Select Committee on Defence Seventh Report


PROGRESS IN ASCERTAINING THE CAUSES OF GULF VETERANS' ILLNESSES

30. In our predecessors' Report in 1995, they listed possible causes of illness as—

  • Bacteria
  • Sand
  • Organic chemicals, including organophosphate insecticides
  • Burning oil wells
  • Known illnesses, such as post traumatic stress disorder, chronic fatigue syndrome and multiple chemical sensitivity
  • Exposure to depleted uranium, contained in shell tips and tank armour
  • Chemical and/or biological attack from the Iraqis
  • Medical counter-biological and chemical warfare measures.

The Committee commented briefly on each of these potential causes, based on what the available research had revealed at that time.[78] A great deal more research has been carried out since 1995 and is continuing. We are not in a position to make scientific judgements about the possible health effects of the various exposures which Service personnel may have experienced during the Gulf conflict; this must be done by those with the necessary scientific and medical qualifications. Our role is to decide whether the MoD is doing all it should in gathering information about possible exposures and making this information available to veterans. We review below the work the MoD has done in the areas which remain the most serious causes of concern for veterans.

Organophosphates

31. We have already mentioned the controversy over information provided by the MoD to the previous Parliament and to veterans about the use of organophosphate (OP) pesticides in the Gulf (see paras 6 and 12). A major focus of our predecessors' 1997 Report was the MoD's admission in October 1996 that OP pesticides 'were used more widely in the Gulf than we had previously been led to believe'.[79] To discover the true extent of pesticide use in the Gulf, the MoD set up the Organophosphate Pesticide Investigation Team (OPPIT).[80] The OPPIT report was published in December 1996 and found that a range of OP pesticides, both approved and unapproved under UK regulations, had been used in the Gulf.[81] With regard to ascertaining exactly where and how such pesticides were used, the OPPIT report found that—

    ... any documentation relating to pesticide use would have been principally generated and held in theatre. These were not records that were naturally regarded as having long term significance or ostensibly required for any purpose after the conflict ended. Some such ephemeral records have been the subject of fortuitous preservation, others have clearly been destroyed, either at the time or subsequently during routine weeding ...[82]

Dr Rokke pointed out the difficulties in providing proper physiological assessments for veterans suffering symptoms if it is not known what pesticides they were exposed to.[83] Professor Hooper told us that—

    It is undeniable that excessive exposure to many insecticides occurred during the Gulf conflict and that such exposures can give rise to profound neurological damage.[84]

The MoD response to this was that—

    The OPPIT report does not include evidence of excessive or inappropriate application of pesticides.[85]

32. The Institute of Occupational Medicine (IOM) in Edinburgh reported in July 1999 on research into the effects of low level exposure to OP pesticides in the context of ill health amongst farm workers exposed to OP sheep dip. There was a further report from the Defence Scientific Advisory Council in October which concluded that high doses of OPs may have long term effects on the peripheral nervous system but that there was limited evidence about the long term effects of low doses. The Committee on Toxicity's (COT) findings, published in November, came to similar conclusions and recommended further research on the effects of low level exposure.[86] The MoD told us in December that they were studying these reports 'to see if they have a bearing on suggestions of links between exposures to OPs and Gulf veterans' illnesses'.[87] The Minister for the Armed Forces announced in a Parliamentary answer in January that—

    During the Gulf conflict very few UK service personnel would have handled concentrated OPs ... There was no evidence of acute organophosphate poisoning or of subsequent unusual ill health arising in this small group ... Neither the IOM nor the COT report provides evidence which would cause us to reassess our view of the possible role of OPs in relation to Gulf Veterans' illness ... there is currently no reason to believe that Gulf veterans who might have been in casual contact with dilute pesticide ... are at increased risk of long term ill-health.

