House of Commons - Culture, Media and Sport

Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Fourth Report

III. THE OLYMPICS AND THE WIDER SITE

20. The National Stadium competition was not originally conceived to select an Olympic venue. Bids were received from cities which were not proposed Olympic centres.[73] The BOA was not involved in the selection process for the National Stadium because there was no requirement to choose a location "within the context of an Olympic bid". Sport England considered that the BOA "could not have assessed objectively bids from outside London".[74] Last year Mr Casey told us that the final selection of Wembley was "not predicated on the basis that it would be for the Olympics".[75] When the then Minister for Sport, Mr Iain Sproat, informed Parliament about Government policy on the National Stadium at Wembley and its role in international events in March 1997, he discussed the FIFA World Cup and the World Athletics Championships but made no reference to the Olympic Games.[76]

21. Although the BOA decided on 4 December 1996 that "the only viable option for a future Great Britain Olympic bid would be from London", that organisation's own chronology of its involvement with the project begins in January 1998.[77] No British bid was made for the 2004 Olympics. It is the view of the BOA, endorsed by the Secretary of State, that a bid for 2008 would not be "competitively viable" given that both the 2004 Summer Olympics and the 2006 Winter Games will be held in Europe and that the IOC has a "desire for continental rotation".[78] In consequence, "the 2012 Olympic Games are the earliest Games for which the BOA would consider entering London as a candidate city". Bids must be submitted for those Games by 1 February 2004.[79] The BOA is committed to ensuring that a future Olympic bid will be made only if it has a realistic chance of winning.[80] Mr Craig Reedie, the Chairman of the BOA, considered that "any publicly announced bid by Britain for a period in advance of decisions on 2008 will be regarded as an unhelpful action" by the IOC.[81]

22. On 4 December 1996 the BOA decided to commission a feasibility study into London's viability to stage the Olympic Games and the BOA employed a projects officer to undertake this work on 17 January 1997.[82] In March 1999 we asked Mr Simon Clegg, the Chief Executive of the BOA, whether a British Olympic bid was dependent on what happened at Wembley and he replied:

Earlier Mr Clegg had stated: "You imply that we are committed to Wembley. We are only in so much as it meets our needs."[84]

23. The feasibility study that was commissioned on 4 December 1996 has not yet been completed. After three years, we find this totally unacceptable. The BOA told us that a 250-page draft report had been prepared which "has concentrated (as a result of assurances the BOA was given as to Wembley's suitability) on Wembley acting as the centrepiece of a future London Olympic bid".[85] Mr Stubbs told us that "the first I heard from the BOA was in the spring/summer of 1999 when they asked me what I was going to do with the 1948 Olympic plaque which is bolted on the Stadium. That was their only contact with us." He questioned why the BOA had not made a direct approach to WNSL.[86] In response, the BOA argued that matters relating to the design brief were best pursued with Sport England as the body responsible for that design brief.[87] Mr Stubbs subsequently pointed out that WNSL's knowledge relevant to an Olympic bid with Wembley as its centrepiece went well beyond design matters: he found it "extraordinary" that the BOA had not at any time approached WNSL for information for the feasibility study given WNSL's "unrivalled knowledge of the new Stadium and the Wembley environment".[88]

24. London International Sport, a body which was established with the express remit of attracting major events to London and which is represented on the BOA's facilities working group, considered that "Wembley was going to be the focus of a bid for the World Athletics Championships and was likely to be for an Olympic bid also. It was not and is not the only option for either event."[89] Mr Moorcroft told us:

WNSL's understanding was that the BOA would not commit itself to Wembley as an Olympic venue even if all the BOA's design requirements, which we consider below, were met.[91] Mr Brooking told us that the BOA's commitment to Wembley had been raised with Mr Clegg at a meeting on 19 October 1999. Mr Brooking's summary of Mr Clegg's reply was as follows: "Matters of our bid are confidential; what I can say is Wembley is possibly one of two or three other sites in the London area".[92]

