APPENDIX 29
Memorandum submitted by Friends of the
Earth, Greenwich
1. Friends of the Earth exists to protect and
improve the conditions for life on Earth, now and for the future.
Friends of the Earth is one of the largest international environmental
networks in the world, with over 50 groups across five continents.
It is one of the UK's most influential national environmental
pressure groups, and has a unique network of campaigning local
groups, working in 250 communities throughout England, Wales and
Northern Ireland.
2. Jennifer Bates is currently co-ordinator
and spokesperson of Greenwich Friends of the Earth, and as such
speaks for Friends of the Earth on Greenwich Millennium issues.
3. Request to present oral evidence on the
matter detailed below.
4. Summary of main suggestions:
— all such projects should a showcase
of sustainability in approach and execution from the outset;
— all developments should from day
one involve local stakeholders in a proper participation exercise
that is properly funded, and has real bearing on what happens;
— that the nature and extent of corporate
funding on such projects should be critically assessed;
— the area of housing planned for Dome
coach park and exhibition support, that is due to join up with
Millennium Village should in no way be jeopardised or compromised;
— we must not turn a disastrous year
at the Dome into a disastrous legacy—we must get the right
plan (one that is better than either of the two shortlisted),
and not be lured by offers to take over the Dome early/high bids
to save face and recover extra money granted;
— the National Audit Office should
consider the Dome legacy arrangements/sale of site proceeds distribution
in its inquiry due to report in July (ie before legacy decision);
— there should be a properly agreed,
detailed brief for the Dome site should the Dome be scrapped after
15 years; and
— we must avoid in future top down
regeneration as English Partnerships have inflicted on the Greenwich
Peninsula, make sure wider and longer term issues are considered,
and not allow political imperatives to rush developments through
inappropriately.
THE DOME
IN 2000
5. In submission to the Committee's previous
inquiry "Back to the Dome" I considered Dome content
and sponsorship together because I felt they had regrettably become
linked. I now consider Dome content not only with sponsorship,
but these with ticket sales/attendance and finances as I feel
these, sadly, are all linked.
6. I expressed various fears to the Committee's
previous inquiry "Back to the Dome" eg about the corporate
sponsorship threatening to turn the Dome into a virtual trade
fair, and about the sponsors being zone-specific and having (in
my view) too much control over "their" zones. These
fears seem to have been realised.
7. The Guardian (20 December 1999)
declared "Corporate sponsors have hijacked the Millennium
Experience" as a sub-headline, and go on to say "whether
or not you like the Millennium Experience housed in and around
the Dome, the spirit of corporate sponsorship weighs heavily"
and questions whether it is possible to enjoy the Millennium Experience
while ignoring the "blatant commercial sponsorship".
Prince Charles is reported (Sunday Times, 16 January 2000)
to have said the Dome is "commercial and banal". Design
Week magazine asked prominent British designers their opinions
(21 January 2000) and one said "I felt we were in a giant
trade fair".
8. This is despite the fact that the "Back
to the Dome" inquiry, in response to fears expressed by me
and two others about the relationship between NMEC and its sponsors,
questioned Bob Ayling (in his role as the then NMEC Chairman),
and reported "Mr Ayling assured us that NMEC had not had
to succumb to unreasonable commercial demands from sponsors"
(paragraph 60). To me, however, the nature and extent of corporate
sponsorship in the Dome is unreasonable, it is invasive and pervasive.
9. The City of London sponsored Money zone
has a whole wall on the importance of the City of London. BT's
Talk and Ford's Journey zones particularly are by any measure
heavily branded (and even an NMEC spokesperson admitted as much).
Ford's sponsorship always seemed one the most in danger of not
being unbiased (eg because of their membership, at the time of
being accepted, of the Global Climate Coalition which was fighting
to stop meaningful agreement at Kyoto climate change talks). Ford's
Journey zone culminates, up a final staircase, in a Ford Ka (one
of Ford's models). Also in the Journey zone is a large display
on terminal five proposals at London Heathrow airport whose main
backers are British Airways (whose Chief Executive until recently
was Bob Ayling) and British Airports Authority. These two organisations
are themselves joint sponsors of the Home Planet zone. The terminal
five display does not offer a balanced approach—whereas
it acknowledges there has been a public inquiry, doesn't actually
examine the case against terminal five, and seems to pre-empt
the inquiry's outcome by stating ". . . Spring 2002 Subject
to Government approval, construction work begins . . . 2007 Terminal
Five opens" (rather than could/would open). Another cosy
arrangement of sponsors seemingly supporting each other is mentioned
in The Guardian of 20 December 1999 where the BskyB sponsored
film ". . . brandishes a Tesco loyalty card . . .; the camera
lingers on the blue plastic card for what seems an inordinately
long time." Tesco is another Dome sponsor.