However, the Minister said that the MoD would continue to monitor the debate about OP safety and to review scientific evidence in the light of future research.[88]

Depleted Uranium

33. Depleted uranium (DU) is a radioactive heavy metal. DU is about 40 per cent less radioactive than natural uranium and is classified in the lowest hazard class of all radioactive material.[89] DU is almost twice as dense as lead and because of this high density it is used in armour-piercing ammunition. Both the UK and the US used ammunition containing DU during the Gulf War. The MoD's assessment is that UK tanks fired 'fewer than 100 DU rounds' against the Iraqis, although additional rounds were fired during training in Saudi Arabia. The US Department of Defense estimates that 860,000 DU rounds of varying calibres were fired during the conflict.[90] The US also used DU to enhance the armour protection on some tanks. The MoD thinks it unlikely that any UK troops would have been exposed to DU, other than those who entered, or were in the immediate vicinity of, Iraqi tanks which had been penetrated by DU cores.[91]

34. Exposure of humans to DU has potentially hazardous effects due to its radioactivity and chemical toxicity. When DU hits a target, it combusts and forms both soluble particles, and fine insoluble particles, which can be inhaled or ingested. The insoluble particles of DU, if inhaled, can be retained in the lungs and would not be readily expelled from the body, which could lead to health risks relating to the radioactive properties of DU, in particular, damage to lung tissue and eventually lung cancer.[92] According to hazard assessments carried out by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency's Radiation Protection Service, the possible worst case of exposure during the Gulf conflict would have been well below the very high exposure levels known to cause acute radiation health effects in humans.[93]

35. Individuals ingesting or inhaling large quantities of soluble DU might experience acute adverse health effects and widespread damage to body tissue, particularly the kidneys, due to DU's toxic effects once it is dissolved in blood. However, those who experienced this type of exposure would excrete 90 per cent of the uranium in their urine within 48 hours.[94] Chronic health effects might result from the remaining 10 per cent of uranium retained in the body; the most likely effect would be chronic kidney damage. Cases of chronic kidney damage experienced by some veterans and reported to MAP have all been attributed to other diseases.

36. Many veterans remain concerned that they may be suffering the effects of DU exposure and have asked to be tested. The MoD has never had a policy of testing veterans generally for the presence of DU. In March 1999, the MoD restated its policy in a document entitled Testing for the presence of depleted uranium in UK veterans of the Gulf conflict: the current position. The head of the Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit at the MoD told us that testing would be arranged for those veterans whose case histories suggested possible exposure, for example, those who had been near tanks hit by DU cores, or whose clinical symptoms indicated the need for further investigation. This approach was similar to the testing which the US government was offering to those US veterans who had been exposed to a broadly comparable risk.[95]

37. Several UK veterans have, at their own expense, undergone urine tests for DU poisoning conducted by Dr Hari Sharma at the University of Waterloo in Canada.[96] DU has been found in the urine samples of a number of them. The Minister told us in April 1999 that he was aware of these tests but that the MoD could not take further action until it had received the evidence.[97] In December, the MoD said that—

    The information about the tests seen so far by the MoD has not been sufficient for the Department to properly review the research nor interpret the results.[98]

In reply to a Parliamentary Question in February, the Minister said that 'we have still not seen any robust scientific data justifying the claims' despite repeated requests to Dr Durakovic and Dr Sharma and to veterans' representatives.[99]

38. The Minister for the Armed Forces has announced that the MoD will provide DU testing for those who have tested positive in Canada. One veteran, a civilian contractor, has since undergone a test organised by the MAP. He believed he was being tested for depleted uranium but in fact the test was for the total presence of uranium. The MoD believes that it is worth testing for DU only if elevated levels of total uranium are first found. A draft protocol for DU testing was passed to veterans' representatives on 1 November 1999 for comment.[100] In evidence to us, veterans' representatives told us that the draft protocol was too narrow and that all veterans who had suffered possible contamination should be offered a DU test, not just those who had tested positive in Canada.[101]

39. We appreciate that the possible adverse health effects of depleted uranium is a hugely complex issue. Although the MoD may have acted correctly from the scientific viewpoint in this respect, the way that it has dealt with veterans' concerns has not been impressive. The MoD took action on DU testing only when it became unavoidable. It failed to explain to veterans precisely what the tests organised by the MAP involved and some veterans now believe that they have been misled. We hope that the MoD will learn from this and approach veterans' concerns in a less defensive and more collaborative way. What is of immediate importance now is that Gulf veterans should be offered appropriate tests, based on the most up-to-date scientific information available. The full scope of the tests, and any limitations, should be clearly explained to those undergoing them.

40. The use of depleted uranium is of wider relevance than Gulf veterans' illnesses alone. The government have indicated that, where necessary, DU will continue to be used in ammunition,[102] with the possible concomitant future implications for British personnel. It was announced in January that a team of scientists from the Royal Society would conduct an independent investigation into the effects of depleted uranium which will report later this year. The team will assess, amongst other things, the exposure to DU which military personnel are likely to experience and the possible health effects of these exposures.[103] We hope that the MoD will take on board the findings of the Royal Society's study of depleted uranium when they are available, even though it has not initiated the work. We expect the MoD to demonstrate that it is driving research in this area rather than, as has appeared to be the case so far, adopting a reactive approach and responding to new developments only when forced to by events.

