Select Committee on Agriculture Minutes of Evidence



MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY ADVANTA SEEDS UK LTD (G 1)

BACKGROUND ON ADVANTA SEEDS UK

  1.1  Advanta Seeds UK Limited ("Advanta UK") is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Advanta BV ("Advanta"), a company registered in the Netherlands. Advanta is also the holding company of Advanta Seeds Inc, a company registered in Canada.

  1.2  Dr David Buckeridge is responsible for Advanta's European Operations. The General Manager of Advanta UK is Mr Mike Ruthven.

  1.3  Advanta UK is primarily a plant breeder using classical methods. It is also involved in the UK Government's farm-scale field trials of selected GM crops and is fully committed to the Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops (SCIMAC) code of practice. It sells no GM products in Europe.

REQUESTS FOR ACTION

  2.1  It is a matter of serious regret that these issues, which industry has warned about for some time, have not been adequately addressed by the regulatory authorities to date. Early political action to create a comprehensive regulatory framework would have at best prevented this incident from occurring or at worst managed public expectations about seed purity and averted further media hysteria. It is essential that this regulatory framework be created with no further delay. At a minimum, thresholds for accidental GM impurity need to be set, standard testing methods need to be stipulated and results should be analysed by an approved and consistent statistical method. The regulations should provide these details.

1.   Seed Purity, GM impurity thresholds for seeds and the lack of regulation

  3.1  Seed production is carried out in open fields and absolute guarantees of seed purity have never been possible. Since they were first introduced in 1963, seed purity regulations have successfully kept varietal and other impurities to a fixed maximum level, usually no more than a few per cent. The same approach has been taken to the maximum permitted level of certain GM material (1 per cent) in food labelled as GM-free under European law. Trace levels of GM impurities will occur now that various parts of the world have accepted the value and safety of GMOs. This is universally recognised, including by Michael Meacher in his recent statements to the House of Commons.

  3.2  Under UK and European law, no regulations currently exist for a maximum accidental GM content for conventional seed batches, leaving the seed industry in an impossible position. Seed industry groups have long pressed Government and the European Commission to establish such regulations. The incident is proof positive that despite strenuous efforts to maximise seed purity and despite full compliance with seed purity regulations, seed can enter the UK market with trace levels of impurity.

  3.3  It is worth noting that even though the problem has been at the centre of media attention since the middle of May, and known about by Government since the middle of April (or possibly even earlier, given that the first industry meeting with the European Commission took place on 11 October 1999 and with the French Government in November 1999), at the time of writing there are still no regulations at either a national or EU level.

  3.4  Fearing an apparent lack of appreciation of the timings of harvest and planting, Advanta UK urged the Minister of Agriculture to take action on threshold regulations when it was finally granted a meeting with him on 1 June. It is lamentable, with harvest of Winter Oilseed rape only days away, and planting of the new crop starting at the beginning of August, that regulatory guidance is still non-existent.

2.   Communications Problems

  4.1  From our perspective, the incident also serves to demonstrate that communication of the facts, allowing individuals to make informed decisions, is virtually impossible in our society today. This is especially true where the subject matter is highly technical. Advanta believes that a lack of understanding of the basics of agriculture existed in some quarters of the Ministry and most quarters of the media. Important technical points were glossed over or misinterpreted.

  4.2  After the Government published the issue, it was impossible to communicate effectively with customers—a point that convinced Advanta to set up a registration scheme for farmers at an early stage, as much as anything for the communication of hard facts on the event. Even then, journalists posing as farmers plagued our free information phone service, blocking the lines for genuine callers. In addition, pressure groups deliberately sought to distort the facts in order to boost their position against GM.

  4.3  It is a pity that many people outside Government seem more anxious to win the argument than to understand the facts. We doubt whether it will be possible to frame sensible and practical legislation in the wake of this event and strongly suspect that this will lead to a withdrawal of certain products from the UK market. . . yet another blow to the competitiveness of UK agriculture.

