House of Commons - Agriculture

Select Committee on Agriculture Sixth Report

IV. THE WIDER ROUND

42. The EU, with the full support of the UK Government, has always expressed a strong preference for "a comprehensive round of negotiations covering a wide range of trade issues in order to achieve significant further liberalisation of trade and promotion of economic growth, set firmly in the context of sustainable development".[107] Almost as an afterthought, MAFF conceded that "A comprehensive round should also make it easier to reach a deal on the more difficult subjects, including agriculture."[108] The draft Seattle text gives some indication of how far WTO member countries would have been prepared to open up the negotiations beyond the in-built agenda. In addition to market access, export competition, domestic support and rules and disciplines, it provides that "the negotiations shall take into account: Non-trade concerns ... in particular, the need to protect the environment, food security, the economic viability and development of rural areas, and food safety, in full conformity with the Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and on Technical Barriers to Trade".[109] If "in particular" can be read as meaning that the list of considerations is not exclusive, then this would allow an opportunity for the EU to argue for the introduction of other key concerns, namely animal welfare, multifunctionality, food safety, GMOs and labelling. We examine each of these in turn below.

Animal welfare

43. Farm animal welfare is a highly emotive issue in the UK and in some other parts of the EU. There is great pressure on the EU to raise the matter in the course of the WTO negotiations on agriculture for several reasons. First, there have been claims from the animal welfare lobby that the current WTO rules "are having an increasingly damaging effect on attempts to secure improved standards of animal welfare".[110] Both the RSPCA and CIWF emphasised that this was due to the way in which the rules had been applied and interpreted, rather than the legislation itself. Mr Fisher, a consultant to the RSPCA, told us that animal welfare "is not a victim of WTO rules, it is a victim of the EU's perception of WTO rules".[111] Their concern is that fear of a challenge to the WTO is preventing the EU from introducing new animal welfare measures. Second, there is no mechanism under the WTO for a country to discriminate between products on the basis of how they were produced. As the RSPCA pointed out, all animal welfare issues are essentially matters of process and production methods (PPM); yet, because a free range egg is identical in appearance to an egg from a battery hen, then the two must be treated as 'like products' under the WTO rules.[112] This means that countries cannot impose import restrictions based on PPM and thus prevent the sale of meat and other products produced to welfare standards below those generally acceptable in that market. The rules also prevent discrimination on the grounds of the environmental implications of how a product was made or whether the ingredients of a food product have been affected by genetic modification. Finally, there is the impact of the rules on the competitiveness of domestic producers. Unilateral EU animal welfare regulations may drive up the cost of production but WTO rules appear to rule out compensation or subsidies and sanction no protection against lower quality goods from overseas competitors.

44. These arguments have crystallised in the example of the EU directive on the welfare of laying hens (99/74) which requires member states to ban the use of battery cages from 2012. The egg industry in the UK "is extremely worried about the costs" which will arise from this measure and its consequent impact upon their ability to compete, especially with the United States.[113] The NFU estimated the additional capital costs for UK producers at "some £500 million", with "significantly increased running costs" thereafter.[114] If consumers are not willing to pay the higher prices for eggs produced to the new EU standards, then UK producers will lose market share to lower-priced imports. These concerns led the European Council and Commission to include a provision in the Directive that the outcome of the WTO negotiations should be taken into account when reviewing the Directive in 2005[115] and also to call for "international acknowledgement of animal welfare rules to be a key point of the EU's negotiating brief for the WTO round".[116]