Vaccinations and Medical Countermeasures

41. The Gulf conflict was the first occasion when Nerve Agent Pre-treatment Sets (NAPS) were used on a large scale as a countermeasure to possible chemical attack from Iraqi forces (although NAPS had been in service since 1981).[104] Personnel were also vaccinated against the perceived threat of Iraqi biological warfare. The vaccines administered were for anthrax and plague; a pertussis (whooping cough) vaccine was also given as an 'adjuvant' to accelerate the immunisation effect of the anthrax vaccine.[105] Other routine vaccinations may also have been administered. These include: those which Service personnel are normally required to have (yellow fever, tetanus, typhoid and poliomyelitis); those recommended for travellers to the region (cholera) and those appropriate to 'particular categories of Service personnel' (hepatitis B). Some veterans may also have received meningitis and hepatitis A vaccines.[106] A number of the countermeasures were unlicensed at the time of the Gulf conflict; the MoD says that 'the fact that a medical product is unlicensed does not mean that it is untested or is inherently unsafe'.[107]

42. MoD policy was that such vaccinations were administered 'on the basis of voluntary informed consent'.[108] However, our predecessors were concerned that pressure had been put on personnel to have the vaccinations. They were told that some veterans who refused to have inoculations were asked to sign a disclaimer relinquishing all claims against the MoD and the Army for any possible consequences of refusing to be vaccinated, although the then Surgeon General was adamant that there was no such official MoD disclaimer.[109] Our predecessors' view was—

    ... it is clear that some personnel felt under intense pressure to accept the BW vaccinations being administered.[110]

The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Henderson) told us in April 1999 that—

    ... vaccinations should be done on a voluntary basis ... we have rewritten the regulations to make it absolutely clear to the chain of command that this is the case.[111]

43. Our predecessors were concerned about the effects of the number of vaccinations being administered at the same time and in combination with the NAPS tablets, the so-called 'cocktail' of countermeasures. The Chemical and Biological Defence (CBD) sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) at Porton Down had advised the MoD in August 1990 that 'no significant adverse reactions should be expected' from taking NAPS in combination with administering vaccinations.[112] The MoD confirmed this to our predecessors in 1994—

    There is no medical reason why the vaccines offered, which are in routine civilian use, should produce any long term adverse effects, even in combinations.[113]

Nevertheless, our predecessors' view was that, although there was no scientific evidence linking the combination of countermeasures with symptoms suffered by Gulf veterans at that time—

    ... the lack of comprehensive and convincing research on the long term effects of such combinations of drugs administered rapidly and in unusual conditions means that it is impossible to rule out this explanation with complete certainty.

They believed that the MoD had a duty to carry out the necessary research to establish beyond doubt the safety of the drugs administered.[114]

44. When the Minister for the Armed Forces in the new government (Dr Reid) gave evidence to us in July 1997, he told us that he was setting up an investigation into the whole issue of vaccines and countermeasures.[115] An initial document was published by the MoD in October 1997.[116] One of the specific issues it looked at was the discovery by MoD officials in April that year that the Department of Health (DoH) had expressed anxieties about the vaccines used in the Gulf as early as December 1990. The investigation found that the DoH had indicated to the MoD that the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) had found, in tests on animals, that when anthrax and pertussis vaccines were combined, 'there was evidence of severe loss of condition and weight loss'. But these were preliminary findings.[117] The investigation found no evidence that the MoD had taken account of the NIBSC research findings in administering the pertussis vaccine. Further research into the combined use of anthrax and pertussis will now form part of the wider research into potential interactions which the Minister had announced in 1997.[118]

45. On 20 January 2000, the MoD published a further document, Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/91. It concludes that although the policy was that the immunisation programme was voluntary and that troops should be informed of the reasons for the programme and given information about vaccines, details of the immunisation programme were classified as secret, to prevent the information about countermeasures becoming available to the Iraqis. 'This led to much less information being provided to individuals in many cases than had been intended.' The report goes on to say—

