House of Commons - Culture, Media and Sport

Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Fourth Report

V. DESIGN ISSUES

The concept and nature of the compromise

48. From the outset of the National Stadium competition, it has been understood by the three sports that the design of the National Stadium would entail a compromise between their different needs arising from the different sizes and shapes of the playing areas.[163] Last year, Sir Rodney Walker, the Chairman of the RFL and of UK Sport, told us that the needs of rugby league and football were the same.[164] The compromise was therefore in essence between the needs of these two sports played on a rectangular field on the one hand and the needs of track and field athletics on the other. The Secretary of State reminded this Committee of our own observation on this matter last year when we stated:

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The notion of a design compromise was integral to the entire concept of a shared National Stadium for the three sports.[166]

49. The nature of the design compromise was intended to reflect the event profile to which we referred earlier, namely a firm commitment by the FA to bring its events to the Stadium—a commitment underpinning the predominant private finance of the project—and the prospect of one athletics event this decade (the World Athletics Championships) with the possibility of a second (the Olympics) in the subsequent decade.[167] A permanent athletics track was, in the view of Sport England, accepted by all parties as having adverse effects on the quality of the football viewing experience.[168] Such a track would entail the vast majority of the compromise being made by football in defiance of the realities of the proposed balance of usage of, and financial arrangements for, the National Stadium.[169]

50. This Committee set out its understanding of the compromise actually proposed in May 1999:

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Sport England considered that this "design approach was widely understood and accepted by all relevant organisations on the grounds of sports demand, economic sustainability and in terms of achieving acceptable compromises between athletics, football and rugby".[171] On 27 July 1999 the BOA confirmed that it accepted "the rationale that the football stadium should be built predominantly for football so long as it had the ability to convert into a track and field configuration [for] an Olympic Games".[172]

Delivering the compromise: the platform solution

51. By the time the Stadium design was launched on 29 July 1999, it was evident how the Stadium designers proposed to deliver the temporary conversion of a football stadium into athletics format. It was proposed to insert a temporary platform or deck approximately six metres above the level of the normal football playing surface and which would also be on top of the rows of seating nearest the pitch. The insertion of the platform would increase the playing surface to accommodate an athletics track and reduce the distance between spectators and the action.[173] This option was selected in preference to the approach adopted in the Stade de France of what is termed "retractable or demountable seating", in which one surface at the same level is used permanently for both athletics and football/rugby, but the lower tier of seating is moved backwards for athletics events.[174]

52. In evidence, both the Secretary of State and the Minister for Sport expressed concern about how late in the design process the platform had emerged. The Secretary of State told us:

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He then referred to a meeting involving Sport England and Mr Banks on 21 April:

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The Secretary of State considered that, by 21 July 1999, "the platform solution was in what one might describe as an embryonic state".[177]

53. The Minister for Sport was of a similar view:

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We are not certain about which minutes the Minister was referring to. The Minister for Sport has declined to publish the Department's minutes of the meeting in April referred to by the Secretary of State and the minutes of this meeting have not been requested or received by this Committee on a confidential basis.[179]

54. The account by the Secretary of State and the Minister for Sport was disputed in almost every aspect by WNSL and Sport England. The design team for Wembley National Stadium was appointed in May 1998: the architects were HOK-LOBB Sports Architecture and Foster and Partners.[180] The design team and WNSL held a meeting on 9 and 10 July 1998 when, according to both Sport England and WNSL, the platform solution was first discussed.[181] On 16 July 1998, Sport England asked WNSL to investigate the platform option further in relation to costs, turn-around times and other key issues.[182] Later the same month the then Minister for Sport and the Secretary of State were given "details of early design options" by Sport England.[183] Two months later Mr Sheard, a member of the design team, discussed the concept of the platform with Mr Casey at the Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games.[184] The design team was not formally engaged or provided with significant sums of money before the purchase of Wembley Stadium was secured in mid-March 1999.[185] By that time, however, more than 200 drawings had been produced.[186]

55. Mr Stubbs stated that, during the design process, "we have taken athletics extremely seriously" and had examined every possible solution to accommodate athletics.[187] We were told that the design team had extensive experience in the design of athletics stadia. Mr Sheard and five other members of the design team had spent the previous two or three years designing Stadium Australia, the Sydney Olympic Stadium. Mr Sheard said that, in consequence, "they brought with them a very clear understanding of what a stadium needed to do to fit athletics and to accommodate the Olympics for that matter".[188] UK Athletics appointed a three-person team to advise on specific athletic issues such as the technical specifications for track and field competition.[189] Two of the members of the working group formed by WNSL and UK Athletics had formerly been technical advisers for the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF).[190] According to Mr Stubbs, "the idea that we have not been liaising with athletics is just simply wrong".[191]

56. This Committee cannot determine the accuracy or otherwise of the Secretary of State's interpretation of his Department's internal minutes of a meeting in April 1999 at which he was not present when the Minister for Sport has declined to place the minutes of that meeting in the public domain. However, we can reach a judgement based on the public meeting which this Committee held on 15 April 1999. On that day, Mr Bates made it clear that it was intended to build a football stadium capable of adaptation as an athletics stadium as and when required and then explained what this meant:

