Memorandum submitted by Professor Malcolm
Hooper, Scientific Advisor to the Gulf Veterans' Association
DEPLETED URANIUM, DU
WHAT IS
DU?
It is the waste by-product of the nuclear weapons
and civilian nuclear programme. It is left over after the process
of enrichment which increases the Uranium-235, U-235, concentration
from ~0.7 per cent in the natural ores to ~3 to 4 per cent in
enriched uranium. For every eight tons of uranium there is produced
one ton of enriched uranium and seven tons of DU. Over ¾
million tons of DU are now stockpiled (LAKA, 1999). The ratio
of U-235 to Uranium-238 is uniquely characteristic of DU and provides
unequivocal evidence of its presence.
DU is both a toxic heavy metal (like lead) and
a radiological poison. The properties and composition of natural
and DU are listed in Table 1. The radiological decay processes
in DU are given in Table 2 together with those for natural uranium.
Table 1
ISOTOPE COMPOSITION, CHEMICAL HALF-LIVES
AND ISOTOPE RATIOS IN NATURAL AND DEPLETED URANIUM
|
| Isotope | Natural
| Depleted | Half-life t1/2
|
|
| U-238 | 99.2749% | 99.7947%
| 4.49 x 109 years |
| U-235 | 0.7196% | 0.2015%
| 7.1 x 108 years |
| U-234 | 0.0055% | 0.0008%
| 2.48 x 105 years |
| U-235/U-238 | 0.0075±10%
| 0.0020±10% | |
| 0.0068-0.0082 | 0.0018-0.0022
| |
|
Any isotope ratio less than 0.0068 (Los Alamos use 0.0065) indicates the presence of DU in the sample (Bertell, 1999, Zadjic, 1999).
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Table 2
RADIOACTIVITY (DISINTEGRATIONS PER SECOND) IN 1 mg OF
U-238 AT SECULAR EQUILIBRIUM
| U-238 | Th-234
| Pa-234 | U-234
|
|
| 12.4 a particles | 12.4 ß-particles
| 12.4 ß-particles | 0.017 a particles
|
|
This is equivalent to 390 million a -particles, and 780 million ß-particles and associated ~-rays in one year—over one billion high energy, ionising, radioactive particles and rays which can produce extensive biological damage. The energy of each a -particle exceeds that required for damaging important macromolecules such as DNA, RNA, enzymes and proteins. By breaking bonds within them and water molecules novel chemical reactions which alter or destroy the shape organisation and function of these molecules are initiated.
There is no lower limit for these effects; they are stochastic (Bertell, Zadjic).
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DU WEAPONS
DU was selected on the following grounds—
(a) It is cheap and was made available to arms manufacturers
free of charge;
(b) It is heavy, 1.7 times the density of lead. Tungsten
has a higher density;
(c) It is pyrophoric, burns on hitting a hard target,
and acts as a self-sharpening pentrator.
Some 359-800 tonnes (359-800 billion milligrams) of DU was
delivered on the Gulf target areas (LAKA 1999, Fahey 1998, 1999).
Some 59 tonnes have been attributed to the UK forces.
We have photographic evidence which clearly shows that the
MoD claim that only 88-100 DU rounds were fired from UK tanks
is yet another denial of the true facts.
THE NUB
OF THE
PROBLEM
When DU hits a target a fine aerosol of ceramic DU is formed.
Many of the particles, figures vary from 46-70 per cent are less
than 10 micron. This means that they are readily inhaled. Particles
under 2.5 micron are particularly dangerous as they enter deep
into the lungs.
Once these fine particles have been released they can travel
up to 25-30 miles (Fahey, 1998. 1999; Deitz 1999) and can readily
be re-suspended by modest breezes or vehicle or personnel movements.
Whilst some of the DU is soluble about two-thirds is insoluble
and remains in the body for up to 10-20 years, ie this is it biological
half-life. There may be some movement from the lung but mainly
to the lymph nodes and later bone. Excretion is very slow.
It is the total radiological dose over this period which
endangers the exposed person. This dose massively exceeds the
recommended limits derived from studies on Hiroshima survivors.
These limits are now regarded by many as inappropriate for the
much lower level of exposure experienced by people not subject
to nuclear bombing. In addition, the radiological insult provokes
destructive biological mechanisms which extended the initial damage
(Vicker, 1993).
GULF EXPOSURES
TO DU
The only study carried out by the VA began in 1993! and involved
some 33 USA service personnel who had received shrapnel wounds
as a result of "friendly fire".
The results of this study were made public at a Conference
in Arlington, USA, in September 1998, McDiarmid, and have since
been published in Health Physics, 1999, 77, 512-519.
The results showed:
(1) The total uranium values for the DU exposed group
ranged from 0.01 to 30.74 microgram/gram creatinine. This is one
way of measuring the levels of urinary constitutents. The 24-hour
urine excretion was measured, more recently, in other veterans
and civilians whose excretion levels are of the order of 3-8 micrograms/day;
(2) Elevated uranium levels correlated with lowered neurocognitive
performance;
(3) There was a sevenfold mean difference in urinary uranium
concentration between the low and high prolactin groups and a
threefold difference in urinary concentration between the high
and low follicle stimulating hormone, FSH, groups. This indicates
a significant endocrine disruption of the centrally controlled
reproductive hormones;
(4) 5/22 had measurable DU in their sperm. A disturbing
observation which indicates the potential for far reaching damage
to any offspring;
(5) In addition the group reported a number of medical
problems; cardiovascular (31 per cent), musculoskeletal (24 per
cent), and psychiatric (24 per cent). One member had an active
tumour; and
(6) Isotope ratios was not measured and the limits of
detection were those associated with the neutron activation analysis
and delayed neutron counting techniques used.
