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Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Second Report



SECOND REPORT

The Culture, Media and Sport Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL RUGBY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In August 1995, the International Rugby Board (IRB) announced that the game of Rugby Union would become professional.[6] This followed the Report on Relations between Rugby Union and Rugby League by the National Heritage Committee calling for an end to "shamateurism".[7] Although Rugby Union had been ostensibly amateur since its birth, the regulations prohibiting professionalism were not, in practice, enforced.[8] Governing bodies "turned a blind eye" to breaches of the regulations.[9] Professionalisation removed the major barrier between Rugby Union and Rugby League—the very obstacle that had caused the split that formed the two codes one hundred years previously.[10] Since that split, the two codes had remained separate, distinct and, at times, antagonistic.

2. Since 1995 Rugby Union has changed radically and, as the youngest international professional sport, it has faced new challenges. Rugby League, too, has changed in recent years with the switch to a summer season and the introduction of the Super League competition.[11] Both codes have received substantial funding from satellite television contracts.[12] This inquiry has examined the nature of the changes in Rugby Union and Rugby League and the impact this should have on public policy in relation to the two sports.

3. We also considered the relations between the two codes since the removal of the main contentious issue between them. In its Third Report of Session 1994-95, the National Heritage Committee considered the relations between Rugby Union and Rugby League, and concluded that the amateur status of Rugby Union was no more than a veil.[13] The Committee further contested the IRB definition of "amateur".[14] The Report recommended an end to the discrimination that Rugby League suffered at the hands of Rugby Union.[15] The evidence submitted to this Committee highlighted the value of the previous inquiry in identifying pressures within as well as between the codes.[16] Many of those pressures have come to the fore since the restructuring of both sports.

4. This inquiry was announced in May 1999. We took oral evidence on Rugby League from the Rugby League Players' Association, Super League (Europe) Limited, the Rugby Football League (RFL) and the British Amateur Rugby League Association (BARLA). We took oral evidence on Rugby Union from the Professional Rugby Players' Association, English First Division Rugby, English Second Division Rugby (ESDR), the Scottish Rugby Union (SRU) and the Rugby Football Union (RFU). We visited Wigan Rugby League Football Club at Central Park, Wigan and Saracens Rugby Union Football Club at Vicarage Road, Watford.

5. We received written evidence from the above organisations and additional written memoranda from other organisations and individuals. This evidence is being published with the Committee's Report.[17] The Committee acknowledges with gratitude the contribution that those who submitted evidence and those involved with the Committee's visits to Wigan and Watford have made to its inquiry.

II. SUSTAINING PROFESSIONAL RUGBY

The causes of the professionalisation of Rugby Union

6. The absorption of professionalism into Rugby Union in the Northern Hemisphere was dictated by the reality of shamateurism at the highest levels of the game, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, where the pretence of amateur status had become severely undermined and unsustainable.[18] Mr Greenwood of English Second Division Rugby claimed that there was a misconception that people knew what they were doing when the game turned professional and stated "there was an element of stampede"[19] and that rugby can only be "a semi-professional sport, if the truth be known".[20]

7. The new competition structures necessary to underpin the professional game were not in place after the hasty introduction of professionalism. Public interest will only be maintained if the highest quality of rugby is consistently made available to a wide audience. The Scottish Rugby Union considered good quality competitions essential.[21] The SRU is keen to participate in "a British League, which involves the whole of the population of our isles in something that may be called a British and Irish League".[22] The SRU added that: "We have to work with our partners in England, Ireland, Wales, and France. We have to have a Northern Hemisphere approach",[23] but warned "If you have a European League, a British League, an International League season, the players are going to be very tired and the top players will have to look at the structure of the playing season, the Six Nations championship and the other competitions taking place".[24] The Rugby Football Union agreed that "we need ... a Northern Hemisphere approach just as they have got a Southern Hemisphere approach. The Unions of the northern hemisphere must meet and look at a common playing strategy ... That has been a weakness of the northern hemisphere game from time immemorial. You get a far better playing structure when your players play at a higher quality and higher intensity week in week out".[25] Mr Fran Cotton, the Chairman of Club England, added that what is required is a "European structured season where our domestic competition is played at the same time, our European competition played at the same time; and our international games played at the same time".[26]