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57. Later the same morning, Mr Casey said that football was "compromised" at the Stade de France, but that "we are trying to find a way in Wembley where you have the capacity, you have the demand, a limited demand for athletics, and you have a design which does not compromise football that is suitable for athletics on the rare occasions that you actually want to get up to" the capacity required for the World Athletics Championships, 65,000 to 70,000.[193] Mr Casey went on to state that "the compromised design" in Paris had cost £40 million, but "we believe that adapting the stadium at a later stage for athletics will be well within that budget and, therefore, better value for money if we get the bid".[194] The BOA summarised Mr Casey's evidence as follows: "Casey refuted the idea of retractable seating and talked of adapting the stadium at a later date 'if we get the bid'".[195]

58. To judge by the public pronouncements of Sport England, an option other than retractable seating was already the preference of Sport England in mid-April 1999. Less than a month after the design team was formally engaged, the concept of the platform had been explicitly referred to in the public domain by WNSL. It was quite legitimate to question the viability of the platform solution, but there is no justification for viewing it as a concept which emerged late in the design process and was not integral to it. While there may have been differing views about its desirability or feasibility, there is no doubt that the platform solution had been available for consideration from any early date.

59. At the meeting of the National Stadium Monitoring Committee on 20 May, WNSL, according to their own minutes, "informed those present that the Design Team had been contracted and that the design process was running successfully and basic issues have been resolved ... Football and athletics solution was outlined. This was the infill or platform solution which would be similar to Monte Carlo".[196] At that meeting, there was discussion about the capacity implications of the platform. The insertion of the platform without other modifications to the Stadium would have the effect of reducing the capacity to about 67,000 seats. The question was raised of how the capacity could be increased to 80,000 seats while the platform remained in place.[197] On 17 June 1999 WNSL submitted proposals to the Department on various options for increasing capacity to 80,000 in athletics mode. On 22 June, officials of the Department sought clarification about which other options had been considered for athletics in terms of retractable or demountable seating.[198] By early July Sport England had provided the Department with papers exploring the cost and feasibility of various proposals, including retractable seating.[199]

60. On 15 July 1999 WNSL presented the stadium design to the Monitoring Committee. The Secretary of State then called a meeting for 21 July.[200] According to his own recollection of the meeting, the Secretary of State had

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He went on to say "I have been ... worried about the concrete platform proposal from the word go".[202] Mr Banks told us that "towards the end he [the Secretary of State] was expressing concern about the choice between the deck and the retractable seating".[203]

61. There is a fundamental divergence of opinion about developments subsequent to the meeting on 21 July. The Secretary of State asked WNSL to provide further details of the costs of the proposed design solution, as well as those options which had been rejected.[204] On 29 July, at the launch of the design, the Secretary of State stated that the new Stadium "will be a magnificent venue for athletics as well as football".[205] Of this statement he told us:

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62. Mr Banks appeared to believe that the Secretary of State had been reconciled to the design solution:

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Mr Banks was not alone in misunderstanding the Secretary of State's position. Mr Stubbs said of the platform proposal: "the model he probably had in his mind was something like Stade de France with retractable seating and it did take a good while to convince the Secretary of State that this [the platform] was an appropriate solution to the athletics issue".[208] However, Mr Stubbs considered that the Secretary of State had been convinced by the time of the launch on 29 July:

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63. On 1 December the Secretary of State told the House of Commons that "I have put the work urgently in hand ... to analyse whether a Stade de France-type solution will work at Wembley".[210] The Secretary of State has not made subsequent reference to this urgent work or explained how it has differed from the examination of the same issue in the summer of 1999, although he did outline some of the advantages and disadvantages of the Stade de France option in evidence on 1 February.[211]

64. The Stade de France employs automatic retractable seats which enable the Stadium to be converted from football format to athletics mode within five days.[212] Whereas this arrangement is an integral part of the stadium in Paris, the proposed platform at Wembley would only be installed if bids to stage at the Stadium the World Athletics Championships or track and field events during the Olympics were successful.[213] If the Stadium were to be built originally in football format, conversion to athletics would take four to six months. A similar timetable is envisaged for subsequent reconversion into football mode.[214] Both conversions would take place during the period September to February; England internationals in this period would be held elsewhere. Mr Stubbs told us that football had accepted this compromise.[215]

65. Both design options involve a compromise between football and athletics. To make it possible to insert the platform as proposed, the new Wembley Stadium places all seats five to ten metres further back than would be the case for a perfect football stadium.[216] Under the Stade de France approach, the lower tier of seats moves, but the second and third tiers of seats are permanently further back to permit the bottom tier to move backwards to athletics mode. In consequence, spectators in the second and third tiers are 12 to 14 metres further away at the sides and 25 to 30 metres further away at the ends.[217] Guidance endorsed by the Government recommends that seats should be no more than 190 metres away from the furthest point of action in football, namely the far corner flag.[218] WNSL estimated that a stadium with the capacity of Wembley which was built with retractable seating would have more than 8,000 seats more than 190 metres from the action.[219] The Secretary of State noted that a Stade de France-type solution "puts football spectators too far away from the pitch to have a really intense atmosphere".[220] Given the balance of usage of the National Stadium, Sport England considered such a compromise to be unacceptable.[221]