3.   Protecting the Interests of Farmers

  5.1  As stated above, as soon as the issue was made public by MAFF, five weeks after it was brought to their attention by Advanta, it was clear that farmers would need urgent advice on the facts of the situation and on how to handle their crops. In fact, Advanta made this clear to MAFF in a hand delivered memo (attached at Appendix 2 [not printed]) on 12 May, five days before the announcement was made. Advanta communicated in writing to all farmers, routing a standard letter through its merchant customers (Advanta, in common with most UK seed companies, does not sell direct to farmers and therefore does not have details of farmer customers). Advanta received excellent help from its merchant customers in this process. We also set up a free information service for farmers to phone and used these combined approaches to register all crops while we awaited Government advice.

  5.2  Many farmers were very concerned about registering in the first instance. They feared that activists would vandalise their property and crops. We are still concerned about being ordered by Government to hand over farmer names and addresses. Legally, we are advised that to do so without being ordered would breach data protection rules. We believe this is an unnecessary step in any event, as all the acreage seems to be tracked down. At time of writing we have 5,200ha registered against a total sold of 4,700ha and have even gone to the lengths of advertising in the national farming press to ensure full coverage.

  5.3  The other activity at the top of our priorities was the marketing options for the crop. Advanta had several discussions with different food chain partners in the days preceding the 27 May, when Nick Brown gave his press briefing about his preference for a "plough-in". Advanta, with the help of these partners, had devised a scheme to segregate the crop and harvest it for export. We tried to meet with MAFF to discuss this, but had no success. After a meeting with Baroness Hayman was cancelled by MAFF on 23 May, we decided to put the ideas in writing and faxed them to MAFF that day (attached at Appendix 8 [not printed]).

  5.4  The ideas were still under active consideration according to the Baroness on 25 May (when she met industry representatives, but not Advanta). Therefore Mr Brown's statements on 27 May about his desire for a "plough-in" were a complete surprise. The briefing he gave was presented as "advice", as he recognised publicly at the time that he had no power to order it as he knew the crops posed no threat to human health or the environment. However, the briefing effectively removed any chance that the crop could be taken to harvest. When the Minister gave his "personal view", that it would be best to plough out the crop, we knew farmers would have no alternative and immediately decided to pay compensation. Advanta UK is still considering its legal position with regard to the financial costs of the Minister's unexpected remarks.

  5.5  To be fair in hindsight, we believe that segregation would have been possible but logistically complicated. The tiny crop area involved spread across a wide geography would have made handling and transportation difficult. It still seems a waste to have ploughed up a crop that presented no risk to health or the environment. Ironically, the German crop (an even smaller area) has been segregated and will be used for fuel.

  5.6  We presented plans for compensation to farmers at a meeting with Mr Brown and others on 1 June. We wrote to farmers immediately explaining that payments would be calculated by independent advisors and in consultation with farmers unions. One month later we had agreed settlement rates and the unions supported these. We continue to work on the logistics of getting the payments made and acknowledge the key role farmers unions have played in helping us to tackle this quickly.

4.   The Need for Urgent Regulation

  6.1  Regulations are needed. Throughout this issue and indeed from the earliest communications with the European Commission in October 1999, the industry has pressed for regulations. As we made clear to the Minister of Agriculture on 1 June (company minutes of the meeting attached at Appendix 9 [not printed]), we need to decide on tolerance thresholds (as we have done in food) and we need clear testing protocols. This is so that farmers and regulators can be assured that a standard achieved by one company is directly comparable to that achieved by another. Also, so that seed companies can know that expensive testing programmes that they will be forced to implement will be "spot checked" by governments using similar statistically valid analyses.

  6.2  This brings a close analogy to food. We have listened to reports of food retailers who claim to sell GM free food. We have no idea what testing methods they use or whether their sampling techniques are sufficiently robust to substantiate their claims. We have heard that they test "to the limit of detection". We see this as extremely misleading to the public since the products clearly cannot be guaranteed to be GM free. Once again they are operating in an environment where regulations lack precision. Presumably because these companies are doing what the pressure groups want they are not scrutinised with anything like the same vigour.

5.   The issue of thresholds for GM impurities in Seeds

  7.1  If thresholds are to be set we believe that the question of why we need them should be addressed rationally (we have already concluded that the current climate makes this impossible). Nevertheless, as we see it, there is no case for thresholds based on safety to the environment or health. In this incident ACRE, FSA and English Nature confirmed this opinion.

