Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 263 - 279)

WEDNESDAY 12 JANUARY 2000 (Morning)

MR COLIN BALMER, MAJOR GENERAL JOHN KISZELY AND MR TREVOR WOOLLEY

Chairman

  263. Welcome, gentlemen. Mr Balmer, I have had experience of witnesses prevaricating for 20 years and their ability to find new excuses for not answering questions is limitless, and I understand that you have been pretty ill, but I must warn you against collapsing in the next two-and-a-half hours, although this would introduce a new approach to avoiding questions. Welcome, and I am sorry that you have been dragged out of your sick bed with the dreaded flu to appear before us.

  (Mr Balmer) Thank you, Chairman. I am just appealing for the sympathy vote.

  264. Introducing your team would be superfluous as you are the usual suspects dragged in on an occasion like this. Thank you very much for coming. This is the first of our four public sessions on the Defence White Paper. We will be producing a report before the end of the month in time for the House to debate the White Paper, though I must say Volume 2 is infinitely superior to Volume 1, which does seem, despite its new pictures, to be not the most communicative or substantial of documents but is partly redeemed by the additional information to what was seen as Volume 2. Introducing a slight note of cynicism, when my colleague Michael Colvin chaired the last Defence Committee, in a notable paragraph we indicated our displeasure at the defence budget having inexorably fallen, and we said, two-and-a-half or three years ago, that any further cuts in the defence budget would endanger the defence the realm. Small cuts were made, and I hope that today and next week you will be able to convince us that although we are now down to—you can tell us—2.4 per cent of GDP (maybe falling even further) we do live up to what the Defence White Paper said, that we have amongst the best armed forces in the world. Those armed forces remain amongst the best when they are sufficiently numerous, when they are operating the best equipment that money can buy, when they are well-trained and they are well-led, at political level and amongst the military themselves. I think we need convincing that the Government's aspirations of still being amongst the best in the world is more than empty rhetoric. The first question I would like to ask is this: for the last two years the Ministry of Defence seems to have had considerable difficulty in spending all of the funds budgeted for equipment. You underspent about £225 million in 1997/98 and underspent by £331 million against the original provision for 1998/99. What can we make of this?
  (Mr Balmer) I think, Chairman, the figures need to be, as usual, treated with some care because during the course of each of those years we have, inevitably, changed the provision with which we started out. In the case of both the last two years we had carry forward from the previous years to take into account. We also had operations in Bosnia which led to extra resources being made available from the Government reserve, and so the totals themselves have to be treated with some caution. It is also the case that inevitably in managing a budget of this size there are constant swings and roundabouts in the way in which budget holders manage their affairs during the course of the year. Our role is to set budgets at the start of the year which we think are taut and reasonable for people to deliver the outputs they are required to deliver, but, inevitably, as time moves on during the year, different things happen and different cost pressures arise. One of the particular factors that happens on the equipment vote—the old Vote 3, which we had until last year—is that during the course of the year we quite often find that a project matures to the stage where it is ready to be transferred to the responsibility of the logisticians —" in our new organisation the Chief of Defence Logistics. At that point we would transfer funds from the equipment procurement vote, Vote 3, into the logistics vote, the old Vote 2. That happened in each of those years. The same factor is happening in the current year although it is not so obvious because they are no longer separate votes. I think it is inevitably a difficult judgment for those who run, particularly, the equipment procurement vote, having looked at the whole range of projects they are required to deliver in the course of the year, to determine exactly what programmes are delayed and exactly how well industry will deliver and, therefore, how much we will pay in the way of bills. That is a juggling act. We certainly have a long tradition of recognising that even when all the individual projects have been properly screened and scrutinised, in aggregate we never spend that total amount of money—something, somewhere goes wrong unexpectedly. So the Chief of Defence Procurement (who, I think, you are seeing this afternoon) and his predecessors have a long history of block adjusting the total of the vote so that it more accurately reflects what he thinks they will in aggregate spend.

  265. So you are fairly relaxed about the figures?
  (Mr Balmer) I would not say we are relaxed about them, because we have to manage within a total and we are not allowed to exceed that total. If we do the Public Accounts Committee, quite rightly, calls us to account for that. Three years ago we did, indeed, overspend the total budget. In the last two years, in trying to manage within the total of the budget we have come close to that, in particular in 1998/99. The underspend on the whole defence budget was £74 million, but that reflected some overspending on the operational vote and a very small overspend on the logistic vote, offset by some underspending on the equipment vote. It is that balance that we have to get right during the course of the year. It is a difficult task, and in the last year we came quite close; £74 million is quite a small percentage to be adrift of the absolute total. In the current year we are similarly experiencing a very taut position.