66. In explaining his final decision on the platform, the Secretary of State referred to the costs involved and to the question of whether the platform represented value for money.[222] His concerns about value for money were shared by UK Athletics.[223] The estimated cost of conversion to and from the platform with 80,000 capacity is £23 million.[224] In addition, WNSL might receive up to £2 million compensation for lost revenue for the football matches not held at Wembley during conversion or dismantling.[225] In other words, the total cost associated with alterations to the Stadium on each occasion would be about £25 million. It is expected that these costs would be met by Sport England in the case of the 2005 World Athletics Championships.[226] By way of comparison, Sport England understood that the initial additional cost of the retractable seating system at the Stade de France was £40 million.[227] Expenditure on the platform option is only required if and when events are secured. An integral retractable seating system would require greater expenditure at the outset before any relevant decisions have been taken about a British Olympic bid. It therefore follows that the platform solution would be better value for money.

67. The Secretary of State noted that a Stade de France-type solution had disadvantages for football, but nevertheless described it as "the best median compromise between football and athletics".[228] The Stade de France was a Government project with Government risk.[229] The English National Stadium is not such a project. It is financed predominantly by the sport of football. An integral system of retractable seating would permanently and irrevocably disadvantage supporters of football—the sport involvement of which is essential to pay for the new Stadium—in return for a prospective advantage for athletics supporters whose opportunities for attendance are not guaranteed and when athletics will not contribute directly towards meeting the costs of the Stadium.

68. The platform solution proposed by the Stadium design team is a solution which meets the requirements of the proposed usage of the Stadium far better than a solution involving a permanent, retractable lower tier of seating. In terms of value for money it compares favourably with the Stade de France option, with the added benefit of certainty that money would only be spent on athletics provision for major events awarded. The process of conversion does take the Stadium out of use for four to six months, but this is a compromise by football which is acceptable to football in return for securing a Stadium significantly superior to the Stade de France.

69. The platform solution is untried. Mr Bates compared it with the arrangements at the Monaco Athletics Stadium, but the Stadium design of Monte Carlo only proves the acceptability of a permanent deck; a temporary deck is untested.[230] The design team at WNSL and Sport England were convinced that the platform was feasible. This is hardly surprising. However, UK Athletics also considered that "the WNSL design team had satisfied concerns relating to the technical viability of the platform".[231] Mr Moorcroft was prepared to "believe in the skills of the architects" and accepted what the solution involved.[232] Ellerbe Becket, whose study on Olympic options formed the basis of the Secretary of State's statement to the House of Commons on 1 December 1999, subsequently said the following:

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Ellerbe Becket has failed to understand the entire rationale for the design, because the Stadium was never intended to stage "regular" athletics events: UK Athletics had indicated in March 1998 that the Stadium would not be viable for regular athletics events. Ellerbe Becket nevertheless accepts that the platform solution "answers the requirements" for athletics. The Secretary of State, while confirming his concerns about the platform on cost and other grounds, did not question its feasibility:

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70. We believe that the platform solution proposed by the Wembley design team is a commendable and innovative solution to the requirements of the design brief and could well provide a template for future projects.

The "Olympic" platform

71. The original design requirements for the National Stadium at Wembley were summarised as follows: "The minimum capacities of the Stadium are 80,000 seats for football and rugby league and 65,000 seats for athletics (capable of upgrade to a higher figure for an Olympic Games)".[235] It is evident that the design team gave sustained and prolonged consideration to the needs of athletics and produced a technical solution viewed as feasible by all relevant parties. The issues which remain in dispute relate to whether the Stadium in athletics mode with a platform can have its seating capacity satisfactorily upgraded.

72. The Stadium design provides for a football capacity of 90,000 seats. When the platform is introduced with the same seating arrangements as planned for football, the capacity falls to around 67,000 because over 20,000 seats are effectively covered by the platform about six metres above the level of the normal football playing surface.[236] In January 1999 Mr Casey stated that "the design team have been asked to make provision to increase ... capacity [in athletics mode] to the required number of 75,000".[237] On 18 May 1999 Sport England confirmed to Ministers that, during June, it would be able to establish the athletics capacity in the range of 70-80,000 seats.[238] These last two comments reflected the ambiguity of Olympic capacity requirements to which we referred earlier. This ambiguity was resolved by Ministers at the meeting of the Monitoring Committee on 20 May 1999 when they asked WNSL to provide options and costings for increasing capacity to 80,000 for athletics events, a figure reflecting the BOA position as set out at a meeting the preceding week.[239]

