Previous SectionIndexHome Page


3.32 pm

Mr. Roger Casale (Wimbledon): I start by making an observation that when European Union Heads of Government meet in Nice next week, they will be able to look back on 50 years of unprecedented peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. I say that because given the tone and substance of much of what we have heard from Conservative Members, with the notable exception of the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), we can easily lose sight of the huge, positive role that the EU has played, and continues to play, in stabilising the post-war settlement in Europe.

To listen to Conservative Members, one would think that there is nothing good to say about the EU--today or in the past. However, if we look back over the broad historical sweep, from post-war reconstruction, throughout the cold war and during the post-Soviet transition since 1989, we see that the institutional architecture, which has included NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and, crucially, the EU, has worked. It has played a crucial role in stabilising the international situation across Europe.

23 Nov 2000 : Column 489

Against such huge EU achievements, Conservative party views will seem to many petty, opportunistic, ignorant of history and lacking any positive idea about the future. The image in my mind of Tory policy makers on Europe is of those standing on the shoreline, peering through the fog, isolated from Europe. The only thing that distinguishes them from King Canute is that they seem unable to determine whether the tide is coming in or going out.

Unlike the Conservative party, this Government and those meeting in Nice will recognise the role that the EU has played in promoting co-operation between European nation states and in producing 50 years of stability, peace and rising prosperity in Europe--a stability that is the result of peace; a prosperity that is the result of stability. There is no prosperity without stability, no stability without peace.

As well as that common understanding, those in Nice will meet in a common climate of constructive engagement, which is based on relationships that have been developed and worked on throughout the year. Governments of the centre left--there are many in Europe today--or of the centre right would be bemused by the tone, content and approach of the Conservative party, which has put itself outside the European mainstream and would not be seen as a credible or serious negotiator, should it ever be returned to power in this country.

So, let us be absolutely clear about the EU's achievements. That can give us great confidence in what it can achieve in future. Let us also be clear that the EU institutions of today are in urgent need of reform. EU enlargement makes reform both a practical and a political necessity.

We cannot celebrate more than 10 years since the fall of the Berlin wall without seizing the opportunity to unite the whole of Europe. Equally, we cannot say that we are in favour of enlargement without favouring the changes necessary to allow it. The Nice summit is the last opportunity to make the institutional changes necessary for enlargement without breaking the momentum for it, with all the consequent damage that would cause to the EU's relations with applicant states. Nice will be a test of member states' resolve to open up the EU to a wider membership and to introduce new members on equal terms to the EU fraternity of nation states. That is why it is so important that the Nice summit succeeds.

It is also important for the existing member states that there should be institutional reform at Nice and that the summit should succeed. Very often, in our rather parochial British debates, focused exclusively, it seems, on the relationship between the EU and Britain, we lose sight of the role that the EU plays in the wider international arena and the importance of giving the EU greater political weight in that arena--not so that that weight can be used against Britain, but so that the EU can play a positive and more forceful role in the international arena, be more powerful in our trading negotiations with the US, and be more influential in the necessary contribution that Europe must make to the reshaping of international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, the United Nations, the World Bank and others. I want an EU that is more powerful in terms of its ability to act in international crises, with a common foreign and security policy that is backed up by its own defence capability. If we are to achieve that, the EU must

23 Nov 2000 : Column 490

be reformed, not just for the sake of enlargement but so that it can succeed in the future in what it has been so well able to do in the past.

Part of the reform process concerns what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg. That is why the issues of the size of the Commission, qualified majority voting and the reweighting of votes are so important. We want change in those areas.

The British approach to the negotiations has been rational and discriminating. We accept that the Commission must not become too unwieldy. We are prepared to give up one of our Commissioners so that there are not too many following the admission of new member states. We want to encourage other large countries to do the same. We recognise the need for the reweighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, so that the majorities in it more accurately reflect member states' populations. In this enterprise, an important democratic principle is at stake.

We want the extension of QMV, but not willy-nilly. We take a discriminating approach to that issue, too. In areas related to transport and the environment, for example, QMV must be extended, although we have said clearly that we will not give up the veto on taxation, border controls, social security and defence.

In other areas, the Government's approach has also borne fruit. We are not to have a binding charter of fundamental rights. We argued that it should be of a declaratory nature--a way to standardise people's existing rights as EU citizens. The British approach seems to be prevailing. Given the comments of the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe at the end of his speech, I am sure that that will give him heart. We should co-operate flexibly and be able to work together in shifting alliances within the EU framework to make progress in areas of particular interest and concern to Britain.