The organisation, funding and sustainability of Rugby Union

8. Rugby Union's history of management failure, political infighting and financial ineptitude have been discussed in detail since the ill-prepared switch to professionalism.[27] The structure of Rugby Union has moved uneasily from its ancestral Corinthian amateur past to its modern professional status. The governance of Rugby Union in England is in the hands of the Rugby Football Union, which has been charged by English Second Division Rugby and the Rugby Union Players' Association with overseeing administrative and financial chaos.[28] The RFU informed the Committee that: "After suffering substantial losses our [the RFU] finances are being turned around ... the £3.3 million loss last year has been reduced to that of an £8,000 loss for this year".[29]

9. Professionalism has been accepted by, and to a considerable degree was the wish of, the players but seemingly this ethos has permeated through to the administrators of the game. Mr Hopley, Secretary of the Professional Rugby Players' Association, said "the RFU ... buried their head in the sand when the game went professional. There was not the sufficient infrastructure or the administration to appoint professional administrators or to look at the professional game."[30] There was an admission from Mr Greenwood that: "We are very naive in many respects ... one of the things we have not done ... is learn from the very clear models that other sports have given us...We have not been very clever at learning these lessons. We are trying to reinvent the wheel and we should not be."[31]

10. Since the transition to professionalism, the illusion of sustainability of Rugby Union at the highest domestic level has been dependent on funding from satellite television, sponsors and the RFU. Many club finances have been bolstered by the initial and in some cases continuing investment by prosperous businessmen. Nevertheless, clubs that have in the past accrued many honours and achieved much success have found themselves under intense pressure in the new commercially competitive environment, and have, in some instances, spectacularly succumbed to that pressure.[32]

11. Wakefield RFC stated: "It is generally accepted that professional Rugby Union at club level is not sustainable at present levels"[33] unless further finances could be secured. Suggestions for further funding have included allocation of nationally-negotiated sponsorship monies, deep-pocketed or emotionally-motivated investors, and further locally-negotiated sponsorship.[34] The financial sustainability of the game depends on future television rights deals, sponsorship and on continuing and reliable gate receipts. Sustainability is therefore dependent on success on the playing field, at both international and domestic levels.

The impact of professional status on Rugby Union

12. Evidence shows that few, if any, professional clubs have made a profit.[35] English Second Division Rugby stated: "The professional game as it stands is unsustainable, we are not sufficiently prudent",[36] and further asserted "there is probably only one of the 28 existing clubs that is a going concern",[37] and many clubs face severe financial hardship.[38] Rugby Union's failure to respond to the challenges of professionalism has been related to unrealistic expectation on the part of clubs, sponsors and players of the revenue that could be generated by Rugby Union.[39] Saracens RFC's submission stated "No professional rugby union club in England is making an operational profit. In large part ...this is due to the way in which professionalism was introduced. There was little forethought and initial optimism resulted in the cost base spiralling out of control—largely in the form of players' wages".[40] We hope that Mr Hopley was correct when he said "there is a viable future for professional club rugby".[41]

The wage cap

13. The initial wage rates have not supported the long-term interests of the clubs or players. The cost of players' wages[42] has been cited as a major cause of Rugby Union's financial problems. The RFU stated: "They [clubs] have been losing in excess of £20 million a year collectively and that cannot go on. They have made very positive moves over the last year to get their financial house in order. The wage cap is part of it". The RFU added that the top clubs "want to introduce wage capping because they recognise there is a need to invest in the infrastructure of the game and that is one of their main objectives".[43] ESDR stated that clubs were paying "unduly high rewards for players" and Rugby Union did not have the "recurring revenue to offer a viable source of operating income to service the players' rewards".[44]

