IV. FUNDING OF THE BBC
Introduction
53. The Davies proposal for additional external funding
of around £150-£200 million a year is in addition to
£600 million per annum which is expected to become available
to the BBC by 2006 as a result of household growth and what are
termed "self-help measures".[172]
The number of households with a television licence rises regularly
over time as a result of household growth of 0.85 per cent per
annum. This is likely to produce additional income for the BBC
of between £80 million and £140 million a year by 2006.[173]
This figure is included in the total of £600 million, which
is otherwise based on the assumption that the so-called "self-help
measures" are "implemented as intended by the BBC".[174]
The Review suggested that the BBC might come closer to its "full
service vision" than would be provided for under the Review's
funding proposals if the BBC were to achieve "faster gains
in efficiency and commercial activities".[175]
Sir John Birt also held out the prospect of funding the BBC's
vision by thinking of how "we can stretch ourselves even
further to fund it [the vision] ourselves".[176]
We consider that the precise scope for savings from the BBC's
capacity to stretch itself should be rigorously explored before,
not after, decisions on external funding levels.
BBC efficiency savings
54. When we last considered the BBC's finances we
stated our expectation that the review of the BBC's funding "will
include a thorough examination of the scope for efficiency savings
in the Corporation in future years".[177]
Regrettably, this recommendation has been ignored. Mr Davies contended
that analysis of efficiency savings "required full-time attention
from experts" and that the Panel "just did not feel
we had the resources or time to do" a detailed investigation.[178]
We would not dispute either of these claims, but they do not explain
why an independent scrutiny was not commissioned to inform the
Davies Panel's recommendations.
55. Instead, the Davies Review suggested that the
Secretary of State commission a study on efficiency savings before
implementing the Panel's recommendations.[179]
Mr Chris Smith has agreed to this proposal and has in fact commissioned
an independent study of all the BBC's financial projections.[180]
The appointment of the consultants was announced in mid-November
and their findings will be submitted to Mr Smith by the end of
1999.[181]
A summary of these findings will be published when Mr Smith announces
his decision on the Davies Panel recommendations.[182]
This timetable precludes consideration of the findings during
this Committee's inquiry, let alone during the period of public
consultation on the Davies Review.
56. The Davies Panel accepted the contention of the
BBC that the level of savings achieved in the 1990s meant that
efficiency savings would be harder to achieve in future.[183]
The BBC contended that past efficiency gains resulted from step
changes which could not be replicated in future.[184]
Compared with savings averaging £89 million a year in the
last three years, the BBC foresees achieving savings around £60
million in coming years.[185]
Sir John Birt saw no scope at present for changes to these efficiency
targets. The "opportunities going forward are harder and
tougher than they have been in the recent past"; the targets
"will be very difficult indeed to achieve".[186]
57. In 1996, the BBC predicted that its efficiency
saving in 1997-98 would be below £20 million and the saving
in 1998-99 below £40 million.[187]
The actual savings achieved in these two years were £76 million
and £105 million respectively.[188]
Even allowing for the low levels of inflation in the period from
1996 to 1999, this discrepancy would suggest that the BBC's capacity
to predict its own potential for efficiency savings is not one
of its strongest suits. The independent study which preceded the
establishment of the five year funding formula from 1997 to 2002
concluded that the targets which the BBC had set itself were "not
stretching enough" and that there was "a scope for more
ambitious efficiency achievements" because of the "excessive"
discontinuity between past savings and projected future savings
and the higher yield from technology-based process improvement.[189]
58. We were disappointed at the statement of Mr Greg
Dyke, the BBC's Director-General-designate, that reductions in
overheads were already "factored into the numbers" for
future efficiency savings which he will inherit.[190]
Mr Chris Smith welcomed Mr Dyke's commitment "to seek to
shift more resources out of bureaucracy and into programme-making".[191]
We consider that this should in future be linked explicitly to
a pursuit of savings beyond those already planned. Sir Christopher
Bland claimed that "the BBC is now a pretty efficient organisation",
but accepted that "it is not world class".[192]
Should the independent study of BBC projections which the Secretary
of State for Culture, Media and Sport has now commissioned find
that any BBC targets for efficiency savings are under-estimates,
we recommend that any differential should be taken into account
when assessing BBC claims of a funding shortfall, rather than
being left for the BBC to spend on such unspecified services as
it thinks fit.
