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Mr. Speaker: Order. That is not the business of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Mr. Foster: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Will the Deputy Prime Minister confirm that at lunch-time he held a meeting with representatives of a large number of non-governmental organisations; that he was specifically asked whether the deal that he had negotiated would reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the US; and that he was unable to give a straight answer? Given the confusion that clearly exists on this issue, can he understand why other countries were not prepared to sign up to the deal that he put on the table? Is it not the case that--at least on this occasion--no deal is better than a bad deal?
Mr. Prescott: It is for all of us to make judgments on whether no deal is better than a bad deal. I personally think that it was a good deal. Had we been able to get the package together, we would have reduced carbon emissions, which was the proposal; we would have tightened it up so that the countries would not have exploited the planting of forests in developing countries, which was a major concern; and we would have had an overall reduction in carbon gas emissions in 2010.
The hon. Gentleman refers to the meeting that I held with the green groups. I told them that, yes, there was a reduction and I gave the amounts.
Mr. Foster: What are the figures?
Mr. Prescott: I shall give them now for the record, and the hon. Gentleman can write them down and then tell the green groups. It was clear that the Americans proposed that forest sinks would equate to 300 million carbon tonnes. That figure went down to 125 million tonnes during the negotiations. I negotiated it down further to 75 million tonnes, and I believe that that was still not the end of the road, but time was short and the document had to be taken up to the conference itself so all the parties to the negotiations could endorse or reject it. It is not true that I did not give the amounts earlier, and they are now on record. On that basis, it can be seen that there was good faith in the negotiations. We got a reduction and, as the hon. Gentleman will know from his knowledge of such issues, planting forests in developing countries under the clean development mechanism was seen as a major loophole. I was the first to get it removed from the deal with the Americans.
Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptford): May I, too, congratulate my right hon. Friend on the role that he has played? May I tell him how important many of us regard the removing of forest sinks from the clean development mechanism and, indeed, the capping of the contribution that such sinks could make in the United States? Will he do his utmost to ensure that both the outline agreements are kept on the table in all future talks, while continuing his pressure on the United States to make real cuts in domestic emissions?
Mr. Prescott: I thank my hon. Friend for her words of support. As I have said, I am pleased that we stopped the development of forest sinks under the clean development mechanism. That major, fundamental change was very much welcomed by the European Ministers when I proposed it to them. On the capping of the United States, it is true that the amounts that we were talking about required not only a ceiling, but greater scientific assessment so that we could judge, over time, whether the science worked and whether it was being abused. The Americans agreed to that at that stage.
On whether the same documents will be put on the table, I must be fair, as one of those in the negotiations, and say that when Ministers get to that stage they have to cut a political deal. At the end of the day, that is what it is all about. Politicians have to use their judgment because all the evidence might not be as clear as they would want. A deal has to be made, and no party to it would want to start the negotiations again if they had already given everything that they thought they could at that stage.
I regret that it is most likely that the negotiators will go back to their original positions. We have already been told that the document used by the president is likely to be used. Given that the settlement that I negotiated, with others, was far better than the president's, we will start off in a worse position, but I hope that we shall reach the better one than I proposed.
Mr. John Gummer (Suffolk, Coastal): I wonder whether the Deputy Prime Minister would agree,
especially after today's announcement, that it would have been better if he had not made the personal comments that appear to have been made, given that he has to negotiate further with those people? Does he agree that there is considerable doubt about the effect of the agreement that he wanted? His recent answer did not dispel that doubt, so will he answer a simple question? By how much would the United States domestic emissions have been reduced under the agreement that he hoped he would get, and how does that compare with the domestic reductions of the European Union?
Mr. Prescott: The right hon. Gentleman was greatly involved in leading the negotiations in the early stages. I think that I must be the first Minister to include an opposite number on the delegation; I recognise the role that he has played. He will know that it is difficult to get precise information when it is based on such variables. Indeed, that was my real problem with the European Ministers, who asked exactly what the reduction would be. Let me give an example. If the opportunity to include forest sinks in the clean development mechanism for developing countries no longer exists, a judgment has to be made about how much they save. Some say that it is as much as 35 per cent. of the effort required, but what is that as a proportion of the American or, indeed, global contribution? It was very difficult to make a precise definition in the two hours that we were negotiating--I readily admit that. We talked the matter over with the Ministers, but, at the end of the day, we have to obtain a reduction in emissions and make sure that it is a reduction and not a plus. All the figures show that an agreement would have led to a clear reduction in Europe as well as in America. It would have been a greater reduction in America, because it is the greatest emitter.
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington): My right hon. Friend has been talking to representatives of a Democratic American Administration and we are likely to have a Republican one in January. Can he assure us that he will develop close relations with the people with whom he might have to sit at a future conference to re-address the same issues?
Mr. Prescott: I must admit that that was one of my considerations, although people will understand that I do not wish to pass comment on who should be the next President of the United States. The political climate can change in six months as it can in six years. It is an important consideration for anyone in negotiations and it certainly was in my mind. We had an opportunity, because Ministers from America and other countries were prepared to come to an agreement. As we have seen from past negotiations, Ministers, Governments and policies change, and we have one opportunity to reach an agreement. I thought that this was the opportunity, but I will not give up looking for another one. However, it is a pity that we did not take this one.
Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham): I believe that the US and the UK position has to be different from that of the French and that we need to move the French to reach an agreement, so will the Deputy Prime Minister take advantage of this opportunity to apologise to his opposite
number in France? I do not think that personal abuse helps to achieve agreement. Does he agree that, if he apologised now, we might get the agreement that he wants?
Mr. Prescott: As the right hon. Gentleman has a reputation in the House for apologising for nothing and for being highly personal in most of his comments, his question is a bit of a cheek. Let me make the position absolutely clear. It was not simply the French who opposed the deal. European Ministers agreed by about 2:1 that they did not have sufficient information to endorse the agreement. However, all that was required was to send the agreement to the president to put it to the conference of delegates who were negotiating. I put together an agreement between two important parties--the umbrella nations and the European nations. An agreement was reached by 10 Ministers from Europe and the umbrella countries but, when it was properly and democratically presented to Ministers from the European Union, those Ministers took the view that, although they endorsed the initiative and particularly the clean development mechanism proposal, they did not have enough information to judge whether it was a good or bad deal. They wanted more negotiations and the deal to be sent to the president.
Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli): Was the European Union supposed to be negotiating as a single bloc at the conference? If so, was that done under the specific provisions of the treaty or was it merely an informal ad hoc arrangement?
Mr. Prescott: My right hon. Friend knows that the Commission has certain responsibilities in international negotiations and often negotiates on behalf of the Community. We were at this conference as European Ministers deciding common policy in negotiations. As he knows, even if we come to a common European position, as we did for the target of 8.5 per cent., Europe then decides the variation of targets between the nations known as the "bubble" and Britain's contribution was 12.5 per cent. We all signed individually to the protocol; it was not signed simply by the Commission, which signs in its own right.
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