10. Further to my concerns raised to the
"Back to the Dome" inquiry, there has been concern about
the McDonalds sponsored Our Town Story zone where groups of children
give a performance (the idea being to have prepared it using their
local McDonalds restaurant as a location). I have heard anecdotal
comments about pressure exerted by McDonalds (eg financial incentives
for cash strapped local authorities and waverers being told they
would be denying children the opportunity of the trip to the Dome
by not taking part). From Aberdeen in response to a piece in the
Museums Journal of July 1999, Ann Scott's letter of 23 August
1999 refers to the Our Town Story project being "its (McDonalds)
latest insidious exploitation of children" (the McLibel trial
had found that criticism to the effect that McDonalds exploit
children by using them, as more susceptible subjects of advertising,
to pressurise their parents into going to McDonalds was justified.
It was true). The letter also said "Support for McDonald's
Our Town project will only mean tacit acceptance of its corporate
philosophy and business practices" (of which the letter was
critical). The letter said "it is not too late for Education
Authorities to boycott this project." And of course the biggest
McDonalds in Europe is the first thing we see and smell as we
approach our supposed national celebration.
11. We suggest that the heavily sponsor-dominated
zones are themselves part of the problem. It is no surprise that
this aspect has aroused press criticism that may have led to negative
public perception (or added to direct impressions), perhaps resulting
in reduced attendance figures and thus adding to financial difficulties.
As the Independent says (5 May 2000) ". . . insisting
the Dome is a success because most people who've been say they've
enjoyed it. Well of course they do. Most people know what's in
it, so you wouldn't go in the first place unless you enjoyed the
sort of things you know are there. People who've been to see live
chess would say they've enjoyed it, but that doesn't mean it's
popular".
12. I've always been concerned about the
scale of the Dome exhibition. I stated to the "Back to the
Dome" inquiry that I believe there are too many zones—with
even more added to the original nine that were planned, seemingly
to suit sponsors that came forward, rather than getting them to
sponsor the nine. The original nine had some sort of coherent
theme. The mish-mash of zones that we have ended up with has meant
there is an unfocused feel to the Dome. Having so many zones has
also meant that people cannot even get round the Dome comfortably
in a reasonable time. Time Out (19-26 January 2000) says
"Reckon to arrive at 10 am and leave at 6 pm. You still won't
have time to see everything . . .". The Guardian (15
January 2000) says ". . . it's impossible to see even half
of the Dome in a day". This must also be off-putting and
result in resentment as, having paid £20 for an adult ticket,
people feel they haven't been able to see everything and would
have to pay to come back, have extra travel costs and possibly
accommodation costs etc. Any "spare" space could have
been used for perhaps some greenery or a water feature. The fact
that there were so many zones that had to be built and that the
costs of the zones may have been too high (I heard anecdotally
that some zone designers had charged over the odds) have serious
financial implications. Considerable savings could have been made
by having fewer zones. Do we know what the contents/zones actually
cost (it sounds as if the Dome structure itself only cost around
£50 million)? Also Sunday Business of 28 May 2000
says "NMEC has never made clear how much of the sponsorship
provided by these companies is in cash or in kind". Could
the corporate sponsors have effectively built their own zones?
13. I would imagine the need for the extra
money granted to NMEC by the Millennium Commission could have
been spared, and perhaps the scheme may not have required corporate
sponsorship at all. Any corporate sponsorship that was needed
should, as I have advocated before, have been by way of supporting
the Dome by paying into a communal fund to finance some worthwhile
aspect of the project. This would have gained good publicity for
the sponsors. Also sponsors would still have presumably endeared
themselves to New Labour. I refer to my submission to the "Back
to the Dome" inquiry that The Observer of 26 July
1998 reported (of what the lobby firm engaged on behalf of Tesco's
suggested) "that a £12 million Tesco donation to the
Millennium Dome was part of a `quid pro quo deal'—giving
its support to a Government project in order to endear itself
to New Labour". Indeed, it is of concern that we do not know
what, if any benefits the corporate sponsors have or may achieve.