BBC Worldwide
59. On previous occasions this Committee and its
predecessor have argued that the BBC should do much more to enhance
the cash flow benefits from its commercial subsidiary, BBC Worldwide.[193]
We previously characterised the BBC's target of increasing the
net benefit to the BBC from the activities of BBC Worldwide to
£200 million a year by 2006 as "markedly unambitious".[194]
In its consideration of BBC "self-help", the Davies
Panel argued that the current targets are "demanding"
and "it will be difficult to exceed them by any substantial
amount, even if the culture of the BBC gives greater emphasis
to commercial activities in future".[195]
60. Elsewhere, the Panel appeared to take a somewhat
different view. It argued that the BBC's archive has been under-exploited
for too long.[196]
It stated that it is "convinced that there is considerable
scope to increase commercial revenues".[197]
Of the £200 million target, the Panel shared "the Select
Committee's view that the growth potential could far exceed that
figure".[198]
The Davies Panel believed, however, that this further growth potential
would be tapped only by structural change within BBC Worldwide.[199]
The Review recommended that private funding of BBC Worldwide should
be increased rapidly to 49 per cent through an injection of private
capital at holding company level.[200]
The Panel estimated that a 49 per cent stake in the non-channel
business of BBC Worldwide could be worth about £200 million.[201]
The Review acknowledged that this part-privatisation would reduce
the profits returned to the BBC, but argued that such lost profits
"could be quickly made up by the increase in the activities
of BBC Worldwide which private involvement would bring about".[202]
61. The BBC, in its response to the consultation
on the Panel's work, argued that the 49 per cent private stake
at holding company level would probably reduce the future value
earned from BBC Worldwide by licence payers because of potential
conflict over brand and editorial values, the threat to current
and future partnerships and the possible under-valuation of assets
involved in the sale.[203]
The BBC was confident that existing relationships developed by
BBC Worldwide would "build over time towards the 49 per cent
level of private capital investment in BBC Worldwide's activities
recommended by the Panel".[204]
BECTU argued that the Davies Panel had ignored the injection of
entrepreneurship into BBC Worldwide resulting from recent management
change and believed that it was too early to judge whether the
"new commercial managers" would deliver improved results.[205]
BECTU agreed that BBC Worldwide was "not contributing as
much as it should" to the BBC, but believed part-privatisation
would actually reduce income flow to the BBC.[206]
The proposal from the Panel did not answer "any of the problems
raised. It is just another fudge that will complicate the matter
even more."[207]
62. Although we share the view of the Davies Panel
that the growth potential of BBC Worldwide is far greater than
the present targets for the organisation imply, we do not believe
that partial privatisation is a recipe for increasing receipts
for the benefit of the BBC as a whole. We reject the Davies
Panel recommendation for a 49 per cent private sector share in
BBC Worldwide at holding company level. We do, however, continue
to believe that the BBC must prove its capacity for much greater
increases in net cash flow from BBC Worldwide to the BBC in coming
years under the current organisational arrangements.
BBC Resources
63. BBC Resources Limited was established in 1998
as the second commercial arm of the BBC. Over 4,000 staff were
transferred into the Company. The aim of granting BBC Resources
this status was to give it the freedom to seek external income
in "a vigorous and unfettered fashion", tapping into
a potentially vast global market.[208]
The Company's target is to generate an additional cash flow of
£82 million over the next five years.[209]
According to the Director-General of the BBC, "BBC Resources
Limited and its staff are a valued and integral part of the BBC".[210]
In considering incorporation, Mr Chris Smith was quoted as saying
"I want to make sure that this cannot be used as a ramp for
privatisation".[211]
64. The Davies Review recommended that BBC Resources
Limited be privatised.[212]
The Panel argued that this would free the organisation from fair
trading constraints. The Review considered that "a market
exists with a number of competitors that are likely to be interested
and who have the ability to realise synergy and develop the commercial
potential" for BBC Resources.[213]
The Panel noted that the BBC's craft base should not be undermined
and the BBC's role as the primary investor in core broadcast skills
should not be diluted as a result of the measure.[214]
The privatisation of BBC Resources was supported in only one submission
received by this Committee, that from ntl, although its reasons
for doing so were not given.[215]
65. BBC Resources already competes in a competitive
market: producers are free to employ either in-house or external
technical staff.[216]
There is already significant use of staff and equipment from the
external market.[217]
Mr Dyke said that experience in Australia indicated that Resources
could only be sold in return for guaranteed business at a guaranteed
price.[218]
This would, of course, run counter to the freedom to choose the
external market. Helen Black, in dissenting from the Davies Panel
recommendation, argued that "ultimately the BBC would end
up paying more for programmes than it currently does".[219]
This view appeared to be shared by Lord Gordon of Strathblane,
who was "lukewarm" about the Panel's proposal even though
he had not dissented from it.[220]
Others were also of the view that costs would increase as a consequence
of privatisation.[221]
66. BECTU considered that any increase in costs would
not be offset by sale proceeds on the scale anticipated by the
Davies Panel. The Review estimated that a 100 per cent stake in
BBC Resources would be worth in the region of £230 million
and thought that the "bulk" of it should be sold.[222]
BECTU believed that this valuation was too high, being based on
a 1998 business plan which was already superseded by the time
the Davies Panel reported. BECTU thought a more up-to-date and
realistic valuation was £100-£120 million.[223]
It also argued that the BBC would need to compensate new employers
for any inherited redundancy entitlements.[224]
67. Technological progress should make it more possible
in future for the BBC to achieve greater "vertical integration"
between production and resources functions.[225]
This approach is already adopted by other broadcasters and is
a potential means of obtaining efficiency savings.[226]
According to BECTU, "if Resources were privatised that opportunity
would be lost to the BBC".[227]
68. ITN, a rival of the BBC, notes that BBC Resources
"still plays an important role in equipping individuals with
important skills and training for careers across broadcasting
and production".[228]
The Davies Panel did not explain how the BBC would continue its
role as this country's "primary investor in core broadcast
skills" following privatisation.[229]
BECTU argued that "the largest technical training resource
in British broadcasting" would disappear.[230]
In an industry increasingly characterised by freelance employment,
core skills for broadcasting and the film industry would be lost.[231]
We recommend that the Secretary of State for Culture, Media
and Sport rejects the recommendation of the Davies Panel that
the bulk of BBC Resources be privatised.
The Digital Licence Supplement
69. As its principal proposed measure designed to
meet the perceived need for "buoyancy" in the BBC's
external revenues, the Davies Review recommended that, with effect
from 1 April 2000, a digital licence supplement should be introduced
at a level of £1.99 a month, and that the level of the supplement
should fall to 99 pence a month by 2006.[232]
Several arguments are adduced by the Panel in support of the supplement.