45. Several possible solutions were put forward to us for resolving animal welfare issues within the context of the WTO. The RSPCA classified these under seven headings: preferred market access (enabling WTO members to give preferential or conditional market access on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory sustainable production criteria); domestic support (clarifying that measures to promote animal welfare may be included in green box payments); counterbalancing measures (probably in the form of tariffs to adjust for any extra costs imposed on domestic producers with the proviso that such measures could not be introduced where competitors operate equivalent standards); labelling (so that consumer can distinguish between products on the basis of PPM); import restrictions (to be used only rarely where a product is unacceptable to the public); institutional reforms (inclusion of PPM in non-trade concerns within the WTO agreement); and multilateral solutions (international agreements for farm animal welfare).[117] All of these solutions have their difficulties, as the NFU pointed out in compiling a similar list.[118] Of the three most commonly cited, including by MAFF,[119] labelling would be unworkable for processed products and difficult in the case of food sold in restaurants or away from home;[120] domestic subsidies (green box payments) could be open to challenge[121] and might "not be acceptable to the Chancellor or the European Union because it may involve extra costs";[122] whilst multilateral agreements would be likely to adopt only the very lowest common standards and would not resolve the difficulty of what happens when the EU or other countries wish to introduce improved standards of animal welfare.[123]

46. The greatest difficulty, however, lies not in the detail of any particular solution but in persuading both some other EU members and the EU's trading partners that animal welfare is a legitimate concern in WTO trade rules. The CIWF believed that the crucial issue is to change WTO attitudes towards the treatment of process and production methods.[124] The RSPCA admitted that at the moment other countries "see animal welfare as just another reason for the EU to maintain its protectionist policies."[125] MAFF confirmed that there is "very little support for [the inclusion of animal welfare] outside the EU" and argued that "It could well be counter-productive to make sweeping proposals for WTO rule changes which will have virtually no chance of acceptance by other WTO members".[126] Evidence submitted to the Committee on behalf of the Governments of New Zealand and the US confirmed this view. The former suggested labelling or equivalency as solutions but believed that "To allow subjective moral considerations to apply would risk creating an easy pathway for any country wishing to protect local producers by restricting imports".[127] The USDA was equally firm that "Factors that are related to 'consumer preference', such as production methods, socio-economic factors, and ethical or religious preferences, must be addressed through the marketplace".[128] Finally, as we noted earlier, there have been suggestions that developing countries would find it insulting that the rich West wishes to discuss higher standards for animals than are enjoyed by many people in the world.

47. Representatives of the UK meat industry were sympathetic to the inclusion of animal welfare in the Round but "dubious as to the likelihood of success"[129] and concerned that, in the absence of a "universally held concept of animal welfare", any rules arrived at would be "very simplistic".[130] Ms Quin too recognised that "It is extremely difficult to reconcile our United Kingdom position with the position of the Americans and others".[131] She believed that "the need to try and explain the position and build up support is tremendously important"[132] and she highlighted Ministerial participation in international conferences and lobbying as ways of raising awareness. The Rt hon Nicholas Brown MP, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, has also pledged to explore the possibility "of having animal welfare payments in a green box system", but Ms Quin admitted that work still remained to be done on finding acceptable definitions.[133] We believe that the EU, and the UK Government in particular, must make continued and forceful efforts to clarify objectives on animal welfare and then explain their intentions to individual WTO members prior to the launch of a wider round of talks. We also believe that the EU's position would be strengthened by the adoption of uniformly high welfare standards across all Member States. Of the various solutions suggested, we favour a combination of labelling, green box support and multilateral agreements on issues which cannot be brought into the purview of the WTO. The progressive trade liberalisation has been due in large measure to the willingness of Governments to accept the economic benefit it brings and to resist the temptation to introduce external criteria into the debate. If such criteria - be they animal welfare, labour relations or the environment - be introduced, there must be a consensus that this is a sensible way to go forward and agreement that such questions can be expressed in terms which lend themselves to definition and measurement so as to permit meaningful negotiations. None of these external issues should, when push comes to shove, be permitted to prevent agreement on a further round of 'classic' trade liberalisation. Governments which introduce unilateral animal welfare measures should consider their impact on trade at the time of their introduction, not seek to use the WTO to sustain these actions.

