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Miss Ann Widdecombe (Maidstone and The Weald): I thank the Home Secretary for his statement and for his courtesy in giving me an early sight of it. Of course I accept that he is studying the judgment. Indeed, I would have been the first to criticise had he come to this House with ready-made decisions without studying it in more depth. Nevertheless, I will ask him to indicate his thinking on one or two matters that have been the subject of much public discussion.
Does the Home Secretary agree that a tariff must reflect what is appropriate to the crime itself, rather than take into account the various stages at which the nature of imprisonment changes? He will be aware that there has been considerable discussion about whether it is right for Thompson and Venables to enter the adult system. Does he agree that that is not germane to setting a tariff, but that a tariff must reflect the gravity and nature of the crime, rather than any consideration about the nature of the imprisonment involved?
Does the Home Secretary agree, from his knowledge of tariffs, that, had these two been adults, the tariff would probably have been in the region of 25 years and that, therefore, an appropriate and, indeed, sizeable discount was given to reflect their youth? Does he agree also that that tariff is roughly comparable to that involved in the only other roughly comparable crime committed by a child of similar age, and that the tariff of 15 years is not vastly in excess of the time served by Mary Bell, who also transferred to the adult system during the course of her imprisonment?
Will the Home Secretary confirm that it is the case that, in July 1996, our Court of Appeal upheld the Home Secretary's right to adopt the same policy for setting tariffs for young offenders as for adults, and that decision gave legitimacy to the practice? Furthermore, does he recognise that the power to increase tariffs has been used hundreds of times without challenge?
Naturally, I accept that the Home Secretary is studying the judgment. Is he in any position to indicate, even in a preliminary fashion, what options might be available? For example, does he feel absolutely compelled to change the nature of the Home Secretary's role? He has observed--the House will be grateful for this--that the judgment does not affect the verdict. Does he agree, and can he say whether, even had the trial been conducted under the juvenile rather than the adult system, it is most unlikely that anything would have happened other than that Thompson and Venables would still have been convicted and sentenced to detention at Her Majesty's pleasure?
Does the Home Secretary agree that it is in the interests not only of James Bulger's parents and the surviving relatives but of Thompson and Venables themselves that
they settle down to complete their sentence without the regular glare of publicity that this case involves, and that being encouraged to look upon themselves as victims of the system rather than perpetrators of a serious crime will not help them come to terms with what they have done and to lead law-abiding lives thereafter?
Conservative Members join absolutely with the Home Secretary in renewing our sympathy for James Bulger's parents and other members of his family and expressing the horror which we all felt at that crime, at the vulnerability of the victim, and at the shockingly young age of the perpetrators. I thank him again for his statement and should be grateful for as much elucidation as he can give on the points that I have raised.
Mr. Straw:
In turn, I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for the way in which she put those questions. She asked a number of specific questions about the setting, or resetting, of tariffs in these cases. I crave the indulgence of the right hon. Lady and the House if I do not go down that road. These matters require the most careful consideration; I do not believe that it would be appropriate to offer views on them, given that, like everyone else, I have only had the judgment for about three hours.
It is important for the House and the country to understand that setting a tariff sets the minimum sentence which someone convicted of these grave crimes can serve for retribution and deterrence. It is only at the end of the serving of a tariff that the issue of release arises. Then, an assessment of risk is made as to whether it is safe to release the individual, whether it is an adult convicted of murder or someone who is serving a sentence at Her Majesty's pleasure--typically, a juvenile. The assessment of, and final decision on, adult murderers is made by the Home Secretary of the day, but the decision about those detained at Her Majesty's pleasure is, as a result of a separate decision of the European Court of Human Rights, made by the parole board. However, many people convicted of murder--both adults and juveniles--serve a sentence significantly beyond their tariff because the Home Secretary of the day or the parole board judge that it is not safe to release them any earlier.
I have read the judgment as carefully as possible, as I previously read the preliminary decision of the European Commission of Human Rights. It is important to appreciate that the issue is not the guilt or innocence of the two youths--it relates instead to the circumstances in which the trial had taken place, the setting of tariffs and the allegation that there had been insufficient judicial supervision of the sentence post-tariff but before its expiry.
Mr. Kevin McNamara (Hull, North):
This was a terrible crime, and our sympathies go to the family of James Bulger, particularly his parents. Can my right hon. Friend clear up some of my confusion? If the European Court has accepted that a fair trial was denied, under article 6(1), how does the verdict stand? The trial was either fair or it was not. Can my right hon. Friend explain that contradiction, now or later?
Mr. Straw:
I am afraid that the matter is not as simple as that. Our domestic courts may decide that an error had been made in the process of a trial but that it was not such as to require a guilty verdict to be overturned. I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) to look in detail at the judgment.
As I have already made clear, the European Court of Human Rights found in favour of the United Kingdom Government in two respects. One was with regard to a claim by the applicants that aspects of the trial process relating to the age of criminal responsibility breached their rights under article 3 not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The Court also found in favour of the United Kingdom in respect of the applicants' rights to liberty under article 5. It was in respect of aspects of article 6(1), on the right to a fair trial, and article 5, on the detention of anyone in Council of Europe countries, that the court held that there had been a violation. The court did not say, therefore, in the sense in which it is understood in common parlance in the UK, that the trial at Preston Crown court was defective and that the verdict should be overturned. That was never at issue.
Mr. Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey):
I thank the Home Secretary for his prompt, accurate, considered and welcome statement. I join him and the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) in saying to the family of James Bulger that the House and the country remain supportive and sympathetic. We share their belief that, when young people commit terrible crimes, they should be properly punished.
It is an instructive point of the decision that the family of the victim were represented before the hearing in the European court. Will the Home Secretary consider how we can better ensure that victims who survive or the families of victims who do not can be represented in the processes that precede decision and sentence? One of the great complaints about our system is that great attention is given to hearing the defendants, while little is given to hearing the views of those who have been victims or who have suffered bereavement, as in this terrible case.
I should make just three further points. Does the Home Secretary agree that the case does not for one moment suggest that, simply because we require fair trials for children--even if differently fair from those for adults--we should not have appropriate and severe sentences for children, just as we should for adults who offend?
Like me, the Home Secretary has had only a short while to consider the judgment, but will he reflect on the key element of the decision that we should move away from political decisions on sentencing to judicial decisions? We must all welcome that. Means exist for dealing with lenient or excessive sentences, but they should be judicial means, free of political interference. That does not necessarily mean less severe or shorter sentences, but it must mean sentences beyond a political context that might be affected by the pressure of the moment.
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