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5.22 pm

Mr. Norman Baker (Lewes): First, I apologise to the House for not being present for the opening speeches, for a reason that I conveyed to Madam Speaker yesterday. It involved significant constituency activities, with a visit from leading French politicians and the signing of an accord in relation to the Newhaven port, which is of key importance to my constituents.

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the debate. I have listened with considerable interest to Members' speeches. I listened with, I hope, a learning mode in place. In many instances, those who have spoken are members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. They have an insight which I do not.

I hope to bring an outside view to the debate--that is, one from outside the Committee--and perhaps in one sense a more mainstream view of Members of this place than the privileged view which others have expressed this afternoon. I have that much in common, if perhaps nothing much else, with the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis), other than an interest in these matters.

There is a need to strike a balance between the proper secrecy procedures that are in place within our security services and the need for democratic accountability. The key question is how that balance is struck. In an answer to me, the Home Secretary said:

I accept that there should be . . . openness in the work of the Security Service, provided it does not endanger national security in any way.--[Official Report, 30 March 1998; Vol. 309, c. 894.]

That seems to be a fair and proper description of how the Government should be approaching these matters.

I shall argue that perhaps we can go a little further a little faster in tilting the balance towards accountability without endangering national security in any way. I pay tribute to the steps that were taken by the previous Government under the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) and that have been taken by the present Government to move slowly--sometimes painfully slowly--towards a more open and accountable system, which in my view has not endangered national security. Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that further steps can be taken without endangering national security.

Not long ago, we were not even told that MI5 and MI6 existed. We started that far back. Now we have operations put on a legislative footing. We have the Intelligence and Security Committee and, as someone outside that Committee, I have formed the opinion that it does a good job.

I have confidence in the capabilities and the integrity of the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), who chairs that Committee. I have absolute confidence, of course, in my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), who has been in the House since 1973, and in other hon. Members, such as the hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours).

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They bring not only experience but a commitment to democracy and civil liberties, which are important in examining the work of the intelligence and security services.

I pay tribute to the steps that have been taken, as the hon. Member for New Forest, East noted, by the Home Secretary in small ways to open matters up, and by the Foreign Secretary, who was kind enough to publish the Zinoviev letters in response to a written question of mine. We now have the annual debate in Parliament. Those are all worthwhile steps, but we can go further.

I shall deal first with the subject of files, to which the hon. Member for New Forest, East referred. It is right that there is now independent scrutiny by officials of the Public Record Office. I called for that in November 1998. However, we are told in paragraph 79 of the Committee's annual report that 3,000 files were destroyed in the time between the decision to involve independent scrutiny being taken, and that scrutiny kicking in.

One wonders what was in those files. It must have been a fast operation to destroy them before the scrutiny process began. A fair-minded person must suppose that the files contained information that might cause embarrassment to the security services and that they might, with hindsight, regret compiling them.

I entirely concur with the future programme of work set out in the report with regard to files. I refer to paragraph 89 on page 36, which refers to three issues relating to personal files. The first is

whether individuals should have rights in connection with the destruction or otherwise of any file held on them and protections against having inaccurate information gathered, stored and used against individuals' interests.

That is a crucial issue for the Committee to pursue. It is a principle on which both the present Government and the previous one acted by introducing data protection in other respects. That seems consistent and should apply to material held by the security services.

There was speculation in the newspapers a while ago that a file was held on the Home Secretary and the then Minister without Portfolio, the present Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It is difficult to imagine anyone who is less of a security risk than the Home Secretary--[Interruption.] From where I am standing, the right hon. Gentleman seems to be a fully paid-up member of the establishment. If files are held on such people, perhaps the security services have been a little over-enthusiastic in their information-gathering activities.

It is right that if a file has been held on the Home Secretary, or anyone else, which the security services deem it no longer operationally necessary to retain--that is a proper consideration--why should not that person have access to the file and know what was written about him or her? Otherwise, something that may have been written by a very junior official a long time ago could stay on someone's record for ever, which seems wrong. The record may be destroyed, but the memory remains.

People must have the right to challenge that information when the security services consider that the file no longer needs to be kept for operational reasons. I hope that the Committee will press for that.