  266. Despite your very logical explanation, when people like myself are saying "We are not spending enough on defence and we are not spending enough on equipment" it does seem rather embarrassing when journalists would argue "Look, they have not even spent the money they have been allocated". You think the explanation is sufficient that it is simply not possible to be bang on target every single financial year.
  (Mr Balmer) That is my argument, particularly since we are not allowed to, or it would be unsafe to, aim to spend exactly the total, because given that there must be a margin of error, there is a chance we would overspend and we are not allowed to overspend. We have to so manage our affairs that we do not overspend, which means, inevitably, the probability if not the certainty that there will be some measure of underspending in any given year. The good news is that under the current Government arrangements we are allowed to carry forward the underspending into next year.

  267. So what kind of dodges would you have got up to in the old days when you could not carry over? What was the down-side of the system? I see a wry grin on your face, and it was not your responsibility then, but what would your predecessors have done in order to have been bang on target?
  (Mr Balmer) I was smiling at the word "dodges", Chairman, which I will, of course, resist. We have been able to carry forward underspend on the equipment vote for a number of years now—it was actually in the mid-1980s that that facility was first introduced. At the time it was limited to 5 per cent of total vote, but even that we found manageable because that was several hundred million pounds. So we now have experience, over 14 or 15 years, of managing this way, and carrying forward underspending into the following year, where we have the time to programme it, either to cover particular bills which may have slipped from March to April, or if we detect that, actually, the programme was somewhat over-funded and there is some spare cash to reprogramme that into speeding up other programmes.

  268. How far ahead can you tell if there is going to be an underspend?
  (Mr Balmer) It depends on the fineness of the margin. Clearly, if we are several hundred millions under that becomes apparent quite early in the year, and sometimes we are able to add programmes in during the course of the year to cover that. In years where we are tight, like last year and the current year, it is very difficult to predict what the final outturn will be, because it depends on what bills we pay during March, and that depends on what bills industry submits for payment during March. Clearly, those in charge of the delivery of projects have the responsibility of assessing what that will be, but come the day if a particular contractor does not submit an invoice or manages to complete a piece of work slightly quicker than expected and puts in an invoice quickly at the beginning of March then we will pay it. So judging the fineness of that rate of spend is one of the difficult tasks we have, and it is why three years ago we overspent, because some of our reporting mechanisms were not quite accurate enough.

  269. Having developed a degree of cynicism over the last 20 years, is there any advantage in underspending, in the sense that now we are continuously engaged in surprise operations, is there any attempt to hold back something on one account to give advantage, if we are engaged in a Kosovo-type situation, so that at least you can carry forward from one year to the next?
  (Mr Balmer) Our normal expectation, for unplanned operations—the unexpected deployments of the likes of Bosnia and Kosovo in recent years—we do not make provision in public spending totals. The defence budget is judged to be sufficient to have the capability to have the armed forces in place with appropriate training, with appropriate equipment holding, and so on. So that if we then incur extra costs through deployment and having to fight an operation that would be extra cost. Where it is significant we would then expect, in discussion with the Treasury, to appeal for funds from the reserve. That debate, in any given year, will depend on the state of the budget overall. Clearly, if we were underspending in a given year the Treasury would expect us to try to use that to accommodate the extra costs of operations. So in the current year some of the smaller extra costs of operations, such as the enforcement of the No Fly Zone over Iraq, such as the minor costs of East Timor, we are absorbing within our budget, but for the major programmes, in Bosnia and Kosovo, for several years now we have been given extra provision for the extra costs that we have incurred.

  Chairman: We will come on to that later on.

Mr Colvin

  270. For how many years can you carry forward? When we did our inquiry into some of the overdue projects—Horizon is an obvious one, the Type 45, Bowman is another and ASTOR—there are a number of projects which are steadily moving to the right, which makes it quite difficult for somebody else to balance the books. However, we are assured that Smart Procurement is beginning to work and all these things are going to come back on stream. It obviously must help you, to a certain amount, to see it going to the right but how far can you go? How long can you carry forward the money that is currently allocated for those programmes which are running seriously over time?
  (Mr Balmer) The arrangements we have with the Treasury do not allocate carry forward money to specific projects. We do not say "We have underspent by X million pounds on a particular project, therefore we are carrying it forward. It is measured against our total budget.

  271. Do you not think you should do that?
  (Mr Balmer) We could, and, indeed, internally, that is part of the juggling act we have to go through each year in looking at our forward programme and adjusting the cash provision we expect to be needed by each project. If a project is in trouble and it is slipping several years to the right, that usually means there is extra cash available to deal with the projects which are more in that year. That juggling act, as I describe it, is a difficult process that we have to go through each year. I do not think it would make sense to allocate a bunch of resources to a particular project and ring-fence them in some way so that they could never be moved. We find it better to take a view of all the projects against the total provision we have, to ensure that we can ensure that they have the right amount of provision that they will need in any given year. The carry forward facility that we have is judged against our total budget and that is taken year-by-year; so in each year if we underspend by £50 million or £100 million then we can move that into the next year.

