Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 19

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the British Olympic Association

WEMBLEY INQUIRY—EVIDENCE TO THE CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE OF 27 JANUARY 2000

  Thank you for the copy of the transcripts of the oral evidence of Wembley National Stadium Limited and Sport England[11]. Both sets of witnesses made points in their evidence which related specifically to the BOA and the Olympic Games. To the extent that those points appear to us to be factually inaccurate, incomplete or frankly untrue we have set out the BOA's understanding to assist the Committee.

A.  THE EVIDENCE OF SPORT ENGLAND

  1.  Responding to questions on the National Stadium Monitoring Committee, Sport England stated[Q. 202] that "in contradiction to the BOA's evidence, the BOA were in fact invited to present to the Committee on 20 May 1999—unfortunately it could not attend". Sport England also referred to a letter from the former Minister for Sport of 24 May 1999 which mentioned a meeting of the Monitoring Committee.

  The BOA received no formal or written invitation to attend or to present to the Monitoring Committee on 20 May 1999 and has no recollection of any oral invitation. It is also true that the BOA received no invitation to attend or present at any previous or subsequent meetings of the Committee nor was it made aware that any such meetings were planned or taking place. The BOA was not informed of the purpose for which the Committee was established nor of what was discussed. The BOA has requested copies of all the minutes of all meetings of the Monitoring Committee but has so far not been offered nor has it seen such minutes (other than the minutes of the 20 May 1999 meeting which were attached to WNSL's response on 9 December 1999 to the Ellerbe Becket report).

  The letter from the former Minister for Sport of 24 May 1999 (a copy of which is enclosed[12]) does refer to a meeting of the Monitoring Committee several days earlier. At that stage however, from the passing reference to an unspecified Monitoring Committee it was not clear to the BOA who sat on the Committee, what its remit was or simply whether it was an internal DCMS group to monitor all the Department's work. It is only in the context of what we now know, that the significance of the Monitoring Committee is apparent.

  2.  Sport England was asked [Q. 234] whether anyone anywhere was thinking "we might be an Olympic bidder?" Sport England's reply stated that "at that time, the BOA, having had unsuccessful bids in Birmingham and Manchester, was taking stock about what should be done and a couple of statements by the Association were saying round about that time that they had not yet decided either to bid or indeed were to bid. Effectively it was not until the spring or summer of 1998 that the BOA decided that it would make a bid if it was viable and secondly it would be London."

  The BOA formally decided in its capacity as the National Olympic Committee at a meeting of the NOC on 4 December 1996 that the only viable option for a future Great Britain Olympic bid would be from London. At that same meeting it was also decided to commission a feasibility study into London's viability to host an Olympic Games and the BOA employed a projects officer to undertake this work on 17 January 1997. Four working groups were established to assist in the preparation of this study—the Environment, Transport, Olympic Village and Facilities Working Groups. Sport England is represented on the Facilities Working Group and has attended regular meetings since December 1997.

  3.  Sport England was asked [Q. 238] why they have failed to reply to the BOA's letter to them of 5 March 1998. In response, Sport England stated that they found it "somewhat surprising, because clearly over that period there was a tremendous amount of contact with the BOA by letter, by telephone, by briefings and by direct contact."

  The BOA's chronology appearing as an appendix to its written submissions to the inquiry sets out the prolonged lack of correspondence and interaction between the BOA and Sport England. In particular, Sport England failed entirely to respond to the BOA's letter of 5 March 1998 despite the BOA's efforts to elicit a response in its letters of 20 May 1998 and 10 July 1998.

  4.  Sport England was asked [Q. 239] why the BOA was not involved in the formulation of the design brief. Sport England in their reply stated that at a meeting on 5 July 1999 "the Minister went into great detail on how you were going to design the stadium in Olympic mode. I think that again last week it was suggested that three days before the actual launch was the first time they had seen the actual design. To be fair to the Minister, on 5 July he had gone through with the BOA . . . how that was going to be achieved".

  No work had been undertaken by 29 July 1999 on how to achieve a solution to accommodate Olympic requirements at Wembley. At their presentation to the BOA on 26 July 1999, it was clear that the design brief had not changed from the original brief to produce a football stadium which when converted into a track and field configuration would accommodate 65,000 spectators. Even at that presentation, the designers provided no information on how to upgrade the stadium to Olympic specifications. In fact, the BOA is not aware of any evidence to suggest that the Olympic dimension was part of the design brief. What we were presented with up to 29 July 1999 were the broad concepts and the broad design principles of an athletics deck and a later increase in seating capacity. It was not until the proposed solution of cramming additional seats into the lower tier was presented to the BOA in October 1999 that the BOA was aware that there were serious problems in relation to sightlines.

B.  THE EVIDENCE OF WEMBLEY NATIONAL STADIUM LIMITED (WNSL)

  1.  WNSL were asked [Q. 122] how much consultation there had been between them and the BOA during the design process. They replied that there had been none. They continued [Q. 124] by stating that the first time they had "heard from the BOA was in the spring/summer of 1999" in relation to the 1948 Olympic plaque. "We are not exactly a low profile organisation . . . I think one of the questions you should ask is why did not the BOA come to us and express their concerns some way back? We assumed that given our contact with UK Athletics, Sport England and DCMS, the BOA were completely happy."