14. The case for a wage cap has been broadly accepted. Mr Hopley stated that the initial player contracts in the wake of professionalism were "not worth the paper they are written on" and accordingly players had accepted the concept of a wage cap. He thought that they would "rather be involved in a financially viable and stable sport than one that is dropping clubs left, right and centre".[45] The RFU told us: "The first division clubs have implemented a wage cap and they are determined to stick to it".[46]

15. The SRU—in a manner similar to Southern Hemisphere countries—has gone for a totally different structure whereby it directly funds the two professional Scottish Rugby Union teams at a cost of approximately £1 million per annum per team, rather than players having contracts with the clubs as is the case in England.[47] The SRU considers this position to be sustainable only if "[players' wages] will be diluted downwards, based on affordability. What we cannot determine is English club owners who are creating the market value, who are prepared to go along with sustaining losses for the interest in the game rather than treating it as a business....We like to think that businessmen are looking for a return".[48]

The financial state of Rugby League

16. The Rugby Football League gathers its annual revenue from four primary sources, the Challenge Cup competition, international and representative rugby, grant-aid support and sundry sponsorships. The revenues in 1999 will be approximately £5.5 million. Professional Rugby League also receives revenue from television contracts with BBC Television Sport and Sky Sports. The total revenue from external commercial sources, excluding individual clubs revenue, is some £20 million per annum.[49]

17. The revolution in Rugby League came about as a result of a satellite television contract which funded the payment of the high wages and substantial transfer fees necessary to secure the services of the best players at home and abroad. That original £87 million deal over five years was spread over all the member clubs—about £30 million of which went to the division one and two clubs and the balance to Super League clubs.[50] The future funding from satellite contracts will be at a lower level and Super League Europe stated: "They have to take measures to control that financial deficit by exercising internal financial disciplines and, of course, increasing their share of the market and balancing it by additional income".[51] They went on to say that Super League would have to be "more proactive and more aggressive in generating and looking for new income streams".[52] Super League admitted "exuberances have taken place over the past number of years and a set of club directors has been followed by another set of club directors, followed by another entrepreneur who put money out of his own pocket to try and sustain excellence and success at the cost of financial prudence".[53]

18. Rugby League has traditionally received less television coverage than Rugby Union.[54] A poor television presence has the knock-on consequences of a poor ability to attract sponsors and fewer youngsters being exposed to the sport. Mr Lindsay, the Chief Executive of Super League (Europe) Limited, admitted that "any sport would prefer if it were able to be on terrestrial [television]"[55] but "we were earning less than a million pounds a year with the BBC and we were able to negotiate Sky Sports at £17.4 million a year which the game gladly took and badly needed".[56]

19. Wage costs in Rugby League increased, as in Rugby Union, as a result of more money being available in the short-term and the pressures to compete for players with clubs abroad. The situation was described by Mr Lindsay as "everyone wanting to win the championship and everyone wanting to go to Wembley, natural competitive instincts have overtaken sound rationale ... [the salary cap] was introduced, to curb those excesses. Enthusiastic directors were going into debt to finance hoped for success". [57] Mr Caisley, Chairman of Bradford Bulls RLFC, stated that the "imposition ... of a salary cap has had immense benefits. Clubs have found it to be extremely useful in terms of their cash flow and cash monitoring and certainly I believe that salary cap will be further enhanced over the coming years to cater for the development of the game according to circumstances as they then are".[58]

Future funding arrangements for the two codes

20. The health of both rugby codes is clearly dependent on the competitive vigour of clubs and their financial strength which in turn is now dependent to a large extent on television rights income. Both codes have from time to time blamed their respective poor finances on a combination of overpaid players, inept governance and the effect of large television contracts.[59] Comparisons between Rugby Union and Rugby League have always been hampered by differences in the games themselves, and in their history, and their management styles and their structure. The recent ending of the financial distinction between the codes has made comparison easier, and has highlighted the fact that many failures, problems and, possibly, solutions are common to both.

