Select Committee on Agriculture Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 9

Memorandum submitted by Consumers' Association (S 14)

INTRODUCTION

  1.  Consumers' Association (CA), publisher of Which?, Health Which? and other consumer magazines and information, is an independent consumer organisation with over 700,000 members.

  2.  We welcome this opportunity to submit comments on the implications of trade liberalisation for UK agriculture and EU agricultural policy. The next round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations are of great interest to us as they could have enormous implications for consumers. While we have welcomed greater trade liberalisation in principle, as it can bring with it greater choice, it can also raise many questions about the level of consumer protection we can expect in the UK. We would therefore be pleased to submit further comments to the Committee following the launch of the new round at the Ministerial Meeting in Seattle at the end of November where we will be represented by Consumers International.

  3.  Our response gives general comments on the impact of the WTO agreements for food standards and agriculture. We then go on to give more specific comments, where we have experience, on the specific areas identified by the Committee for consideration.

GENERAL COMMENTS

Agreement on Agriculture

  4.  Despite the Agenda 2000 reforms, we are concerned that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains largely producer focused and does not take into account consumers changing demands from food production. We are also concerned that the CAP results in consumers paying higher prices for food than is necessary. It also fails to take into account aspects such as food quality, nutritional value of the diet and food safety concerns. It continues to promote intensive methods of farming, without reflecting the increasing consumer demand for organically produced, less intensive methods of production.

5.  We are therefore concerned that the European Commission's proposals for the WTO negotiations on agriculture aim to maintain the existing unsatisfactory CAP with all of its damaging effects on consumers, taxpayers and the environment. The CAP needs to become more responsive to demand. There needs to be a move away from price support that brings prices closer to world prices and any form of support for farmers must be decoupled from production. It is therefore essential that the new round is used to further reduce agricultural protectionism.

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures

  6.  The SPS Agreement has proven to be highly controversial in recent years, most notably as a result of the hormones dispute and in relation to concerns about genetically modified (GM) foods. The Agreement sets out the conditions under which a member may introduce measures to protect human, or plant life or health. The Agreement has enhanced the status of international food standards developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission by making them reference documents for the settlement of any disputes under the Agreement. Our concerns therefore relate to the agreement itself and the way that it is interpreted, and also to the Codex process.

  7.  Under the Agreement, members can introduce measures that go beyond the relevant international standard where one exists if there is a "scientific justification" or if it is considered to be appropriate as a result of a scientific risk assessment.

  In this respect, article Article 5.1 states that:

    "Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organisations."

  8.  We are concerned that it is currently unclear how the Agreement should be applied in cases where there is scientific uncertainty. While clearly the Agreement should not allow members to introduce barriers to trade on the pretence that they are designed to protect public health, there are situations where members may need to introduce measures to protect public health in the absence of clear evidence of the scale of the risk.

  9.  Article 5.7 allows members to apply a precautionary approach:

    "In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organisations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time."

  However, there is a need for clarity as to how and when this should be applied and what constitutes "a reasonable period of time". In some situations it may not be possible to set a time limit in which to do a more objective risk assessment.

  10.  The Agreement also places a great deal of emphasis on risk assessment and on the importance of sound science. However, as we have repeatedly seen, supposedly objective risk assessments can often come to different conclusions about the significance of the risk depending on who is making the assessment. There is therefore a need for clarity over how risk assessment should be conducted. The work that the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)/ World Health Organisation (WHO) and Codex is doing in the whole area of risk analysis should be taken into account in this respect, particularly its emphasis on "risk assessment policy" where risk managers clearly specify the parameters of the risk assessment, and on the need for consumer involvement and therefore effective risk communication throughout the entire process. Our policy report "Confronting Risk—a new approach to food safety" which considers these issues in greater depth is enclosed for the Committee's information.

  11.  Crucial to this debate is the role that "other legitimate factors" should play in international food standards, and whether there is the flexibility for a member to base sanitary and phyosanitary measures on "other factors" at national level, for example as a result of ethical or moral values. It would appear from the wording of the agreement that there is no such flexibility and if challenged, such measures could be considered a barrier to trade.

  12.  When settling such a dispute and considering whether such measures were justifiable, the WTO would look to Codex. The place, therefore, where other factors besides science must be acknowledged is within Codex standards. Codex is currently debating the role of "other legitimate factors" which need to be taken into account when setting standards besides "sound science" with the aim of clarifying how its four statements of principle should be applied in practice. The most significant of these principles for this debate are 1, 2 and 3 which state that[12]:

    (1) The food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of Codex Alimentarius shall be based on the principle of sound scientific analysis and evidence, involving a thorough review of all relevant information, in order that the standards assure the quality and safety of the food supply.

    (2) When elaborating and deciding upon food standards Codex Alimentarius will have regard, where appropriate to other legitimate factors relevant for the health promotion of fair practices in food trade.

    (3) In this regard it is noted that food labelling plays an important role in furthering both of these objectives.

  13.  We consider that a clear policy on "other legitimate factors" needs to be developed and that they need to be recognised within Codex standards. We are also concerned that in many situations other factors besides an objective scientific analysis are already implicit, although this is not openly acknowledged. At the moment judgements will inevitably be made, particularly now that the status of Codex texts under the agreements has made the process far more politicised. However, these decisions will still be misleadingly presented as scientifically based. The "other factors" debate appears to be polarised between the EU, which considers that a clear policy needs to be developed and other factors should be considered when elaborating Codex standards; and the USA, which considers that sound science alone should be the basis of standards.



  14.  Codex is also currently debating the appropriateness of applying the precautionary principle when developing standards and how this can be achieved in practice. We consider it essential that Codex explicitly acknowledges the principle, and that it considers how a precautionary approach may be applied as part of its on-going work on developing working principles for risk analysis.