For instance is it possible that the arms manufacturers BAe and
GEC/Marconi sponsoring the Mind zone may have endeared themselves
to New Labour and the Government's Export Credit Guarantee Department
on which they are so dependent? The Observer article had
gone on to say (referring to the fact that Tesco's lobbyists were
campaigning to block plans for a tax on car spaces) "there
is no suggestion that Tesco made the Dome donation to help it
get its way over the car park tax issue. But the plan to impose
the tax was dropped from last week's White Paper on transport—and
the terms of the exemption were exactly as LLM's Ben Lucas (the
lobbyist) had suggested".
14. By organising the Dome we have used
what is public money, but allowed it to be dwarfed by corporates.
A more compact, more focused, at the very least a not corporate
sponsor-dominated Dome (ie a better Dome) would surely have cost
less and been more attractive to press and visitors and led to
higher attendance figures, which would in turn have helped financially.
Instead we have added to the symbolism and reality of corporate
dominance in our society and seemed happy to have any sponsor
on board. It is interesting that the corporate sponsors do not
seem to mind the idea of early closure even if they have contracts
till the end of the year. As one director of a sponsor said (Sunday
Express 28 May 2000) "To be associated with such a failure
does our corporate image no good whatsoever".
14(a) David Faber MP, a member of this Committee,
according to the Sunday Times of 28 May 2000, said "So
far, we've let the Dome off the hook on the quality of its contents".
That seems obvious.
15. NMEC in their document "Environment
at the Dome" say ". . . the NMEC has adopted the principles
of sustainability from the outset". We completely disagree.
We believe it should have been a showcase of sustainability in
its approach and execution, but (unlike the also part Lottery
funded Earth Centre in Doncaster) this has not been the case.
There have been some good aspects and initiatives, and these are
welcome, but they have often been partial, add-ons or have been
undermined by other factors.
16. NMEC have indeed been focused on public
transport to get people to the Dome, but they tried to get Falconwood
Field (a supposedly protected area of Metropolitan Open Land)
used as a giant car park-and-ride as part of their unbalanced
transport strategy. NMEC was defeated after a large local campaign.
On the energy side there should have been a policy from the start
to maximise the use of renewable energy on the site eg solar and
wind. This could have been a demonstration in action for people
to see the way forward for the 21st Century. In fact NMEC proclaim
to be supplied by "100 per cent renewable `ecotricity'"—but
apparently about 30 per cent of the energy is from household waste
incineration which we do not consider in any way renewable or
green as such waste incineration acts as a disincentive to reduce
waste and recycle adequately. NMEC has been rightly proud to talk
about its greywater reuse schemes, but they could have done more
eg by having solar water heating for all hot water for washroom
facilities and even catering facilities. There should have been
a policy from the start to consider the resource use and waste
implications of all decisions made. NMEC have a welcome attitude
to recycling, but allowing McDonalds (who are a sponsor) to have
their largest McDonalds in Europe at the Dome producing untold
waste is absurd. We advocated that only catering facilities that
used proper crockery and cutlery should be allowed licences. The
roof material chosen was PVC—a substance known to be toxic
in is manufacture and disposal—and only got changed after
pressure was exerted. The changed roof material happened to give
the Dome the potential to be permanent. Of course we believe it
should have been considered to be permanent from the start. EcoDesign
magazine (volume V11 No 3) say "For the Dome, the external
work (ie not the Dome structure itself) has been specified with
a lifespan of only two years!" It goes on to say, referring
to the admission booths, ". . . the value of the materials
after recycling would not cover one per cent of the cost of manufacture
of the booths. This is obviously a gross waste of resources .
. ."
16(a) The fact that the site is a brownfield
not a greenfield one is welcome (but that was chosen for them).
