SECOND REPORT
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee
has agreed to the following Report:—
THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL RUGBY
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In August 1995, the International Rugby Board
(IRB) announced that the game of Rugby Union would become professional.[6]
This followed the Report on Relations between Rugby Union and
Rugby League by the National Heritage Committee calling for
an end to "shamateurism".[7]
Although Rugby Union had been ostensibly amateur since its birth,
the regulations prohibiting professionalism were not, in practice,
enforced.[8]
Governing bodies "turned a blind eye" to breaches of
the regulations.[9]
Professionalisation removed the major barrier between Rugby Union
and Rugby League—the very obstacle that had caused the split
that formed the two codes one hundred years previously.[10]
Since that split, the two codes had remained separate, distinct
and, at times, antagonistic.
2. Since 1995 Rugby Union has changed radically and,
as the youngest international professional sport, it has faced
new challenges. Rugby League, too, has changed in recent years
with the switch to a summer season and the introduction of the
Super League competition.[11]
Both codes have received substantial funding from satellite television
contracts.[12]
This inquiry has examined the nature of the changes in Rugby Union
and Rugby League and the impact this should have on public policy
in relation to the two sports.
3. We also considered the relations between the two
codes since the removal of the main contentious issue between
them. In its Third Report of Session 1994-95, the National Heritage
Committee considered the relations between Rugby Union and Rugby
League, and concluded that the amateur status of Rugby Union was
no more than a veil.[13]
The Committee further contested the IRB definition of "amateur".[14]
The Report recommended an end to the discrimination that Rugby
League suffered at the hands of Rugby Union.[15]
The evidence submitted to this Committee highlighted the value
of the previous inquiry in identifying pressures within as well
as between the codes.[16]
Many of those pressures have come to the fore since the restructuring
of both sports.
4. This inquiry was announced in May 1999. We took
oral evidence on Rugby League from the Rugby League Players' Association,
Super League (Europe) Limited, the Rugby Football League (RFL)
and the British Amateur Rugby League Association (BARLA). We took
oral evidence on Rugby Union from the Professional Rugby Players'
Association, English First Division Rugby, English Second Division
Rugby (ESDR), the Scottish Rugby Union (SRU) and the Rugby Football
Union (RFU). We visited Wigan Rugby League Football Club at Central
Park, Wigan and Saracens Rugby Union Football Club at Vicarage
Road, Watford.
5. We received written evidence from the above organisations
and additional written memoranda from other organisations and
individuals. This evidence is being published with the Committee's
Report.[17]
The Committee acknowledges with gratitude the contribution that
those who submitted evidence and those involved with the Committee's
visits to Wigan and Watford have made to its inquiry.
II. SUSTAINING PROFESSIONAL RUGBY
The causes of the professionalisation of Rugby
Union
6. The absorption of professionalism into Rugby Union
in the Northern Hemisphere was dictated by the reality of shamateurism
at the highest levels of the game, particularly in the Southern
Hemisphere, where the pretence of amateur status had become severely
undermined and unsustainable.[18]
Mr Greenwood of English Second Division Rugby claimed that there
was a misconception that people knew what they were doing when
the game turned professional and stated "there was an element
of stampede"[19]
and that rugby can only be "a semi-professional sport, if
the truth be known".[20]
7. The new competition structures necessary to underpin
the professional game were not in place after the hasty introduction
of professionalism. Public interest will only be maintained if
the highest quality of rugby is consistently made available to
a wide audience. The Scottish Rugby Union considered good quality
competitions essential.[21]
The SRU is keen to participate in "a British League, which
involves the whole of the population of our isles in something
that may be called a British and Irish League".[22]
The SRU added that: "We have to work with our partners in
England, Ireland, Wales, and France. We have to have a Northern
Hemisphere approach",[23]
but warned "If you have a European League, a British League,
an International League season, the players are going to be very
tired and the top players will have to look at the structure of
the playing season, the Six Nations championship and the other
competitions taking place".[24]