Multifunctionality

48. Multifunctionality is a term employed by the EU and Japan to represent the need to see agriculture in the context of its contribution to the countryside and rural communities. However clumsy the word, it expresses the view that agriculture is not about the most efficient means of production at the lowest unit cost irrespective of any impact on the environment, social organisation or broader economic well-being. The term is criticised because it is seen as code for protection. Before Seattle, environmentalists such as the CPRE had been calling for the EU to take into account "the impact [of trade liberalisation measures] on both the rural environment and those farms that are operating to higher environmental and welfare standards" in its WTO negotiating stance.[134] The EU's subsequent adoption of the term 'multifunctionality' was therefore welcomed in some quarters as "potentially a step forward as it is a recognition that agriculture is more than just producing the lowest cost food for international markets".[135] The UK Government has endorsed the EU's approach, stating that "agriculture is multifunctional in character" and that "Future [WTO] commitments should take full account of the social and environmental aspects of sustainable agriculture as well as the need for a competitive and viable industry."[136] Ms Quin argued that, while any economic activity has an importance beyond the mere act itself (the argument often posed by opponents of multifunctionality), "there are some issues ... which are, if not unique to agriculture, particularly marked in the case of agriculture".[137]

49. This is by no means a view shared by all the EU's trading partners. The RSPB rightly identified "scepticism among WTO members (including countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the US) that the term justifies protectionist policies or acts as a means of giving trade-distorting (or production) subsidies to farmers 'by the back door'".[138] There is some agreement that environmental issues are relevant within the context of trade relations as is underlined by the existence of a WTO committee on trade and environment and the specification of the environment as a legitimate non-trade concern within the Agreement on Agriculture. However, as Professor Swinbank pointed out, "in the main environmental considerations are deemed to be not trade issues, even though they impinge upon trade".[139] The New Zealand Government provided strong confirmation of this impression with its argument that trade liberalisation would "assist, not undermine environmental protection", by encouraging efficiency.[140] Agricultural policies, such as the CAP, which hamper this pursuit of efficiency will therefore do more harm than good, although any individual country should be allowed to introduce environmental protection measures, provided that they are non-trade-distorting.

50. The attitude of New Zealand and others will make it hard for the EU to include multifunctionality as a workable concept in the WTO talks. The term was rejected in the draft text produced in Seattle, although as we noted earlier, the proposed wording would have allowed the EU to raise most of its concerns with regard to the need to consider agricultural subsidies in tandem with agriculture's wider role in the environment and the local economy. Ms Quin believed multifunctionality could be included but that it would have to be combined with other EU concessions to ensure that the EU "do not seem to be putting the environmental argument simply in isolation, where ... it is more likely to be misconstrued as a protectionist argument".[141] The greatest obstacle is probably the term which the EU has chosen to encapsulate its ideas and the lack of comprehension among its partners of its meaning since it relates so closely to the 'European model of agriculture'. Part of the hostility expressed by opponents to the concept of multifunctionality may arise from misunderstanding of the basic fact that farms in Europe play a different role in the economy and local community than in some other parts of the world and suspicion that multifunctionality may be just a new description for the EU's traditional protectionism. The RSPB therefore argued that in order to make multifunctionality a real bargaining tool, the EU first had to define multifunctionality clearly in an effort to secure greater understanding from WTO members of what is meant by the term, and second, had to demonstrate that there was no alternative method of achieving the environmental and social benefits that resulted from targeted agriculturally-related payments made to farmers.[142] The Minister agreed that this was the right way forward, stressing also the importance of explaining that "some of the issues we are talking about are related to the quality of life for people generally, and also related to environmental benefits which are not just local and regional but actually European and global".[143]