However, such a site has implications for and responsibilities
to Greenwich and its people. There have been some welcome initiatives
such as promoting local services and labour linked to training
initiatives, as well as some SRB money eg for local housing. However
we believe this is only part of the story, and believe local people
haven't been properly involved (see below).
(Transport is mentioned at other places in the
document, and covered in more detail in submission to the "Back
to the Dome" inquiry.)
LEGACIES BEYOND
2000
17. I deal with the issues of progress of
the future use for the Dome competition, the economic and community
impact of the Dome, and the lessons to be learnt together.
Competition process/Consultation
18. As I expressed to the "Back to
the Dome" inquiry, local stakeholders should have been involved
from day one of the Dome's inception—in planning if the
Dome should be permanent and if so what would be useful and appropriate
for that site and for the people of Greenwich and the wider area
afterwards (and this integrated with requirements for the NMEC
exhibition). This did not happen and the Dome was conceived of
as a temporary structure, but now with a changed roof it could
be permanent—and going for planning permission as leisure
use for the Dome area would fit in with the disposition of uses
as shown in the English Partnership/Richard Rogers master plan
for the Greenwich Peninsula site of 1997. The original planning
permission for the Dome was granted on the basis of it being a
temporary structure, with what public consultation there was (essentially
just a chance to comment after plans had been drawn up) being
on the basis of it being temporary. The Dome will have been imposed
on us by the backdoor without the proper participation of local
stakeholders.
19. Indeed we were glad to see the "Back
to the Dome" Report concurring (paragraph 80) "We regret
that successive Governments did not consider the Dome's future
from the very start of the project, and we hope that this shortcoming
does not jeopardise the regeneration of the Greenwich Peninsula
and the wider Thames Gateway area." We do feel that the regeneration
has been compromised.
20. There has been inadequate consultation,
and no proper participation, on the Dome as the project has progressed,
on its legacy, and on the wider Greenwich Peninsula developments.
What there has been has usually taken the form of a comment form
after plans have been drawn up and maybe an exhibition. There
has been some ongoing dialogue with representatives of umbrella
activists groups on the Dome and the Dome legacy, but we consider
this adequate. Proper participation is properly funded and has
due weight given to its findings.
21. Despite the "Back to the Dome"
Report's recommendation in the legacy section (paragraph 83) that
"We believe that a satisfactory system of public consultation
is essential in order to maximise local support for the Dome",
this has not been the case. Indeed, English Partnerships; the
Government's regeneration agency who are handling the legacy competition
on behalf of the Government, effectively on behalf of the people,
have organised inadequate, even incompetent consultation. What
has been organised in no way adds up to the proper participation
of local stakeholders that should have been implemented. For instance
the public's chance to view and, again only, comment on the then
nine shortlisted proposals for the Dome legacy was incompetently
handled. The meeting and display at the Forum@Greenwich in November
1999 was not correctly advertised, and the display showed panels
of detailed information, a lot of which was so low people might
have to get on their knees to read, but did not have this information
in a document form that could be taken away and studied. English
Partnerships expected people to read, assimilate, compare and
evaluate that information on the spot and fill in the comment
form. I complained at the time of this poor system of public participation,
and was glad to at least see an accompanying brochure when the
next phase of five shortlisted contenders was displayed. However,
the brochure is inadequate—particularly it does not show
clearly for each bid which areas of land are being sought (only
two of the five bother to show maps of their plans).
22. On 15 July 1998 Nick Raynsford, the
Greenwich MP and the then Minister for London said "I firmly
believe that regeneration must be an inclusive process, not imposed
from above by local or central government, but directly tied to
the full participation and support of local communities".
On this count alone we would say the regeneration has failed.
Dome future
23. On the Dome legacy the "Back to
the Dome" Report states (paragraph 79) "We believe that
the Government should have taken a more dynamic approach and should
take vigorous steps to encourage the type of development which
would complement the existing regeneration projects on the Greenwich
Peninsula and in the Thames Gateway".
24. Unfortunately, while English Partnerships
produced evaluation criteria which said that a commercially sustainable
future use for the Dome was wanted "which contributes fully
to sustainable regeneration both of the Greenwich Peninsula and
more widely", English Partnerships did not produce a local
stakeholder-agreed, detailed development brief that was specific
about what to exclude and what should be included.