73. On 17 June WNSL submitted proposals to the Department on various options for increasing capacity to 80,000 in athletics mode. On 29 June, according to the Department, Ministers met WNSL and Sport England to discuss costed options for increasing capacity for the Olympic Games; it was agreed that an initial increase in football capacity was not viable, but that the design should preserve the option of the Stadium being upgraded later in line with Olympic requirements.[240] When the Monitoring Committee met on 15 July, Ministers "pressed WNSL on what was required to increase to 80,000 for Olympics" and asked WNSL "to provide the BOA with a presentation on the design ahead of the proposed public launch later that month".[241]

74. On 26 July the BOA received a presentation from WNSL on the plans, but, according to the BOA, "no information on the critical issue of the upgrading of the Stadium to Olympic specification was provided".[242] The BOA immediately communicated its concern to the then Minister for Sport and on 2 August officials of the Department wrote to WNSL seeking more detail of their "outline proposals for conversion of the stadium into athletics mode" and requesting that these proposals be presented to the BOA.[243]

75. While evidence from the Department and from the BOA on these developments is very detailed, that from Sport England and WNSL on the same issues is remarkably slight. To judge from the evidence which is available to us, it seems possible that, while Sport England was conscious of the need to prepare a design solution combining an Olympic capacity with athletics mode, this need was not effectively communicated to the design team. Surprisingly, the requirement was not included in the Lottery Agreement. It is evident from WNSL's own minutes of the Monitoring Committee meeting on 20 May that proper consideration of an increased capacity in athletics mode had not taken place at that date.[244] The BOA left its meeting with WNSL on 26 July with the clear impression that such consideration had never been part of the design brief.[245] A detailed proposal on how to increase the capacity in athletics mode to 80,000 was not presented by WNSL until 6 October.[246] The fact that a design option for 80,000 spectators in athletics mode did not appear to be an integral part of the design plans in July 1999 coloured the approach of Ministers and of the BOA towards the platform solution per se and towards the particular proposals for providing 80,000 seats in athletics mode which were presented to other parties in October 1999.

76. Sport England regarded the design concept for 80,000 capacity in athletics mode as one which would only actually be implemented "at a later date" and then only if a successful Olympic bid centred on Wembley were made.[247] However, in evidence in January 2000, Mr Stubbs indicated that, if the World Athletics Championships of 2005 were held at Wembley, it was proposed that the "Olympic" mode with 80,000 seats would be adopted rather than the athletics mode with 67,000 "so that we have all the sports events locked in. If it [the capacity] drops below 70,000 we fully anticipate that event owners could withdraw their events."[248] In other words, Sport England allowed a tension to develop between the principal design brief as set out in the Lottery Agreement and the requirements of the sports as they have subsequently been defined. WNSL now proposes to resolve this tension through a design option developed in detail at a relatively late stage in the design process and so developed at the specific request of Ministers.

77. The solution to the capacity problem which was eventually presented to other parties by WNSL on 6 October involved the reconfiguration of the lower tier to create 13,000 additional seats.[249] The BOA, while laying no claim to expertise in stadium design, was concerned at the impact these changes in the lower tier would have on spectators.[250] The BOA's concerns were conveyed to Ms Hoey, the Minister for Sport since the end of July.[251] The Minister called a meeting of all interested parties on 19 October at which the BOA raised their concerns about "the technical viability of the Olympic solution".[252] At that meeting, the Minister for Sport considered that "there were completely different points of view coming from all parties". Accordingly, she proposed that an independent design study be commissioned.[253] The Minister for Sport was confronted by a new issue about specific proposals for achieving 80,000 capacity in athletics mode. She quite properly sought an independent examination of the issue.

The Ellerbe Becket report

78. UK Sport, a public body which is concerned with British strategy for major events and which does not itself fund capital projects from the Lottery, was asked to commission the independent study.[254] WNSL provided UK Sport with a list of companies which might conduct the study which included Ellerbe Becket. All parties agreed to the selection of Ellerbe Becket, an architectural practice which designed the Atlanta Olympic Stadium.[255] UK Sport requested that the review be delivered "in as shortest work time as possible" [sic].[256] The review was concluded and a report produced in three weeks.[257]

79. Mr Sheard argued that Ellerbe Becket "could not really cope" with the project in the time. Nine months had been provided for a review of the Sydney Olympic Stadium and five months for a review of the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff. Ellerbe Becket had two weeks to examine hundreds of drawings and "it was just patently impossible for any review architect to be able to analyse that number of drawings of such a complicated building in that period of time".[258] WNSL expected to discuss a draft of the report with Ellerbe Becket, a procedure which was viewed as "professional protocol".[259]

80. Ellerbe Becket's report was delivered to the Chief Executive of UK Sport in draft form on 23 November. Having spoken to the Chairman of UK Sport, the Chief Executive asked the Minister for Sport how to handle the report. Ms Hoey, having previously discussed the handling of the document with the Secretary of State, instructed the Chief Executive of UK Sport not to take the report to any of the parties concerned until Ministers were in a position to consider its findings and deliver their judgement.[260]

81. Ministers first saw the Ellerbe Becket report on 29 November.[261] The next day the Secretary of State had a meeting with UK Sport to discuss the report. He recollected that "their advice was very clear, that they did not recommend we went ahead with athletics at Wembley ... The UK Sports Council ... agreed with the conclusions that we were reaching at that stage."[262] This Committee is not in a position to assess the arguments advanced by UK Sport on 30 November in favour of this position because, according to its own submission, "UK Sport endeavoured to maintain a neutral position during the subsequent debate and has chosen to comment neither on the merits or otherwise of the original design nor the provenance [sic] of the Ellerbe Becket criticisms".[263] There seems to have been a disjuncture between the private advice offered to the Government by UK Sport and the public position of UK Sport in the subsequent debate.