  272. On the question of the overall financial position, we have read some fairly disquieting things in the press suggesting that there is going to be a £500 million deficit, and I just want to put some questions to you on this because at the halfway point of this year, 1999/2000, your budget was running 4.3 per cent above forecast. We calculated that if that continued until the end of the year you would be overspent by £950 million. I just wondered what areas, other than the unprogrammed which we will be coming on to later, account for the overspending? What is causing it?
  (Mr Balmer) I do not recognise the detailed figures you are reading from, which have clearly come from press reports. It is certainly the case that we have found, in the early part of this year, that we were spending money at a higher rate than anticipated, and so we had to look hard at the areas where this was occurring. It was occurring in one or two of our Top Level Budget areas but, also, on the expenditure on the new equipment programme. It is not clear whether that was being caused by Smart Procurement having beneficial effects earlier thanwe expected, in the sense that things were being delivered which we thought might not have been delivered.

Chairman

  273. You will tell us if that happens?
  (Mr Balmer) We will indeed tell you the moment that happens.

Mr Colvin

  274. Can you give us any example of that happening at the moment?
  (Mr Balmer) There are certainly some projects where, under the Smart Procurement initiative, we have found ways in which we can share benefits with a contractor who has found a different way of doing something. I do not think I can point to an example where that has caused us, yet, to spend in the current year a significant amount of more money. Sir Robert Walmsley this afternoon might be able to think of a better example, if you would like to ask him.

  275. There must be many more projects that are going in the opposite direction, so the net balance should be a saving rather than the other way round.
  (Mr Balmer) Except that, as I tried to describe, we aim off for that phenomenon; we expect, in the nature of things, that some projects will, indeed, slip, and we aim off for that and do not make provision for what we do not expect to spend. However, in the current year we have found that we are spending slightly faster than expected so we did a full survey, as usual, with our budget holders at certain points during the year (in midsummer and in the autumn) to ensure that they could so organise their affairs that they would not overspend their allocations; in the same way that the Treasury and Parliament gives us an absolute limit we give limits to our individual budget holders in turn. That analysis caused us to move some provision from the logistics area, where the rate of expenditure was rather slower, and some out of the procurement area, because that rate was going too fast. Some of those bills will now, effectively, be slipped into next year—maybe a couple of hundred million pounds' worth—and other budget holders have had to tighten their belts in one or two areas. There have been one or two examples of exercises being cancelled or curtailed, and there have been press reports of one or two examples of ships being tied up for slightly longer than they might otherwise have been. Generally speaking, however, the tempo of activity, particularly with all the operational activity that is going on, has been high, and that has caused people to be able to rein back in other areas of their budget which, in a more stable period, they might have been spending money on. The position remains tight, but the measures that have been taken, primarily on the procurement budget, to move money on bills into the early part of next year, we are confident should enable us to stay within our overall cash limit. The position is tight.

  276. You touched on the question of exercises and I will come on to that in a minute, but in terms of planned operations and training and other deployments, what have been cut in order to help you stay within budget?
  (Mr Balmer) I might ask General Kiszely to give you some examples here, but the first point to make is that because of the operations in Kosovo, in particular, quite a large number of exercises—particularly for the Army but also for the Royal Air Force which they would otherwise have undertaken -were cancelled simply because the troops were deployed in an operational theatre. The same is true, to some extent, for the Navy. So of all the various exercises that have not taken place, most are driven by the requirements of Kosovo. Some have been driven by the effect of the slight squeeze on the budget.
  (Major General Kiszely) Yes, that is right. In the period covered by the report there were two major United Kingdom NATO exercises that were cancelled because of operational reasons. However, in-year there have been some eight NATO or United Nations exercises cancelled, largely due to operational commitments as well, because the troops that would have been taking part in them were either in Kosovo or deploying for operations or returning from operations.

  277. Do you have a figure for the sort of money that is being saved as a result of those exercises?
  (Mr Balmer) No, I do not, and primarily, of course, it was not for savings reasons that these exercises were cancelled.

Mr Hancock

  278. Have any of them at all been cut just for the sake of making a saving?
  (Mr Balmer) There is certainly one example, which is the Royal Marines deployment to Norway which was planned. I think there is a point worth making about savings from exercises, that the extra cost of exercising tend not to be very high because the troops are being employed anyway, so their salaries are covered. It tends to be the cost of the actual deployment and, maybe, some locally incurred costs. So although we have, indeed, trimmed back on one or two exercises, like the Marines' deployment, to save money, it does not save a huge amount in itself.

  279. £78 million to take the Army to Canada is a substantial sum of money.
  (Mr Balmer) The figures for the cost of deploying troops on exercises, again, we have to be careful about because that is something we expect to do anyway. We expect to fly our C130 aircraft and our VC10 aircraft, and so using those sorts of facilities to send people on exercises we would not regard as an extra cost. It is part and parcel of our normal defence budget.


 
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