25. A key point for us is that the area
currently being used for the Dome coach park and for exhibition
support. This area is shown on the English Partnerships/Richard
Rogers master plan of 1997 as due to be developed after the Dome
closes at the end of 2000 as more housing to join up with the
Millennium Village. This land should not be in any way jeopardised
or compromised by any future use of the Dome. This is especially
important in light of the high need for housing in London and
the South East, particularly on brownfield sites.
26. Our view has been that any ongoing use
of the Dome should be something that is of use and benefit to
the people of the area—something they would have access
to and interaction with, something that would offer activity possibilities
as well as training/education potential. When, in the absence
of a proper English Partnership participation exercise on Dome
legacy, Docklands Forum started a pilot study actually asking
people what they wanted, it seemed that what most people wanted
was a flexible and mixed use for the Dome. Thus a use could perhaps
include a cultural/arts use and education (the height could suit
some theatrical/performance use, and the natural light could suit
visual arts uses), combined maybe with a sports/physical activity
use and training. The idea of a sports use had strong local support
when the nine shortlisted proposals were shown. Perhaps this could
be combined with natural environment features that would enhance
the interior and could be designed to be part of the facilities
as well—perhaps a water feature. The future use of the Dome
could be extraordinary just by being ordinary—by being right
for local and sub-regional needs.
27. The failure of approach on Dome legacy
has meant that we have ended up with neither of the shortlisted
contenders being satisfactory. For instance, the apparent favourite
Dome Europe bid (who have the same PR agency who NMEC have used)
worryingly emphasise "commercial sponsorships and partnerships
with major European businesses", and shopping. The Legacy
bid, (according to the Daily Express of 25 May 2000) has
won its backing from academic institutions, and Legacy's Director
said "London's leading universities are keen to develop their
research for commercial ends". Their bid does not seem to
fit in with the leisure use stipulated in the English Partnerships/Richard
Rogers master plan for the Dome area. Drawing elements out of
the five shortlisted bids to form some sort of composite would
be better than any of the five or the two. It was reported (Financial
Times 3 March 2000) that the Government was trying to achieve
something along these lines. It is very disappointing that this
has not been achieved and we urge a better outcome than either
of the two still to be pursued.
28. We are further particularly concerned
that the successful bidders are only required to keep the Dome
structure for 15 years whereas its lifespan is considerably longer
than that ie decades. The Sunday Times of 28 May 2000 says
that there will be strict curbs on the resale of the site. This
is certainly needed. Although any future development would presumably
still have to fit with leisure usage, proper, agreed criteria/guidelines
for what would be acceptable for any future development are needed,
based on a new public participation exercise (other than the chance
only to comment to the planning authority after plans have been
drawn up).
29. The bidders, who are bidding for a 999-year
lease, see this site as prime real estate (The Independent
29 January 2000 "one of the hottest pieces of real estate
in Britain"; Daily Telegraph 25 February 2000 "one
of the most valuable pieces of real estate in Britain").
The fact that this is the case means that they can offer to take
the Dome over early and offer high bids. There are serious concerns
about the dangers of being lured into taking one of these two
shortlisted bids because they would have apparent benefits. The
offer to take over the Dome early would save a perhaps embarrassingly
empty Dome in the autumn. It is imperative the Government isn't
lured into making financial considerations too important or all-important
in the legacy choice because NMEC's financial difficulties have
created a desire to recover the extra money (approximately £140
million at the time of writing) granted to the Dome by the Millennium
Commission. The financial offer is only supposed to be part of
the evaluation process for the legacy choice, but press reports
paint a worrying picture of the Government's thinking. The Financial
Times of 21 May 2000 states "The Government is now pinning
its hopes on securing the maximum cash bid for the Dome . . .
", and The Independent of 25 May 2000 quotes a "government
source" as saying "Now we must take the best commercial
deal available". Saving the embarrassment of a financially
disastrous year at the Dome must not create a disastrous legacy
for Greenwich ie if the wrong legacy plan were chosen for the
wrong reasons. We must get the right plan for the future for the
people of Greenwich and the wider area.