The Rugby Football Union agreed that "we need ... a Northern
Hemisphere approach just as they have got a Southern Hemisphere
approach. The Unions of the northern hemisphere must meet and
look at a common playing strategy ... That has been a weakness
of the northern hemisphere game from time immemorial. You get
a far better playing structure when your players play at a higher
quality and higher intensity week in week out".[25]
Mr Fran Cotton, the Chairman of Club England, added that what
is required is a "European structured season where our domestic
competition is played at the same time, our European competition
played at the same time; and our international games played at
the same time".[26]
The organisation, funding and sustainability of
Rugby Union
8. Rugby Union's history of management failure, political
infighting and financial ineptitude have been discussed in detail
since the ill-prepared switch to professionalism.[27]
The structure of Rugby Union has moved uneasily from its ancestral
Corinthian amateur past to its modern professional status. The
governance of Rugby Union in England is in the hands of the Rugby
Football Union, which has been charged by English Second Division
Rugby and the Rugby Union Players' Association with overseeing
administrative and financial chaos.[28]
The RFU informed the Committee that: "After suffering substantial
losses our [the RFU] finances are being turned around ... the
£3.3 million loss last year has been reduced to that of an
£8,000 loss for this year".[29]
9. Professionalism has been accepted by, and to a
considerable degree was the wish of, the players but seemingly
this ethos has permeated through to the administrators of the
game. Mr Hopley, Secretary of the Professional Rugby Players'
Association, said "the RFU ... buried their head in the sand
when the game went professional. There was not the sufficient
infrastructure or the administration to appoint professional administrators
or to look at the professional game."[30]
There was an admission from Mr Greenwood that: "We are very
naive in many respects ... one of the things we have not done
... is learn from the very clear models that other sports have
given us...We have not been very clever at learning these lessons.
We are trying to reinvent the wheel and we should not be."[31]
10. Since the transition to professionalism, the
illusion of sustainability of Rugby Union at the highest domestic
level has been dependent on funding from satellite television,
sponsors and the RFU. Many club finances have been bolstered by
the initial and in some cases continuing investment by prosperous
businessmen. Nevertheless, clubs that have in the past accrued
many honours and achieved much success have found themselves under
intense pressure in the new commercially competitive environment,
and have, in some instances, spectacularly succumbed to that pressure.[32]
11. Wakefield RFC stated: "It is generally accepted
that professional Rugby Union at club level is not sustainable
at present levels"[33]
unless further finances could be secured. Suggestions for further
funding have included allocation of nationally-negotiated sponsorship
monies, deep-pocketed or emotionally-motivated investors, and
further locally-negotiated sponsorship.[34]
The financial sustainability of the game depends on future television
rights deals, sponsorship and on continuing and reliable gate
receipts. Sustainability is therefore dependent on success on
the playing field, at both international and domestic levels.
The impact of professional status on Rugby Union
12. Evidence shows that few, if any, professional
clubs have made a profit.[35]
English Second Division Rugby stated: "The professional game
as it stands is unsustainable, we are not sufficiently prudent",[36]
and further asserted "there is probably only one of the 28
existing clubs that is a going concern",[37]
and many clubs face severe financial hardship.[38]
Rugby Union's failure to respond to the challenges of professionalism
has been related to unrealistic expectation on the part of clubs,
sponsors and players of the revenue that could be generated by
Rugby Union.[39]
Saracens RFC's submission stated "No professional rugby union
club in England is making an operational profit. In large part
...this is due to the way in which professionalism was introduced.
There was little forethought and initial optimism resulted in
the cost base spiralling out of control—largely in the form
of players' wages".[40]
We hope that Mr Hopley was correct when he said "there is
a viable future for professional club rugby".[41]
The wage cap
13. The initial wage rates have not supported the
long-term interests of the clubs or players. The cost of players'
wages[42]
has been cited as a major cause of Rugby Union's financial problems.
The RFU stated: "They [clubs] have been losing in excess
of £20 million a year collectively and that cannot go on.