    The practice when implementing the programme varied, not only between the three Services, but also between types of unit and depending when a unit was sent to theatre and where it operated. The review found that some UK Service personnel had no real understanding at the time of what the immunisation programme involved and what vaccines were being given to them. Some medical officers were uneasy at the time about the lack of information provided.[119]

46. The lack of information about vaccines in the 10 years since the conflict ended has contributed to a suspicion amongst some Gulf veterans that they were given additional vaccines to the ones disclosed and that this may have been done on an experimental basis. The MoD acknowledged in Gulf Veterans' Illnesses: A New Beginning that—

    There is a continuing belief amongst some Gulf veterans that the MoD administered vaccines to British troops which so far have not been publicly declared.[120]

While undertaking to investigate the whole area of vaccines, the MoD's view in 1997 was—

    There is no evidence to support the allegation by some veterans that the programme was used to test other, experimental vaccines on British service personnel.[121]

Professor Hooper asserts in his submission that 'each soldier received up to 10 different vaccines', and that some of these were 'undeclared and unidentified' and included smallpox and tularaemia (a severe infectious bacterial disease).[122] The fact-finding team (FFT) on the implementation of the immunisation programme investigated these allegations and the specific cases of two veterans who claimed to have received smallpox vaccinations. It found—

    ... no evidence that UK Service personnel were immunised except under the anti-BW immunisation programme as detailed in this paper or with routine immunisations. In particular, the FFT saw no evidence of the issue of smallpox, tularaemia or any other vaccine not already declared by the MoD.

In the specific cases of the two individuals, one was found to have received a smallpox vaccine 'by private arrangement from a non-MoD source' and in the other case the information was found to have been entered on his records in error.[123] In its commentary on his submission to the Committee, the MoD says that Professor Hooper has been invited several times to provide evidence regarding his claims about additional vaccines and concludes—

    Once again for the record, the Ministry of Defence states that the 1990-91 anti-biological warfare immunisation programme for Operation Granby consisted of anthrax, plague and pertussis as an adjuvant, and nothing else.[124]

LESSONS LEARNED

47. When UK forces were again deployed to the Gulf region in March 1998 lessons learned from mistakes made during the 1990-91 conflict meant that new procedures were implemented. It was made clear, in writing, to all personnel deployed, that the immunisation programme was voluntary. Commanding officers and medical staff were given detailed guidance to enable them to explain why immunisation was being offered, what vaccines were being used and other relevant information, including possible side effects. Explanatory leaflets were given to all personnel.[125]

48. We conclude that it is now unlikely to be possible finally to prove or disprove, to the satisfaction of all parties, whether vaccines precipitated some of the illnesses presented by Gulf veterans. We are pleased that the MoD has acknowledged the deficiencies in its immunisation procedures during the Gulf Conflict and welcome the detailed research which has been undertaken to discover what went wrong and why. The MoD has demonstrated that lessons have been learned and improvements to procedures have subsequently been achieved. Unfortunately, this does not help those who may have suffered as a result of the initial deficiencies.

MEDICAL RECORDS

49. So far as the historical question remains, a further problem arises for veterans in trying to determine exactly which vaccinations they received, because there were deficiencies in the keeping of medical records in-theatre during the Gulf conflict and in transferring the necessary information back to permanent records in the UK. In April 1999, the MoD made available a document which describes how medical records are kept in the Armed Forces and gives details of how such records were kept during the Gulf conflict. It concludes—

The report of the Fact Finding Team (FFT) on the implementation of the immunisation programme similarly concluded in January—

     It appears that record keeping was inadequate from the start. It is certain that there was a significant failure to transfer what immunisation data was available on to permanent medical records after the Gulf conflict and that much of that data is probably now irrecoverable.[127]

50. The MoD made improvements to medical record-keeping before the publication of these reviews. When British forces deployed to the Gulf in March 1998, steps were taken to ensure that full details of immunisations were recorded in individuals' medical records and on a central database.[128] We welcome the MoD's acceptance that there were problems with medical record-keeping during the Gulf conflict, and the improvements which it has already put in place to improve such procedures. Recent experience has demonstrated that units may frequently be deployed overseas. It is essential that full and up to date medical records are maintained for all individuals in the Armed Forces throughout their service careers and including any medical treatment received during deployments.