82. We find it difficult to understand why the meeting on 30 November was with UK Sport and with UK Sport alone. The timescale clearly permitted the arrangement of a meeting on 29 or 30 November with WNSL, Sport England and the British Olympic Association. Had that opportunity been taken, then the Secretary of State would have been able to avail himself of more considered views from these bodies before drafting his statement to the House of Commons.

83. However, as it turned out, the Ellerbe Becket report was shown for the first time to WNSL, Sport England and the BOA on 1 December.[264] These parties having had the report for half an hour, a meeting took place at which the Secretary of State read from the statement which he intended to make to the House of Commons later that afternoon.[265] WNSL advised the Secretary of State at the meeting that it viewed the Ellerbe Becket report as being "fundamentally flawed".[266] At the conclusion of the meeting, the Secretary of State "left immediately for the House".[267] The Secretary of State considered that it was important to share the concerns raised by the Ellerbe Becket report with the House "at that stage", particularly in the light of the fact that he had told the House the preceding week of his belief that Wembley was suitable for athletics.[268]

84. The Secretary of State made six assertions to the House on 1 December about the design of Wembley National Stadium in athletics mode with a capacity of 80,000 arising from the Ellerbe Becket report. He stated that "the seating space for individual spectators would be far from ideal".[269] The Ellerbe Becket report had noted that the minimum tread depth (or seating row depth) of Wembley National Stadium would be 760 mm and stated that it was a requirement of the Sydney Olympic Stadium that the tread depth of the general spectator seating be 850 mm.[270] The Government's Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, known as the Green Guide, prescribes a minimum seating row (or tread) depth of 700 mm for new construction.[271] WNSL noted that the new Wembley Stadium complied with the tread depth requirement of the Green Guide and that some 30,000 seats at Sydney had a tread depth below the requirement for that Stadium stated by Ellerbe Becket. WNSL also told us that the minimum tread depth at the new Wembley would be the same as that currently available in the Royal Box at Wembley and would be more generous than the standard space provided in the Stade de France (750 mm).[272] The Green Guide prescribes a minimum seat width for new construction of 460 mm.[273] According to WNSL, the typical seat width at Wembley National Stadium would be 500 mm; the temporary seats in the lower tier would have a width of 480 mm. WNSL stated that the width in many modern stadia, including the Olympic stadia in Atlanta and Sydney, was 480 mm.[274]

85. The Secretary of State told the House on 1 December that the roof of the Stadium "would cover some lanes of the track and not others".[275] The importance of this issue had been asserted by Ellerbe Becket in the following terms:

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In its response to Ellerbe Becket, WNSL stated that it was unreasonable to assume a roof positioned more than 40 metres above track level would have a significant differential effect on conditions in different lanes. WNSL published a statement by the IAAF as follows: "Most major stadia have covered spectator accommodation and in many cases the outer lanes are covered, in whole or in part, by the roof without adverse effect". WNSL said that such stadia included the Montreal Olympic Stadium and the Stade de France. WNSL also stated that the City of Manchester Stadium being built for the 2002 Commonwealth Games "will also have a roof which partly over-sails the running track".[277] The Secretary of State told us that on this point "WNSL have indeed satisfied me".[278]

86. In his statement of 1 December 1999 the Secretary of State informed the House that "there would be no portal for people and equipment to gain access to the deck".[279] This derived from the following observation by Ellerbe Becket:

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WNSL replied that consideration had been given to access to the deck and that "the overall loss of seats to accommodate the arena access requirements should be no more than circa 100 seats from the seating bowl total". They also noted that Ellerbe Becket had made no reference to the opportunities for access provided from below the platform.[281]

87. The Secretary of State said on 1 December 1999 that "the east-west alignment of the track would be detrimental to athletes".[282] This comment arose from an account by Ellerbe Becket of the problems that could arise if runners approaching the finishing line had the sun in their eyes. Ellerbe Becket considered that "many of the Olympic-preferred orientations for track athletics and field events may not be achievable".[283] WNSL replied that the height of the stands in the new Wembley meant that the setting sun would not pose a problem for athletes.[284] WNSL's description of the design has suggested to the IAAF that "the height and manner of construction of the building and the roofing is more than adequate to protect against any problems likely to arise from the setting sun".[285] The Secretary of State was satisfied with WNSL's response on this matter.[286]

88. On 1 December the Secretary of State told the House of Commons that, "for any Olympic Games, the deck would have to be constructed and in place for at least a year in advance, which could render the Stadium unusable for international standard football for more than two years".[287] The Ellerbe Becket report had stated:

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In response, WNSL pointed out that the regulation size of a pitch fulfilling FIFA requirements is 105 metres x 68 metres. The notion that a FIFA-standard football pitch is incompatible with an IAAF-standard athletics track was characterised by WNSL as "clearly ludicrous".[289]

89. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport noted in written evidence that "WNSL successfully addressed many of the concerns highlighted by Ellerbe Becket", but did not expand upon which concerns had been so responded to.[290] Similarly, the BOA stated that "WNSL refuted a number" of the findings of the Ellerbe Becket report, but declined to state which findings.[291] When we asked the Secretary of State which points made by Ellerbe Becket had not been "very usefully addressed" by WNSL he made no reference to any of the issues we have so far considered—seating quality, the roof, access to the platform, stadium alignment and the alleged potential incompatibility of the platform and international standard football.[292] Indeed he did not mention any of them as factors in his final decision on athletics at Wembley. On 10 December Ellerbe Becket issued a press notice based on its sight of a draft of WNSL's response to Ellerbe Becket's original study, a response which had been provided to Ellerbe Becket to enable them to request amendments before the document was finalised. The press notice from Ellerbe Becket made no reference to the five technical issues we have so far considered.[293] The technical critique of the Stadium design arising from the Ellerbe Becket report as summarised to the House on 1 December by the Secretary of State might reasonably have been understood by listeners as a damning assessment of the competence of the Stadium architects to design a stadium capable of staging a major athletics event. It now appears that all that is maintained by the Secretary of State of that original critique is one issue—the quality of sight-lines and focal points, particularly with the proposed platform for athletics and an 80,000 capacity.[294] Of the six criticisms of the Wembley design levelled by Ellerbe Becket which were referred to by the Secretary of State in his statement to the House of Commons on 1December, it would appear that WNSL have subsequently satisfied the Secretary of State on five of these concerns. If these concerns had been raised with WNSL when the Ellerbe Becket report first became available, the Secretary of State's statement to the House of Commons on 1 December might have been different or perhaps rendered unnecessary.

Sight-lines and focal points

90. On 1 December 1999 the Secretary of State told the House of Commons that, "in any likely configuration, the sight-lines for large numbers of spectators would be poor, and in some cases could fail Olympic requirements".[295]

91. The term "sight-line" refers to the ability of a spectator to see a point on the pitch or area of activity past the heads of the spectators immediately in front. The quality of a sight-line is often expressed as a "C" value, calculated as a distance in millimetres on the basis of a mathematical formula. The "C" value is in essence the difference in height between the line of sight of an individual as the line of sight passes someone in the row below as one point and the eye level of that person in the row below as the other point. The average distance between the centre of the eye and the top of the head of an adult male is around 120 mm. In consequence, a "C" value of 120 mm represents a very good viewing standard.[296] However, a high "C" value has consequences for the rake or angle of a stand and its height, a particular problem for larger stadia, especially multi-tiered designs. As a result, in some areas of large stadia it is considered difficult to achieve a "C" value greater than 60 mm.[297] This represents a sight-line half-way between the top of the head and the eye level of the person below, but it has to be borne in mind that seats are arranged so that an individual in one row is not usually seated immediately behind a person in the row in front.

92. A "C" value can only be calculated in relation to a particular, pre-determined focal point because integral elements of the calculation are the horizontal distance from the eye to the point of focus and the vertical height from that point of focus to the eye.[298] The Ellerbe Becket report stated:

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WNSL told us that there were no IOC or IAAF requirements relating to the focal point; each Olympic stadium had its own viewing standard.[300] WNSL stated that the focal point for athletics at Wembley had been agreed with Sport England and UK Athletics to be the outside of the track on the straights and swinging to the inside lane on the end bends.[301] Every seat in the Stadium in athletics mode with a capacity of 80,000 was said by Mr Sheard to have a "C" value of at least 60 mm based on this focal point.[302]

93. On 25 January 1999 the Minister for Sport stated that, "based on the ideal focal point at ground level on the outside edge of the running track ... the proposals put forward by WNSL to provide 80,000 seats in athletics mode would reduce the 'C' value of the first eight rows of seating in the lower bowl, and some seats at the end of the stadium, to below 'C' 60".[303] WNSL indicated that a requirement to meet this "ideal" focal point was not communicated to WNSL during the design process.[304] We asked the Minister whether WNSL had been informed about the "ideal focal point" and she replied: "I do not think Sport England went into the detail of sight-lines in that way so probably Wembley were not".[305]

94. The Football Stadia Advisory Design Council (FSADC) guidance on sight-lines lays down an effective minimum "C" value of 60 mm.[306] This minimum standard is adopted by Wembley.[307] As we have noted, any "C" value must be calculated in relation to a pre-determined focal point.[308] If the focal point is the inside lane at ground level on the bends, all sight-lines at Wembley are considered by the designers to be of a "C" value of 60 mm or above. If the focal point is the outside edge of the outside lane at ground level on the bends, sight-lines in a limited number of seats in the lower tier fall below "C" 60. The Minister suggested that the detail of sight-lines and the focal point from which such sight-lines would be calculated had not been discussed with Sport England. If this suggestion were correct, it would imply that WNSL had no certainty that its design would be accepted by Sport England as complying with the minimum requirements of FSADC guidance. The FSADC guidance on sight-lines was written by Mr Sheard, one of the principal architects of the new Wembley Stadium.[309]