They have made very positive moves over the last year to get their
financial house in order. The wage cap is part of it". The
RFU added that the top clubs "want to introduce wage capping
because they recognise there is a need to invest in the infrastructure
of the game and that is one of their main objectives".[43]
ESDR stated that clubs were paying "unduly high rewards for
players" and Rugby Union did not have the "recurring
revenue to offer a viable source of operating income to service
the players' rewards".[44]
14. The case for a wage cap has been broadly accepted.
Mr Hopley stated that the initial player contracts in the wake
of professionalism were "not worth the paper they are written
on" and accordingly players had accepted the concept of a
wage cap. He thought that they would "rather be involved
in a financially viable and stable sport than one that is dropping
clubs left, right and centre".[45]
The RFU told us: "The first division clubs have implemented
a wage cap and they are determined to stick to it".[46]
15. The SRU—in a manner similar to Southern
Hemisphere countries—has gone for a totally different structure
whereby it directly funds the two professional Scottish Rugby
Union teams at a cost of approximately £1 million per annum
per team, rather than players having contracts with the clubs
as is the case in England.[47]
The SRU considers this position to be sustainable only if "[players'
wages] will be diluted downwards, based on affordability. What
we cannot determine is English club owners who are creating the
market value, who are prepared to go along with sustaining losses
for the interest in the game rather than treating it as a business....We
like to think that businessmen are looking for a return".[48]
The financial state of Rugby League
16. The Rugby Football League gathers its annual
revenue from four primary sources, the Challenge Cup competition,
international and representative rugby, grant-aid support and
sundry sponsorships. The revenues in 1999 will be approximately
£5.5 million. Professional Rugby League also receives revenue
from television contracts with BBC Television Sport and Sky Sports.
The total revenue from external commercial sources, excluding
individual clubs revenue, is some £20 million per annum.[49]
17. The revolution in Rugby League came about as
a result of a satellite television contract which funded the payment
of the high wages and substantial transfer fees necessary to secure
the services of the best players at home and abroad. That original
£87 million deal over five years was spread over all the
member clubs—about £30 million of which went to the
division one and two clubs and the balance to Super League clubs.[50]
The future funding from satellite contracts will be at a lower
level and Super League Europe stated: "They have to take
measures to control that financial deficit by exercising internal
financial disciplines and, of course, increasing their share of
the market and balancing it by additional income".[51]
They went on to say that Super League would have to be "more
proactive and more aggressive in generating and looking for new
income streams".[52]
Super League admitted "exuberances have taken place over
the past number of years and a set of club directors has been
followed by another set of club directors, followed by another
entrepreneur who put money out of his own pocket to try and sustain
excellence and success at the cost of financial prudence".[53]
18. Rugby League has traditionally received less
television coverage than Rugby Union.[54]
A poor television presence has the knock-on consequences of a
poor ability to attract sponsors and fewer youngsters being exposed
to the sport. Mr Lindsay, the Chief Executive of Super League
(Europe) Limited, admitted that "any sport would prefer if
it were able to be on terrestrial [television]"[55]
but "we were earning less than a million pounds a year with
the BBC and we were able to negotiate Sky Sports at £17.4
million a year which the game gladly took and badly needed".[56]
19. Wage costs in Rugby League increased, as in Rugby
Union, as a result of more money being available in the short-term
and the pressures to compete for players with clubs abroad. The
situation was described by Mr Lindsay as "everyone wanting
to win the championship and everyone wanting to go to Wembley,
natural competitive instincts have overtaken sound rationale ...
[the salary cap] was introduced, to curb those excesses. Enthusiastic
directors were going into debt to finance hoped for success".
[57]
Mr Caisley, Chairman of Bradford Bulls RLFC, stated that the "imposition
... of a salary cap has had immense benefits. Clubs have found
it to be extremely useful in terms of their cash flow and cash
monitoring and certainly I believe that salary cap will be further
enhanced over the coming years to cater for the development of
the game according to circumstances as they then are".[58]
Future funding arrangements for the two codes
20. The health of both rugby codes is clearly dependent
on the competitive vigour of clubs and their financial strength
which in turn is now dependent to a large extent on television
rights income. Both codes have from time to time blamed their
respective poor finances on a combination of overpaid players,
inept governance and the effect of large television contracts.[59]
Comparisons between Rugby Union and Rugby League have always been
hampered by differences in the games themselves, and in their
history, and their management styles and their structure. The
recent ending of the financial distinction between the codes has
made comparison easier, and has highlighted the fact that many
failures, problems and, possibly, solutions are common to both.