21. The influx of large sums of money from satellite television broadcasters has had a profound influence on the size of crowds of both rugby codes. In Rugby League, new money has increased the income of the top clubs, but at the expense of a smaller television audience and a fall in the number of spectators attending games.[60] The influx of satellite broadcasters' money has also been cited as an "upward pressure on transfer fees and salaries".[61] A smaller television audience may, in the long-term, cause a reduction in support for the sport, leading to fewer young people participating.[62] The changing media environment has led to a reduction in the numbers of people attending matches or watching them on television. Rugby Union has suffered similar reductions in the television audience for club rugby, but has largely retained and in some cases may even have increased supporter numbers.[63] The new television contracts were part of a shared ambition of both sports to be able to market the game more widely.

22. English First Division Rugby stated: "BSkyB have bought the rights to England home international and to club rugby. The allocation to club rugby is pooled amongst the top clubs. We do pay a small extra fee to clubs who are shown live on television because generally that has an adverse effect on the gate".[64] However, English Second Division Rugby stated that "the Second Division receives a very generous share. The division as a whole, to be shared amongst the 14 clubs, has been guaranteed £3 million for the next two seasons but that is a consequence of the existing contractual relationship. There is a genuine concern in the Second Division that that will go to nil in three seasons' time because of the pressures that have been put on from the First Division and their own financial constraints. There is no certainty of continuity of financial support for the Second Division after two seasons hence."[65]

23. Investors came into the professional game not least because it was seen as a mini-football.[66] High levels of investment from individuals have been welcomed by many clubs and have allowed them to compete in the new competitions. However, as Mr Greenwood stated: "To see one man put in a rumoured five to six million [pounds] and then find himself not able to continue that support is reckless. We seek financial prudence throughout the sport".[67] The initial rush of investment has settled down and the need for stability of funding has been recognised. We were told by the RFU: "Without proper finances you do not have a business and the entrepreneurs running those clubs know that."[68] Some entrepreneurs investing in the sport were, as Mr Hammond, Chairman of London Welsh RFC, confessed, "emotional investors",[69] in that their investments in sport were not only based on business considerations but also an emotional attachment to seeing that sport, or club, flourish.

24. The future of both codes is dependent not only on creating a sustainable financial policy and the development of present and future players but also on remaining relevant to the general public.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO CODES

25. The separation between the codes runs much deeper than the issue of professionalism and has long been acknowledged to be a problem. However, since the start of professionalism in Rugby Union, as EFDR stated, "the previous tension which existed between the two codes largely disappeared".[70] We found little support for closer links between the codes on the playing field.[71] The Rugby Football League's opinion was typical: " I do not see that there is much need for that [combining the two codes] ... Rugby League has its own strengths in its own particular parts of the country, while Rugby Union has its own strengths in its particular parts of the country. We have co-existed with our ups and downs for over 100 years. We are both still in a position of some strength and some prosperity and from that basis I do not see there is any need to come closer together".[72] Cooperation has been achieved in administration areas and "certain ... opportunities for ground sharing".[73] Rugby League teams "have proven to be very proficient at 'Sevens'" and this may be an area "where the two codes could cooperate both at club and ultimately international levels".[74] The RFU stated: "At the logistical end there is a common dialogue in terms of the two codes, registration and insurance, and trying to get the best deal for the game through our individual contacts".[75]

26. The Committee recognises the distinct nature of the two codes and the long cultural separation between them. In Mr Lindsay's words "everybody has now accepted that there are two different codes, two different types of entertainment, which perhaps draw two different followings".[76] The professionalisation of Rugby Union has removed the main obstacle to interchange between the two codes, and both Rugby Union and Rugby League could learn from each others successes and failures.