95. There is a consensus that design quality in matters such as sight-lines and focal points can be assessed in part by reference to other stadia. There is no consensus about which stadia represent the most meaningful comparators. The letter commissioning the Ellerbe Becket report requested that one of the topics the audit should consider was:

310

The Ellerbe Becket report confined itself to comparisons with two of these stadia—the Atlanta Olympic Stadium which Ellerbe Becket designed and Stadium Australia in Sydney, on which a number of the design team for Wembley had worked.[311] During a discussion about Olympic guidelines on the size of seats, Mr Sheard said the following:

312

96. Stadium Australia has minimum "C" 60 sight-lines based on a focal point on the outside edge of the outside lane around the whole track.[313] The Minister for Sport considered that Stadium Australia "has set the current benchmark for quality of sight-lines required for the Olympics. This was acknowledged by the Wembley design team at the recent Culture, Media and Sport Committee inquiry into Wembley."[314] We presume that this last assertion is a reference to Mr Sheard's comment above, although Mr Sheard's statement was not made in the specific context of sight-lines.

97. WNSL accepted that the new Wembley Stadium's sight-line and focal point characteristics were not of the same standard as Sydney or Atlanta, but did not accept that these purpose-built Olympic stadia were the most reasonable comparators for the new Wembley Stadium.[315] Both the Atlanta and Sydney stadia were built specifically for the Olympics in cities which had already been awarded the Games. The first event at Stadium Australia took place eighteen months before the Olympic Games.[316] According to WNSL, "stadia recently built specifically to stage the Olympics in the first instance have undergone or will undergo a major post-Olympic metamorphosis to convert them to a form more suited to their long-term use".[317] In Atlanta, one entire side of the Stadium was removed and re-built in a new configuration, a process which took approximately eight months to complete. In Sydney, the two, uncovered end stands will be removed, the roof extended and the lower tier pulled in by 16 metres.[318] Mr Sheard said that this process of conversion in Sydney would be funded partly as a result of proceeds from the Olympics.[319] The cost of this conversion is understood to be about A$65 million.[320] Mr Sheard stated that subsequent radical conversion of this kind was the "only condition" in which the sight-line and focal point standards at Sydney could be reconciled with long-term use.[321]

98. The brief for the new Wembley Stadium is quite different from that for a purpose-built Olympic Stadium. In stark contrast to the design brief for the purpose-built Olympic stadia in Atlanta and Sydney, WNSL is designing a football stadium with a potentiality for athletics on spec with no Olympic bid for London made, let alone approved. The new National Stadium is to be built in a country which has not been awarded the Olympic Games and which cannot rely on those Games as a source of finance. The Stadium is, however, intended to be capable of conversion for the Olympics.[322] Not only is there no certainty whatsoever about Olympic use, it is known that any such Olympic use would have no direct positive effect on the Stadium's funding.[323] WNSL maintained that a more valid comparison could be made with stadia with a comparable initial primary function other than the Olympics.[324]

99. WNSL considered that the proposed design at Wembley in athletics mode with a capacity of up to 80,000 would have "sight-line characteristics similar to those for Stade de France and a quality of spectator provisions far higher than Stade de France".[325] The focal point on the bends at the Stade de France was said by WNSL to be similar to that at Wembley.[326] Sport England have stated that "the Stade de France has significant numbers of seats with obstructed views when in athletics mode".[327]

100. The Ellerbe Becket report did not consider the sight-lines in the Stade de France. In its comment subsequent to the WNSL response, Ellerbe Becket noted that WNSL compared Wembley with Stade de France "which apparently achieves comparable sight-lines and focal points". Ellerbe Becket went on to point out that the Stade de France had permanent, retractable seating, a matter we considered earlier, but did not dispute WNSL's contentions about sight-lines and focal points at the Stade de France.[328] The Secretary of State said to us of Stade de France:

329

101. On 3 February 2000 the Minister for Sport answered a question about whether the standards for the focal point and sight-lines in the new Wembley Stadium with 80,000 seats in athletics mode were matched or exceeded by other stadia in Europe with capacities in excess of 75,000 as follows: "My Department has made no specific assessment of the Wembley proposals against other stadia in Europe".[330] WNSL contended that the minimum "C" values at the Barcelona Olympic Stadium (which had a capacity of 65,000) and the Athens Olympic Stadium were lower than the minimum "C" values at Wembley.[331] Why not?