30. Indeed, as I understand it, NMEC only
ever expected £15 million at the end of the year from any
saleable parts of the Dome structure and/or contents, and any
revenue from a legacy plan that effectively buys such assets off
NMEC would seem legitimate. However, revenue going to NMEC from
the sale of the site, which is owned by English Partnerships,
would not seem legitimate. Indeed English Partnerships are on
record as claiming all the money (Independent on Sunday
27 February 2000), although they are now talking about a new arrangement—keeping
a 15 year stake in the site, and taking a share of profits on
any future sale of the site (The Sunday Times 28 May 2000).
On the latter point they have probably learnt from their dealings
with Sainsbury's who are reported (Sunday Business 6 February
2000) to be selling the site that they bought for their retail
store on the Greenwich Peninsula, almost recovering their development
costs. Sainsbury's are planning to "pay a peppercorn rent—believed
to be just £1 a year—to occupy its flagship supermarket
next to the Dome for the next 150 years".
30(a) Money from the sale of the site that
should be used for future regeneration works by English Partnerships
cannot be hi-jacked to save face and pay back extra money granted
by the Millennium Commission, even if—dreadfully—the
New Opportunities Fund is deprived. It seems the Government is
however planning to do just that. The Guardian of 26 April
2000 says "Money from the sale of the Millennium Dome is
expected to be used to pay off its multimillion-pound losses,
government insiders admitted yesterday. . . . A Government source
last night confirmed that it expected part of the sale proceeds
to go towards paying off the Dome's losses." Also, according
to The Independent of 23 May 2000, "commission sources
admitted they expect . . . cash to come from the sale of the Dome
site". There may be other ways of recouping money—eg
by future Dome owners agreeing to allow maybe some proceeds of
Dome related merchandise over the next 15 years to go to the NMEC.
31. The Daily Express of 26 May 2000
states that the National Audit Office (NAO) will be making an
interim report on the Dome's finances to the Commons Public Accounts
Committee before Parliament goes into recess at the end of July.
I suggest that the financial considerations of the Dome legacy
arrangements/sale of site proceeds distribution are included in
the NAO inquiry, and within the same time frame so that results
are known before a final legacy competition decision is made.
The same applies if there is any public inquiry as requested by
the recent House of Commons motion.
The Wider Implications
32. The impact of the Dome and lessons of
the project affect the whole Greenwich Peninsula (GP) site, and
encompass wider regeneration issues—not only for the Dome
area, but also including the Millennium Village and Sainsbury's
area of large scale retail on the GP site that were laid out in
the Richard Rogers/English Partnerships master plan. English Partnerships
(EP) in their document "A New Urban Quarter for London"
(the Greenwich Peninsula) state "Sustainability is the hallmark
of the entire project" and "Greenwich Peninsula . .
. becoming the showcase for British urban regeneration and setting
the standards for the future development of urban brownfield sites."
We disagree with these statements and do not believe this should
be in any way a model to be followed.
33. Importantly, the decision to route the
Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) through the site was made before
Greenwich was chosen for the Millennium exhibition. British Gas
(the previous owners of the site) paid £20 million to secure
it, and it would have helped any regeneration project. Also it
must be made clear that the cost of the Dome never included the
cost of site remediation and infrastructure works which were done
for the whole GP site. Initial remediation works were done by
British Gas, with further works and infrastructure works being
done by English Partnerships. These works could have been done
for any regeneration project—the site did not need to have
the Dome on it to be regenerated as some have suggested. Peter
Mandelson said at a meeting on 8 December 1998 that it was a site
with a past, a great past in many ways "but certainly not
with a future" (unless the Dome was built). This seems ridiculous—Greenwich
Peninsula is a prime site close to the World Heritage Site of
central Greenwich, and just 11 minutes to central London on the
JLE. It is true that the Greenwich Peninsula was heavily contaminated,
but we have to find mechanisms to regenerate such sites without
building a Dome on each one (eg by taxing development on greenfield
sites). Indeed Richard Rogers Urban Task Force recommended the
launch of a national campaign to bring all contaminated land back
into beneficial use by 2030. A prime site such as this, would
surely have been one of the first to benefit.
34. EP state in their brochure "Time
to make regeneration work" under a list of environmental
improvements "decontamination of 300 acres of gas works site".