27. In the National Heritage Committee Report on the relationship between the codes, one of the main charges laid at the door of Rugby Union was its obstruction to free movement of players between the codes.[77] Both the Rugby Union Players' Association and the Rugby League Players' Association confirmed that there is now a free flow of player movement between the two codes.[78] Although the two codes remain distinct, they attract, to some extent, the same players, if not the same supporters. Conversely the RFU states that "since the game went professional there is no longer migration from union to league".[79]

IV. PROMOTING WIDER PARTICIPATION

28. The Committee was provided with a great deal of evidence on the growth of grassroots rugby and the efforts that both codes have made to encourage participation through schools.[80] Many witnesses bemoaned the decline of school sport in general. The Rugby Football League stated "the way that school sport has been declining in recent years has been a national tragedy, for individual sports and for our sporting welfare across the whole board".[81]

29. On our visits to Saracens and to Wigan, we observed the work of their educational teams with local school children. The 'chalk and talk' sessions are based on national curriculum standards incorporating maths, English and other subjects in the context of rugby. We were impressed by the quality and extent of the clubs' work in the community, particularly with children. We recommend that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Education and Employment look carefully at the 'Chalk and Talk' schemes to see if this good practice can be replicated in other sports.

30. BARLA made an impassioned plea for the development of grassroots, amateur Rugby League and for their organisation to be directly involved and funded to this end.[82] The RFL pointed out that not only do they fund development officers charged with the expansion of the game geographically, but also the clubs employ development officers and that that is a requirement for Super League clubs.[83] Similarly the RFU funds full-time development officers, encouraging participation and assisting particularly talented players.[84]

31. The women's game is actively supported in both Rugby Union and Rugby League. The governing bodies of both codes have made money, facilities and expertise available to women's rugby. The British Amateur Rugby League Association described their support for the women's and girl's game, and for mixed sex teams up to under-11.[85] The RFU supports the Rugby Football Union for Women, and assists in the development of women's Rugby Union directly and through assisting with bids to UK Sport.[86] The SRU stated "women's rugby union ... have their own season and leagues for clubs and it is the fastest growing women's sport in Scotland so it is doing very well. We support it as much as we possibly can".[87]

32. Playing success will clearly depend on the professional development of an elite of players. Future playing success will depend on support for amateur and youth rugby—BARLA stated: "The amateur game is the proven nursery of Rugby League talent and produces the overwhelming majority of players for the professional game".[88] Even so BARLA maintain that none of the money from the television deals goes down to the grass roots "in a direct manner".[89]

33. The RFU distributes money throughout the game "all the way down to the clubs right at the bottom of the tree who get a small but certain amount of funding".[90] In 1991 the RFU had been involved with 500 schools participating in rugby, in addition to 3,500 RFU affiliated schools; that figure has now grown to 10,000 schools.[91] However, the RFU noted "the game up to the age of 16 still shows a fairly significant increase. The difficulty we have is in retaining those players into adulthood. We refer to a time between 16 and 21 where there is a little bit of a black hole in participation",[92] and furthermore "like all sports in this country the participating numbers are diminishing for many and varied reasons".[93]

34. Grassroots development has been influenced by the relationship between the codes in the past. The RFU described the situation whereby "with most youngsters there is a cross-code influence. Rugby players do not actually see themselves a rugby union or league. They see themselves as rugby players. It is only as you develop through to mid teenage years that there is a move towards specialism."[94] This view was echoed by the RFL who added that the switch to playing Rugby League in the summer enabled youngsters to play a wider variety of sports.[95] The RFL also referred to the success of their campaign to tackle racism in the sport, including the encouragement of black and Asian youngsters to take up the sport.[96]

35. Mr Hammond considered it "the social responsibility of the clubs that receive that money [a definitively recurring proportion of media revenue] to develop the sport as a whole, not just the professional sport".[97] Mr Greenwood expanded on the clubs' responsibility to grassroots development and described Waterloo RFC's activities, including, "community and schools visit programme with hands-on coaching and development of young players and encouragement of players to come to our club" he added: "If we do not do that then we are doomed".[98]

V. PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS RUGBY UNION AND RUGBY LEAGUE

36. Rugby Union and Rugby League in England currently receive public funding via Sport England (formerly the English Sports Council), the National Lottery Sports Fund, administered by the Sports Councils and Sportsmatch—the Government's Sponsorship Incentive Scheme for Sport which matches, pound for pound, commercial sponsorship of grassroots sport.[99] Neither Rugby Union nor Rugby League is in a financial position to turn down money offered to them, but SRU warned: "The balance of revenue and capital funding from the Lottery has created a dependence culture".[100]

37. Since the Lottery Fund was established in 1995, Rugby Union has received 98 capital awards from the National Lottery Sports Fund, amounting to £21.1 million.[101] Rugby League has received 22 capital funding awards, worth £4.5 million.[102] There is a very marked disparity in Lottery grants with Rugby Union receiving five times as much money as Rugby League. We recommend the National Lottery Sports Fund examine the reasons for this disparity and the assumptions behind it.

38. Sport England supports Rugby League through Sport England Exchequer grant-in-aid to help the development of the sports infrastructure, development officers, women's Rugby League and the education and training of coaches and match officials. In addition grants have been offered to support the amateur game. Rugby Union also receives grant-in-aid to fund sports development officers and promote both the men's and women's game.

39. Sportsmatch has provided £3.7 million of pound-for-pound matching funding for grassroots rugby. Together with the matching commercial sponsorship £4.7m and £2.74m of new money has been raised for Rugby Union and Rugby League, respectively.[103]

40. "Unattractive and outmoded grounds and stadia" have been suggested to be principal reasons for the falling attendances at Rugby Union matches.[104] Many arguments were put before the Committee, advocating the building of purpose-built, often multi-sports, modern stadia.[105] We also heard many complaints that unreasonable demands were being placed on clubs that proposed to build new or to alter existing stadia.

41. Shortly before the start of our inquiry the Committee was informed that the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport had announced the relaunch of the Sports Ground Initiative. Although a great deal of work remains to be done finalising the details, the scheme will make a share of a £10 million fund for stadium improvements available to professional Rugby Union and Rugby League clubs.[106]

42. In our view, the principal concern of public policy with regard to sport is to maintain and enhance participation in sport of all kinds. We expect this aim to be at the centre of the Government's long awaited and much delayed Strategy for Sport.[107] In the context of public policy, the sustainability of professional rugby matters insofar as the professional game contributes to wider interest and participation in sport.

43. We recommend to Sport England that further public investment in facilities and grounds for professional clubs should be subject to two conditions. First, as proposed by Hemel Hempstead RLFC, grants for spectator facilities should be "linked with a club's proven track record of youth, schools and amateur development in the community".[108] Second, conditions related to the management and finances of professional clubs should be imposed before grants are given for stadium development.

VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44. Our principal conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

      (i)  We recommend that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Education and Employment look carefully at the 'Chalk and Talk' schemes to see if this good practice can be replicated in other sports (paragraph 29).

      (ii)  There is a very marked disparity in Lottery grants with Rugby Union receiving five times as much money as Rugby League. We recommend the National Lottery Sports Fund examine the reasons for this disparity and the assumptions behind it (paragraph 37).

      (iii)  In our view, the principal concern of public policy with regard to sport is to maintain and enhance participation in sport of all kinds. We expect this aim to be at the centre of the Government's long awaited and much delayed Strategy for Sport. In the context of public policy, the sustainability of professional rugby matters insofar as the professional game contributes to wider interest and participation in sport (paragraph 42).

      (iv)  We recommend to Sport England that further public investment in facilities and grounds for professional clubs should be subject to two conditions. First, as proposed by Hemel Hempstead RLFC, grants for spectator facilities should be "linked with a club's proven track record of youth, schools and amateur development in the community". Second, conditions related to the management and finances of professional clubs should be imposed before grants are given for stadium development (paragraph 43).


