Athletics and the National Stadium
11. Athletics was in a period of considerable organisational
strife as these developments were taking place. The British Athletic
Federation went into administration in October 1997.[39]
The original plan for the National Stadium had listed eight athletics
events to be staged there.[40]
The new governing body of athletics, officially designated as
UK Athletics from January 1999, re-assessed this proposal and
took the view that the Stadium would be too large for national
and Grand Prix events.[41]
As London International Sport, a body which was established with
the remit of attracting major events to London, put it to us last
year, "it would not be financially viable" to use the
Stadium for Grand Prix events and "the Stadium would not
be filled to anything like capacity".[42]
On 2 March 1998 Mr David Moorcroft, the Chief Executive of what
is now UK Athletics, wrote to the Stadium developers and, appreciating
the value of being "realistic from the outset" about
the potential use of the National Stadium for athletics, stated
that the sport could not provide an annual event for the Stadium.[43]
12. Accordingly, the athletics use of the National
Stadium became focused upon a limited range of international bid
events. One international bid event, the European Cup, is to be
staged this year in Gateshead at a Stadium with a capacity of
only around 12,000.[44]
The capacity required for the European Championships was said
by the Secretary of State to be around 25,000. Sport England considered
that these Championships would be more suited to a venue other
than Wembley.[45]
The interest of UK Athletics in the National Stadium has thus
become concentrated on one event for which it can bidthe
World Athletics Championships.[46]
13. In recent years, there has been a growing understanding
that facilities for major events should have long-term viability.[47]
Last year the Department for Culture, Media and Sport set out
its policy on venues for major events as follows:
"The imaginative use
of existing facilities has to be considered. If new facilities
are necessary, the Government believes that a sound business case
must be prepared and the potential for continued use after the
event must be assessed."[48]
During the same inquiry the BOA told us that the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) "looks favourably upon
the re-use and multi-use of existing venues".[49]
14. Mr Casey indicated to us last year that the cost
of a separate athletics stadium in London capable of meeting the
demand for the very largest events which may come to this country
about once a decade would not be "far off" the then
projected cost for the construction of the new Wembley Stadium£198
million.[50]
In addition to this consideration, Sport England had fundamental
doubts about the long-term viability of such a Stadium. Mr Trevor
Brooking, the Chairman of Sport England, said in April 1999: "you
may be going to build an athletics facility and let it lie there
as a white elephant most of the time when it is only going to
be used two or three times in twenty years".[51]
This view was repeated in evidence by Sport England and WNSL during
the present inquiry.[52]
Long-term viability required the involvement of another sport
or sports. This was the rationale for the National Stadium.
15. On the basis of the evidence received last year
and rehearsed now, this Committee made the following statement
in May 1999:
"There is a consensus
that no more than three major athletics events requiring a large
capacity stadiumthe Olympics and the World and European
Athletics Championshipscan be attracted to this country
in the next 20 years. A permanent athletics stadium with the capacity
required for such events would not therefore be economically sustainable."[53]
The only change in the evidential position since
then is that the number of events requiring a Stadium with a capacity
in excess of 50,000 has been clarified as two rather than three.
No evidence has emerged during the present inquiry to call into
question the Committee's conclusion.
Financing of the Stadium and project
costs
16. The essential financial foundation for the development
of the new Wembley is the 20-year staging agreement with the FA
to hold its flagship events at the Stadium. On this basis, WNSL,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the FA, is required to finance the
construction of the new Stadium through debt.[54]
As Mr Ken Bates, the Chairman of WNSL, told us last year: "the
FA have to raise the money, run the Stadium and make it pay".[55]
According to Sport England, "in addition to their capital
investment, the FA/WNSL will take the long-term risk over Wembley".[56]
As the Secretary of State put it:
"It is not just that football is bringing the
majority of events to the new Wembley. Football is also bringing
a very substantial proportion of the money to the new Wembley."[57]
17. Neither of the other two partner sports is making
any advance financial commitment or undertaking any financial
risk.[58]
Although heads of terms have been agreed between WNSL and the
Rugby Football League (RFL) for more than a year, the RFL is prepared
to consider withdrawing from the Stadium and staging its major
matches elsewhere if certain conditions are not met.[59]
Mr Bob Stubbs, the Chief Executive of WNSL, told us that the RFL's
events were profitable and that Wembley was also keen to secure
them for non-financial reasons, but that the events were not crucial
to WNSL's financial prospects.[60]
Relevant athletics events and the Olympics must be taken by the
new Stadium on a cost-only basis: all rights to ticketing, television,
sponsorship, advertising, merchandising, catering, hospitality
and all other services belong to the event owner.[61]
Athletics thus brings no direct profit to WNSL which is financing
the construction of the Stadium.[62]
18. Since we last considered Wembley National Stadium,
the estimated costs of its construction have risen by £136
million from £198 million to £334 million.[63]
Mr Stubbs told us that the earlier estimate had been indicative.