21. The influx of large sums of money from satellite
television broadcasters has had a profound influence on the size
of crowds of both rugby codes. In Rugby League, new money has
increased the income of the top clubs, but at the expense of a
smaller television audience and a fall in the number of spectators
attending games.[60]
The influx of satellite broadcasters' money has also been cited
as an "upward pressure on transfer fees and salaries".[61]
A smaller television audience may, in the long-term, cause a reduction
in support for the sport, leading to fewer young people participating.[62]
The changing media environment has led to a reduction in the numbers
of people attending matches or watching them on television. Rugby
Union has suffered similar reductions in the television audience
for club rugby, but has largely retained and in some cases may
even have increased supporter numbers.[63]
The new television contracts were part of a shared ambition of
both sports to be able to market the game more widely.
22. English First Division Rugby stated: "BSkyB
have bought the rights to England home international and to club
rugby. The allocation to club rugby is pooled amongst the top
clubs. We do pay a small extra fee to clubs who are shown live
on television because generally that has an adverse effect on
the gate".[64]
However, English Second Division Rugby stated that "the Second
Division receives a very generous share. The division as a whole,
to be shared amongst the 14 clubs, has been guaranteed £3
million for the next two seasons but that is a consequence of
the existing contractual relationship. There is a genuine concern
in the Second Division that that will go to nil in three seasons'
time because of the pressures that have been put on from the First
Division and their own financial constraints. There is no certainty
of continuity of financial support for the Second Division after
two seasons hence."[65]
23. Investors came into the professional game not
least because it was seen as a mini-football.[66]
High levels of investment from individuals have been welcomed
by many clubs and have allowed them to compete in the new competitions.
However, as Mr Greenwood stated: "To see one man put in a
rumoured five to six million [pounds] and then find himself not
able to continue that support is reckless. We seek financial prudence
throughout the sport".[67]
The initial rush of investment has settled down and the need for
stability of funding has been recognised. We were told by the
RFU: "Without proper finances you do not have a business
and the entrepreneurs running those clubs know that."[68]
Some entrepreneurs investing in the sport were, as Mr Hammond,
Chairman of London Welsh RFC, confessed, "emotional investors",[69]
in that their investments in sport were not only based on business
considerations but also an emotional attachment to seeing that
sport, or club, flourish.
24. The future of both codes is dependent not only
on creating a sustainable financial policy and the development
of present and future players but also on remaining relevant to
the general public.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO
CODES
25. The separation between the codes runs much deeper
than the issue of professionalism and has long been acknowledged
to be a problem. However, since the start of professionalism in
Rugby Union, as EFDR stated, "the previous tension which
existed between the two codes largely disappeared".[70]
We found little support for closer links between the codes on
the playing field.[71]
The Rugby Football League's opinion was typical: " I do not
see that there is much need for that [combining the two codes]
... Rugby League has its own strengths in its own particular parts
of the country, while Rugby Union has its own strengths in its
particular parts of the country. We have co-existed with our ups
and downs for over 100 years. We are both still in a position
of some strength and some prosperity and from that basis I do
not see there is any need to come closer together".[72]
Cooperation has been achieved in administration areas and "certain
... opportunities for ground sharing".[73]
Rugby League teams "have proven to be very proficient at
'Sevens'" and this may be an area "where the two codes
could cooperate both at club and ultimately international levels".[74]
The RFU stated: "At the logistical end there is a common
dialogue in terms of the two codes, registration and insurance,
and trying to get the best deal for the game through our individual
contacts".[75]
26. The Committee recognises the distinct nature
of the two codes and the long cultural separation between them.
In Mr Lindsay's words "everybody has now accepted that there
are two different codes, two different types of entertainment,
which perhaps draw two different followings".[76]
The professionalisation of Rugby Union has removed the main obstacle
to interchange between the two codes, and both Rugby Union and
Rugby League could learn from each others successes and failures.