25. There has been no decision by the BOA to bid for the Olympics. There is no published feasibility study to assess practicability and cost. There is no firm financial commitment to a British Olympic bid by the Government, although such a commitment is an essential prerequisite for a bid. There was no commitment by the BOA that any such bid would have been centred on Wembley and no certainty when or whether such a commitment would have been made. Above all, there is no certainty that any such bid would meet with success.[93]

26. We cannot understand why the BOA, which has no financial stake whatever in this costly project, should have been allowed so decisive a voice in the progress or lack of progress of the Wembley National Stadium project. Furthermore, taking into account the readiness of the BOA to involve itself in the project when the BOA had made no commitment to Wembley as the centre for staging of the Olympic Games in London, we would have expected the BOA to have focused its own objectives more sharply. Even now, we have no idea whether the BOA wants to make a bid for an Olympiad to be held in Britain and, if so, for which year. The BOA has exercised an influence on the Wembley National Stadium which has not been justified, an influence exercised ironically to the detriment of athletics.

27. These uncertainties have been compounded by doubts about Olympic capacity requirements. The IOC's Manual for Candidate Cities for the 2004 Olympics states:

There is no particular capacity indicated for track and field athletics during the Olympics and no definite requirement to stage the ceremonies and athletics in the same stadium, although the BOA considered that "Olympic formality dictates" that they be combined.[95] Sport England and WNSL have contested the BOA's interpretation that "a desired capacity" can effectively be equated with "a minimum requirement".[96] Such scepticism is arguably reinforced when the IOC President is quoted as stating:

The BOA implied that the IOC indicated that lower capacities were acceptable so as not to discourage bids.[98] In 1998 in correspondence with Sport England and in January 1999 before this Committee Mr Clegg referred to the IOC requirements or needs for a capacity of 75,000.[99] The BOA has taken the view, however, that the "minimum capacity" may increase and has therefore referred to "the Olympic requirement of 80,000".[100]

28. The evidence we have received from the BOA and from Sport England demonstrates that they had and have quite different views of the linkage between the National Stadium project and a prospective Olympic bid. The BOA was consistently concerned that it did not consider itself to be adequately briefed on, or consulted about, the design brief.[101] The BOA was sufficiently concerned about the responsiveness of Sport England that the BOA frequently had direct recourse to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.[102] The BOA sought assurances from Sport England and from Ministers that the Stadium could have a capacity in athletics mode of 75,000 (later 80,000) and believed that they had received such assurances.[103] In the light of these assurances the BOA was surprised to discover that the Lottery Funding Agreement signed in January 1999 did not contain an obligation to provide more than 65,000 seats for track and field athletics. The BOA viewed the design brief as "fundamentally flawed" in consequence.[104]

29. Sport England did not accept the BOA's criticisms. Mr Casey considered that there had been a "tremendous amount of contact" between the BOA and Sport England.[105] Sport England said that from July 1998 onwards the design brief required the designers to consider how the athletics capacity could be increased from 65,000 to 80,000 in the event of a successful Olympic bid.[106] In April 1999 Sport England stated in evidence to this Committee: "The minimum capacities of the Stadium are 80,000 seats for football and rugby league and 65,000 seats for athletics (capable of upgrade to a higher figure for an Olympic Games)".[107] Sport England contended that there had been a consistent design brief;[108] we agree. The Lottery Funding Agreement specified the certain requirements for 65,000 seats for athletics and 80,000 seats for the other two sports.[109] The Agreement required WNSL to accept the Olympics on the same basis as the World Athletics Championships.[110] The Lottery Agreement did not identify a capacity for the Olympic Games, but Sport England stated that "it is understood that this would be subject to negotiation at the time the event was awarded".[111]

The wider site and the warm-up track

30. For the National Stadium to have its desired impact and for major events to be staged at Wembley, there is a need for far more than the Stadium itself. As Mr Banks put it, summarising his reply to an Adjournment debate on Wembley Stadium in June 1998:

