Conclusions
44. Both WNSL and Mr Banks implied that non-design
issues might have played a significant role in the eventual decision
by the Secretary of State on the suitability of Wembley as an
athletics venue.[151]
Mr Stubbs said:
"I think the problem
that has started to emerge is that if Wembley is the Olympic venue,
and you wish to preserve that, you now have to buy that land to
preserve that opportunity. It is not an option to do nothing.
Simply, that would involve a CPO of private sector land."[152]
From its inception, the Task Force, in its own words,
"identified an urgent need for the Government's 'sporting
aspirations' for Wembley to be clearly identified to facilitate
the redevelopment of the Stadium and the related regeneration
of the wider area".[153]
The impact of this urgent need on Government policy was indicated
in the Secretary of State's evidence. He listed five reasons why
he reviewed the "athletics platform design at Wembley"
of which the fourth was:
"the regeneration possibilities
around Wembley and the need to free substantial areas of land
if Wembley was going to be regarded as the heart of an Olympic
bid".[154]
The need for a warm-up facility was described by
the Secretary of State as "a crucial element in the range
of factors that led us to take the decision we did in December".[155]
45. This Committee drew attention to the urgency
of decisions about the wider site in a Report published on 19
May 1999.[156]
The importance of this matter was barely reflected in the initial
response we received to that Report from the Department on 8 September
1999. We declined to publish this response on the grounds of its
inadequacy and regret to say that the nature of this response
was not an isolated event. Moreover, it was symptomatic of the
weakness in the Government's approach to this project. That document
stated:
"The needs of a venue
for the Olympics as well as a World Athletics Championships are
very much in mind as part of the development ... Plans are ...
under consideration for the development of the wider site, both
as part of the requirements for warm-up facilities for athletics
events, and the general regeneration of the area, with the active
involvement of English Partnerships and under the leadership of
Sir Nigel Mobbs."
In other words, the leadership role in an integral
aspect of the project, which we argued should be the direct responsibility
of a designated Minister, was ceded to a private individual.
46. On 1 December 1999 a member of this Committee
asked the Secretary of State about progress with the warm-up track
and he replied as follows:
"That is possible at
Wembley, although it would require the acquisition of land which
is not in WNSL's ownership. However, that is possible to achieve,
given the right circumstances."[157]
The Secretary of State referred more than once in
his evidence to the importance of a legacy for athletics, or the
lack of it, in his decisions.[158]
He did not, however, expand on why he considered that a permanent
warm-up track at Wembley would deliver "no legacy" for
athletics.[159]
47. We cannot assess the exact extent to which considerations
about the wider site played a crucial role in the Secretary of
State's final decision on 22 December. The Secretary of State
considered the development of a warm-up track at Wembley to be
"possible" on 1 December.[160]
Mr Banks argued that this problem and others related to the wider
site could be solved, but "that requires commitment and it
requires commitment from Government".[161]
The situation which faces the Government in relation to the wider
site has not changed since 1 December. Regeneration of the area
around the National Stadium is essential, regardless of whether
it is the venue for particular major events awarded by international
sporting bodies. A site which Sport England considers suitable
for a warm-up track for the 2005 World Athletics Championships
is available at a cost of £2.4 million.[162]
A more expensive option is available if the Government wishes
now to take a significant step forward in securing an opportunity
for a facility essential to a London Olympic bid centred at Wembley.
Insofar as non-design factors played a part in the Secretary
of State's decision of 22 December, they are problems which should
have been apparent to Ministers since May 1999. In particular,
it would have been possible for the Government to resolve the
confusion about the warm-up track at a much earlier stage and
it should have done so. Solutions to these non-design problems
were and remain primarily a responsibility of Ministers.
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