The increase was attributable to three factors: an increase in
football capacity from 80,000 to 90,000; a decision greatly to
enhance the quality and quantity of spectator provision; and an
extension of self-funding commercial facilities to create "a
much deeper and broader business" than stadia such as Twickenham
and the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff.[64]
These increases will be funded by debt finance.[65]
WNSL was confident that the project changes would generate additional
profits.[66]
On 27 January Mr Stubbs told us that he was confident of securing
a preferred funder to underwrite the debt.[67]
It has subsequently been announced that a lead arranger for the
financing of the Stadium has been selected.[68]
19. It is possible for major projects of this kind
to be undertaken as public projects funded principally by Government.
According to Mr Casey, this was the approach of the French Government
to the construction of the Stade de France.[69]
Wembley National Stadium is not such a public project. It is a
public/private partnership to which the public, through the National
Lottery, contributes £120 million, a figure established in
1996 which has not been re-visited or adjusted for inflation subsequently.[70]
Sport England considered that their initial investment had been
successful in "leveraging in" more than £350 million
from private sources. The extent of private involvement made the
public commitment "excellent value for money".[71]
Under the Lottery Agreement, Sport England can seek re-payment
of the grant in full if the project does not remain on track.[72]
18 T Watt and K Palmer, Wembley: The Greatest Stage-The
Official History of 75 Years at Wembley Stadium (London, 1998);
Evidence, p 128. Back
19 Q
277. Back
20 Q
383; HC (1998-99) 124-I, para 130; HC Deb, 1 December 1999, col
313. Back
21 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, p 144; Evidence, pp 60, 108. Back
22 Evidence,
p 60. Back
23 Evidence,
p 88. Back
24 Evidence,
p 61. Back
25 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, p 146; Evidence, p 109. Sport England's eventual
grant for the City of Manchester Stadium was greater than that
agreed in principle in December 1996. Back
26 Q
277. Back
27 Evidence,
p 109. Back
28 Wembley:
The Greatest Stage, p 315. Back
29 Evidence,
pp 111, 118. Back
30 HC
(1998-99) 124-I, para 130. Back
31 QQ
232, 244, 260, 274; Evidence, pp 122, 124, 139. Back
32 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, p 123; Evidence, pp 61, 65. Back
33 Evidence,
p 61. Back
34 Evidence,
p 88; Q 74. Back
35 Evidence,
p 88. Back
36 QQ
74, 276; Evidence, p 88; HC (1998-99) 124-II, p 123. Back
37 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, pp 123-124; HC (1998-99) 124-III, pp 252-253;
Evidence, pp 65-66, 88. Back
38 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, pp 124-125; Evidence, pp 40, 61-62. Back
39 Evidence,
p 22. Back
40 Evidence,
p 108. Back
41 Q
229; Evidence, p 23. Back
42 HC
(1998-99) 124-III, pp 250, 282. See also HC (1998-99) 124-II,
QQ 498-499. Back
43 Letter
from Mr David Moorcroft to WNSL, 2 March 1998. See also Evidence,
p 23. Back
44 Evidence,
p 23. The capacity figure is taken from UK Athletics Major
Events Strategy, 18 October 1999. Back
45 Q
363; Evidence, p 58. Back
46 Evidence,
p 23. Back
47 HC
(1998-99) 124-I, para 31. See also ibid, Annex 2, para
45. Back
48 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, p 169. Back
49 Ibid,
p 28. Back
50 Ibid,
Q 499; ibid, p 125. Back
51 Ibid,
Q 498. Back
52 QQ
229, 255, 178. Back
53 HC
(1998-99) 124-I, para 132. Back
54 Evidence,
p 66. Back
55 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, Q 451. Back
56 Evidence,
p 139. Back
57 Q
383. Back
58 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, Q 583. Back
59 Q
135; Evidence, p 129. Back
60 QQ
192-194. Back
61 Evidence,
p 56. Back
62 QQ
309-310. Back
63 HC
(1998-99) 124-II, p 125; Evidence, pp 40-41. Back
64 QQ
130, 190. Back
65 Evidence,
p 41. Back
66 Ibid. Back
67 QQ
132-134. Back
68 Chase
Manhattan press release, 18 February 2000. Back
69 Q
277. Back
70 Evidence,
p 61; QQ 98, 244. Back
71 Evidence,
p 139; Q 244. Back
72 Q
276. Back