Mr. Redwood: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it not an insult to the House that for a long time there has been no member of the Foreign Office ministerial team on the Treasury Bench? Can you invite the Minister to come here and fulfil his responsibilities to the House?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael Lord): Whether or not Ministers attend these debates is entirely a matter for them.

Mr. Casale: All these institutional changes are necessary, both to make the EU more efficient and better at achieving results, and to prepare the way for enlargement. I have talked about institutional reform because much change is necessary at the heart of the EU in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Mr. Bercow: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Casale: I am keen to make progress because I still have a lot to say.

The EU's strength and stability come not just from what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg, but from the network of bilateral relationships in Europe and the intergovernmental aspect of the European institutional architecture. It is simply wrong to say that Europe is only

23 Nov 2000 : Column 491

about what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg when many of the key decisions that affect Europe's future are being made in Paris, Madrid, Berlin, London and Rome. The Conservative party paints a completely false picture of the decision-making process in that respect.

Ideas such as the European defence initiative were not cooked up in Brussels, but have been a feature of Britain's bilateral relations with other countries in Europe, notably Italy, for some time. The defence initiative and the headline goal for defence capabilities in Europe were important features of the statement that was made at the end of the British-Italian bilateral Heads of Government summit last year. Our policy is that countries in Europe should make a greater contribution to Europe's defence and to joint defence efforts. Very often Britain contributes the lion's share, puts the most soldiers on the ground and picks up the tab. If enhancing defence co-operation achieves that objective of greater contributions from other countries, it must be viewed as good for Britain.

The European Union has been a unique and successful historical experiment. It continues to be a success. In the future, it can become a vehicle for the unification of Europe and a serious contender to share international leadership with the United States. It can continue to be a source of security and benefit for citizens of Europe, which is why I should like the social policy agenda, which will be discussed at the Nice summit, to be strengthened, particularly in industrial relations matters such as information for, and consultation of, employees.

The EU is in need of reform, and enlargement is turning that need into a practical imperative. None of us will deny the role that it has played in the past and its huge potential for good in future. I am delighted that our Government are playing such a strong, constructive role in reshaping the EU, making sure that its role in enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe will be just as important in the years to come.

3.43 pm

Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham): One of the Foreign Secretary's assertions is that the treaty and the negotiations in the run-up to Nice are not about extending the competence of the European Union. I hope that when the Minister for Europe replies he will answer my points.

Has the Foreign Secretary not read any of the papers? Has he not been to any of the discussions? He told the House that he wishes to block the proposals to take away our veto on taxation. Why does he need to say that? It is because our partners and the European Commission want to get much more power for the EU over our tax matters. He tells us that he wants to block certain social security proposals. Why does he have to tell us that? Again, because some of our partners and many in the Commission want more control over our social security matters.

The Foreign Secretary tells us that he wants to block proposals for common borders, a common frontiers policy and a common asylum policy. Again, why does he need to give us that reassurance, which is probably worthless? It is because he knows that the Commission wants much more power over those areas. He tells us that he will block any proposal to remove our veto over treaty changes. Even treaty changes are up for discussion in these

23 Nov 2000 : Column 492

important negotiations. Some of the leading members of the EU on the continent and certainly in the Commission believe that even treaty changes should no longer be subject to the veto.

I hope that the Minister heard those points, because he will need to apologise for the Foreign Secretary, who dared to tell us that the debates in Nice are not about extending the EU's competence, whereas with their own words Ministers had to accept that our partners on the continent and the Commission believe that it is about extending the EU's powers and competence, which is why the Government may be forced into blocking some of the more outrageous proposals.

One of the things to which I most object in the Government's handling of the negotiations is the contempt that they show for the House and for anyone, inside or outside the House, who tries to ask them civil questions to elicit simple information about what, among the many proposals on the agenda, they think is in Britain's national interest and what is not. The Minister and his boss, the Foreign Secretary, declined to answer 50 questions that I tabled identifying each of the vetoes which the Commission and some of our partners think should be sacrificed, asking them what was the Government's position on each veto. Why is that a secret?

The Government say that there are some vetoes that we must give up in the national interest. Why will they not come clean with the House, and go through the 50 questions and tell us where they believe it is in our national interest to give up the veto? Why will they not come clean with the House about the vetoes that they rule out giving up? There are 50 proposals on the table. I was given a silly answer the first time that I asked the questions, and I was blocked from even tabling them when I tried to get clarification on the Government's approach.

Worse still, when I talked to a leading journalist from The Sunday Times, I was told that the newspaper had already been informed that the Government had conceded 17 of the 50 vetoes. A leading newspaper has been taken into that confidence, yet the House and the British public have not.


Next Section

IndexHome Page