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Mr. Anderson: It does not give the United States cause for concern because of the nature of the agenda that we are seeking. The United States has said that it would have reservations if the scheme went further along a particular road. It is our task, with the partners who share our views within Europe, to deal with this complex matter in such a way that it serves our interests and those of the Alliance as a whole. That is what the Government have set out to do.
Enlargements in the past have been, in part, for political reasons. The enlargements to encompass Spain, Portugal and Greece came after periods of dictatorship and sought to provide stability and democracy in those countries. I believe that the same motive is now relevant for the current six, and for the six who are likely to be endorsed at the Helsinki summit.
I very much agree with what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday about Cyprus. He said that we had hoped that the dynamic of Europe would provide a stimulus for a solution to the tragic division of that island. If it does not, we have made crystal clear that Turkey will not have a veto, and that the Republic of Cyprus--with all the complexities which will follow--will be eligible to join the European Union.
Slovenia was dealt with badly in its exclusion from NATO, and has been a victim of wider considerations. Slovenia--the most prosperous part of the old Yugoslavia, at the southern part of the Austrian Alps--is very much a democracy and should be able to glide into the European Union with no great difficulty.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have always had a European vocation. I lived in Hungary en poste in our embassy for a couple of years, and I saw then--even under the darkest days of communism--the European vocation of Hungary, the historical spear point of Europe against the east.
Poland has made enormous strides and Estonia, as a result of its application and the pressures on it, has made crucial changes in respect of its Russian minority and its economy. I am glad that they will be joined in the second wave by Latvia and Lithuania, so that we can consider the Baltic countries as a whole. Latvia and Lithuania are relatively small. They are absorbable and have made serious democratic strides. As it is difficult, because of Russian sensitivities, to bring them into NATO, there is all the more reason to bring them into a European Union security structure so that, together with their Scandinavian sponsors, they can help to provide an acceptable buttress.
Sir Michael Spicer:
That all presupposes greater centralisation and, as the Foreign Secretary said, dissipation of Britain's power at the centre of Europe. What evidence is there that the British public want that? This morning, I heard the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), saying on the radio that his battle bus campaign was a great success. Every time the battle bus gets outside the garage, public interest in the Government's proposals seems to plummet. What legitimacy does the proposed extension have?
Mr. Anderson:
Expansion does not presuppose further centralisation. It will surely lead to greater diversification and more difficulty in finding the centralisation of which Conservative Front Benchers are so afraid. I have been involved in the European debate as a diplomat and in various other guises for many years and I am convinced that the British people are persuaded by facts. It is a fact that all other countries neighbouring Europe are desperately keen to clamber on board. They do not get frightened and run to nanny as Conservative Front Benchers do. They see the future for our continent in a positive way. It would be sad if the Conservative party were to run scared from Europe at a time when so many others want to join in a positive spirit.
Slovakia, after Meciar, is making enormous strides, and the Czech Republic is a ready sponsor. Malta has no serious problems and I hope that the Maltese Labour party will go through the same transformation as my own party. Stabilisation and democracy have been established in Romania and Bulgaria.
Clearly, differentiation is important. We cannot have the countries, either in the first six or in the following six, joining one by one, in part because of the ratification process. In national parliaments political constraints will arise, but we are talking about an historic and welcome task, which the British people will support, to widen and make more powerful the new Europe.
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife):
It is clear that the principal issues that will be discussed in Helsinki will be enlargement, the related issue of the remit and terms of reference of the intergovernmental conference in 2000, and the European security and defence identity.
It would be a great pity if the withholding tax were allowed to overshadow the Helsinki summit, at which such important issues are to be discussed. There are more
important things to focus on, such as enlargement and the ESDI. The truth is that the withholding tax would not achieve the objective of stamping out tax evasion among European savers and could, as we have heard already, do substantial damage to London's international bond market. The solution for individual countries that have a problem with tax evasion is to reform their own domestic systems of assessment and collection. The bond market in London is worth £1.86 billion and it must not be allowed to be disturbed, as the New York market was some years ago when a similar proposal was made and carried through.
There is no reason, however, why we should not explore the possibility of a voluntary code on unfair tax competition, which is against the interests of a properly functioning single market. If it is also against the interests of UK exporters and manufacturers, we should do all that we can to ensure that unfair competition is removed. One can legitimately say of the withholding tax that it should simply be withheld.
It is right on such an occasion to ask what the purpose of enlargement is. It is easy to offer the answer that it is to provide for suitable candidates the economic opportunities of trading in a single market, but it is more than that. It is worth reminding ourselves of the purpose of the European Coal and Steel Community--the primary forerunner of the European Union--which grew out of the terrible maelstrom of Europe during the second world war. When we offer suitable candidates the opportunity to join the European Union--and NATO, too, for that matter--we offer them the chance to entrench the values of freedom and democracy that have emerged in those countries, rather as the countries have emerged blinking into the daylight like the prisoners in "Fidelio", sometimes from a period of impenetrable totalitarian darkness.
Those countries have fledgling democratic institutions, some just a few years old. Those institutions would be underpinned by membership of the European Union, and experience tells us that. It is inconceivable, for example, that Spain might revert to a Franco, Portugal to a Salazar, or Greece to a handful of colonels. Those countries' membership of the European Union inhibits any such regression.
We should be clear that negotiations to join the European Union must proceed on the basis of merit, not of compassion. The Copenhagen criteria, to which reference has already been made, must not be weakened or undermined for any one country, no matter how deserving it might appear to be in other respects. There is little doubt, as the Foreign Secretary rightly recognised, that Turkey poses an especial challenge. Some say that there should be no dialogue about the entry of Turkey until it obviously and clearly meets the Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, some Liberal Democrats say that any such dialogue without the criteria having been met would simply encourage the view that entry could be achieved at a lower standard, thus providing no incentive to change.
My own view is rather different in emphasis. We must recognise that the European Union's treatment of Turkey in the recent past has caused great resentment in that country. I am sympathetic to the view that dialogue on human rights and enhanced political exchanges--always with the prospect of membership--are more likely to be successful. They should be accompanied by the clear understanding that no matter what progress may have been made on some of those issues, and no matter how
deserving in all other respects Turkey may be, the Copenhagen criteria will not be reduced or diluted. Turkey would also be well advised to consider the consequences for its legitimate aspiration to join the European Union if it were to proceed with the execution of Mr. Ocalan.
The issue of enlargement leads naturally to some consideration of the IGC of 2000. We must recognise that the conspicuous failure to prepare for European Union enlargement has created an enormous pressure for success at the IGC. As has already emerged in at least one exchange this afternoon, reform of the common agricultural policy is one of the matters that must be resolved.
Even if enlargement were not on the table, there would be compelling reasons for reform of the CAP, but those reasons are doubly compelling under the pressure of enlargement. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that, without reform of the CAP, there can be no enlargement.
However, every step taken by the IGC must be measured against the principle of subsidiarity. The EU should exercise powers and competencies only if the policy outcome is demonstrated to be more effective and efficient than could be achieved by member states acting individually. To put that in less complicated language: decisions should always be taken at the level where they are most likely to be effective.
I give way to the hon. Gentleman for the Scottish constituency.
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