These arguments can be summarised as follows: first, "it
is unfair to charge analogue households for the development of
digital services which they cannot receive";[233]
second, there are precedents for charging more for new services,
including the introduction of television itself and the introduction
of colour television;[234]
third, once the initial decision was taken by Government to introduce
the supplement, "it would remove the BBC licence fee from
the arena of political controversy for many years to come".[235]
70. In support of the argument that "those who
benefit should pay" for digital television, Mr Davies stated
that "the vast majority of licence fee payers, of whatever
means, are paying £10 to subsidise those of us who choose
to watch digital TV".[236]
However, the Director-General of the BBC himself stated to the
National Heritage Committee in 1996:
"We think we can justify investments in new
technologies or new services, provided always our judgement is
in the long-term all licence fee payers who wish to are likely
to be able to receive it".[237]
The television licence fee is a general payment for
a whole range of BBC services, not all of which are accessed by
or accessible to all licence fee payers. The implications of applying
a "user pays principle" to the licence fee are very
considerable.[238]
They have not been fully explored by the Davies Panel.
71. The Davies Review recommended that its proposed
digital licence supplement be reduced and eventually phased out
over time, a point which Mr Davies felt had been largely over-looked
in media coverage of the Review.[239]
This aspect of the supplement was in fact seen by some as particularly
worthy of attention as an argument against its introduction. Lord
Gordon of Strathblane, the member of the Panel who disagreed with
the recommendation for a digital supplement, argued that "those
considering a switch from analogue will be tempted to wait until
the digital licence supplement has reduced before actually switching",
thus deferring digital take-up.[240]
Mr Peter Rogers, Chief Executive of the ITC, thought that a digital
supplement which declined over time and therefore benefited those
waiting longer was "worst of all".[241]
72. The prospect which the Davies Panel held out
that the digital licence supplement, once introduced, "would
remove the BBC licence fee from the arena of political controversy
for many years to come" is a mirage.[242]
The digital licence supplement is set at a cash figure for the
period to 2006-07, starting at £1.99 and ending at 99 pence.
These figures are consciously arrived at and are not presumably
intended to be adjusted for inflation.[243]
They have already been questioned in quite abrupt terms by the
BBC: "The Panel cites no evidence which leads them to recommend
a £1.99 figure as opposed to £2.99 or £3.99 a month".[244]
We do not accept the view of the Davies Panel about factors affecting
what will or will not be a matter of political controversy in
coming years. Setting aside for one moment the controversy surrounding
the proposed supplement itself, there is no obvious reason why
its level should not become the subject for debate, not least
because the BBC, like Oliver Twist, can be relied on to ask for
more.
73. The United Kingdom is leading the way in the
development of digital television.[245]
The vibrant market in this country assists in creating business
opportunities in international markets.[246]
Ondigital is a world leader in digital terrestrial television.[247]
BSkyB has the biggest digital satellite platform in Europe.[248]
A great deal of money is being invested by private companies in
this embryonic industry, involving high degrees of risk.[249]
These commercial organisations have argued that a digital licence
supplement would substantially reduce their return on this investment.[250]
74. Mr Davies was highly sceptical about the motivation
of those who criticised the digital supplement as a "tax
on technology": he called this "a slogan coined by people
in whose interests it is to maintain the status quo ... the present
status quo is obviously of benefit in the short-term to the private
sector digital industry".[251]
However, characterisation of the digital supplement as a tax on
innovation is not confined to the private sector. The current
Director-General of the BBC described a digital supplement as
"in effect a tax on innovation" in 1996, even though
he has subsequently changed his mind on the merits of a digital
supplement.[252]
The same term is used by Mr Peter Ainsworth MP, the Shadow Secretary
of State for Culture, Media and Sport, in the Conservative Party's
submission to the Davies Panel.[253]
75. There is a consensus that imposition of a digital
licence supplement would delay take-up of digital television.
In 1996 the BBC told the National Heritage Committee that such
a supplement "would in fact inhibit and delay the growth
of digital broadcasting in Britain".[254]
Mr Davies himself acknowledged that "it would be foolish
to pretend" that the disincentive effect on digital take-up
did not exist.[255]
The only matter of contention is the extent of that disincentive.
The Davies Panel did not believe that "the damaging effectmeasured
over a period of yearswill be large".[256]
An alliance of broadcasters, programme-makers and equipment manufacturers
vigorously disputes this view, pointing to research by National
Economic Research Associates (NERA) which they commissioned which
suggested that some 5.2 million less households would have converted
to digital television by 2008 in consequence of the supplement.[257]
76. Mr Davies disputed the validity of NERA's findings.
He argued that the study had "substantially exaggerated the
price effects of the digital supplement" and believed that
the fall in take-up suggested was "way too high ... implausibly
too high".[258]
Mr Davies' critique is in turn disputed by NERA. That body pointed
out that the methodology for its study was well-established, having
been previously employed for a study on digital take-up for the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. NERA stressed that any
decision which dissuaded people from buying integrated digital
televisions in 2000 was likely to have a continuing impact after
2006, since television sets are usually replaced about every eight
years.[259]
Mr Chris Smith told us that he took the conclusions of the NERA
study very seriously and was examining NERA's evidence very carefully.[260]
77. We received evidence to support the contention
that the digital television audience was highly price sensitive.