51. In terms of what the EU would hope to achieve from the negotiations once the concept was admitted, the most likely outcome would be that payments to farmers which have a primary aim of conserving and enhancing the rural environment and economy would be clearly green box measures and therefore not under threat of a challenge. Growing environmental awareness and the importance attached to international treaties on environmental matters offer some hope of success to the EU in promoting the need to consider the environment as a legitimate non-trade concern, though there is a potent argument that environmental issues should be dealt with through this process and not be allowed to become a central 'pillar' of the WTO. Insistence on the term multifunctionality is probably counterproductive to the EU's case in this regard. Multifunctionality presents the delivery of environmental protection and other benefits as almost an accidental process. We believe that it would be preferable to define more closely the EU's desired objectives and the policies necessary to realise them than to push for the inclusion of a nebulous concept, distrusted by many parties to the negotiations. We agree with the Government that it must work to persuade other countries of the real meaning of multifunctionality and project it as representing a dynamic and forward-looking view of agriculture, not shorthand for a reluctance to reform. The EU needs to continue to define objectives and develop policies which express the ability of agriculture to fulfil a multifunctional role. The CAP is not nearly multifunctional enough, and the EU needs to pursue its evolution. We see no reason why reasonable support for goals encompassing the multifunctional nature of agriculture could not be embraced in further green box measures.

Food safety

52. Food safety issues are regulated within the WTO by the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). Introduced as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement, the SPS relates to measures which are used to protect human, animal and plant health. These are permitted so long as they are applied only to the extent necessary for these explicit purposes, are based on sound science and do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between trading partners.[144] MAFF described the SPS as providing "a balance between the ability of countries to decide the appropriate level of protection against health risks and the requirement for protective measures to achieve that level of protection to be based on sound science".[145] MAFF also drew attention to the provision for a precautionary approach to be adopted where information is still insufficient, on condition that countries seek to obtain the additional information and review the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.[146]

53. In general, it was agreed by witnesses that the SPS had worked well as far as it goes. This was the view of the NFU, of the New Zealand Government and of our own Government.[147] Ms Quin told us that the Government did "not see that it is necessary to reopen the SPS agreement",[148] although it "could support initiatives to develop guidelines clarifying some of its provisions".[149] The Consumers' Association identified this need for clarification on risk assessment, on the definition of 'other legitimate factors' which might be taken into account, and on the status of Codex Alimentarius under the SPS.[150] All these areas would deserve attention. However, the aspect of the Agreement which caused most concern was the application of the precautionary principle (again raised by the Consumers' Association amongst others).[151] One witness pointed to apparent discrepancies in the application of the principle in terms of whether imported and domestic products should be treated alike (for example, while antibiotic growth promoters and hormone growth promoters are both banned in the EU, imports of meat from animals treated with antibiotics are permitted but not of those treated with hormones).[152] More common was the perception that the precautionary principle could be used to permit political considerations to override scientific evidence and to erect scientifically unjustified trade barriers, a concern expressed not just by those wishing to import to the EU such as the New Zealand Government and the United States Meat Export Federation but also by the UK Food and Drink Federation claiming to speak for "all in the international food business".[153]

54. The "textbook case" used to illustrate what happens "when scientific evidence is denigrated by politicians, quasi-politicians and pressure groups for their own short term interests" (to quote the US Meat Export Federation)[154] is the EU's ban on hormone-treated meat from the US. This is a highly emotive issue on which the UK Government has tended to side with the US. The EU and the US have been in dispute on this issue since at least March 1996 when the US requested that a WTO disputes settlement panel be set up to rule on the legality of the EU ban. A series of rulings against the EU followed but the latter has consistently refused to comply. At the moment, the European Commission is conducting a new risk assessment, having released the results of an interim study at the beginning of May 1999 which it claimed justified continuation of the ban. Last year the US was granted authorisation to suspend trade concessions on EU products to the value of $116.8m in retaliation. None of these products was from the UK, reflecting the UK Government's insistence that the EU ban is not justified on scientific grounds but this may change under new carousel legislation passed by the US which allows it to rotate the products upon which retaliatory action is taken.[155]

