Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 460 - 479)

WEDNESDAY 12 JANUARY 2000 (Afternoon)

SIR ROBERT WALMSLEY, KCB, GENERAL SIR SAM COWAN, KCB, CBE AND MR NICK WITNEY

  460. Can you give us a figure comparing the administrative costs including personnel and their office space for the DLO compared with the three single service organisations that they are succeeding? What is the saving on administration?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) The best way to cover that is on numbers of people because that is where the operating costs are. I did not set a numbers total on this because I did not want to adopt a sort of slash and burn mentality. The setting up of the Defence Logistics Organisation, given its size, has been a very rapid process and also I am aware that the three defence service logistic areas have been through quite a lot of change and cuts and reductions, so I decided that initially, as I was building up the new structure, to do it on a process driven system, subject to some conditions which I will outline in a minute. Just carrying out a pure analysis, we are starting on 1 April with about just over 600 fewer people than we had in the old, combined structure. Over the next year, we will be carrying out a careful analysis of those numbers in each of the business areas to make certain that in some areas we are not over-insuring against what we thought we would need and in other areas we may have under-provision in numbers. I thought that it would be right to take that hard look when the system was up and running, rather than when it was just a theoretical model. I hope that gives you some idea. There is a 600 reduction as we start, but I think the numbers will come down because a number of the ideas inherent in the lean support projects will inevitably lead to reductions in numbers. They will be driven not just by any arbitrary reduction in people but trying to drive down the total cost of support.

  Chairman: That is a very refreshing approach. I wish others would take it rather than deciding on the numbers and then redefining the task to suit the financial cuts and the numbers. I hope your ideas catch on.

Laura Moffatt

  461. I wonder if I could refer you to paragraph 44 because most of my questions in the Defence White Paper are around that particular paragraph. I know that the General has kindly outlined many of the new ways of working but I am not sure I caught exactly a particular issue that I am interested in, the two chains of logistics to supply front line services which I believe should have been in place by 2001 and 2003. Are they still on line?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) Yes. That is the intention.

  462. It has not slipped at all. It is good to hear that. In that paragraph it clearly says that additional funding for deficiencies in weapon systems and spares was required. How much was required for the deficiencies?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) In the case of that specific reference to the Royal Air Force, I am responsible for a major part of the programme. My part of the programme will be complete by probably the end of the financial year 03/04. The majority of it will be complete by 02/03 and it has already started to have an impact. That is such matters as buying additional engines for aircraft, additional spares, additional night vision goggles, additional avionics equipment, additional capacity to make certain that we can repair these aircraft and these helicopters under field conditions. That amounts to about £90 million.

  463. That is substantial.
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) A substantial enhancement. I did take a check on this 2006 figure because it is not one that I recognise. I am working to a different timescale and I was informed that that figure relates to something which I am not responsible for. It is something under the hand of the Royal Air Force Strike Command, to do with the enhancements to their tactical communications wing, which will take that amount of time, I am told, because of its complexity and wider manning implications. It is not an area which I am directly responsible for but I did check that because it is three years longer than the programme that I am going to be looking at.

  464. That is interesting. Thank you for highlighting that because I was going to ask you which bits of kit were involved and you have kindly named them. I must admit what was of more interest to me and was not mentioned there was the other two services. If there was difficulty in sustaining the RAF, I believe that we felt that there were difficulties in the other two services as well. Why are they not mentioned?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) This is really a question relating to last year's White Paper and the SDR outcome. I can only answer it rather speculatively because I do not have the White Paper of 12 months ago to hand.

Mr Blunt

  465. There was not one.
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) There was an SDR document.

  466. This is the first White Paper of this government.
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) Thank you, but there was a document issued under the signature of the Secretary of State which gave the results of this Strategic Defence Review. I think there is a reasonable explanation. Of course the Army is very much orientated around deployment and work in the field. It is a new characteristic of this post-cold war world that, rather than the majority of our Air Force being stationed in stations in Germany, there is a great deal of deployment that now takes place of operational squadrons. Those have to be maintained outside peace time infrastructure and of course the greater use and activity of the aircraft in operational theatres led the Strategic Defence Review analysis to say that the Royal Air Force needs specific enhancement in order to preserve its ability to sustain operations over a longer period of time and also to meet the new defence review requirement to make certain that we could sustain two simultaneous, medium term deployments.

Laura Moffatt

  467. We are obviously very pleased to hear that. Thank you for that explanation. Do you see any conflict here with what is stated in the MoD memorandum[1] about having a reduction in the inventory of £2 billion held? How do you square that?

  (General Sir Sam Cowan) That again originated from the Strategic Defence Review and I am responsible for delivering the removal of £2 billion-worth of stock over the next couple of years. I have already achieved over 50 per cent of that.

  468. Where from?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) From a careful analysis of the inventory. Do not forget, a lot of this inventory was bought many years ago for a very different defence scenario. I can assure you that this stock will be removed because it has not moved and therefore it should have been removed some years ago with no operational detriment whatsoever. We are getting new relationships with our suppliers, so even though I may not hold the stock it will be available on demand under contract from the commercial world, which is efficient in terms of managing the inventory and also enables me to deliver this stock reduction. I can assure you that the £2 billion target worth of stock will be removed to the timescale stated without any detriment to my ability to support front line outputs.

  469. I am having trouble trying to visualise what this stock may be. What are we talking about?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) It is all the stuff that has been bought over the last 20, maybe 25, years to support the tanks and the aircraft and all the ships that we have in service and continue to have in service. There is a natural reluctance among what used to be called equipment support managers to get rid of kit. It tends in the past to have sat around. "We bought it. It is not costing us anything, so we may as well hold it just in case." Under resource accounting and budgeting, not only are all these assets available but they are now exposed and I have to pay a six per cent interest accruals charge, so I am very interested in what we are holding. I am utterly unimpressed with people who say to me, "Well, we know the kit has gone out of service but we bought it some years ago and it would be a shame to throw it away."