The second issue in the Committee's future programme of work is

the position under future/current data protection legislation,

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which is clearly linked to the first issue and to the third, which is


implications of the European Convention on Human Rights.

I commend the Committee for that programme of work on files, and I hope that progress is made.

On 29 July 1998 the Home Secretary, who I am pleased to see has returned to the Chamber, made a long, full and helpful statement about personal files. He said that there were 13,000 active files on United Kingdom citizens, and it would be interesting to know whether there is an up-to-date figure. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will be able to tell us; if not, I would be happy to table a question after the debate. The Home Secretary also said that 110,000 files were destroyed or earmarked for destruction. It is important to establish whether those earmarked for destruction have been destroyed, or whether they are lying around somewhere.

I refer Ministers to paragraph 47 of the 1997-98 report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which expressed anxiety about the age cut-off point. On the 110,000 files, it states:

We note however that reviewing in this respect is currently restricted to files on individuals who are over 55 years old. This means that there may be files on individuals under the age of 55 because they joined an organisation which was categorised as subversive possibly 20 years ago and these files may still be used for vetting and other purposes. However, no such files would be open on someone who joined the same organisation today.

It also says that the Committee will consider that further. I do not know whether the Committee has done that, but it is an important point.

Since being elected to Parliament, I have tabled several written questions on the interception of communications. I note with interest and perhaps a little anxiety that the number of warrants issued each year has continued to increase. In July 1998, Lord Nolan said:

I am satisfied that the substantial increase in interception is due to the continuing incidence of large-scale crime coupled with the greater interception facilities available to the various agencies.

That clearly explains why the number of interceptions has increased.

I want to consider Lord Nolan's second reason: the greater interception facilities available. That means that technology is progressing apace and that it is now possible to intercept more accurately and perhaps more speedily than hitherto. There is therefore a greater tendency--or, at least, temptation--for the security agencies, including the police, to use interception facilities. That may be useful in detecting large-scale crime. I am sure that we are all grateful if the use of the facilities has facilitated the detection of large-scale crime and the arrest and prosecution of those responsible.

Mr. Mates: The advance of technology is double edged. It makes intercepting old technology easier, but it is much harder to intercept digital technology, which an increasing number of criminals and terrorists use. Any increase in numbers is related not to the ease of interception, which is in many ways more difficult, but to the urgency of the cases. Criminals are now so sophisticated; for example, they use mobile telephones and satellite phones to do their deadly deeds. We must pick them up.

Mr. Baker: I am grateful for that intervention and I accept the hon. Gentleman's point. It poses a problem for

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those of us who are committed to accountability and democracy. There is a difficult balance to strike between ensuring that our security services are given the opportunity to detect crime, and maintaining proper civil liberties. I do not have the answer, but the question concerns me as an ordinary Member of Parliament.

In the spirit of my initial remarks to the effect that more information could be made available without endangering national security, I ask the Home Secretary whether more information could be provided on interceptions for which warrants have been granted. We are given information about the number of warrants, but not about the number of individuals or telephone lines that may be subject to interception. That extra information would not endanger national security, and it might help Members of Parliament and others to build up a picture of the activities of the security services. Could the provision of such information, which is not person-specific, be considered as part of the Government's review of the need to make the security services more accountable to Parliament and to the population generally?

Especially in the light of the increasing number of warrants that are being issued, or for which permission has been granted, I am worried about the level of authorisation required for the issuing of such warrants, and in particular, the powers that are winding their way through Parliament under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill. When a body or person wishes to interfere with the liberty or privacy of another person, it is important for there to be some external check on the process; otherwise there is surely potential for corruption.

Hitherto, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have signed warrants. That is entirely right. The Home Secretary has assured me in written parliamentary answers that he takes the matter very seriously and has considered it properly before doing so, and I am sure that that is true. However, I am worried about what may happen if senior officials have, in some respects, authority that has previously been exercised by elected Members. I understand that that may happen under the Bill. As the Home Secretary probably knows, my party has proposed a greater use of circuit judges rather than a reliance on senior officials.

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