51. Gulf veterans and their general practitioners (GPs) also experienced problems in obtaining full access to the medical records which did exist. This was due to the security classification attached to information about injections and medications at the time and for some years subsequently, because of the need to prevent Iraq learning about UK medical countermeasures.[129] Only in December 1996 did the then Minister for the Armed Forces announce—

    ... following a detailed review, we now judge that, six years on and in the light of further developments since the Gulf conflict, knowledge of the steps that we took then is now less militarily sensitive. I can therefore today provide a full account of the vaccination programme that was carried out ...[130]

Another consequence of the security classification was that the codewords for the vaccines, rather than their real names, were sometimes used in medical records, which, the MoD says—

    ... led to serious misconceptions, which persisted for some years after the conflict.[131]

52. Our predecessors were concerned that, even after 1996, relevant information was not being made available to veterans, and in some cases even to their GPs. GPs of veterans attending the MAP were able to access medical records, but due to what the MoD described as 'a failure of internal communications', this was not always the case for GPs who applied directly to the Services.[132] The MoD's current position in relation to access to medical records is as follows—

    Under the Access to Medical Records Act of 1990, anyone may seek access to their medical records compiled after 1 November 1991. The Act provides for disclosure of earlier records if this is essential to the understanding of the disclosed record. It is under this provision that the Minister for the Armed Forces has extended the period of access, for Gulf veterans, to 1 August 1990. Unless it is judged that the records contain mention of a third person or information that would not be in the patient's interests, disclosure of the records follows automatically from an application.[133]

The MoD warns that Gulf veterans may experience delays when requesting documents if a number of agencies representing the veteran's interests (for example, solicitors, the MAP, and the War Pensions Agency) request the same documents. Veterans are advised to check whether their legal representatives already have copies of medical records before making a further application for disclosure.[134] We welcome the clarification of the MoD's position on access to medical records, and trust that this will ensure that in future former and current Service personnel and their medical practitioners are able to obtain necessary information without undue delays.

Chemical and Biological Attack

53. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, assessments were made by the coalition forces of Iraq's capability to use weapons of mass destruction against them. Iraq had demonstrated during the conflict with Iran in the 1980s that it possessed chemical weapons (CW) and was prepared to use them. In 1990, Iraq was believed to have large stockpiles of CW agents and a variety of means of delivering them.[135] The UK assessment was that Iraq also had a biological warfare capability which would enable it to deliver anthrax and plague agents. In addition to the medical countermeasures discussed above (paras 41-46) British forces were issued with: warning and detection equipment; protective clothing in the form of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) suits and respirators; and collective protection (COLPRO) in the form of shelters, either static or for use in vehicles.[136]

54. There were a number of incidents during the conflict when the CW detection alarms went off. Personnel were told immediately after such events that the alarms had sounded because of the equipment's sensitivity to other substances, such as aircraft fuel, and that there had been no chemical attack by the Iraqis. Further unease was caused to some personnel by the number of dead animals in the region, which they believed might have died as a result of chemical or biological substances. The MoD's view at the time of publication of Gulf Veterans' Illnesses: A New Beginning in 1997 was that—

    ... there is no confirmed evidence of the use of chemical or biological weapons (CBW) during the Gulf War. Such detections as did occur during the conflict were subject to follow up at the time and were not substantiated ... Nevertheless, many veterans continue to believe that CBWs were used by the Iraqis. In view of public concern, the United States authorities are re-investigating alleged chemical detections ... The MoD is also reviewing specific events during the Gulf War in response to reports from British veterans.[137]

In evidence to us in July 1997, the head of the Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit said that patients at the MAP 'recalled the alarms going off and were therefore concerned they could have been exposed to a chemical agent'.[138]

55. Since then a number of studies have been published by the MoD.

  • a joint study with the US Department of Defense on a tank of liquid found at the Kuwaiti Girls' School in Kuwait City, published in March 1998[139]

  • a study of an alleged chemical attack in Al Jubayl on 19 January 1991, published in January this year[140]

  • a study of the presence of dead animals in theatre, published in April 1998[141]

  • an assessment of the possible release of CW agents following the demolition of the Khamisiyah ammunition dump, published in December 1999[142]

  • a review of British chemical warfare defence during the Gulf Conflict, published in December 1999[143]

Further work is under way.[144]

56. The review of chemical warfare defence during the Gulf Conflict found that—

    Documents surviving from the time of Operation Granby indicate that there were many occasions when units reacted to non-existent threats from CW agents ... Some of these problems were caused by the fact that very few of the personnel who deployed to the Gulf had any previous experience of using the detection and monitoring equipment.[145]