  7.2  One issue of particular concern was the risk that the crop could cross-pollinate other rape crops. Shortly after the Government's announcement of the issue, the Minister said that the crop was sterile, and this caused consternation. How could a crop that had cross-pollinated in Canada not do so in the UK? The Minister was substantively correct. Officials asked us for a technical answer immediately after his statement so that response could be put in the Commons library. We replied the same day, and would be pleased to repeat this explanation to the committee (diagrams are attached at Appendix 4 [not printed]).

  7.3  Advanta believes the decision on acceptable levels should be an issue of seed quality. This is exactly the conclusion that we believe the Government reached when it decided the event in question should be handled by MAFF rather than DETR (we were informed of this on 9 May). We do believe that there is also an issue of choice which makes it appropriate to ensure levels are at a minimum and seed is as pure as possible. In other words, precisely the same labelling issue we have seen in food.

  Consistent with the threshold for GM content in "GM-free" food, Advanta UK believes the threshold limit for accidental GM seed impurity in batches of conventional seed should be 1 per cent. We believe that tests to confirm this level can be done accurately with a high degree of statistical certainty, within a timeframe that will allow the turnaround of seed between harvest and sowing, while at a cost that is affordable to UK agriculture. We make these points because it is vital for the UK farming sector, and for ordinary consumers, that whatever threshold is agreed is reasonable, affordable and consistent for both authorised and non-authorised genetic events.

  7.4  The evidence from Friends of the Earth in the previous report of this committee amply demonstrates that sweeping statements are being made in areas of intense technical complexity. Here they stated that testing could allow the detection of levels as low as 0.001 per cent. We would like to comment in our evidence as to why we see 1 per cent as a sensible level. However, as an example, we have calculated that in order to provide approaching absolute statistical certainty that an impurity level was at the 0.001 per cent level in the seed that Advanta is preparing for sale next year in Europe, we would need to test somewhere in the order of 9 billion seeds.

  7.5  In the attachments (Appendix 6 [not printed]) we show the sample sizes that are required in order to give statistically valid test results at various levels of contamination. If the committee desires, these can be explained in more detail on 18 July.

6.   Can thresholds be achieved?

  8.1  We believe that realistic thresholds can be achieved by the industry, but these may need to take into account the crop species and hybrid vs non-hybrid seeds. Existing seed regulations already do this and there is no reason why GM purity regulations could not do the same. Obviously one of the key issues will be separation distances and this was a great talking point in the incident under review. We were surprised at the apparent inability of Government to answer what we regarded as fairly obvious reasons for the difference in the separation distances which existed for the hybrid crops in question and for the SCIMAC trials.

  8.2  We have included attachments (Appendix 5 [not printed]) to try to explain the key differences and will readily reiterate these to the committee. Where GM has been released, wide separation distances can help to create absolute minimum levels of GM impurity (as in this case, less than 1 per cent). They cannot guarantee zero impurities and have never been designed or claimed to do so.

7.   Standard testing processes and protocols for GM impurity in seeds

  9.1  The testing method most commonly used in the food industry is the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test, which is a DNA-based methodology. It was just such a PCR test, at a government laboratory in Germany, that first brought to light the incident in question. An alternative test method, which is also used in Herbicide Tolerant (HT) GM detection, is bio-assays such as a "blotter test" or a "spray test". However, these tests take 10-14 days and 3-4 weeks respectively to produce results, whereas a PCR test can be completed more rapidly. Seed companies face extremely short turnaround times between harvest of one crop and the sowing of another (particularly in the UK with its large percentage of autumn sown crops). For this reason, Advanta is of the view that the PCR test has to be adopted as the standard methodology for assessing compliance with regulations on GM impurity in conventional seed.

  9.2  At various times, many commentators (including independent scientific journals, officials of DETR and publications from MAFF) have noted the tendency of these tests to give unreliable results if protocols are not robust. It was the known frailty of the test that led Advanta initially to be sceptical about the German results. Only after conducting confirmatory tests and sending its own scientists to audit the methods and procedures of alternative labs did it feel confident to accept the findings.