For example, Ondigital offers subscription packages at £9.99
and £11.99 and finds that "a good proportion of people
choose the first of those".[261]
As Mr Stuart Prebble, Ondigital's Chief Executive put it, "it
feels self-evident that if something costs additional money then
people are less likely to take it up than if it does not".[262]
Mr Chris Smith confirmed that he would consider the competing
claims about the impact of the supplement on take-up before reaching
his decision and added that the Department for Culture, Media
and Sport's chief economist would provide impartial advice on
the differing analyses of this impact.[263]
78. Given that the Secretary of State has set a target
level of take-up before analogue switch-off and that the digital
licence supplement will slow take-up, it is an almost inevitable
consequence that the supplement will push back the date of analogue
switch-off. The Davies Panel contended that its proposal is designed
so as not to "conflict in any way with the possibility of
analogue switch-over in about ten years' time".[264]
To this end, the Panel envisaged that the supplement would disappear
by 2010.[265]
This is problematic in several ways. First, there is likely to
be pressure for retention of the supplement once introduced. Second,
the argument ignores the disincentive effect on early take-up
among those waiting for the supplement to end. The NERA study
suggests that the supplement might delay switch-off by three years
and argues that the proposal is therefore "incompatible with
the Government's plans for switch over from analogue to digital
transmissions".[266]
79. The digital licence supplement will fall initially
on "early adopters" of digital television. As Lord Gordon
of Strathblane, a member of the Davies Panel, noted, "people
are not switching to digital to watch the BBC programmes, they
are switching to digital to watch the other programmes".[267]
The BBC itself acknowledges that "Digital early adopters
have very specific viewing preferences. They are primarily interested
in sports and film channels."[268]
In effect, those who watch the BBC least will pay the most for
the privilege.
80. The Davies Panel noted that "a digital licence
supplement at the levels suggested (averaging £1.57 per month
over the next seven years) is small compared with the cost of
commercial subscription packages which range up to £29.99
a month".[269]
The Panel ignored the fact that those who subscribe to commercial
digital services choose to do so, while a digital licence supplement
would be compulsory. Moreover, the Panel's comparison is misleading.
Basic digital packages cost far less than the figure cited. Telewest,
for example, offers a £5 a month entry package.[270]
More importantly, digital television is available simply as a
free-to-air service, either following purchase of an integrated
digital television or installation of a BSkyB dish.[271]
The digital licence supplement would bear heavily on those only
able to afford free-to-air digital television.[272]
It would negate at a stroke the BBC's earlier promise to deliver
digital services to licence fee payers "at no extra charge".[273]
81. The Davies Panel made much of the comparison
with the introduction of colour television and of a colour licence
fee in proposing a digital licence supplement.[274]
Lord Lipsey described the two situations as "very analogous".[275]
In fact, the comparison is false. First, at the time of the switch
from black and white to colour, the BBC's services were at the
core of the improved offering for which people were being asked
to pay. For those seeking to switch to digital television, BBC
services are currently perceived as peripheral.[276]
Also, the technological change is of a different order. Black
and white television sets still work. It is the Government's stated
policy to render analogue televisions without digital capability
obsolete.[277]
There is a public policy imperative behind the switch from analogue
to digital which simply did not apply to the switch from black
and white to colour.
82. Commercial broadcasters also argued that collection
of the digital licence supplement would pose considerable difficulties,
particularly in relation to those who switched between providers
or ceased to subscribe at all.[278]
Mr Chris Smith told us that he was considering the ease and cost
of collection of the supplement as one factor in reaching his
final decision.[279]
83. The Davies Panel described the current licence
fee as "a good way of financing public service broadcasting",
but "a very bad way of taxing the public".[280]
Yet, according to opinion polling commissioned by the Davies Panel,
the digital supplement is much more unpopular than the main licence
fee.[281]
Since there are already well over 2 million digital subscribers,
it would be perceived as being, in effect, retrospective.[282]
The digital licence supplement would slow take-up of digital
television and delay analogue switch-off. It would hamper the
possibility of marginally free digital television being available
to consumers and would accordingly bear most heavily on the most
disadvantaged in society. In short, it would run directly counter
to the objectives of public policy. Regardless of any decision
on the funding requirements of the BBC, we recommend that the
proposal of the Davies Review for a digital licence supplement
should be rejected.
The five-year funding settlement, 1997-2002
84. The Davies Panel did consider the possibility
that the digital licence supplement might be rejected. Accordingly,
they made an alternative proposaltermed "the analogue
option"for an increase in the licence fee of £5
in 2000-01 and a further increase by the same amount in 2001-02.[283]
Lord Gordon of Strathblane also argued for increasing the licence
fee "very marginally" in these years, by £3 in
2000-01 and £4 in 2001-02.[284]
He thought that an increase of £5 to £7 would "not
cause too much public outrage".[285]
85. As we noted earlier, the five-year funding settlement
was put in place in 1996 precisely in order to fund the BBC's
involvement in digital television. The settlement linked the licence
fee to inflation in 1997-98, but offered the BBC above-inflation
increases in 1998-99 and 1999-2000, to be off-set by increases
below inflation in 2000-01 and 2001-02. The overall effect of
the settlement was to provide the BBC with funding 0.08 per cent
below inflation over five years.[286]
In consequence of the implementation of this formula, the licence
fee has risen from £89.50 in 1996-97 to its present level
of £101.00, an increase of almost 13 per cent in three years.[287]
86. The new Government decided in December 1997 that
the five-year settlement "remains appropriate".[288]
In December 1998, after the appointment of Mr Davies to chair
the Panel, the Government re-affirmed its commitment to the five-year
settlement and confirmed that the licence fee increases in 2000-01
and 2001-02 would be "below inflation".[289]
The position of the settlement in relation to the work of the
Davies Panel was set out by the Government in its published reply
to a Report from this Committee in terms which leave no room for
doubt or equivocation:
"The review will not reconsider the current
five-year formula for the level of the licence fee until 2002,
announced in April 1997 following an independent assessment of
the BBC's funding needs ... The Government will consider the level
of the licence fee after 2002 following completion of the review."[290]
87. The Davies Panel accepted that its second-best
proposal "breaches the present licence fee settlement"
and that "the five-year settlement should not be re-opened".[291]
Even Lord Gordon of Strathblane conceded that "it is a bad
idea in principle to disturb the current licence fee settlement".[292]
Nowhere did the Davies Panel explain the overwhelming imperative
which should lead the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport to renege on his firm and repeated commitment to the five-year
funding formula.