6  Evidence, p 47. Back
7  Third Report from the National Heritage Committee, Relations between Rugby Union and Rugby League, HC (1994-95) 276. Back
8  Evidence, p 47. Back
9  Ibid. Back
10  Evidence, p 9. Back
11  Evidence, p 10. Back
12  Evidence, pp 18, 79. Back
13  HC (1994-95) 276, para 68. Back
14  Ibid., para 27. Back
15  Ibid., para 65. Back
16  QQ 94-95; Evidence, p 92. Back
17  For lists of witnesses, published Memoranda and Appendices, see pp xvii-xix. Back
18  Evidence, p 47. Back
19  Q 269. Back
20  Q 251. Back
21  Evidence, p 68. Back
22  Q 285. Back
23  Q 289. Back
24  Ibid. Back
25  Q 338. Back
26  Q 355. Back
27  Evidence, pp 47-48, 60. Back
28  Evidence, pp 60, 107. Back
29  Q 335. Back
30  Q 146. Back
31  Q 266. Back
32  Evidence, pp 109-110. Back
33  Evidence, p 106. Back
34  Evidence, p 113. Back
35  Evidence, pp 106, 133. Back
36  Q 247. Back
37  Q 248. Back
38  Evidence, p 107. Back
39  IbidBack
40  Evidence, p 133. Back
41  Q 169. Back
42  Evidence, p 106. Back
43  Q 337. Back
44  Q 248. Back
45  Q 138. Back
46  Q 336. Back
47  Evidence, p 69. Back
48  Q 286. Back
49  Evidence, pp 17-18. Back
50  Q 42. Back
51  IbidBack
52  IbidBack
53  Q 65. Back
54  Q 43; Evidence, p 10. Back
55  Q 58. Back
56  Q 54. Back
57  Q 64. Back
58  Q 62. Back
59  QQ 2, 4, 199, 213-220. Back
60  Evidence, pp 100-101. Back
61  Evidence, p 96. Back
62  Evidence, pp 100-101. Back
63  Evidence, p 103. Back
64  Q 215. Back
65  Q 249. Back
66  Q 176. Back
67  Q 248. Back
68  Q 336. Back
69  Q 261. Back
70  Evidence, p 51. Back
71  QQ 14, 15, 63, 76, 77, 154, 234. Back
72  Q 77. Back
73  Evidence, p 60. Back
74  Evidence, p 51. Back
75  Q 350. Back
76  Q 63. Back
77  HC (1994-95) 276, paras 59-61. Back
78  Evidence, pp 2, 108. Back
79  Evidence, p 79. Back
80  Evidence, pp 11, 21-22, 28-29, 51, 61, 69-70, 80-81, 106-107. Back
81  Q 76. Back
82  Evidence, p 91. Back
83  QQ 80, 92. Back
84  Evidence, p 78. Back
85  Evidence, p 28. Back
86  Evidence, p 78. Back
87  Q 329. Back
88  Evidence, p 28. Back
89  Q 100. Back
90  Q 344. Back
91  Q 346. Back
92  Q 352. Back
93  Q 346. Back
94  Q 351. Back
95  QQ 77,78. Back
96  Q 81. Back
97  Q 261. Back
98  Q 263. Back
99  Evidence, p 92. Back
100  Q 288. Back
101  Evidence, p 91. Back
102  Ibid. Back
103  Evidence, p 92. Back
104  Evidence, p 106. Back
105  Evidence, pp 69, 92, 106, 108. Back
106  Evidence, p 125. Back
107  Fourth Report from the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Staging International Sporting Events, HC (1998-99) 124-I, para 25; HC Deb, 29 October 1999, col 1010W. Back
108  Evidence, p 105. Back

 
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Prepared 14 December 1999