Marketing and media
103. Throughout our scrutiny of the project, this
Committee has been concerned with the marketing of the Dome.[297]
In evidence to our inquiries, NMEC assured us that although the
marketing budget was limited, the strategy would be successful.[298]
At times we expressed doubts, particularly about ticket sales,[299]
but we were again given assurances that the Company was confident
in its abilities.[300]
In Countdown to the Millennium, we noted that the Dome's
high profile was not particularly due to any formal marketing.[301]
104. In evidence to a previous inquiry, NMEC stated:
"The Millennium Experience Dome does not suffer from lack
of product recognition amongst the general public either in the
UK or abroad".[302]
The Company also said that the Dome had received a good deal of
media attention, and, although that attention was not all positive,
it had given the Dome a high profile for no expenditure.[303]
In evidence to our previous inquiry, Mr Ayling said that the Dome
had been "helped by the media and the media's continuing
interest in everything that we do".[304]
NMEC relied heavily on passive media coverage as a substitute
for marketing.[305]
Once that relationship turned sour the Company was always struggling
to recover.
105. The Dome's projected lifetime budget for commercial,
communications and marketing has risen from £31 million in
1997 to £43 million in the most recent Annual Report,[306]
which states that the Company has adopted a new marketing strategy
that is driven by volume targets and supported by a new media
scheme.[307]
NMEC stated that the original marketing budget of 2 per cent of
the total was far too low for a visitor attraction.[308]
The additional grant to NMEC awarded in May of this year included
£3 million ring-fenced for marketing to assist the Company
in achieving its revised visitor number target.
106. The marketing strategy has suffered from a lack
not only of funds but of focus. In Not Only the Dome, we
concluded that more precise information on the content would assist
the marketing strategy.[309]
Mr Gerbeau described how the project had suffered from being unique
and from the lack of brand awareness.[310]
Even though the Dome is now open, Lord Falconer admitted that
"there is not a clear picture in people's minds as to what
they get when they get there".[311]
107. The marketing campaign has had to counter many
preconceptions and media insinuations about the Dome. The Company
did not place a sufficient emphasis on marketing before the Dome
opened and was unduly reliant on free coverage in the press. That
approach proved to be disastrous when the press coverage became
largely hostile.
108. The Company identified the débacle on
New Year's Eve, when members of the media were delayed, as a turning
point that had an impact on media coverage of the Dome immediately
following its opening.[312]
However, Mr Quarmby said that "there has been a lot of support
from many media",[313]
a view shared by Lord Falconer, who rejected the implication that
the press was universally hostile and said that the content had
enjoyed "quite favourable" media reviews.[314]
109. When describing the impact of New Year's Eve,
Mr Quarmby contended "the degree of media criticism that
we have had ... has undoubtedly dented our visitor numbers."[315]
Ms Page claimed that it would be impossible to quantify the media
impact upon visitor numbers.[316]
Since his arrival, Mr Gerbeau has attempted to woo the media,
and the Company has recently adopted a new media strategy designed
to promote the Dome as a visitor attraction, rather than as a
news item.[317]
297 HC (1997-98) 340-I, para 31; HC (1998-99) 21-I,
para 55; HC (1999-2000) 24-I, paras 33-43. Back
298 HC
(1998-99) 21-II, QQ 407-408, 459. Back
299 HC
(1999-2000) 24-I, para 39. Back
300 HC
(1999-2000) 24-II, QQ 88, 133. Back
301 HC
(1999-2000) 24-I, para 33. Back
302 HC
(1998-99) 21-II, p 111. Back
303 Ibid. Back
304 HC
(1990-2000) 24-II, Q 83 Back
305 Q
319; Evidence, p 43. Back
306 NMEC
Corporate Plan, 1997/98-2001/2002,
para 4.2.1; Annual Report 1999, p 13. Back
307 Annual
Report 1999, p 9. Back
308 Evidence,
pp 42-43. Back
309 HC
(1997-98) 818-I, para 40. Back
310 QQ
158-160. Back
311 Q
323. Back
312 QQ
158, 209; Evidence, p 40. Back
313 Q
209. Back
314 QQ
315, 329. Back
315 Q
158. Back
316 Q
51. Back
317 Annual
Report 1999, p 9. Back
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