88. Mr Davies referred to his secondary alternative
as an increase in the "analogue licence fee".[293]
But the current licence fee has increased above inflation in recent
years and privatisation proceeds have been granted to the BBC
precisely to fund its digital services. As Lord Gordon noted,
"the presumption must be that the BBC would not have started
services as prudent managers of a public-funded organisation unless
they could fund them".[294]
A similar point was made by Mr Prebble:
"They [the BBC] would have been irresponsible,
and I am sure the BBC would not have done it, to launch all of
these services and assume that at some point in the future somebody
would give them a large sum of money. So they must have had that
in their business plan."[295]
89. The BBC has known the profile of its external
income from 1997 to 2002 for several years: significant rises
initially, followed by a relative decline. It was the duty of
the BBC to cut its coat according to the cloth. The Secretary
of State reaffirmed his commitment to the five-year funding formula
and explicitly excluded the matter from consideration by the Davies
Panel earlier this year. We see no possible justification for
the Secretary of State to resile from that position. We recommend
that the level of the licence fee in 2000-01 and 2001-02 should
be set in accordance with the settlement announced in 1996 by
the previous Government and endorsed by the present Government.
Concessions and fairness
(i) The licence fee and income distribution
90. When we considered the BBC's work in the Autumn
of 1998, we described concessionary licences as "one of the
most pressing matters to be considered by the funding review".[296]
The Panel observed that this issue attracted more correspondence
than any other aspect of the review.[297]
The Davies Review considered concessions in the light of its lapidary
remark that "the licence fee, correctly described, is a tax
and a poor tax at that".[298]
The licence fee is "highly regressive", representing
1.7 per cent of the net incomes of the poorest ten per cent of
the population.[299]
The licence fee as a funding mechanism is "not well suited
to solving problems of income distribution";[300]
"the alleviation of poverty is not a broadcasting issue";[301]
the BBC should not be used "as a surrogate social security
department".[302]
(ii) Free television licences for those aged 75
and over
91. The Davies Panel concluded that "an easy
solution" to problems related to concessions "does not
exist within the confines of broadcasting finance".[303]
The Panel decided that any concessions funded by the Treasury
were outside its terms of reference.[304]
The analysis of the Davies Panel, however, together with advocacy
of free television licences for those aged 75 or over by all political
parties represented on this Committee, forms part of the background
to the recent Government announcement.[305]
92. In his Pre-Budget Statement on 9 November 1999,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that, from the Autumn
of the year 2000, every pensioner aged 75 or over will receive
the television licence free of charge: every one of the 3 million
households including a pensioner aged 75 or over would be able
to save £101.[306]
Mr Chris Smith welcomed a measure which provided "a real
benefit to many of the poorest households in this country".[307]
He considered it preferable to a general increase in the pension
because it would be available as a lump sum to meet a lump sum
charge and because it would not be taken into account in calculations
of other benefits such as Housing Benefit.[308]
93. The BBC was not consulted before the Chancellor's
announcement was made and further details about the precise mechanism
by which payment will be made to individuals is not yet determined.[309]
We explored some of the practical implications of the scheme with
witnesses. Mr John Smith, the BBC's Director of Finance, said
that, to "minimise fraud", a licence of nil value would
be issued to those aged 75 and over.[310]
Ms Patricia Hodgson, the BBC's Director of Policy and Planning,
said that the BBC was keen to maintain the principle of liability
on individual households; the legal obligation to hold a valid
licence would remain even for those aged 75 and over.[311]
We put it to Mr Chris Smith that there was accordingly a possibility
that someone aged 75 or over could be fined or imprisoned for
not obtaining a free licence. He viewed this only as a "technical
possibility" which was "unlikely to occur".[312]
He did not think that "such a hypothetical problem"
should "disrupt a sensible administrative procedure".[313]
Nevertheless, a prevailing sense that the obligation to obtain
a licence did not apply to those aged 75 or over or that normal
sanctions would never be applied might undermine a system based
on a compulsory licence without a face value.
94. In an inquiry into the BBC and its funding
we do not propose to comment on the merits of a social security
measure concerned in part with the alleviation of poverty. We
consider, however, that the new scheme for those aged 75 and over
should be introduced in a way as well-suited as possible to the
needs of broadcasting finance. In our view, the scheme would work
best as a voucher system in which all persons aged 75 and over
would be issued, as part of their old age pension, with a voucher
for the full cost of a colour television licence, currently £101.