  9.3  Furthermore, another disadvantage of the PCR method is that it is essentially qualitative, testing only for the presence or absence of substances that may indicate GM contamination. Various alternative approaches have been pursued to allow the quantification of any results that indicate a positive presence. Advanta believes (after a thorough assessment of these methods in the course of deciding what it will do for next year's crop) they can be used to assess the quantity of a GM impurity. However data will only be valid if seed samples are of an appropriate size for the threshold level being sought and the test is replicated so the sample can be shown to be representative of the whole seed batch. Advanta would be disappointed if the Government had not already made similar assessments itself, but if not, would be pleased to share its conclusions in order to speed up the process.

8.   UK Chronology and Key Facts

  10.1  There has been considerable Parliamentary interest in the events that occurred leading up to and after Advanta UK went to the Government for advice and guidance on this issue. At this stage, Advanta UK believes that time would be more constructively spent on analysing the regulations and on framing workable rules.

  10.2  The event has put our reputation with our merchant and farmer customers under considerable strain. Our employees have been physically and mentally exhausted and have been forced to endure unacceptable levels of stress as a result of the incident.

  10.3  Financially, we will spend several million pounds in order to settle compensation payments. Now our priority is twofold:

    —  to rebuild the relationships with our customers and the morale of our staff;

    —  to co-operate in the framing of regulations by contributing our experience, so that lack of guidance can never put us in this invidious position again.

  10.4  Nonetheless, we understand the committee may wish to understand the events that occurred. The company believes that it has broken no laws or regulations and that it has acted swiftly, openly and responsibly from the moment the incident in question was first brought to its attention. We have included a chronology below that is extracted from our detailed files that we have kept on the whole event. Each entry is supported by written minutes made at or soon after the date of the meeting or contact.

  10.5  This chronology should be read in the context of four key facts:

    (1)  The potential problem was highlighted by industry but the regulatory authorities failed to adapt the regulatory framework in time to manage the incident in question adequately.

    (2)  Less than 1 per cent of the Advanta UK Spring Oilseed Rape seeds planted in this country contained GM material. The area of crop with the impurity represents only 1 per cent of the UK rape acreage. The incident in question therefore constitutes a trace impurity in a tiny fraction of a conventional UK crop.

    (3)  Advanta UK, the UK Government and its advisory bodies (FSA, ACRE and English Nature) are all convinced that this trace impurity of GM in what is a conventional crop poses no threat to human health or the environment.

    (4)  The UK Government has made it clear that no regulations or laws have been broken at any time by Advanta UK.

10.6  1998

  The affected seed batches were grown during 1998 by Advanta Inc in Alberta, Canada for import to the UK under the OECD seed certification scheme. For its conventional hybrid crops, Advanta Inc's minimum separation distance from GM crops (1,600 metres) is twice the distance required by Canadian law (800 metres). In reality, the actual separation distance in the relevant year was never less than five times the legal minimum, namely 4,000 metres, and this was the de facto minimum separation distance for Advanta Inc. At no time did Advanta Inc have any reasonable grounds to suspect that accidental contamination of its hybrid crops might have occurred.

10.7  1999

  As the use of GM crops in North America increased (in 1998, 35 per cent of Canadian crops were GM, in 1999 the figure rose to 55 per cent), so in early 1999, on the basis of precaution rather than any suspicion of possible contamination, Advanta Inc decided to shift Hyola production to GM free areas such as Montana, USA, New Brunswick, Canada and New Zealand. As a result, there is no GM impurity in the 1999 harvest of Spring Oilseed Rape seeds delivered to Europe.

10.8  2000

  Friday 31 March 2000.

  Late afternoon, Herr Petersen, agent of Advanta UK in Germany, received a phone call from German Government official.

  10.30 pm, phone message left by Herr Petersen for Advanta UK about possible, low-level (less than 1 per cent) GM presence in conventional Hyola 401 Spring Oilseed Rape from the 1998 harvest, discovered by a laboratory in Freiburg, Germany, using PCR tests.

  Monday 3 April 2000.

  Efforts made to obtain further details on harvest year, lot numbers, etc, to see if UK batches of seed were affected; discussions about the reliability of the PCR test method; agreement to halt sales of Hyola 401 in Germany on a precautionary basis.

