Previous SectionIndexHome Page


Mr. Mullin: Yes.

Mr. Brake: The Minister says that he can do that. In his answer to a parliamentary question from me, he listed the arguments for public-private partnership, but the need to improve safety did not feature. He has another opportunity now.

The Minister knows--as, I think, do his Back Benchers--that this is really about money. It is about a smash-and-grab raid by the Treasury. Whether the Chancellor will have £350 million or £15 million in his war chest in return for the sale of NATS, I do not believe that the Minister--either in the Government's response, or here today--will be able to demonstrate that the sale is needed because it is the only way of improving safety in air traffic control. The Government must abandon their plans to privatise air traffic control: that is the one transport U-turn that everyone would welcome.

3.2 pm

Mr. George Stevenson (Stoke-on-Trent, South): So far, all who have spoken have done two things. First, they have said how important and detailed the report is, and drawn attention to the time and trouble expended by the Committee and everyone else involved, including witnesses. Secondly, they have echoed a view expressed throughout the report, and stressed the high quality of the United Kingdom's aviation safety record. I do not think that that can be repeated too often.

As others have briefly pointed out, the background is an enormous growth in air traffic services. I am told that, in 1989, some 92 million passengers passed through British airports, and that 159 million did so in 1998. That represents an average annual growth of about 8 per cent.,

16 Dec 1999 : Column 437

and none of the evidence received by our Committee suggests that the same rate of growth is unlikely to continue. In many respects, there is a good tale to tell--a tale of which we should be proud. As the report and its recommendations suggest, the challenge is this: how can we at least maintain our record, and, if possible, improve it?

I share the disappointment expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) about the Government's response to a report that issues the challenge to which I have referred, and makes detailed, well-researched, specific recommendations on how it can be met. I want to highlight three points made in the report. The first relates to the safety regulation group, which is part of the Civil Aviation Authority. The report draws attention to a particular aspect of the group's vital activities. Our evidence suggested that, in recent years, it had taken a "hands-on" approach to aviation safety. That means that airlines and operators produce their safety plans and safety operations, and the safety regulation group considers them to establish whether they are adequate.

It could, I suppose, be argued that the process has worked. By definition, we would not have such a good safety record if it had not. So what is the problem? First, it clearly represents a move towards a self-regulatory regime, and that is not the purpose for which the safety regulation group was originally established. Secondly, we should consider the enormous growth in the industry that has already taken place, and the enormous growth that will take place in the future. We should also consider anxieties that have been expressed about virtual airlines. I think I am right in saying that the evidence that we received from the safety regulation group suggested that it was difficult to monitor the activities and safety standards of virtual airlines, because of their fragmented nature.

Given those and many other problems, we must consider seriously whether the hands-off embryonic self-regulatory approach that the safety regulation group seems to have developed over recent years is one on which we can depend for the future. I would feel rather more comfortable if we could be assured that the Government would engage in discussions with the CAA and the safety regulation group to ensure that the right balance was achieved. I would like to be sure that, as the process continues, we shall not lose sight of the concept that the safety regulation group should set standards and make inspections to ensure that they are applied, rather than simply judging whether the operators' plans are adequate. I think it essential for my hon. Friend the Minister to reconsider his response to the report's recommendation about the safety regulation group. I feel that it is complacent, and misses the important point that the report was trying to make.

I am also concerned about the relationship between the air accidents investigation branch, the CAA, the safety regulation group and the Government. By definition, the reports of the air accidents investigation branch follow accidents, some of which are tragic; they are therefore that much more important, in terms of the conclusions reached by the branch, and the action that it recommends the CAA and the Government to take to ensure that lessons are learned and such accidents do not occur

16 Dec 1999 : Column 438

again. The evidence we received suggested that recommendations made by the branch some years ago had still not been implemented.

We were worried about the cause of some tragic air accidents, including the infamous Boeing 737 accident, which resulted in many lost lives. Recommendations were made. I understand that there is still uncertainty about the cause and the recommendations; any recommendations that were made have not been implemented. There are other examples of that. Therefore, it is crucial that the issue of CAA involvement in air accidents investigation branch reports and recommendations, and the Government ensuring that the recommendations are acted on, is revisited urgently.

There is some merit in the CAA ensuring--as it does at the moment--that air accidents investigation branch recommendations and reports are made public, but the branch itself should perhaps publish its recommendations. In addition, as a matter of urgency, the Government should ensure that there is minimal delay in branch reports being made public and brought to the attention of Government, and that recommendations are implemented.

The final area to which I shall refer--in many ways, it is crucial to the debate about the future of air safety--is our relationship with European organisations, a matter that has been touched on by other hon. Members.

At the moment, we have the Joint Aviation Authority, which has been described as a club. Twenty-seven or 28 European nations get together, discuss issues and try to come to some conclusions. As the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) rightly said, it goes at the pace of the slowest camel in the train. We took evidence that clearly showed that three, four or five years may pass before conclusions are reached.

I know that the Government are worried about that. I suspect that it is one of the reasons why the Minister will say that the Government are in favour of developing the European profile, but we must make the decision making quicker and more efficient. We cannot tolerate inordinate delay in coming to decisions.

When we questioned the safety regulation group on the whole relationship between safety standards and regulations in the UK and what may happen in Europe, we were given assurances that, if there were inordinate delay and the JAA took decisions that reduced UK standards, the group would not hesitate to implement, or to improve, UK standards. That was reassuring, but the proposed European air safety authority is a different animal altogether. The JAA has no legal standing. EASA will be a legal entity. Presumably, therefore, its decisions will have the force of law.

If the safety regulation group is determined to ensure that safety standards in this country are not compromised as a result of the changed European profile, two things will be important. First, when and if EASA is set up as a legal entity and the safety regulation group does not agree fundamentally with a decision, the group will have two options. It can act illegally by doing something else and, as a result, begin to undermine EASA's credibility. We cannot have it both ways.

Mrs. Dunwoody: There is another alternative. The group can be ordered to maintain the compromise standard that is acceptable throughout Europe.

Mr. Stevenson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. It means that I do not have to detain the House with the second option. It is an important point.

16 Dec 1999 : Column 439

The report makes it as clear as we could possibly make it that, if air safety standards in the UK are to be maintained and improved, we cannot tolerate international organisations, with perhaps the best will in the world, taking decisions that we are legally bound to apply, but that dilute those safety standards. We think--the report is clear about it--that the Government should be extremely careful and seek the most concrete assurances before they sign up to EASA.

I make two more quick points in relation to that. First, evidence to the Committee, which came from professionals in the industry, not from politicians, was clear. There is a north-south divide in Europe in relation to safety standards. Generally speaking, the north of Europe has much higher standards than southern Europe.

That leads to my second point. For my sins, I spent 10 years in the European Parliament, so I know a little about how the place works. We have heard the term "negotiation". People say, "Do not worry, we shall negotiate from a position of strength. We shall ensure that our interests are protected," and so on. That is fine. I differ from the hon. Member for North Wiltshire. There is a role to play in international co-ordination and co-operation on air transport. We have to be careful about falling into the trap of taking a little Englander view. By definition, that is the case. It is nonsense to argue differently.


Next Section

IndexHome Page