This system has several advantages: first, it clarifies the obligation
to obtain a television licence (at its face value) and thus greatly
reduces the problems of collection and enforcement; second, it
would switch the burden of determining eligibility from an organisation
which has no business in knowing people's agesthe BBCto
one which doesthe Department of Social Security; third,
it provides those aged 75 or over who feel on financial or other
grounds that they wish to pay the full licence fee with an opportunity
to do so, thus saving the taxpayer money; and, finally, it will
remove a financial disincentive from having a colour television
for those old age pensioners aged 75 or over who either do not
currently possess a television or who have a black and white television,
thus potentially improving their quality of life.
(iii) The concession for blind people
95. When the radio licence was abolished in 1971,
its value (£1.25) was converted into an ongoing discount
for blind people if they chose to have a standard television (as
opposed to a sound-only television receiver). Blind people do
not have to pay any licence fee if they have a sound-only television
receiver, but many blind people naturally would want a television
set with pictures in their home, either for those who live with
them or for visitors.[314]
The Royal National Institute for the Blind described the current
concession as "derisory" and proposed that it be increased
to £50.[315]
The Davies Panel recommended that the concession be set at 50
per cent of the full colour licence fee.[316]
We have received a great deal of correspondence in support of
this proposal. We wholeheartedly endorse the recommendation
of the Davies Panel that a 50 per cent concession on the cost
of the full colour licence fee should be available for registered
blind people and congratulate the Panel and the Royal National
Institute for the Blind for identifying the insulting inadequacy
of the previous concession.
(iv) Collection and payment methods
96. The BBC assumed responsibility for licence fee
collection in 1991. Since then collection costs have fallen along
with levels of evasion. According to Sir John Birt, "this
has been a major success story".[317]
This is attributed first and foremost to measures which the BBC
has taken to make the licence fee easier to pay for those who
find it hard to budget for a single lump sum payment.[318]
The schemes introduced were examined by the Davies Panel, which
noted that the "Cash Easy Entry" scheme, designed for
those on income-related benefits, required its users to pay for
two licences in the first year of operation. The Review recommended
that this scheme should be put on the same payment schedule as
the "Monthly Cash Plan", a proposal already accepted
by the BBC.[319]
97. We were disappointed that the Panel did not comment
upon the single most popular instalment payment schemethe
"Quarterly Budget Scheme" which is used by 23 per cent
of all licence fee payers. Under this Scheme, licence fee payers
make four quarterly payments to the BBC, each with a £1.25
surcharge, supposedly because the payments are in arrears.[320]
We put to Mr Chris Smith that such a system was not right. He
agreed that this was "an entirely valid point" which
the BBC "ought to address".[321]
It is wrong that the BBC actively solicits licence fee payers
to switch to a payment system which requires them to pay £106
for a £101 licence fee. We recommend that the additional
charge for payment by direct debit be discontinued with effect
from 1 April 2000.
98. The BBC estimated that it could achieve cumulative
savings of £50-70 million per year by 2006 as a result in
improvements in the efficiency of collection.[322]
The Davies Panel was impressed by improvements in licence fee
collection and by those now responsible for collection.[323]
Granada Media argued, however, that the BBC target of £70
million was "unambitious", not least because digital
television would make evasion harder than ever.[324]
We have not examined collection in detail in this inquiry. We
note that the National Audit Office already has the power to examine
the BBC's arrangements for collecting the licence fee and that
it and the Committee of Public Accounts have not done so since
the BBC assumed responsibility for collection.[325]
This may be a fruitful area for scrutiny in the near future.
99. The BBC's enforcement procedures have the weight
of the criminal law behind them. Many people are fined for non-payment
of their licence fee. In turn, a significant, but diminishing
number are jailed for failure to pay the resultant fine: 728 people
were jailed in 1995 and 148 in 1998, of whom a significant proportion
were women.[326]
The BBC has previously expressed the hope that the Crime Sentences
Act 1998, which increases the range of non-custodial sentences
for those not paying fines, would further reduce the use of imprisonment.[327]
Sir Christopher Bland said that the sooner the number imprisoned
"is zero the better".[328]
100. The National Consumer Council implied that a
switch away from custodial sentences for non-payment of fines
was not enough. It recommended that "non-possession of a
TV licence should be de-criminalised and treated in the same way
as other debts through the civil courts".[329]
It argued that criminal sanctions did not apply for other public
services and did not believe that collection costs would be much
greater.[330]
Mr Chris Smith noted that any change would require the involvement
of other Ministers in other Departments. His initial view was
that the present system worked well because "the criminal
sanctions have not had to be applied in enormous numbers".[331]
The BBC said that the question of whether the criminal law continued
to apply rather than civil sanctions was a matter for Parliament,
but that their aim was "to get a sale not a prosecution".[332]
We recommend that the Lord Chancellor's Department and the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport commission a report for
publication during the first half of the year 2000 on the implications
both of removing the sanction of custodial sentences for non-payment
of fines for licence evasion and of de-criminalising failure to
possess a licence altogether.
(v) A fairer licence fee?
101. The Davies Review noted that "while the
licence fee is a good way of financing public service broadcasting,
it is a very bad way of taxing the public". The Panel confessed
that "we have joined several previous committees in failing
to identify ways of making the system obviously fairer".[333]
The Panel touched upon but rejected the idea of a supplementary
licence for households with more than one television set.[334]
Mr Davies told us that his Panel had found that "the multiple
television households in the UK are not very highly correlated
with income or wealth; they seem to be better correlated with
family type".[335]
Such a charge would also impose considerable hurdles for collection.[336]
102. The Davies Panel also examined the system of
business licences.[337]
The Review decided that any extension of the licence payable by
hotels would penalise small hotels.[338]
The Panel thought that any extension to other businesses would
raise little extra revenue, but would involve considerable collection
costs.[339]
We do not question these judgements of the Davies Panel, but consider
that avenues for exploration should not be closed off for good.