27. In the National Heritage Committee Report on
the relationship between the codes, one of the main charges laid
at the door of Rugby Union was its obstruction to free movement
of players between the codes.[77]
Both the Rugby Union Players' Association and the Rugby League
Players' Association confirmed that there is now a free flow of
player movement between the two codes.[78]
Although the two codes remain distinct, they attract, to some
extent, the same players, if not the same supporters. Conversely
the RFU states that "since the game went professional there
is no longer migration from union to league".[79]
IV. PROMOTING WIDER PARTICIPATION
28. The Committee was provided with a great deal
of evidence on the growth of grassroots rugby and the efforts
that both codes have made to encourage participation through schools.[80]
Many witnesses bemoaned the decline of school sport in general.
The Rugby Football League stated "the way that school sport
has been declining in recent years has been a national tragedy,
for individual sports and for our sporting welfare across the
whole board".[81]
29. On our visits to Saracens and to Wigan, we observed
the work of their educational teams with local school children.
The 'chalk and talk' sessions are based on national curriculum
standards incorporating maths, English and other subjects in the
context of rugby. We were impressed by the quality and extent
of the clubs' work in the community, particularly with children.
We recommend that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
and the Department for Education and Employment look carefully
at the 'Chalk and Talk' schemes to see if this good practice can
be replicated in other sports.
30. BARLA made an impassioned plea for the development
of grassroots, amateur Rugby League and for their organisation
to be directly involved and funded to this end.[82]
The RFL pointed out that not only do they fund development officers
charged with the expansion of the game geographically, but also
the clubs employ development officers and that that is a requirement
for Super League clubs.[83]
Similarly the RFU funds full-time development officers, encouraging
participation and assisting particularly talented players.[84]
31. The women's game is actively supported in both
Rugby Union and Rugby League. The governing bodies of both codes
have made money, facilities and expertise available to women's
rugby. The British Amateur Rugby League Association described
their support for the women's and girl's game, and for mixed sex
teams up to under-11.[85]
The RFU supports the Rugby Football Union for Women, and assists
in the development of women's Rugby Union directly and through
assisting with bids to UK Sport.[86]
The SRU stated "women's rugby union ... have their own season
and leagues for clubs and it is the fastest growing women's sport
in Scotland so it is doing very well. We support it as much as
we possibly can".[87]
32. Playing success will clearly depend on the professional
development of an elite of players. Future playing success will
depend on support for amateur and youth rugby—BARLA stated:
"The amateur game is the proven nursery of Rugby League talent
and produces the overwhelming majority of players for the professional
game".[88]
Even so BARLA maintain that none of the money from the television
deals goes down to the grass roots "in a direct manner".[89]
33. The RFU distributes money throughout the game
"all the way down to the clubs right at the bottom of the
tree who get a small but certain amount of funding".[90]
In 1991 the RFU had been involved with 500 schools participating
in rugby, in addition to 3,500 RFU affiliated schools; that figure
has now grown to 10,000 schools.[91]
However, the RFU noted "the game up to the age of 16 still
shows a fairly significant increase. The difficulty we have is
in retaining those players into adulthood. We refer to a time
between 16 and 21 where there is a little bit of a black hole
in participation",[92]
and furthermore "like all sports in this country the participating
numbers are diminishing for many and varied reasons".[93]
34. Grassroots development has been influenced by
the relationship between the codes in the past. The RFU described
the situation whereby "with most youngsters there is a cross-code
influence. Rugby players do not actually see themselves a rugby
union or league. They see themselves as rugby players. It is only
as you develop through to mid teenage years that there is a move
towards specialism."[94]
This view was echoed by the RFL who added that the switch to playing
Rugby League in the summer enabled youngsters to play a wider
variety of sports.[95]
The RFL also referred to the success of their campaign to tackle
racism in the sport, including the encouragement of black and
Asian youngsters to take up the sport.[96]
35. Mr Hammond considered it "the social responsibility
of the clubs that receive that money [a definitively recurring
proportion of media revenue] to develop the sport as a whole,
not just the professional sport".[97]