55. Without pronouncing on the wisdom of the EU's action in this instance, we recognise that the beef hormones case does highlight the importance of basing trade restrictions on sound science and the difficulties of applying the precautionary principle in the many areas where science is not so clear. Their experience over the beef hormones dispute led the US Meat Export Federation to dismiss the precautionary principle altogether on the grounds that it "relegates the use of quantifiable evidence to a secondary position within the regulatory system and enhances the power of pressure groups to the detriment of public policy making".[156] On the other hand, the NFU, which does not support the beef hormone ban, recognised that the precautionary principle means that "where there is insufficient scientific evidence to form a proper risk analysis, it may be legitimate for governments to postpone a decision or take a cautious approach until there is proper scientific proof", provided always that the search for that proof continues.[157] Professor Swinbank pointed to the heart of the problem which was that "everyone has different thresholds when it comes to applying a precautionary principle".[158] This is undoubtedly true but while the SPS allows for the use of the precautionary principle it is essential that the term be properly defined and that common agreement be reached on its application. The European Commission has initiated discussion on this point by producing a paper on the use of the precautionary principle.[159] This is a useful start but it is clear from the questions raised by the US at least that there is still a long way to go before agreement is reached.[160] Food safety is a subject which matters greatly to consumers and has been given unprecedented prominence over recent years by a series of seemingly never-ending food scares. There will always be some degree of disagreement among scientists on any policy issue but we believe that the SPS provides a framework in which action can be taken on an equitable and scientifically justified basis.

Import inspections

56. The safety of imported foodstuffs is ensured through inspections. These procedures play a vital role in public health protection but, as the NFU argued, "Border inspections can also be used to discriminate against and restrict trade in foodstuffs".[161] In oral evidence, the NFU's Director of Policy claimed that the US "quite often, use their inspection procedure as a protectional device, particularly on horticultural products."[162] We discussed US inspection procedures while we were in Washington with staff of the USDA (responsible for inspections of meat, poultry and egg products) and the FDA (responsible for inspections of all other food products). We saw no evidence which implied that the system was being used as protectionism, although we were surprised to be told by one official that "importing to the US is a privilege, not a right", a sentiment that is hardly in keeping with the ethos of the WTO. During our visit to the US, we also heard about the serious problems experienced by US exporters, particularly meat and poultry plants, in passing the health and safety inspections carried out by EU officials before licences to export to the EU were granted. There is a need to apply equivalent rather than identical standards in such cases. The NFU believed that "Further development of international agreements for the mutual recognition of food safety inspection systems would ... help greatly to streamline border procedures for trade in foodstuffs".[163] We agree. We recommend that the Government, through the EU if necessary, work towards the establishment of international agreements for equivalence of food safety inspection systems to remove a potential barrier to trade.

Genetically modified organisms

57. The SPS also has implications for the regulation of trade in GMOs insofar as they can be objectively judged to present a risk to human, plant or animal health. English Nature saw GM products as an example which justified the need for the acceptance of the reasonable application of the precautionary principle in trade policy.[164] GMOs also fall under another WTO agreement, that on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), in terms of demands for labelling. However, some members of the WTO want to go further and before Seattle were calling for discussions on the whole area of trade provisions for GM technology.[165] Both Japan and Canada published proposals for a WTO working group on biotechnology, a suggestion which in the event caused much confusion at the Ministerial meeting as the EU's Commissioner Lamy at first accepted the idea and then was overruled by European Environment Ministers, including the UK's Michael Meacher. The US also expressed the view that biotechnology issues should be included in the agenda for the agriculture negotiations.