(vi) Sub-titling
103. No concession on the licence fee is available
to those who are deaf or hard of hearing, nor was such a concession
proposed by the Davies Review.[340]
In order to provide a full service for those who are deaf or hard
of hearing8.7 million people according to the Royal National
Institute for the Deaf, of whom 5 million use sub-titles regularlyit
is essential that sub-titling is widely available on BBC services.[341]
The BBC aims to adhere to targets for sub-titling set by the ITC
for other broadcasters and also to be "ahead of the rest
of the industry as a matter of policy".[342]
It is notable that the BBC's terrestrial channels do not appear
to be markedly ahead of ITC channels in terms of sub-titling,
although we have not had the opportunity to explore the interpretation
of these figures.[343]
104. The Davies Panel examined the proposals of the
BBC for sub-titling on its digital services. The Review described
the current target, which is for sub-titling of only 50 per cent
of programmes ten years after launch of digital terrestrial television,
as "wholly inadequate".[344]
The Panel recommended that the BBC should aim to achieve 50 per
cent of programmes on new digital services being sub-titled in
the next five years and 100 per cent by 2009.[345]
This recommendation has already been supported by the BBC.[346]
We consider it a matter for regret that the BBC as a public sector
broadcaster needed external prompting to establish stretching
targets for sub-titling, but we also support the Davies recommendation,
with one amendment which may or may not be of significance. We
recommend that the target of 100 per cent sub-titling of programmes
of BBC digital services should be set for 2009 or the date of
analogue switch-off, whichever is the earlier.
The level of the BBC licence fee, 2002-2006
105. Mr Chris Smith told us that he believed now
was the time to reach a decision on the BBC's remit and funding
in the medium term in order to try to "shape the broadcasting
world for the benefit of the viewing public".[347]
He expected to give a clear view on the level of the licence fee
in the period to 2006 in announcing his response to the Davies
Review.[348]
We do not believe that now is the right time to determine the
BBC's funding beyond 2002. Change in broadcasting is accelerating
and the BBC's capacity to account for its own role has not kept
pace with this change. The questions referred to earlier about
the BBC's impact on the commercial market are become increasingly
pressing. The present arrangements for the accountability and
regulation of the BBC are not sustainable to 2006. Funding decisions
for the period from 2002 to 2006 should only follow after a fundamental
reconsideration of the BBC's role and remit.
172 6Ibid,
p 55. Back
173 Ibid,
pp 46, 55. Back
174 Ibid,
p 55. Back
175 Ibid,
p 57. Back
176 Q
268. Back
177 HC
(1997-98) 1090, para 38. Back
178 Q
37. Back
179 Davies
Review, p 54. Back
180 HC
Deb, 29 October 1999, col 1213. Back
181 Department
for Culture, Media and Sport News Release 281, 17 November 1999. Back
182 HC
Deb, 29 October 1999, col 1213. Back
183 Davies
Review, p 39; Q 38. Back
184 Evidence,
pp 184-185. Back
185 Ibid;
Q 38. Back
186 Q
723. Back
187 Setting
the Level, p 13. Back
188 BBC
Report and Accounts 1998-99,
p 9. Back
189 Setting
the Level, p 13. Back
190 Q
292. Back
191 Q
685. Back
192 Q
721. Back
193 HC
(1993-94) 77-I, para 101; HC (1997-98) 1090, paras 11-14. Back
194 Ibid,
para 14. Back
195 Davies
Review, p 53. Back
196 Ibid,
pp 27, 90. Back
197 Ibid,
p 90. Back
198 Ibid,
p 98. Back
199 Ibid,
p 97; Evidence, p 16. Back
200 Davies
Review, pp 98-99. Back
201 Ibid,
p 99. Back
202 Ibid. Back
203 BBC
Response, pp 29-30. Back
204 Ibid,
p 30. Back
205 QQ
532, 533, 534, 536, 537. Back
206 Q
533; Evidence, p 139. Back
207 Q
537. Back
208 BBC
Resources Report and Accounts 1998-99,
pp 1, 6; Davies Review, p 100. Back
209 Davies
Review, pp 96, 99. Back
210 BBC
Resources Report and Accounts 1998-99,
p 1. Back
211 Evidence,
p 136. Back
212 Davies
Review, p 100. Back
213 Ibid. Back
214 Ibid. Back
215 Evidence,
p 145. Back
216 Evidence,
p 136. Back
217 Q
527. Back
218 Q
319. Back
219 Davies
Review, p 103, fn. Back
220 Q
67. Back
221 Evidence,
pp 137-138, 246. Back
222 Davies
Review, pp 100, 103. Back
