly aeroplane, but it is not one that we would wish to become part of the currency of arms smuggling.
To those who say that we now live in a safer world, let me say that the truth is that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and some of its controls, the availability of weapons and access to nuclear and other materials present a threatening and dangerous scenario, and it is vital to have the best possible intelligence to try to prevent proliferation.
So soon after the tragic assassination of Brigadier Saunders, there is no need for me to restate the reasons why international terrorism continues to pose a major threat. I understand that the French football team in the European cup is now having to have special security against a threatened international terrorist attack. It is a continuing threat. The Home Secretary reminded us of Hammersmith bridge and of our own domestic concerns. It is an area in which intelligence and security continue to be needed.
The Committee visited Dover a few months ago. I do not think a single member of the Committee was surprised by the tragic news that came from Dover, having seen the situation in that port and the pressures that exist. Our 1998-99 report emphasised the importance of enhancing intelligence capability against organised crime. We specifically mentioned immigrants as one of our areas of concern.
I touch on several other issues that are of concern to the Committee. I do not want to accuse the two senior Ministers here, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, of breach of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, but there is a publication called "National Intelligence Machinery." It describes the role of Ministers and makes it clear that the Prime Minister has overall responsibility. It then draws attention to the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services. It looks pretty good on paper. I do not think that it looks very good in practice. It might be a good idea if that committee met and had some actual physical presence. It would be a nice gesture, if no more, to the intelligence agencies.
It is not a party political point because the ministerial committee was not known for the frequency of its meetings during the term of office of the previous Government, either. It may interest members of the previous Government to know that the ministerial committee even existed, but it did.
If we are to have ministerial accountability, if it does make sense to have divided responsibility for the intelligence and security agencies, and if the structure is to be such that there is separate accountability, the argument for the ministerial committee meeting must be strong. It could be a valuable exercise. If it met, not necessarily frequently, but at least annually, that would be a significant improvement.
The Committee takes considerable interest in personnel practices in the agencies and in recruitment and retention. I must add one sharp criticism and one complaint about the Government response. Two reports ago, we made a proposal in response to a problem, which is well known, involving Mr. Tomlinson. He complained that he was dismissed from the Secret Intelligence Service and was denied any redress or access to an employment tribunal on the ground that it was impossible to hear the evidence which was said to be too secret to be available to an employment tribunal.
We came up with a fairly simple proposal: it should be possible to set up a special tribunal identical to the normal employment tribunal, but constructed in such a way that it could handle secret matters. The Government accepted that proposal. We have said some rude things in our report--I shall not rehearse them--about the shambles of the parliamentary handling of that. The Home Secretary need not look embarrassed because, as ever, another Department handled the Bill concerned--the proposal was tacked on to the Employment Relations Bill as an amendment.
Having made the proposal, the Committee was never consulted when the amendment actually went in. It never even came through the Commons; it was done in the Lords and came back. However, we were assured that we would be consulted on the regulations. What is pretty outrageous is the Government response:
- The Government is therefore disappointed at the reaction of the Committee to this prompt improvement in the rights of members of staff of the agencies.
I have referred to areas of expenditure and the assistance of the NAO. We are seeking to give greater information about the cost of the individual agencies; we referred to that in our report. The Government were looking forward to a meeting with us to discuss those matters further. That meeting has now been held. I think that it was helpful. I hope that we will be able to make progress on that matter and that next year's report will be rather fuller in that respect than this year's. We await Ministers' response on that point.
The area of expenditure that we addressed that was of particular concern to us--we got agreement to the publication of NAO reports on the matter--was the cost of the new premises for the SIS and the Security Service, and the substantial over-runs in expenditure that were incurred on both occasions. Although they were past events, we quoted them because we recognised that the complexity and scale of the new accommodation project for GCHQ was far greater than either of those undertakings.
We gave the clearest warnings of our concern, in view of past experience, that the problems should not be repeated and that there would be the closest watch. We were grateful that the response in January says:
- During its planned move to new accommodation GCHQ is paying considerable attention to ensuring that degradation of its operating capability is kept to a minimum and that all essential services are maintained.
-
Later, in paragraph 17, the Government noted
the Committee's endorsement of three guiding principles in the management of the GCHQ New Accommodation Project. GCHQ has sought to ensure that the maximum likely costs have been identified.
- continue to supplement its own project management experience and expertise by the use of contractors and expert advisers. GCHQ--
- understands the need to control costs at all stages . . . Limits on spending will be set before work commences, and any need for subsequent adjustment will be carefully scrutinised.
The two issues that our report says will lead to further work are files, on which we hope to have more to say in our next report--I shall not go into it in detail--and security procedures, which has been a constant theme of every report that the Committee has written. We are concerned about whether the agencies insist on constant vigilance on internal security. The recent events involving laptops are merely an illustration of the problem that we have been continually trying to draw to the attention of Ministers and heads of agencies. We have not had the worst experiences; other countries have suffered worse lapses of security recently. We can maintain that position only by constant attention to this tiresome, time-consuming but critically important role.
Finally, we attach great importance to security and secrecy. The Intelligence and Security Committee seeks to establish the highest standard in its own conduct in that respect. Against that background, let me express a personal view. Obviously, we have concerns about the actions of a former head of the Security Service. It is one thing to publish a book about one's early childhood experiences or happy holidays, but it is quite another to write a book that covers in any detail work or responsibility in this area. It is peculiarly critical in respect of somebody who has been the leader of an agency as it raises concern that other members of the agency might be tempted or attracted by financial reward to do the same. There is a heavy responsibility on a former director-general.
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