I would say that they have not decontaminated the site, rather
they have done some remediation work leaving large amounts of
contaminated material covered up and isolated on site. Rather
than what has been done (largely either taking the toxic material
to landfill sites, or leaving it covered up). I understand from
specialists that more remediation treatment works could have been
done. Crucially these would have taken more money, and more time.
35. As with the Dome there have been some
positive aspects and initiatives, and these are welcome, but are
often add-on's that can amount to no more than greenwash.
36. EP have failed to take up a proposal
for a combined heat and power (CHP) plant that would serve the
whole of the GP site and was proposed to be located in the Millennium
Village. The proposal was for biomass fuel, so the plant would
have been CO2 neutral (ie with no net discharge of climate changing
CO2). It is still possible to do something but problems cited
are particularly the storage area needed for the biomass fuel.
Space could probably be found (see below). The Millennium Village
is now planned to be using gas as an energy source, although is
has welcome energy saving building initiatives.
37. The Sainsbury's store also has welcome
energy-saving building design (exactly the way to build a superstore
if you are going to). However its solar and wind energy devices
prominently displayed at the food store's entrance are no more
than tokenistic greenwash. They do not do anything useful like
help run the refrigeration, instead they light store signs at
night—something that will probably just help to attract
more traffic to its massive car park. This has 1,150 spaces to
jointly serve the Sainsbury's food and non-food stores and the
next door leisure. We feel some of this space could be used to
store biomass fuel for the CHP plant (see above) as space hopefully
becomes available under an agreement to annually review the car
park capacity.
38. English Partnerships make out in their
"A New Urban Quarter for London" brochure on the Greenwich
Peninsula that car parking provision on the whole of the Greenwich
Peninsula will be reviewed annually. This is not the case (the
document is inaccurate and misleading), but it should be.
39. The Sainsbury's car park will be a massive
traffic generator at a time when there are road traffic reduction
targets and air quality targets. This is a classic case of giving
with one hand (energy saving building) and taking away with the
other (generating traffic). Sainsbury's even want a petrol station—something
the council fought against but lost. The car park also makes a
mockery of the supposed eco-Millennium Village next door.
40. The Millennium Village itself has car
parking standards that are not much below current Greenwich UDP
standards. By the time the village is built this supposed 21st
Century flagship scheme may well have car parking levels that
exceed new standards that are set as minimums. The Millennium
Village should have been bold and been car free—it is, after
all, next to what English Partnerships describe as "some
of the best transport links in London". Those responsible
probably worried about the political implications if the homes
did not sell. In fact the whole Millennium Village project has
been affected by politics. A political decision to want some of
it ready for when the Dome opened so that visitors to the Dome
could also see the flagship village, means that there was very
little and very rushed consultation. Proper participation is as
much part of building a sustainable community as the energy saving
that the village is so proud of.
41. The decision by English Partnerships
to allow the Sainsburys to be built at all shows what I call their
bottom line fundamentalism. Despite the fact that there was already
ample provision of superstores just adjacent to the site, English
Partnerships sold the site to Sainsbury's for £20-£30
million. The retail stores would also have helped to boost what
is apparently one of their core outputs—floorspace. English
Partnerships make out that to have the large scale retail was
out of their hands eg in response to my criticisms reported in
Building magazine (24 April 1998) they say "planning
permission for the large retail park was granted before English
Partnerships took over". The issue of whether or not the
retail space should be developed was decided a long time ago.
It's like arguing that the Millennium Dome shouldn't be built
when it's halfway up. This is not the case—yet outline planning
permission had been granted, but the Greenwich planning authority
confirmed to me that English Partnerships could have dropped the
large scale retail voluntarily from their Richard Rogers master
plan. This should particularly have been the case as they were
asking for additional retail space (it was finally realised the
Millennium Village should have some small shops). These should
have replaced the large scale retail, not been in addition to
it.
42. English Partnerships are keen to mention
the jobs "created", as are Sainsbury's—their press
release says "Sainsbury's has created 380 jobs in the Greenwich
area" (on the food store). However, the retail trade's own
National Retail Planning Forum produced a report in January 1998
saying that " . . . strong evidence that new food superstores
have on average a negative net effect on retail employment"
and go on to say "Each superstore opening resulted in an
average net loss in employment of -276 full-time equivalents."