223 Q
525; Evidence, p 137. Back
224 Ibid. Back
225 Evidence,
pp 265, 216, 138. Back
226 QQ
528, 543. Back
227 Q
528. Back
228 Evidence,
p 262. See also Q 545. Back
229 Davies
Review, p 100. Back
230 Evidence,
p 138. Back
231 Q
538. Back
232 Davies
Review, p 87. Back
233 Ibid,
p 6. Back
234 Ibid,
p 21; Q 45. Back
235 Davies
Review, p 21. Back
236 Evidence,
p 1. Back
237 HC
(1996-97) 147-II, Q 17. Back
238 Q
331. Back
239 Davies
Review, p 84; Q 1; Evidence,
p 2. Back
240 Davies
Review, p 87, fn; Q 99. Back
241 Q
205. Back
242 Davies
Review, p 74. Back
243 Ibid,
p 84; QQ 9, 63. Back
244 BBC
Response, p 24. Back
245 Q
416. Back
246 Evidence,
p 250. Back
247 Evidence,
pp 102, 248; Q 416. Back
248 Q
416. Back
249 Evidence,
pp 119, 150, 211. Back
250 Evidence,
pp 204-206. Back
251 Q
51. Back
252 HC
(1996-97) 147-II, Q 16; Q 239. Back
253 Fair
Funding for the BBC: Submission to the BBC Funding Review by Peter
Ainsworth MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport, on behalf of the Conservative Party, para 45. Back
254 HC
(1996-97) 147-II, Q 24. Back
255 Davies
Review, p 22. Back
256 Ibid,
pp 22, 75-76, 81. Back
257 Evidence,
p 204; The Impact of A Digital Licence Fee on the Take-Up of
Digital Television, NERA, October 1999. Back
258 Q
9. Back
259 Evidence,
p 279. Back
260 Q
636. Back
261 Q
382. Back
262 Q
375. Back
263 QQ
632, 637. Back
264 Davies
Review, p 16. Back
265 Ibid,
p 84. Back
266 Evidence,
p 206; The Impact of a Digital Licence Fee on the Take-Up of
Digital Television, p 23. Back
267 Q
89. Back
268 Evidence,
p 56. Back
269 Davies
Review, p 76. Back
270 Q
583. Back
271 Evidence,
pp 179-180. Back
272 Evidence,
pp 48-49. Back
273 Evidence,
p 118. Back
274 Davies
Review, p 21. Back
275 Q
45. Back
276 Evidence,
p 87; QQ 89, 328, 403. Back
277 Evidence,
pp 147-148. Back
278 Evidence,
p 206. Back
279 Q
676. Back
280 Davies
Review, p 9. Back
281 Ibid,
p 187. Back
282 Q
100. Back
283 Davies
Review, pp 71-72, 86, 87. Back
284 Q
64. Back
285 Q
91. Back
286 HC
Deb, 18 December 1996, col 591W; Department of National Heritage
Press Notice 408/96. Back
287 Department
of National Heritage Press Notice 408/96, p 5; Department for
Culture, Media and Sport Press Notice 310/98, 15 December 1998,
p 1. Back
288 HC
Deb, 11 December 1997, col 636W. Back
289 Department
for Culture, Media and Sport Press Notice 310/98, 15 December
1998, p 1. Back
290 Cm
4258, para 5. The formula was, in fact, announced in December
1996. Back
291 Davies
Review, p 72. Back
292 Ibid,
p 87 fn. Back
293 Evidence,
p 1. Back
294 Q
78. Back
295 Q
374. Back
296 HC
(1997-98) 1090, para 10. Back
297 Davies
Review, pp 28, 112. Back
298 Ibid,
p 142. Back
299 Ibid,
p 114. Back
300 Ibid,
p 112. Back
301 Ibid,
p 124. Back
302 Ibid,
p 28. Back
303 Ibid,
p 112. Back
304 Evidence,
p 2. Back
305 HC
Deb, 15 July 1997, cols 198-200; HC Deb, 24 November 1999, col
631. Back
306 HC
Deb, 9 November 1999, col 891. Back
307 Q
661. Back
308 Q
663. Back
309 QQ
237-238; HC Deb, 9 November 1999, col 908; Evidence, p 168; Q
661. Back
310 Q
228. Back
311 QQ
228, 236. See also Evidence, p 169. Back
312 Q
677. Back
313 Q
678. Back
314 Davies
Review, p 120. Back
315 Ibid,
pp 171, 128. Back
316 Ibid,
p 129. Back
317 BBC
Response, p 36; Q 724. Back
318 Q
724; BBC Response, pp 36-37. Back
319 Davies
Review, pp 129-130; BBC
Response, p 37. Back
320 Davies
Review, p 129. Back
321 Q
672. Back
322 Davies
Review, p 52. Back
323 Ibid,
p 52; Q 49. Back
324 Davies
Review, p 54; Evidence, p
212. Back
325 Davies
Review, p 199; Thirtieth
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Receipts in respect
of Broadcast Receiving Licences issued, HC (1989-90) 193. Back
326 Evidence,
p 282. See also Evidence, p 274. Back
327 HC
(1997-98) 1090, Q 72. Back
328 Q
724. Back
329 Evidence,
p 158. Back
330 QQ
600-602. Back
331 Q
633. Back
332 QQ
724, 725. Back
333 Davies
Review, p 9. Back
334 Ibid,
p 69. Back
335 Q
23. Back
336 Davies
Review, p 69; Q 23. Back
337 Davies
Review, pp 68-69. Back
338 Ibid,
p 68; Q 26. Back
339 Davies
Review, p 69. Back
340 Ibid,
p 127. Back
341 Evidence,
p 243. Back
342 QQ
280, 282; Evidence, pp 182-183. Back
343 Evidence,
pp 276-277, 182-183. Back
344 Davies
Review, p 127. Back
345 Ibid,
p 131. Back
346 BBC
Response, pp 36-37. Back
347 Q
630. Back
348 QQ
638-640. Back
|