  WNSL were commissioned by agreement with Sport England to carry out and implement Sport England's design brief for the stadium. As it was Sport England that conceived the design brief for the stadium in consultation with the English National Stadium Trust, it was not unreasonable that the BOA should have concentrated its efforts on the body responsible for determining what was to be constructed.

  2.  WNSL stated [Q. 126] that 80,000 seats for the Olympic Games "may be the Secretary of State's view, but that is certainly not the IOC's view or our view. We consulted the IOC . . . Statements from the IOC are 65,000 would be an acceptable capacity. What you had was the BOA's view of what they desired rather than the Olympic requirement."

  The IOC in fact stated in their letter to WNSL of 30 November 1999 that "the IOC does not have any specific requirements as to a capacity for Opening and Closing ceremonies at the Olympic Games. The IOC negotiates this number with the bid or host city. The capacity should be around 75,000 to 80,000 to be considered adequate, but it can go as high as 115,000".

  The BOA is the sole authority as to whether to allow a bid to proceed. Therefore the BOA's needs are a prerequisite. The IOC's procedures for Olympic bidding put the National Olympic Committee (the BOA) at the very centre of the process, requiring them to enter into a formal contract with the IOC. The ultimate authority as to where and when to bid rests with the BOA. It is therefore the BOA which must first be convinced of the viability of all facilities before it considers that a bid should be made. If the BOA is not satisfied that Olympic requirements have been met, the BOA will not make or sanction a bid. The BOA's views are therefore paramount.

  3.  WNSL stated [Q. 138] that the "Olympics is a collection of a whole range of sports and the sport we happen to be talking about at Wembley only is track and field events. "There is one clear technical adviser in the world of track and field and that is the IAAF. They lay down the rules to all track and field events, whether it is the Olympics or the World Championships or anything. That is the technical requirement we have conformed to."

  Olympic formality dictates that there is a main stadium for the Olympic Games in which the Opening and Closing ceremonies take place and in which the track and field events are run. The main stadium at an Olympic Games would therefore have a dual purpose. Whilst the IAAF decides on the technical specification for track and field athletics, the BOA decides on the adequacy of specifications for the Olympic stadium based on IOC, IAAF and other guidelines.

  WNSL stated [Q. 165] that they "have no idea why [the seats] are described as crammed". "These seats which are described as crammed are the same size seats as currently sit in the Royal Box."

  In athletics mode, in order to convert the stadium from 67,000 to 80,000 the lower tier would require over 80 per cent more seats to take the lower tier capacity from 16,100 to 29,100 in an area only 40 per cent larger. The BOA stated to the current Minister for Sport on 20 October 1999, that "if this can be achieved within the bounds of safety and without compromising the quality of seating, then it becomes a viable, albeit less attractive, Olympic option". The BOA was not asked to provide guidelines on seating quality. It is not unreasonable however for the BOA to have expected that the quality of seating in Olympic mode would be of a similar quality to the seating in non-Olympic mode.

  5.  WNSL stated [Q. 176] that the BOA "see themselves in Olympic bid mode now". "If you are trying to maximise your chances of winning the Olympics . . . the only way . . . is to build a purpose built Olympic venue. My distinct impression from talking to them and dealing with them is that they are never going to be happy unless we build a purpose built Olympic stadium . . ."

  The point is not whether the BOA is in Olympic bid mode now, what is important is that it has throughout this process sought to ensure that the design and construction of the new national stadium do not prevent it from being adapted satisfactorily for the Olympic Games. It is also contrary to the BOA's position to suggest that it would not be happy unless a purpose built stadium is built. The BOA has stated on many occasions and in correspondence to the current Minister for Sport (20 October 1999) that "if totally independent advisers can confirm that the additional seats can be added without compromising the quality of seating then I think it would be unreasonable for the BOA not to accept this option at the present time". WNSL's view that the BOA requires a purpose built Olympic Stadium is also contrary to the BOA's position that the stadium should be designed to be capable of being satisfactorily upgraded at a later stage in the event of a successful London Olympic bid.

  WNSL also stated [Q. 184] that the "BOA have become obsessed that if you build a stadium you win the Olympics. They have forgotten about the raft of other problems . . . Even if we build the stadium to satisfy the BOA they would not commit at this point to Wembley being the Olympic venue. I think they wish to keep their options open. That seems to be a ludicrous position".

  The BOA is fully aware of all the complexities of staging an Olympic Games. The BOA has not "forgotten about the raft of other problems". On the contrary, the BOA's Olympic bid Working Parties have been considering the environment, transport, Olympic Village and facilities issues for over two years. The feasibility study which is being prepared in tandem not only considers these core factors but also other issues such as costs, changes in law and the media. The resultant 250-page report has concentrated (as a result of assurances the BOA was given as to Wembley's suitability) on Wembley acting as the centrepiece of a future London Olympic bid.

  We hope that these explanations may be of assistance to the committee. Please let us know if there is any further clarification we can provide.

January 2000


11   HC (1999-2000) 164-ii. Back

12   Not printed. Back


 
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