Alarms went off in circumstances where CW agents were not present, either because of false alarms caused when equipment reacted to other substances or simply because of equipment failure. The document explains that—

    The propensity of equipment to give false alarms in certain circumstances was not covered in training as this might lead to casual attitudes to alarms with disastrous consequences in the event of a genuine CW attack. However, this approach to training had the effect of persuading many Gulf veterans that their equipment would only respond to real CW agents. It is likely that many veterans who experienced alarms in the Gulf believed, and still believe, that they were experiencing a real chemical attack.[146]

In written evidence, we were told—

    The Ministry of Defence assessment, shared by the US DoD, remains that there is no evidence that Iraq used chemical weapons against the coalition forces.[147]

Each of the specific studies undertaken seems to support this view.

KUWAITI GIRLS' SCHOOL

57. The joint US-UK study of events surrounding the discovery and testing of a storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School in Kuwait City, suspected of containing CW agent, assessed that CW agent was 'definitely not' present in the storage tank and that the substance in the tank was 'definitely' inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA).[148] One of the bases for this conclusion was the fact that Iraqi forces used the school as a test and maintenance facility for Silkworm anti-ship missiles for which IRFNA is used as a fuel oxidizer. The study asserts that the lack of precision in identifying what substance the tank contained arose from a number of factors, one of which is that—

    It is the policy of both the UK and US militaries to set chemical weapons detector parameters loosely so as to err on the side of caution — i.e. to accept a false positive response, rather than run the risk that a genuine positive might be overlooked.[149]

AL JUBAYL

58. The detailed study of events surrounding the suspected exposure to CW agents at Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia, was published in January. This investigated reports from a number of units located there in January 1991 that CW detection alarms sounded following explosions being heard in the area. Personnel also reported droplets falling from the air and detector strips on protective clothing changing colour, indicating exposure to CW. The review highlights the problems created by inconsistencies in recording events at the time and by deficiencies in preserving records subsequently, when trying to examine such events nine years later. The reviews accepts that, at the time, units would have been more concerned with dealing with incidents rather than recording them, and that documents would not have been shipped back to the UK where those concerned 'considered that nothing of significance had occurred'.[150] It concludes that—

    ... the balance of available evidence relating to the events in Al Jubayl on the morning of 19 January 1991 does not indicate that British troops were subject to attack or exposed to the presence of CW agents ... while it is not possible to explain all of the events that took place that morning, the MoD conclude that the indications of the presence of CW agent were false alarms.[151]

But adds—

    ... it must be recognised that there is an element of doubt about the assessment that UK troops on Al Jubayl on 19 January were not exposed to Iraqi CW agents ... we are dealing with history and the passing of nine years introduces an element of uncertainty. We no longer have available all of the information that we would like to see.

The review recommends that 'in future, such alerts should be investigated more thoroughly at the time, even when it is suspected that there is no actual chemical threat' and that records of such alerts should not be destroyed, even when it becomes clear that alarms were false.[152]

DEAD ANIMALS

59. During the Gulf conflict, many personnel reported seeing groups of dead animals, (mainly camels, goats and sheep) in the region. Some suspected that the animals had died as a result of exposure to chemical or biological agents used by Iraq, and that this factor had not been taken into account when assessing whether Iraq had used CBW during the conflict. The MoD investigated the circumstances surrounding these events and reported in April 1998.[153] It examined both UK and US reports of such incidents. It also investigated claims that samples of dead animals had been sent back to the Chemical and Biological Defence (CBD) sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) at Porton Down for testing. The investigation concluded—

    ... many of those who served in theatre remembered the presence of dead animals, but few were able to provide any detailed information about such incidents. It is clear from the contemporary documentation that the idea that the presence of groups of dead animals might be an indicator that Iraq had used CBW was considered at the time and that certain incidents were investigated for that specific reason. Enquiries to establish whether sample remains of dead animals had been returned to ... CBD Porton Down, for the purpose of analysis did not find any evidence that this had occurred ... no evidence has been found to suggest that the presence of dead animals in the Gulf theatre of operations during the 1990-91 conflict was related to the use of CBW.[154]

Similarly, a report from the US Navy Forward Laboratory, which developed into a 'state of the art infectious disease diagnostic laboratory' for coalition forces during the conflict,[155] concluded that—

    US veterinary personnel evaluated these animals and determined that their deaths were due to natural causes amongst the large herds of sheep, goats and camels kept by Bedouin in the region. The local residents left the dead animals in specific locations for counting and compensation from the government.