  Tuesday 4 and Wednesday 5 April 2000.

  Confirmation that Hyola 401 of 1998 harvest affected; further tests commissioned from a separate German laboratory to back up original results on Hyola 401 and to investigate possible contamination of Hyola 38 and Hyola 330 from the 1998 harvest because they were grown in the same region of Canada.

  Thursday 6 April 2000.

  All sales of Hyola 401 from 1998 and 1999 harvests halted in the UK on a precautionary basis (1999 harvest subsequently proven to be clear).

  Wednesday 12 April 2000.

  7.31 pm, new information arrives by e-mail from Canada on Hyola 38 and Hyola 330 from the 1998 harvest; impurities detected in preliminary bio-assays.

  Thursday 13 April 2000.

  Advanta UK meets with its lawyers (advice privileged); new information from Canada reviewed; decision taken to halt all sales of Hyola 38 and Hyola 330 from the 1998 harvest.

  Friday 14 April 2000.

  On legal advice (privileged) and through an industry body, Advanta UK requests meeting with UK Government; Advanta UK drafts a press release (attached at Appendix 7 [not printed]) in anticipation that Government will want to make an immediate public statement on 17 April.

  Monday 17 April 2000.

  First meeting between Advanta UK and MAFF and DETR officials; briefing document tabled (Appendix 1 [not printed]).

  Tuesday 18 April 2000.

  Advanta UK advised that GM contaminated plants almost certainly "male sterile"; Advanta UK prepares a purely reactive press statement, given the advice from DETR and MAFF officials; FSA calls Advanta UK to follow up the meeting with DETR and MAFF officials.

  Wednesday 19 April 2000.

  Advanta UK calls DETR and MAFF to tell them that the GM contaminated plants are almost certain to be "male sterile"; DETR says that "Ministers have been informed about the incident, that eyebrows were raised and that there was no widespread panic"; MAFF Seeds Division says that there are "no further issues for it to investigate".

  Monday 24 April 2000.

  Advanta Inc calls from Canada with the final test results.

  Tuesday 25 April 2000.

  Advanta UK advises DETR that about 90 per cent of the GM contaminated plants were resistant to Roundup and about 10 per cent to Liberty, which tallied with its understanding of the 1998 Canadian commercial GM crop; the 1999 crop is clear and the contamination of the 1998 crop is below 1 per cent.

  DETR tells Advanta UK that they do not need any more information from the company, that the Department has written legal advice that no offence has been committed, that no further action will be taken, that DETR will write to the European Commission to request proper regulation and that Michael Meacher is on holiday all week.

  Wednesday 26 April—Monday 8 May 2000.

  Series of phone calls, carefully minuted by Advanta UK, between the company and officials; officials expressed concern about possible leaks.

  Tuesday 9 May 2000.

  DETR advises Advanta UK that MAFF is now playing the lead role; MAFF advises that a press statement will be necessary, probably on Thursday 18 May, and that a meeting between officials and industry groups (not Advanta UK) is to be held on Friday 12 May.

  Friday 12 May 2000.

  Industry representatives meet with officials; Advanta UK not present but submits a document setting out a series of questions that Government needs to answer before the matter enters the public domain (attached at Appendix 2 [not printed]).

  Monday 15 May 2000.

  Advanta UK's distributor in Sweden discovers some contaminated seed has been sown there; the distributor informs the Swedish Government and then Advanta UK; Advanta UK informs MAFF.

  Tuesday 16 May 2000.

  Swedish Government issues press release.

  Wednesday 17 May 2000.

  MAFF issues press release; Advanta informed about press release one hour in advance of publication.

  Thursday 18 May 2000.

  Information pack sent to seed merchants who are Advanta UK customers.

  Monday 22 May 2000.

  Advanta UK informed that planned meeting with Baroness Hayman had been postponed; Advanta UK's free information helpline for farmers set up.

  Tuesday 23 May 2000.

  Advanta UK proposes an independent panel on farmer compensation to Baroness Hayman by letter.

  Thursday 25 May 2000.

  Seed industry and related bodies meet with Baroness Hayman (Advanta UK not present).