Table 3
SUMMARY OF ANIMAL AND HUMAN DATA ON THE CHRONIC EFFECTS
OF EXPOSURE TO URANIUM
|
| System/organ affected | Major effects (animal species)
|
|
| Respiratory | Lung fibrosis, cancer* (dog)
|
| Blood/bone marrow | Lengthened clotting time*, blood monocytes down
|
| Immune system | Lymph note fibrosis, susceptibility to infection*
Increases in autoimmune diseases*
|
| Central nervous system | Impaired neurocognitive function*
|
| Endocrine changes | Disturbance of hypothalamic-pituitary function*
|
| Musculo-skeletal | Weakness*
|
| Liver | Fatty liver*, necrosis
|
| Genes and reproduction | Cancers, birth defects*
|
| Gastrointestinal | Irritable bowel syndrome* (bleeding)
|
| Kidney | Degeneration*, regeneration, lesions, necrosis
|
| Mortability | 4.5 %* (dog) |
|
*Effects reported in Gulf War Veterans
(Bertell 1999)
One clear case of birth defects attributable to DU exposure
is that of Sergeant Daryll Clark who was in a forward position
with a radar battery and found his unit surrounded by 20 Iraqi
tanks. He called for air support which destroyed all 20 tanks
leaving Clark and his unit engulfed in choking smoke and fumes
from the burned out tanks. Subsequently Clark has developed severe
chronic respiratory problems. His daughter, born in September
1992 had no thyroid gland and haemangioma (purple welts) on her
skin and internal organs. His urine tested positive for DU in
1994 (Zajic 1999).
MEASURING DU
It is important to measure as accurately as possible the
amount of DU being excreted in the urine of GWVs. Now nine years
after the Gulf War these levels will be low. The best technique
is Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry which can accurately and
directly quantify the levels of all the uranium isotopes and,
using the data in Table 1, show the presence or absence of DU.
From such measurements the total radiological exposure and the
effective biological dose can be calculated.
A number of UK veterans have been found to have DU in their
urine almost 10 years after the Gulf Conflict (Sharma, 1999; Horan,
1999).
Both the present Minister and the head of MAP have failed
to understand this point as evidenced by the letters to the Daily
Express and one Gulf Veteran who was seen and misled by MAP,
Lee 1999—see also Rosker 1998.
The calculations from urine concentrations are not straightforward
and require some assumptions to be made. However, both Professor
Sharma and Dr Bertell have made such calculations using a number
of reasonable assumptions. Their outcome is an estimated initial
exposure of 42 mg for GWVs presently excreting -3 micrograms of
DU in a 24-hour urine sample. This can be used to calculate the
increased risk of additional cancers in such GWVs. This comes
to an additional increase of 3-21 per cent which equates with
1,500 to 10,500 additional cancers in the gulf cohort assuming
equal exposure.
A USA study of 10,000 GWVs indicated that four out of five
had been in situations where they could have been exposed to DU
see also Kornkeven, 1998.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) There is now clear evidence of GWVs excreting DU almost
10 years after the conflict ended;
(2) This represents a significant health threat;
(3) The failure to investigate GWVs for DU contamination
is a failure of health care by the Government and Military;
(4) The present Minister of Defence and leader of the
MAP programme do not understand the nature of the problem;
(5) This can be attributed to crass ignorance, gross incompetence
or calculated deception;
(6) The screening of a large number (at least 1,000) of
GWVs for DU in their urine is an urgent priority;
(7) This must be done by an independent laboratory, following
an agreed protocol, and under the control of the expert(s) nominated
by the GWVs.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS,
BWS
Intelligence reports had led the Coalition leaders to believe
that Iraq had weaponised—
(1) Anthrax, Bacillus anthracis spores which could
be delivered as an aerosol and inhaled by troops exposed;
(2) Plague, Yersinia pestis, is responsible for
bubonic plague which is usually transmitted by rat by fleas which
live on rats. A more deadly form of the disease, pneumonic plague
is spread via infected sputum and can be aerosolised as a BW;
(3) Botulinum Toxins—there are some eight
types of botulinum toxin, A, B, C1 and 2, D, E, F and G.
(5) Other Possibilities these include smallpox, and camelpox.
The former is known to be favoured by the Russians as strategic
weapon. Francisella turaraemia which had been previously
stockpiled by the USA and then supplied to Iraq. Brucella
spp likewise supplied by the USA. Other possibilities are listed
in the Reigle Report, Appendix IV in Bringing the War Home
(Thomas 1998), Christopher et al (1997), and Franz
et al (1997);
(6) Myctoxins from Fusarium spp. were known to
the Iraqis as yellow rain, may have been weaponised. Again the
initial cultures were supplied from the States. There is at least
one account of "yellow rain" affecting a USA soldier
following a SCUD attack (Thomas 1998).
All these agents have varying capacities to kill by damaging
the major systems of the body (Christopher, 1997; Franz 1997).
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