Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320 - 339)

WEDNESDAY 12 JANUARY 2000 (Morning)

MR COLIN BALMER, MAJOR GENERAL JOHN KISZELY AND MR TREVOR WOOLLEY

  320. Does it really have the same effect? If you knew that you could spend up to £300 million or £400 million on unprogrammed, unexpected expenditure without any need to worry, surely that gives you more flexibility than a position whereby you are strictly constrained about what you can spend and you are worried, and there might be a tendency to slip the equipment programmes in order to provide more resources for operational matters for a year until the Treasury gives you the okay? Is there not more flexibility, from your point of view, and is it not easier for you in terms of your own management, if there was a sum in the budget every year for unexpected expenditure on operational matters of this kind?
  (Mr Balmer) For the smaller operations—things like East Timor—we expect to have to meet those from our own budget, perhaps £20 million or £30 million. So, yes, to that extent, we do indeed assume that we will have a range of those costs and we can programme that. For the larger operations, they are, by their nature, very unpredictable; their size and their scale can arise at very short notice—as with Kosovo—and I do not think we would gain any greater confidence by having some of that provision already available and then just relying on it being topped up. Before we engage in an operation like Kosovo we have a very earnest debate to ensure that we do know how the costs will be met—whatever they turn out to be. That is what happened with Kosovo and, as I said, we had the assurance at the start of the campaign that we would have the extra provision and, therefore, it would not affect the rest of our budget.

Mr Blunt

  321. Can I follow up on Iraq, because you told us the cost of the on-going operations in the Gulf are being accommodated from the budget.
  (Mr Balmer) Yes.

  322. In the memorandum you submitted to us you told us that the cost of Desert Fox was £10,000.
  (Mr Balmer) Yes.

  323. That seems rather a low figure. Why is it that low?
  (Mr Balmer) I think because very little has happened in that financial year.

  324. Desert Fox happened—if my memory serves me right—in December 1998. What has happened? That cannot be right.
  (Mr Balmer) I suspect the way the figures are working is that the extra costs of the other operations, Warden and Jural—the controlling of the airspace—is where most of the costs of the aircraft and fuel is accommodated. So any extra costs specifically for Desert Fox are, actually, very, very small.

  325. What is the cost of a Paveway 2 or a Paveway 3 bomb?
  (Mr Balmer) I do not have the figures to hand, but it is several thousand pounds. You would not get that many for £10,000. I can see your point.

  326. Are any of your colleagues able to assist on what is the approximate cost of a Paveway 2?
  (Mr Balmer) I think the important point here is that we would not, in that period, have bought another Paveway 2, therefore there is no extra cost. Even if we drop bombs we do not score the cost until we replenish them.

  327. So these figures here are not a true reflection of the cost of taking part in Desert Fox, or in the on-going operations in the Gulf?
  (Mr Balmer) That is absolutely true, and it is the same for the Kosovo costs; the order of costs I have given you today does not reflect all the costs of replenishing the expended ammunition.

  328. It should do, should it not?
  (Mr Balmer) No, because we have not spent the money yet. All we have put in this estimate is the money we have expended this year.

  329. But this is the basis of your negotiations with the Treasury.
  (Mr Balmer) Yes, and next year, I expect, we will be spending money on replenishing some ammunition stocks and that will score against the reserve next year.

  330. It will be too late by then, will it not?
  (Mr Balmer) No, because we get the money each year. That is why Bosnia costs have been rolling each year, because we claim from the reserve the costs we incur that year. So the Bosnia costs will include vehicles being repaired in the UK which would have been on deployment in Bosnia in previous years. As I said, we have incurred very little Kosovo ammunition costs yet, in terms of replenishment costs. The replacement Paveway 2 kits are due to start arriving from this month onwards. Once we start paying for them then we will claim.

  331. But you have agreed with the Treasury to accommodate the costs of the Gulf operation.
  (Mr Balmer) For the Gulf operation that is correct.

  332. Yet you have dropped 125 Paveway 2 bombs and 9 Paveway 3 bombs during the course of 1999, although you do not know how much they are going to cost to replace.
  (Mr Balmer) Because we have not yet signed contracts[5] for their replacement. To the extent that those are costs we would have incurred—because we normally drop weapons during training exercises—there would be no extra costs. To the extent that it is an extra cost for that operation, if it is a Desert Fox cost then at the moment we would absorb that and if it is a Kosovo cost then we get it back from the reserves at the point at which we incur the cost.

  333. That is an operational restraint on Bolton.
  (Mr Balmer) No, I do not think it is.

  334. So they can continue to bomb Iraq as much as they like with no constraints coming from you about the use of their ammunition despite the fact that those costs are being contained within the on-going budget.
  (Mr Balmer) I certainly do not and the financial structure does not put any constraint on the amount of weapons expended in that operation. Those judgments are made by the Commanders and sometimes by Ministers in certain circumstances and the cost will be a factor in that decision, but there is no separate constraint placed on that operation.

  335. How big does this cost have to become before you go to the Treasury to say the costs of Bolton have to be met from the reserves?
  (Mr Balmer) We do not have an absolute figure agreed with the Treasury. The arrangement is that what we call costs of minor operations, which is what this is now judged to be, we will attempt to absorb.

  336. But you do not know how much that is.
  (Mr Balmer) Were it to be of the order of £30 or £40 million then we think we can do that, but were it to become a much more significant operation and cost hundreds of millions then that will be a different matter and that will be a major operation and we would seek to claim that against the reserve.

  337. So you do not know how much these bombs cost?
  (Major General Kiszely) You have got an opportunity to ask the Chief of Defence Procurement and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff this afternoon exactly those points.

Chairman

  338. Perhaps you would alert him.
  (Mr Balmer) Yes, we will do that.

Laura Moffatt

  339. There is something I need to get clear. At the start of this evidence session, Mr Balmer, we were talking about the way in which under-spends could be carried forward. Does that apply to all areas of under-spend? Is it within your gift to use those under-spends for the following year?
  (Mr Balmer) Yes it is. All aspects of the defence budget are covered by that agreement. To the extent that we spend less than Parliament has provided then the difference can be carried forward to the following year.


5   Note by witness: we have not yet received bills for their replacement. Back


 
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