The superstore development will threaten not only existing local
shops, but also those planned for the Millennium Village—thus
threatening the development of a thriving focus and centre to
the village that is a crucial part of building a sustainable community.
Local shops are not only better at providing employment (The
New Economics Foundation has shown that one job is supported
by £50,000 turnover in a local shop, but by £250,000
turnover in a supermarket), but they also help create a cycle
of local employment and investment. Profits do not leave the local
area to go to pay shareholder dividends, but are re-invested locally.
Supporting the local economy and meeting local needs locally also
reduce the need to travel. These are key ways to deliver sustainability.
As I said in the Building article "you can't build
sustainability in a pocket"—ie try to build an eco-village
without considering what you do around it.
43. Some of these issues are beginning to
be recognised. Richard Rogers has admitted, in response to my
question at a SERA conference in 1998 about his master plan for
the Greenwich Peninsula site allowing the large scale retail with
its massive car park particularly next to the supposed eco-village
that it was "a mess" and "a ridiculous way to develop".
English Partnerships have been criticised in a DETR report "Interim
evaluation of English Partnerships: final report (number 24, 1999)".
It said under the Environment section "The research concludes
EP should examine more critically the environmental implications
of all projects . . ." and "There is greater scope for
EP to use the expertise of voluntary environmental groups to assist
in project design and implementation, to maximise environmental
outputs at potentially reduced cost." Also, a report just
out for DETR looking at the Millennium Villages, according to
Urban Environment Today, emphasises the importance of providing
local facilities appropriate for the scale of development. The
superstore at Greenwich is criticised as it could cause congestion
in the area because of the high level of car parking provided.
The report also criticises the Government's approach to promoting
the Millennium Villages. "The villages are trying to achieve
unconventional, trend breaking results through a conventional
development process that is competitive, developer-led, top down
and profit driven" it says.
44. The report apparently also criticises
the Village being cut off from the surroundings by a dual carriageway,
saying this reflects a top down approach to opening up new areas
by providing highways first and buildings later. We were always
unhappy about the new road infrastructure being built on the Greenwich
Peninsula—the road "improvements" as they were
called. In our response to the Richard Rogers Master Plan in 1997
we advocated that Bugsby's Way (between the village and the large
scale retail) have traffic calming measures. We also advocated
that rather than widen the A102M as we were told was necessary
(because of weaving because of the new interchanges) the road
should be demoted from an M-road, thus making widening unnecessary.
One lane should have been given over to buses. The A102M Blackwall
Tunnel approach is already the thirty third most polluted road
in the country (FOE research based on Government data for roadside
pollution in 1999 shows), but there is now a plan for a third
Blackwall crossing going right through the Greenwich Peninsula
site. This is part of a business-led plan for a package of three
river crossings (two of them involving roads, the third rail).
The proposers say London must work in 360 degrees and not have
the river as a barrier, but we say that thinking about meeting
local needs locally and reducing the need to travel is a better
approach. The claimed potential regeneration benefits of the three
river crossings are in no way automatic. A Government report (the
interim report from SACTRA) clearly decouples the building of
large infrastructure with regeneration, saying it can have a positive
or negative effect. This third Blackwall crossing would run close
to the edge of the new housing that is due to join up with the
Millennium Village, and would just add blight to those living
there.
45. A DETR regeneration research summary
paper on the Greenwich Peninsula developments(No. 28, 2000) said
that even with the JLE decision, but without the decision to locate
the Dome on the Greenwich Peninsula, many of those consulted were
of the opinion that "developments on the site would have
proceeded more slowly and in a more piecemeal fashion. It might
have taken up to 10 years or more to achieve what is now likely
to happen in just a few". Even if true, this might have been
no bad thing—to have had slower, more sensitive, organic
regeneration that was done with the full participation and support
of local communities (as Nick Raynsford said—see paragraph
22 above) that build empowerment and ownership of development.
Thus proper, sustainable regeneration might have been achieved
rather than largely imposed development rushed through because
of time deadlines and political imperatives.
46. There have been many opportunities lost,
but there are still crucial ones to be grasped. We must recover
what we can to make the regeneration of the Greenwich Peninsula
as sustainable as possible, and learn lessons for the future for
other regeneration schemes.
May 2000
| 