"It is not just about building a new National Stadium; it is about redeveloping the whole area around Wembley. You cannot just put a new National Stadium into that mess which is Wembley at the moment."[

112

31. The problems of the present site were all too apparent during this Committee's visit to Wembley Stadium on 14 April 1999. They were set out to us clearly by WNSL, as reported in the published notes of the visit:

113

Later the same day Mr Stubbs held a meeting with Brent Council. The next day he summarised the outcome to us as follows:

114

32. During our visit on 14 April 1999, Mr Stubbs also drew our attention to the fact that there was no secured site for a warm-up track, an essential requirement for the World Athletics Championships and for the Olympics.[115] We observed in our Report the following month that "the lack of coordinated thought given by public bodies to the needs of major events at Wembley Stadium is typified by the doubts which still surround the provision of a warm-up track".[116] In its submission in January 2000, Sport England explained that "provision for warm-up facilities was a weakness in nearly all" the original bids for the site of the National Stadium. Three bids, including that from Wembley, proposed the use of temporary facilities on a car park.[117] London International Sport argued that provision for a warm-up track should have been made in the original land purchase.[118] Sport England stated that the warm-up track was excluded from the eventual Lottery Agreement because UK Athletics had identified a suitable location 850 metres from the Stadium with a legacy as a community facility. According to Sport England, "the Government confirmed to WNSL and the FA that they should not have to pay for warm-up facilities".[119]

33. In our Report on Staging International Sporting Events we concluded that "the planning process provides an opportunity to establish an environment and infrastructure surrounding the Stadium which would be appropriate to a new National Stadium and which might contribute to Wembley's development as a potential Olympic site".[120] We stressed the need for urgent coordination of Government involvement with the project.[121]

Conclusions

34. The conclusions of this Committee about the wider site in May 1999 reflected a broader theme of the Report. We stated that we were "greatly concerned at the apparent lack of strategic thinking in the approach to the project by the English Sports Council and the Government".[122] More generally, we argued the case for stronger Government leadership, to impose strategic coherence, to engage all Government Departments concerned with events and to provide the focal point for decision-making on matters of national importance. We recommended the designation of a Minister in the Cabinet Office as Minister for Events and argued that, along with the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games, Government and public sector involvement with the Wembley Stadium development "should be at the very top of the in-tray of the Minister for Events".[123]

35. We reiterate those comments now in order to demonstrate that our conclusions in this Report are not based simply on the benefit of hindsight. In the light of subsequent developments and the more detailed evidence we have received, it is possible to reach fuller conclusions about developments before May 1999. It is evident that a Stadium project that was originally conceived for events sponsored by the governing bodies of three sports was greatly complicated by the addition of potential Olympic ambitions. The uncertainties which surrounded and still surround those Olympic ambitions—about whether the BOA proposes to make a bid, about whether the Government is minded to give the necessary support to make such a bid worthwhile, about whether the BOA would choose Wembley as the focal point of the bid and about whether any bid has a realistic prospect of success—made all parties concerned with the project weaker in their response to the complication than would have been desirable. The conceptually sound project for a National Stadium was threatened by the Olympic dimension and by the lack of strategic leadership.

73 HC (1998-99) 124-II, p 144. Back

74 Evidence, p 67. Back

75 HC (1998-99) 124-II, Q 510. Back

76 HC Deb, 3 March 1997, col 500W. Back

77 Evidence, pp 130, 10. Back

78 Evidence, p 2; Q 352. Ten bids have been submitted for the 2008 Olympics. Two of the cities in question are Paris and Seville, IOC Press Notice, 2 February 2000 ( available at www.olympic.org). Back

79 Evidence, p 2. Back

80 Evidence, p 1. Back

81 Q 8. Back

82 Evidence, p 130. Back

83 HC (1998-99) 124-II, Q 108. Back

84 Ibid, Q 83. Back