Mr Greenwood expanded on the clubs' responsibility to grassroots
development and described Waterloo RFC's activities, including,
"community and schools visit programme with hands-on coaching
and development of young players and encouragement of players
to come to our club" he added: "If we do not do that
then we are doomed".[98]
V. PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS RUGBY UNION AND
RUGBY LEAGUE
36. Rugby Union and Rugby League in England currently
receive public funding via Sport England (formerly the English
Sports Council), the National Lottery Sports Fund, administered
by the Sports Councils and Sportsmatch—the Government's
Sponsorship Incentive Scheme for Sport which matches, pound for
pound, commercial sponsorship of grassroots sport.[99]
Neither Rugby Union nor Rugby League is in a financial position
to turn down money offered to them, but SRU warned: "The
balance of revenue and capital funding from the Lottery has created
a dependence culture".[100]
37. Since the Lottery Fund was established in 1995,
Rugby Union has received 98 capital awards from the National Lottery
Sports Fund, amounting to £21.1 million.[101]
Rugby League has received 22 capital funding awards, worth £4.5
million.[102]
There is a very marked disparity in Lottery grants with Rugby
Union receiving five times as much money as Rugby League. We recommend
the National Lottery Sports Fund examine the reasons for this
disparity and the assumptions behind it.
38. Sport England supports Rugby League through Sport
England Exchequer grant-in-aid to help the development of the
sports infrastructure, development officers, women's Rugby League
and the education and training of coaches and match officials.
In addition grants have been offered to support the amateur game.
Rugby Union also receives grant-in-aid to fund sports development
officers and promote both the men's and women's game.
39. Sportsmatch has provided £3.7 million of
pound-for-pound matching funding for grassroots rugby. Together
with the matching commercial sponsorship £4.7m and £2.74m
of new money has been raised for Rugby Union and Rugby League,
respectively.[103]
40. "Unattractive and outmoded grounds and stadia"
have been suggested to be principal reasons for the falling attendances
at Rugby Union matches.[104]
Many arguments were put before the Committee, advocating the building
of purpose-built, often multi-sports, modern stadia.[105]
We also heard many complaints that unreasonable demands were being
placed on clubs that proposed to build new or to alter existing
stadia.
41. Shortly before the start of our inquiry the Committee
was informed that the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport had announced the relaunch of the Sports Ground Initiative.
Although a great deal of work remains to be done finalising the
details, the scheme will make a share of a £10 million fund
for stadium improvements available to professional Rugby Union
and Rugby League clubs.[106]
42. In our view, the principal concern of public
policy with regard to sport is to maintain and enhance participation
in sport of all kinds. We expect this aim to be at the centre
of the Government's long awaited and much delayed Strategy for
Sport.[107]
In the context of public policy, the sustainability of professional
rugby matters insofar as the professional game contributes to
wider interest and participation in sport.
43. We recommend to Sport England that further
public investment in facilities and grounds for professional clubs
should be subject to two conditions. First, as proposed by Hemel
Hempstead RLFC, grants for spectator facilities should be "linked
with a club's proven track record of youth, schools and amateur
development in the community".[108]
Second, conditions related to the management and finances of professional
clubs should be imposed before grants are given for stadium development.
VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
44. Our principal conclusions and recommendations
are as follows:
(i) We recommend
that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department
for Education and Employment look carefully at the 'Chalk and
Talk' schemes to see if this good practice can be replicated in
other sports (paragraph 29).
(ii) There is a very
marked disparity in Lottery grants with Rugby Union receiving
five times as much money as Rugby League. We recommend the National
Lottery Sports Fund examine the reasons for this disparity and
the assumptions behind it (paragraph 37).
(iii) In our view, the
principal concern of public policy with regard to sport is to
maintain and enhance participation in sport of all kinds. We expect
this aim to be at the centre of the Government's long awaited
and much delayed Strategy for Sport. In the context of public
policy, the sustainability of professional rugby matters insofar
as the professional game contributes to wider interest and participation
in sport (paragraph 42).
(iv) We recommend to
Sport England that further public investment in facilities and
grounds for professional clubs should be subject to two conditions.