Some of the animals were tested for BW agents but none were found.[156]

KHAMISIYAH

60. The MoD has also published a review of the circumstances surrounding the release of nerve agent at Khamisiyah, an Iraqi ammunition storage facility in Southern Iraq, and the implications for UK service personnel based in the area.[157] At the end of the Gulf conflict, in March 1991, US troops demolished the Khamisiyah depot as part of measures to ensure that equipment and facilities which had been overrun by coalition forces would not continue to be available to the Iraqis. It was discovered subsequently that a number of the rockets destroyed contained sarin/cyclosarin nerve agent.[158] The first indications of this came in May 1991 and it was verified by United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors in October that year. The MoD has always acknowledged that the release of nerve agent took place. The area of uncertainty has been over which UK personnel were in the location at the time.

61. Detailed investigation of the incident has been conducted by the US Department of Defense and the CIA and has involved seeking to ascertain the likely dispersal of the portion of the nerve agent which might have been released into the atmosphere. This has involved computer modelling of the plume of aerosolised nerve agent to show its likely movement, taking account of wind speed and direction. The computer modelling also attempted to assess the possible concentration of nerve agent across the plume. Initial projections were published in September 1997 but following criticisms from other US agencies, re-modelling is under way.[159]

62. The UK's interest arises from the possible exposure of UK personnel because a number of units are known to have been in the area at the time. The worst case model indicates that 9,000 UK personnel would have been in the area. The total number whose units were definitely within the modelled plume is 3,800, although not all personnel would have been present in their units at the time. Particular attention has focused on the members of 32 Field Hospital as they have always been assumed to have been in the affected region.

63. The review concludes that—

    Exposure might have happened, but there is no evidence at all that any actually did happen. Even if troops had been exposed to nerve agent at the exceptionally low levels modelled, the impact of this on their levels of acetylcholinesterase would have been much less than the impact of normal bodily variations. There would have been no biologically detectable effect. There is no evidence to suggest that there are adverse long term health effects from temporary exposure to the levels of sarin postulated in the model. However ... the UK is monitoring closely a substantial programme of US research which is looking at the effects of chronic and low dose exposure to chemical warfare agents.[160]

CONCLUSION

64. It is regrettable that these studies took so long to get off the ground as the time lapse can only have had an adverse effect on the discoverable evidence. However, we are impressed with the level of detail contained in the studies, and the clarity with which they explain what occurred and the implications for UK personnel. In producing such research studies, the government is abiding by the principles it set out in 1997, that there would be 'appropriate research into veterans' illnesses and factors which might have a bearing on these' and that the MoD would 'make available to the public any information it possesses which is of potential relevance to this issue'.[161]

65. The MoD has made good progress, therefore, in establishing what took place and addressing specific areas of concern which have been highlighted by veterans. The findings of this research are consistent with the view expressed to us in the United States, that it is likely that there is no single cause of Gulf veterans' illnesses. If further progress is to be made in understanding the nature of Gulf veterans' illnesses, detailed work will need to be carried out to ascertain whether there are any links between possible exposures veterans might have suffered and the symptoms which some are now exhibiting.


78  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, paras 3-8 Back

79  Sixth Report, Session 1996-97, op cit, para 33 Back

80  ibid Back

81  Organophosphate Pesticide Investigation Team, Substantive Report, MoD, December 1996 Back

82  ibid, para 1.B.12 Back

83  Q 161 Back

84  Ev p 41 Back

85  Ev p 82 Back

86  Ev p 82 Back

87  Ev p 90 Back

88  HC Deb., 20 January 2000, cc 535-536w Back

89  RAND National Defence Research Institute report, A review of the literature as it pertains to Gulf War illness, Vol 7, Depleted Uranium, 1998 Back

90  HC Deb., 14 March 2000, cc 103-104w Back

91  Testing for the presence of depleted uranium in UK veterans of the Gulf Conflict: the current position, op cit, para 9 Back

92  ibid, para 14; Q 147 Back

93  ibid, para 14 Back

94  ibid, para 15 Back

95  Q 41 Back

96  Ev pp 46 and 87 Back

97  Q 45  Back

98  Ev p 87 Back

99  HC Deb., 15 February 2000, cc 482-483w Back

100  Ev p 87 Back

101  QQ 177-181 Back

102  HC Deb., 14 March 2000, c 104w Back

103  Royal Society media release, 24 January 2000 Back

104  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, para 38 Back

105  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War (Operation Granby), MoD, October 1997, para 22 Back