58. There are obvious attractions in assigning responsibility for trade in GM products to the WTO. All witnesses to our inquiry who commented on this issue agreed that the global nature of the trade made it imperative that an international protocol should be established to cover the growing, use, commercialisation and trade of GMOs. However, there was a sharp divide on whether the WTO was the right body to police such a protocol. The TFA and the FDF argued that it was.[166] On the other hand, the UK Food Group was concerned that this might lead to too heavy a concentration on trade to the detriment of other issues. They argued that "the correct and most appropriate forum in which to agree biosafety regulations" was the Convention on Biological Diversity which met in Montreal in January 2000 and agreed a protocol on biosafety.[167] This protocol is supported by the EU and UK and was accepted by the US. It establishes procedures for notification of trans-boundary movements of GMOs and allows countries to block imports if there is a lack of scientific certainty as to the danger to human health. The US has not ratified the parent Convention on Biological Diversity and so will not be able to ratify the new agreement. However, we understand that it intends to respect the notification provisions and on this basis we welcome the Montreal Protocol as a significant step forward in achieving international agreement on trade in GMOs. The RSPB expressed concern that raising the subject at Seattle would adversely affect the negotiations at Montreal.[168] The collapse of the Seattle meeting forestalled the possibility that discussions would be continuing in two competing fora at the same time, which would have been an unedifying development. Given that the Protocol is now complete, we recommend that the EU restrict discussions on GMOs in the context of the WTO talks to any measures necessary to harmonise WTO rules with those agreed under the Biosafety Protocol. This may encourage other developments such as the evolution of a GM-free market at the Chicago Board of Trade.

Labelling

59. The solution offered in many of the specific case studies included in this inquiry was labelling. Professor Swinbank observed that an appropriate labelling system was "the instinctive response of an economist" to difficulties such as animal welfare since it would allow consumers to differentiate between products and "then purchase those product characteristics they desired".[169] Labelling, always provided that it is meaningful, accurate and practical,[170] gives the consumer freedom of choice. As the CLA noted, it also "moves responsibility for managing trade flows away from Governments - which must respect international commitments - to the consumer, in whose name such trade management has been requested".[171] This makes it a doubly attractive solution to conflicts such as the beef hormones dispute where the US Meat Export Federation, the ITMA and the NFU all agreed that labelling was the best compromise available, although the NFU believed that "In the present consumer climate in Europe it is unlikely that hormone treated beef would command much of a market".[172]

60. Within the context of the WTO, rules on labelling are governed by the TBT agreement. Although voluntary labelling codes are not considered as trade barriers, mandatory requirements (which of course are more effective and would be needed in cases such as hormone-treated beef) have to conform to the TBT agreement. There are some doubts over what the TBT agreement would allow in the cases we have examined. On animal welfare, Professor Swinbank believed that a requirement for labelling of imported meat products which did not conform to the animal welfare standards prescribed in the importing country "could be challenged in the WTO as an unjustified technical barrier to trade, raising doubts in the mind of the buyer as to the suitability of the product."[173] On hormone-treated beef, it might be difficult to reach agreement as to what the label should say for the same reasons. Finally, GMOs present similar problems. The Consumers' Association told us that "the USA has suggested that EU labelling rules on GM (which in their current form do not go as far as EU consumers would like) could be an illegal barrier to trade under the TBT".[174] This reflects a complete dichotomy between the EU and US attitudes to labelling, where the latter will only label for food safety reasons and not on production methods.[175] During our visit to the US, we were told that labelling GM products would be fiercely resisted as to do so would carry the message to US consumers that such foods were unsafe. Representatives of the major food companies firmly believed that labelling would "kill off the technology". We do not accept this and see proper labelling about both safety and production methods as a crucial part of the consumer's right to know and to choose.