First, as proposed by Hemel Hempstead RLFC, grants for spectator
facilities should be "linked with a club's proven track record
of youth, schools and amateur development in the community".
Second, conditions related to the management and finances of professional
clubs should be imposed before grants are given for stadium development
(paragraph 43).
6 Evidence,
p 47. Back
7 Third
Report from the National Heritage Committee, Relations between
Rugby Union and Rugby League, HC (1994-95) 276. Back
8 Evidence,
p 47. Back
9 Ibid. Back
10 Evidence,
p 9. Back
11 Evidence,
p 10. Back
12 Evidence,
pp 18, 79. Back
13 HC (1994-95)
276, para 68. Back
14 Ibid.,
para 27. Back
15 Ibid.,
para 65. Back
16 QQ
94-95; Evidence, p 92. Back
17 For
lists of witnesses, published Memoranda and Appendices, see pp
xvii-xix. Back
18 Evidence,
p 47. Back
19 Q 269. Back
20 Q 251. Back
21 Evidence,
p 68. Back
22 Q 285. Back
23 Q 289. Back
24 Ibid. Back
25 Q 338. Back
26 Q 355. Back
27 Evidence,
pp 47-48, 60. Back
28 Evidence,
pp 60, 107. Back
29 Q 335. Back
30 Q 146. Back
31 Q 266. Back
32 Evidence,
pp 109-110. Back
33 Evidence,
p 106. Back
34 Evidence,
p 113. Back
35 Evidence,
pp 106, 133. Back
36 Q 247. Back
37 Q 248. Back
38 Evidence,
p 107. Back
39 Ibid. Back
40 Evidence,
p 133. Back
41 Q 169. Back
42 Evidence,
p 106. Back
43 Q 337. Back
44 Q 248. Back
45 Q 138. Back
46 Q 336. Back
47 Evidence,
p 69. Back
48 Q 286. Back
49 Evidence,
pp 17-18. Back
50 Q 42. Back
51 Ibid. Back
52 Ibid. Back
53 Q 65. Back
54 Q 43;
Evidence, p 10. Back
55 Q 58. Back
56 Q 54. Back
57 Q 64. Back
58 Q 62. Back
59 QQ
2, 4, 199, 213-220. Back
60 Evidence,
pp 100-101. Back
61 Evidence,
p 96. Back
62 Evidence,
pp 100-101. Back
63 Evidence,
p 103. Back
64 Q 215. Back
65 Q 249. Back
66 Q 176. Back
67 Q 248. Back
68 Q 336. Back
69 Q 261. Back
70 Evidence,
p 51. Back
71 QQ
14, 15, 63, 76, 77, 154, 234. Back
72 Q 77. Back
73 Evidence,
p 60. Back
74 Evidence,
p 51. Back
75 Q 350. Back
76 Q 63. Back
77 HC
(1994-95) 276, paras 59-61. Back
78 Evidence,
pp 2, 108. Back
79 Evidence,
p 79. Back
80 Evidence,
pp 11, 21-22, 28-29, 51, 61, 69-70, 80-81, 106-107. Back
81 Q 76. Back
82 Evidence,
p 91. Back
83 QQ
80, 92. Back
84 Evidence,
p 78. Back
85 Evidence,
p 28. Back
86 Evidence,
p 78. Back
87 Q 329. Back
88 Evidence,
p 28. Back
89 Q 100. Back
90 Q 344. Back
91 Q 346. Back
92 Q 352. Back
93 Q 346. Back
94 Q 351. Back
95 QQ
77,78. Back
96 Q 81. Back
97 Q 261. Back
98 Q 263. Back
99 Evidence,
p 92. Back
100 Q
288. Back
101 Evidence,
p 91. Back
102 Ibid. Back
103 Evidence,
p 92. Back
104 Evidence,
p 106. Back
105 Evidence,
pp 69, 92, 106, 108. Back
106 Evidence,
p 125. Back
107 Fourth
Report from the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Staging
International Sporting Events, HC (1998-99) 124-I, para 25;
HC Deb, 29 October 1999, col 1010W. Back
108 Evidence,
p 105. Back
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