106  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, paras 23-24 Back

107  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 32 Back

108  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 22 Back

109  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, Q 699 Back

110  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, para 43 Back

111  Q 63 Back

112  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 141 Back

113  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, Ev p 47 Back

114  Eleventh Report, Session 1994-95, op cit, para 53 Back

115  Minutes of Evidence, 29 July 1997, HC 222-i, QQ 191, 201, 241, 244-250 Back

116  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit Back

117  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 63 Back

118  Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 73 Back

119  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/91, MoD, January 2000, paras 4-5 Back

120  Gulf Veterans' Illnesses: A New Beginning, op cit, para 54 Back

121  ibid, para 56 Back

122  Ev p 37 Back

123  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/91, op cit, paras 204-205 Back

124  Ev p 81 Back

125  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/1991, op cit, Accompanying Statement by the MoD, para 9 Back

126  Ev p 98 Back

127  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/1991, op cit, para 196 Back

128  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/1991, op cit, Accompanying Statement by the MoD, para 9 Back

129  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/1991, op cit, para 125 Back

130  Sixth Report, Session 1996-97, op cit, para 26; HC Deb., 10 December 1996, c 122 Back

131  Implementation of the Immunisation Programme against Biological Warfare Agents for UK Forces during the Gulf Conflict 1990/1991, op cit, para 6 Back

132  Sixth Report, Session 1996-97, op cit, para 30 Back

133  Ev p 99 Back

134  Ev p 99 Back

135  British Chemical Warfare Defence during the Gulf Conflict (1990-1991), MoD, December 1999, paras 10-12 Back

136  British Chemical Warfare Defence during the Gulf Conflict (1990-1991), op cit, paras 107-130; see also Background to the Use of Medical Countermeasures to protect British Forces during the Gulf War, op cit, para 18; Back

137  Gulf Veterans' Illnesses: A New Beginning, op cit, paras 57-58 Back

138  Minutes of Evidence, 29 July 1997, HC 222-i, Q239 Back

139  Kuwaiti Girls' School Case Narrative, MoD and US DoD, March 1998 Back

140  A review of the suggested exposure of UK Forces to chemical weapon agents in Al Jubayl on 19 January 1991, MoD, January 2000 Back

141  Dead animals during the Gulf conflict: a review of the circumstances in which UK Forces reported the presence of groups of dead animals in theatre during Operation Granby in 1990/91, MoD, April 1998 Back

142  Review of events concerning 32 Field Hospital and the release of nerve agent arising from US demolition of Iraqi munitions at the Khamisiyah Depot in March 1991, MoD, December 1999 Back

143  British Chemical Warfare Defence during the Gulf Conflict (1990-91), op cit Back

144  British Chemical Warfare Defence during the Gulf Conflict, op cit, paras 3-7 Back

145  ibid, para 86 Back

146  ibid, para 87 Back

147  Ev p 82 Back

148  Kuwaiti Girls' School Case Narrative, op cit, p 49 Back

149  ibid, page 50 Back

150  A review of the suggested exposure of UK Forces to chemical weapon agents in Al Jubayl on 19 January 1991, op cit, paras 15-20 Back

151  ibid, para 148 Back

152  ibid, para 149 Back

153  Dead animals during the Gulf conflict: a review of the circumstances in which UK Forces reported the presence of groups of dead animals in theatre during Operation Granby in 1990/91, op cit Back

154  ibid, paras 49-50 Back

155  Department of Defense Information Paper, Medical Surveillance during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, November 1997, p 4 Back

156  Department of Defense Information Paper, Medical Surveillance during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, op cit, pp 5 and 8 Back

157  Review of events concerning 32 Field Hospital and the release of nerve agent arising from US demolition of Iraqi munitions at the Khamisiyah Depot in March 1991, op cit Back

158  ibid, para 1 Back

159  Review of events concerning 32 Field Hospital and the release of nerve agent arising from US demolition of Iraqi munitions at the Khamisiyah Depot in March 1991, op cit, paras 1-5, 50-52 Back

160  ibid, para 82 Back

161  Gulf Veterans' Illnesses: A New Beginning, op cit, para 4 Back


 
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