61. These concerns will not make it easy to raise labelling issues in the WTO talks. It is possible that all that is required is clarification, as the RSPCA assured us that "Any objective reading of the TBT agreement of the WTO does not rule out mandatory labelling schemes at all, even on the basis of process and production methods",[176] which covers GMOs and hormones as well as animal welfare. It may be possible to test this premise by inviting a challenge on a labelling issue. However, as the RSPCA also reminded us, labelling is going to become ever more important as global trade increases and consumers wish to know more about the products they are buying.[177] The Minister believed that consumers' rights meant that "labelling issues should be addressed within the WTO", although the discussions in this forum would be complicated by the fact that "the field of action of labelling is potentially so wide".[178] We recognise that the range of issues on which consumers require information is ever-growing and that this will make it difficult to reach agreement between WTO members who each have different concerns and different approaches to labelling regimes. Nevertheless, we believe that this development makes it even more important that clarification is sought and obtained on the scope of the existing TBT and that the EU should seek to extend it if it should prove inadequate to meet the concerns of consumers. One way to do this would be to introduce mandatory labelling in one instance as a test case. We recommend that the Government ensure that clarification by whatever means is sought. In doing so, we acknowledge that labelling is not a panacea and does not provide any useful benefits in certain instances, such as processed foods or the catering sector; but it does have much to offer in the way of consumer protection and choice.

Timetable and scope

62. The timetable for a wider WTO round is dependent upon many factors. First, there has to be agreement that a round is necessary. From all our discussions, both on and off the record, we are convinced that a new round will be launched. As Ms Quin observed, "there is enough adherence to the WTO and its principles and also enough political will around the world to make sure that this is a setback but not some kind of terminal state that we are finding ourselves in".[179] Second, there are political factors such as elections in the US and in France which might affect decisions on the best moment to hold negotiations. Third, there is the question of the timing of EU enlargement. Finally, there is the agenda for the talks themselves and how quickly members can reach consensus on what should be included as well as what should be done about each item. The draft Seattle text on agriculture included a timetable to complete the negotiations by 15 December 2002. This may still be possible if as expected the new round is launched in 2001 but it will be hard going and even 2003 looks a demanding target given the experience of previous rounds.

63. Even once the case for a wider round of liberalisation talks than those possible at the moment has been accepted, there remains a question of whether it is right for individual WTO members to press for negotiations on trade to be broadened to include other factors which cannot be described as pure trade issues. The introduction of considerations such as labour rights and the environment are strictly speaking beyond the mandate of a trade organisation and there is a powerful argument that they should be dealt with as far as possible in other fora such as international conventions. On the other hand, trade can never be a wholly autonomous policy concern as more and more countries sign up to the WTO. The CLA pointed to new concerns which had recently emerged which "though not traditionally associated with trade negotiations, nonetheless have an impact on trade". Attributing these new issues to "increasing demand by consumers for proof of safe products" and questions raised "about the acceptability of the processes used to produce food", the CLA concluded that "there is a grave risk that, by not recognising the right for consumers to discriminate between products on ethical or environmental grounds, either through labelling or import restrictions, the process of trade liberalisation as a whole runs the risk of losing credibility".[180] The truth of this is self-evident to any observer of events at Seattle.

64. It is essential that the WTO remain responsive to widespread consumer concerns without losing the focus and clearly defined purpose which has made it so effective. Where there are alternative fora in which such issues may be discussed, these should be preferred, for example the Montreal Biosafety Protocol. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times believed that it was most important to create "bodies in other areas of global concern which have comparable status and effectiveness" to that of the WTO.[181] The Minister too was "reluctant to see the WTO become overburdened with a lot of other considerations, particularly in cases where other bodies exist to deal with these", but she accepted that "the other bodies and the WTO cannot be hermetically sealed from each other".[182] We agree that the WTO should draw upon the work of other more specialised international bodies and not duplicate or rival their areas of expertise. However, the legitimacy of 'non-trade concerns' has long been written into trade agreements under the auspices of first GATT and now the WTO. Current developments should perhaps be seen as merely clarifying the meaning of this phrase.

107 Ev. p. 73, para 9. Back

108 Ibid. Back

109 See Box 2 above. Back

110 Ev. p. 46. Back

111 Ev. p. 46; Q 225. Back

112 Q 195. Back

113 Ev. pp. 107-8, para 1, 8. Back

114 Ev. p. 28. Back

115 Ev. p. 109, para 15. Back

116 Ev. p. 78, para 46. Back

117 Ev. pp. 54-5. Back

118 Ev. pp. 28-29. Back