  Saturday 27 May 2000.

  Nick Brown announces to the media that he wants a "plough in" (although he recognised publicly at the time that he had no power to order it as he knew the crops posed no threat to human health or the environment).

  Thursday 1 June 2000.

  Advanta UK meets with Nick Brown and Baroness Hayman; Advanta UK reiterates its compensation proposal (company minutes of the meeting attached at Appendix 9 [not printed]).

  Friday 2 June 2000.

  Advanta UK press release announces the compensation proposal, including the independent panel.

  Thursday 8 June 2000.

  Opposition Day Debate on the incident in question; European Commission confirms Area Aid payments available for ploughed-in crops.

  Wednesday 5 July 2000.

  Advanta UK issues press release, less than five weeks after it was set up, announcing that the independent panel has agreed a compensation package for all farmers affected, with the agreement of the NFU.

9.   Other Key Issues

SEPARATION DISTANCES

  11.1  The incident in question raises legitimate questions about the separation distances that should exist between GM and conventional crops to prevent unwanted cross-pollination from the GM plants, particularly in relation to the existing farm-scale field trials of selected GM crops.

  11.2  It must be stressed that many different factors, of which separation distance is only one, affect whether cross-pollination will occur in an open field setting. These different factors include the respective times of flowering of the two crops, wind direction, species compatibility and the lifespan of the pollen itself. Nevertheless, given a particular set of circumstances it is possible to make a rough calculation of the likely separation distance needed to achieve a given de minimis GM impurity level in a nearby conventional crop.

  11.3  Advanta UK is of the view that it is correct to keep under review the separation distance in any setting where cross-pollination between GM plants and conventional plants is not desired. However, the incident in question is of a very different nature from the UK Government farm-scale field trials, and the company has no firm view on the appropriate separation distances for these trials.

CROP STERILITY

  11.4  One of the concerns raised by the incident in question, before farmers were assured of compensation and began to plough-in the affected crops, was the theoretical risk of cross-pollination from the tiny number of GM plants in the affected fields once these plants had flowered.

  11.5  For technical reasons, and assuming that some of the affected crops had come to flower, the chances of any of the GM plants becoming fertile and therefore capable of producing pollen were very small indeed. All of the GM plants concerned were hybrid specimens and were "male sterile" plants. They could only have been rendered fertile if a "restorer gene" in pollen from a crop of the same species had been transmitted to them. While this possibility can never be ruled out in an open environment, the chance of this happening was minuscule.

  11.6  For further explanation of the technical aspects of hybrid crop fertility, please see the company's statement and diagrams, attached at Appendices 3-5 (not printed).

COMPENSATION

  11.7  Advanta UK, while not admitting legal liability for the incident in question, has from the outset been concerned that its ultimate customers, the farming community, should receive adequate compensation for any economic losses suffered.

  11.8  Advanta UK strongly supported the successful application to the European Commission for Area Aid payments to be made to farmers inadvertently growing Spring Oilseed Rape from contaminated seed despite the affected crops having been ploughed in. In addition, Advanta UK, with the support of Government and the National Farmers Union, created an independent panel to advise on the compensation necessary to supplement the Area Aid payments.

  11.9  This panel has now completed its work, less than five weeks after it was created. Advanta's offer of compensation has been agreed by the panel and endorsed by the National Farmers Union as fair and equitable. The sums offered by Advanta are £337 per hectare south of a line between Carlisle and Newcastle and £370 per hectare above this line, reflecting the likely higher yields of Spring Oilseed Rape in Northern England and Scotland.

ECONOMIC THREAT TO FARMING

  11.10  Although Spring Oilseed Rape is a small crop in the UK, and the level of contamination was small, this incident has potentially serious implications for all other crops. Unless reasonable regulations are put in place to ensure that GM impurity in conventional crops is kept to a fixed threshold, and unless reasonable testing processes and protocols are created for demonstrating that compliance has been achieved, then seed producers and in turn farmers and ordinary consumers will face enormous costs and uncertainty.

  11.11  In the case of Spring Oilseed Rape, a failure to tackle the regulatory loophole may mean this seed not being available at all in the UK.

10 July 2000


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2000
Prepared 3 August 2000