102. Neither the Department for Culture, Media and Sport or the BOA have commented on these contentions in evidence. If WNSL's contentions are correct, the sight-line characteristics of the new Wembley Stadium in athletics mode with 80,000 seats are broadly comparable with the Stadium which last staged track and field events during the Olympics in Europe, with the Stadium which will next stage track and field athletics in the Olympics in Europe and with the Stadium which is expected to be central to the current Paris bid for the Olympics. Wembley Stadium does not meet standards established in design briefs for stadia to be built initially for the Olympics in 1996 and 2000 and thereafter to be subject to extensive modification to facilitate their long-term viability.

103. The Committee heard two attempts to convey the sight-line standards at Wembley in terms of the spectator experience—one from one of the Stadium's architects together with the Chief Executive of WNSL and another from the Chief Executive of the BOA. Mr Sheard stated that a "C" value of 60 mm based on a focal point in the second lane of the running track meant a direct sight-line moving through knee level to waist level if one looked towards the outside lane. To achieve a fuller view as an athlete moved around a bend, it would be necessary for the spectator to move his or her head to avoid the head of a person in a row below.[332] We were told that this requirement applied only to the bends of the track and only to people in about two to three thousand seats in the lower tier. Most track events most of the time take place either on the straight or are run round the bends without lane restrictions. Fourteen events use the outside lanes round the bends, including the 400 metres, the start of the 200 metres and the first bend of the 800 metres. In short, according to Mr Sheard, two to three thousand people would be affected for a total of eight minutes during the Olympics.[333]

104. To convince doubters, WNSL prepared a mock-up of seats and of a platform constructed in the existing stadium for interested parties.[334] This was attended by Mr Clegg who told us:

335

The BOA considered that "the sight-lines from seats proposed in either athletics or Olympic mode offer views with serious and unacceptable restrictions which would jeopardise any future Olympic bid".[336]

105. The Secretary of State referred several times in his evidence to the accounts of sight-lines in the mock-up from Mr Clegg and from officials of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.[337] The Secretary of State stressed that "the absolutely clear concrete evidence of when you actually create the seating on the ground and sit people in it has demonstrated that there is a problem".[338] Referring again to the BOA evidence, the Secretary of State said that "whatever the computer calculations may show when you actually look at the situation on the ground, it is unacceptable".[339]

106. When asked to comment specifically on the "C" 60 value, the Secretary of State confirmed that he understood the concept and referred to the view of Ellerbe Becket which was "not to be sneezed at".[340] The accounts of "C" values by Ellerbe Becket and WNSL are not in fact the heart of the difference between them: the statement by Ellerbe Becket that the "C" values of Wembley Stadium fall below "C" 60 with a focal point on the outside edge of the outside lane on the bends is not incompatible with WNSL's case. The Stadium design team's contention is that a focal point on the inside or second lane of the track on the bends represents the only practical solution except in a purpose-built Olympic Stadium requiring subsequent re-configuration to ensure long-term viability.[341] The Secretary of State made no reference to the focal point in his evidence. When asked whether WNSL had been informed of the ideal focal point, the Minister for Sport considered that they "probably ... were not".[342]

Conclusions

107. As a result of the unusual process of review and scrutiny which the new Wembley Stadium design has now undergone, two fundamental issues of contention remain: first, whether or not the platform solution represents a better response to the proposed future needs of the National Stadium than a system based on a permanently retractable seating system in the lower tier comparable to the Stade de France; second, whether the sight-line and focal point characteristics of the new Stadium in athletics mode with an 80,000-seat capacity meet the needs for major track and field events and in particular for the Olympics.

108. The viability of the platform solution for athletics does not appear to be in question. We consider that the platform solution also better reflects the balance of use of the Stadium than would a Stade de France-type solution. The second matter is quite distinct from the first. This Committee has received no evidence to substantiate the notion that the sight-line and focal point characteristics of the Stade de France are markedly superior to the equivalent qualities of the new Wembley Stadium and some evidence that they are inferior.

109. There is convincing evidence that Ministers diligently pressed Sport England and WNSL to demonstrate the capability of the design solution to provide 80,000 seats in athletics mode. There is no evidence that WNSL were required to combine such an increase in seating capacity with sight-line and focal point characteristics which would be comparable to purpose-built Olympic stadia and markedly superior to those of the 1992 and 2004 Olympic stadia and of the Stade de France. No technical evidence has emerged from the Ellerbe Becket report or from subsequent written and oral submissions to this Committee which contradicts WNSL's contentions about the new Wembley National Stadium's sight-line and focal point characteristics. The case against the Wembley design now rests almost entirely upon the personal impressions of some of those who attended an attempt by WNSL to demonstrate the worst sight-lines which would be provided within the new Stadium. Stadium design is now a technical process and we consider the evidence provided by WNSL to be satisfactory. The BOA's non-technical views seem to have had a disproportionate influence in the Secretary of State's decision-making.

163 Evidence, p 57. Back

164 HC (1998-99) 124-II, Q 548; Evidence, p 129. Back

165 HC (1998-99) 124-I, para 133; Q 338. Back

166 Q 95. Back

167 Evidence, pp 41, 58. Back

168 HC (1998-99) 124-II, Q 498. Back

169 Q 298. Back

170 HC (1998-99) 124-I, para 133. Back