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

  15.  There is also a need for greater clarity over the situations in which the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement would apply rather than the SPS Agreement. This has arisen particularly in relation to labelling of GM foods (see below). If a measure is considered to fall within the TBT Agreement, the requirements for a scientific risk assessment no longer apply, although Codex standards will still be used as reference texts when settling any disputes.

Codex Alimentarius Commission

  16.  Now that the status of the Codex Alimentarius Commission has changed under the SPS Agreement, and also the TBT Agreement, it is important that the way that it reaches its decisions is also changed in order to reflect this. In particular the process needs to become more open and transparent and there needs to be much greater consumer involvement. At the moment the process remains dominated by industry. We therefore welcomed the Codex Alimentarius Commission's commitment to increasing consumer representation at its meeting in Rome earlier this year. This now needs to be followed up with practical measures.

  17.  These concerns also apply to the scientific committees that advise Codex; the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) and the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR), as well as ad-hoc FAO/WHO consultations. There needs to be clarification over the status of their advice in any dispute where a Codex standard is still in the process of being developed. The basis for their decisions and the factors they took into account when reaching their conclusions should also be transparent. Consumer representatives should also be appointed to these committees.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Hormones in beef

  18.  The hormones dispute has highlighted the lack of clarity over the provisions within the SPS Agreement—and has demonstrated the difference between EU and US perspectives.

  19.  The Codex Alimentarius Commission established Maximum Residue Limits for growth promoting hormones banned from use in the EU at its meeting in Rome in June 1995. The USA then proceeded to make an official complaint to the WTO that the ban was an illegal barrier to trade. As the EU was unable to satisfy the WTO dispute panel that its measures could be justified on scientific grounds, the ban was judged illegal. Although an appellate body decision amending the original verdict gave the EU more time to conduct a risk assessment (which expired in May), and clarified that issues of enforcability could be taken into account, the ban was still considered to be illegal.

  20.  The dispute clearly highlights the implications of the agreements and the extent to which they can now impact on the EU's (and UK's) ability to introduce consumer protection. More generally, it has general implications for the basis of EU food policy, the need to clearly justify legislation within the context of the WTO. It also has implications for the way that Codex sets its standards, the adequacy of the advice that it receives from its expert scientific committees and as highlighted above, the extent to which Codex can—and should—consider other facts besides "sound science".

  21.  The EU did not use article 5.7 which allows for precautionary action in defending its position. This reinforces the need for clarification as to the scope and flexibility within this article as part of the next round of WTO negotiations and also demonstrates the need for the EU to ensure that it is prepared to defend its positions within the context of the WTO agreements.

  22.  We supported the EU's position to complete the risk assessments that it had begun and to try and negotiate compensation with the USA in the meantime. The US opted to introduce sanctions instead. However, it is still necessary, in light of the uncertainties surrounding the safety of these hormones for the EU to complete its assessment. The measures should then be reconsidered within the light of the results and bearing in mind that many consumers do not want to eat hormone-treated beef.

Restrictions on trade in GM foodstuffs

  23.  Again, the implications of the agreements for trade in GM foodstuffs is unclear, but has been interpreted in different ways. For example, the USA has suggested that EU labelling rules on GM (which in their current form do not go as far as EU consumers would like) could be an illegal barrier to trade under the TBT Agreement as they cannot be justified on scientific grounds. Clarification is needed that GM labelling would fall under the TBT Agreement, as labelling is not linked to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and as such does not need to be justified by a scientific assessment.

  24.  At the moment, there is no Codex standard for labelling of genetically modified foods although this is currently being debated within the Codex Committee on Food Labelling (CCFL) which meets in April in Ottawa. Although many countries have changed their positions in favour of labelling in recent years, the USA stance will prevent agreement being reached as codex standards have to be based on consensus.

  25.  Even within this context, the debate that Codex is having on "other factors" will be important as some government delegations argue that labelling standards have to be based on science and therefore cannot be introduced in response to consumer demand alone. We consider that consumers have a fundamental right to know what they are eating, and this must be acknowledged within international standards. In this respect, we welcomed the recommendation of the recent Food and Agriculture Organisation, World Health Organisation and World Trade Organisation conference held in Melbourne in October on International Food Trade Beyond 2000: science based decisions, harmonisation, equivalence and mutual recognition that:

    "The Conference supported efforts by FAO and WHO to explore strategies to collect information from all regions of the world about consumer requirements, perceptions, beliefs and motivations concerning food, nutrition and food safety so as to consider the role that food labelling and other means of communication can play in addressing these concerns."

  26.  It is also essential that controls on the safety assessment and approval of genetically modified foods are harmonised at international level given the global nature of trade in GM foodstuffs. Consumers need to have confidence that wherever they are produced, foods and ingredients have been subject to a rigorous approval process and that they can be subsequently traced throughout the food chain. We hope that the ad hoc Intergovernmental task force on Biotechnology which has been established by Codex and meets for the first time in March in Tokyo will make progress in this respect.

CONCLUSION

  27.  Trade liberalisation is already having an enormous impact on food standards. This brings many advantages, but also raises concerns about the potential negative effect on national standards and brings into question the ability of national government's to implement measures in response to consumer concerns. Even if this is not explicit at the moment, it is certainly implicit, as concern about the impact of the WTO and its implications is often presented as a reason why action can not be taken in particular areas.

  28.  We consider it essential that there is a full, transparent review of the SPS and TBT Agreements that considers the impact of the Agreements on consumers. It is also essential that the next round is used to clarify the scope of the provisions within the Agreements and the flexibility that may remain to go beyond international standards at national level.

3 November 1999


12   Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual, Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 1997. Back


 
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