Visitor attraction expertise
44. The public sector in the United Kingdom has undertaken
activities in many different spheres. However, traditionally it
does not build, design and operate visitor attractions. In consequence,
it does not have the expertise to carry out those tasks. The project
as a whole required many skills associated with the public sector,
such as project management subjected to political control and
urban regeneration. For the Dome to succeed, NMEC, in view of
its unique task and hybrid nature, had to combine the right balance
of public-sector and private-sector skills, including those associated
with managing visitor attractions.
45. Even in the context of visitor attractions, the
task facing NMEC was unique. It was required to deliver, to an
immovable deadline, a visitor attraction that would "be accessible
to the widest possible audience and should use the latest ideas
in interactive technology and exploit the opportunities for shared
experiences of entertainment and education".[125]
Mr Gerbeau explained the challenges for the Millennium Dome were
that "it was a whole new brand to establish [and] it was
100 per cent innovation".[126]
He went on to say that "it takes time to establish not only
a visitor attraction business, but ... something that is entirely
new".[127]
46. During our first inquiry on this subject, in
November 1997, we took oral evidence from Mr Keith Bales, who
has extensive experience in developing successful, internationally
renowned visitor attractions, including Walt Disney World, the
Epcot Centre and Houston Space Centre. He questioned whether NMEC
had sufficient visitor management expertise. In view of subsequent
developments, his evidence perhaps merits extensive quotation:
"It has always astounded me that this group
and the previous Government never had anyone involved in this
project—I am not parading myself here—that someone
did not approach the Chairman of Disney, Michael Eisner, and say
'can you lend us on secondment for two or three years the chap
that put Epcot together, Dick Nunis'. No-one on the Committee
like Chisholm of BSkyB, David Chance of BSkyB, Jennie Page of
English Heritage, has ever run, managed, designed or promoted
in any way whatsoever a major international leisure attraction.
This is a big deal, it is not small. I think you could call Mike
Eisner and he might lend you someone to help that might also audit
your costs."[128]
47. Later that month, we raised that issue with Mr
Robert Ayling, then Chief Executive of NMEC, who was confident
that NMEC had the relevant expertise from the leisure industry,
citing specifically Mr Michael Grade.[129]
Indeed, we were constantly reminded that the project benefited
from the skills of leading experts in the fields of media, entertainment,
travel and leisure.[130]
Mr Grade himself, who chaired the Litmus Group and who also gave
evidence to the Committee in November 1997, but has not subsequently
been among the witnesses volunteered by NMEC, told us on that
occasion:
"Our job is to make professional judgements
about what will and will not attract the British public and the
visitors to this country. That is commercial and professional
judgement that we will make and we are happy to stand or fall
on those judgements. That is what a lot of us do for a living,
make judgements about what will or will not attract the British
public or indeed visitors, tourists."[131]
48. In our Report arising from that evidence, we
quoted a key phrase from the evidence of Mr Bales—the statement
that none of the Board or senior management had "ever run,
managed, designed or promoted in any way whatsoever a major international
leisure attraction"—and summarised the relevant evidence
of Mr Ayling and Mr Grade. We readily admit, however, that we
did not pursue sufficiently the key issue identified by Mr Bales
in the conclusions or recommendations of that Report or in our
subsequent inquiries. With hindsight, it is clear that we should
have done so.
49. Subsequent developments have proved the observations
of Mr Bales in late 1997 to be prophetic. Mr Quarmby confirmed
that, with the benefit of hindsight, "the team you need to
create something like the Dome is not necessarily the same kind
of team as you need to run it as a visitor attraction".[132]
He went on to say that "if there is a lesson I would take
away from our experience, it would be that we needed to have brought
in earlier than we did the kind of expertise which [Mr Gerbeau]
brings, in order to ensure that it succeeded operationally from
day one".[133]
Lord Falconer acknowledged that the public sector did not have
the experience for running a visitor attraction.[134]
He said that the Company had had an Operations Director with visitor
attraction experience, but thought that there should have been
leadership at the executive level of the Company with such experience
and that "from the moment the visitor attraction opened [the
Company should have been] led by somebody who had that experience
and who had that focus ... the focus should have moved on from
a construction site to the first opening".[135]
50. Ms Page noted in her evidence that separate teams
within NMEC were responsible for different aspects of the project,
including content development. She also pointed out that development
of the visitor attraction elements was inseparable from other
aspects, necessitating "a very intensive management effort
at the top" to ensure co-ordination. But she also conceded
that, by the time of the opening, "there is no doubt at all
that ... the management team was exhausted. They had had far,
far too many problems presented to them, and problems which continued
right up to the last moment. The thing that we were critically
short of was enough fresh management expertise to keep us going
on to the next stage just at that critical moment".[136]
51. With the benefit of hindsight it is evident
to some of those involved and to this Committee that the project
lacked enough involvement by those with sufficient experience
of commercial visitor attractions. The evidence that we received
in November 1997 from Mr Keith Bales was far-sighted and demonstrated
that the weakness was foreseen and therefore foreseeable. In spite
of constant reassurances both from Ministers and the Board themselves
that they were safely in control of the project and suitably qualified
to run the project successfully, the Board of NMEC failed to recognise
that different skills were required for the construction and operational
phases of the project and to plan ahead to ensure a smooth transition
between these phases. For too long, the Dome was perceived as
a public monument more than a visitor attraction, but it was the
latter element that would ultimately determine its success or
failure.
125 HC (1997-98) 340-II, p 30. Back
126 Q
158. Back
127 Ibid. Back
128 HC
(1997-98) 340-II, Q 76. Back
129 Ibid,
Q 282. Back
130 Ibid,
QQ 282-285. Back
131 Ibid,
Q 320. Back
132 Q
190. Back
133 Ibid. Back
134 Q
318. Back
135 QQ
401-402. Back
136 Q
54. Back
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