  470. It sounds like my mother!
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) I hope I am dealing properly with your very good question. It is very fundamental to this change of attitude and a new culture.

  471. I wonder how you assign a £2 billion value to it if it is of absolutely no value to you.
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) That is a very good point. Nevertheless, in terms of the old accounting system, it is held on my balance sheet according to the price that was paid. Various adjustments then were made from that time, so although it is £2 billion it is a matter of considerable regret to me that I am not getting £2 billion paid into my budget for getting rid of this. We are getting a certain amount and the Disposal Agency has been very efficient in getting rid of it but at scrap value.

Mr Colvin

  472. How much is saleable?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) A fair proportion of it is but not at the price which we paid.

Chairman

  473. There was an ammunition war stocks review. Has it reported yet and, if it has, is it likely to yield more or less ammunition to be held?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) That work is underway led by one of the centre department organisations. I am obviously very interested in it because, under the new arrangements, there has to be a customer, somebody in the Ministry of Defence, who takes responsibility for interpreting the new guidelines on stock that we should be holding in terms of war reserve, including ammunition. I know that the work is at quite an advanced stage but to my knowledge it is not complete yet.

  474. You have no idea when it is likely to be completed?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) I think within the next six months. Nick, are you aware of that?
  (Mr Witney) Later on this year, yes.

Mr Hancock

  475. I am very interested in what you have been saying because I grew up not so much at sea but in the surrounding area, full of anchors and chains lying across acres and acres of open fields. It took the best part of 40 years to get those moved and the land actually put to some use. I have more than a degree of sympathy for what you are saying, but I am interested in the way in which you target things. You, Sir Robert, mentioned targets and General Cowan has as well. I would be interested to know what you consider to be a target.
  (Sir Robert Walmsley) In terms of savings do you mean?

  476. Yes, and how you go about setting these targets and how realistic they are to be delivered. How do we know that you are not short changing us by setting hopelessly simple targets to meet for yourselves, for example?
  (Sir Robert Walmsley) We employed consultants to help us formulate the prescription for smart procurement, most obviously through Integrated Project Teams. When you bring a lot of people together in a team who have previously held contributing but nevertheless separate responsibilities, quite often each of them holds back so to speak in the total enterprise a little bit of resource for himself. What the consultants told us was that the absolute world standard, when you brought together an Integrated Project Team with all these formerly contributing but nevertheless in some way competing interests together, the absolute bench mark figure for a saving, is around five per cent. We therefore look at each Integrated Project Team as it is formed up and what you find is that, with a requirement specialist in there, interacting directly with the other team members, with industry being more open, we have been able to get rid of these little "come in handy" parts of the resource that each person was holding back. What that means is that I think a hard target of five per cent is a good aiming point. A stretch target needs to be something far more visionary and it is also a fact that if you do not aim high you do not get high, so you should aim high for stretch targets, but there is a huge difference in the way we assign people hard and stretch targets. Hard targets you expect to see taken into the budget. The way we work it is we do not therefore start off with an absolute figure in mind, although this five per cent bench mark is not a bad one. We say to the team, "You have all come together. Let's see your ideas" and basically attribute them to hard targets or stretch targets. You have ten weeks of this breakthrough process, having trained the leader and trained the team, with consultant support, to try to turn those targets into real prescriptions for delivering them. If they cannot turn them into prescriptions for delivering them and get them agreed with all those who have to contribute to the delivery, they will not become a hard target. If they do, they do become a hard target. The budget is adjusted accordingly. Stretch targets will take far longer. This is not of course a once and for all. Again, it is very much something that the team must get used to. It is this cultural point that we have been making. It is a new way of doing business, gain sharing with industry, which is a very real example of something that we are not doing as well as we had hoped, but it seems to me to have a tremendous potential for actually incentivising industry to do better, because they might make more money, as long as they pass some of the savings back to us.

  477. How do you yourselves get on in delivering your 20 per cent reduction in the Procurement Agency's target?
  (Sir Robert Walmsley) That 20 per cent is against the administrative cost of running the Agency. The way the target breaks down is that we have been given four years to do that from the Strategic Defence Review. I expect to achieve the first ten per cent of reduction by 31 March this year. I certainly expect to get the next ten per cent by March 2002. We may well do that second ten per cent a bit earlier, but we are going to get there.

  478. What about you, General, with regard to the targets you have set for your operations in the three services? I was not altogether convinced with the answer you gave to Laura Moffatt.
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) A better way of dealing with Mrs Moffatt's answer is that the £2 billion is a double target. Two billion pounds is the real target which is 20 per cent by value.

  479. I was going back a bit further to what you were going to end up with as an organisation and what you could deliver for the armed forces of this country, a lean, mean, fighting force which should be equipped for a period of time and you could deliver this to ministers when they wanted it at their disposal. Are you going to meet that target?
  (General Sir Sam Cowan) Absolutely. For the fundamental target I believe I can be accountable in a way that I could not have been accountable under cash because fundamental to what I am doing is the introduction of a resource accounting budget for the first time, specifying outputs in a very specific and quantifiable way, which capture the total cost of delivering that spare, not just what it costs in terms of cash to buy the spare, but the total cost of all the processes which contributed to that spare actually being delivered at the point of need. As I mentioned, I have three equipment support areas between which my 50 IPTs are divided and they have customer/supplier agreements being worked up with the front line commands— Commander in Chief Fleet, Commander in Chief Land, Commander in Chief Strike—and their supporting commanders, which specify in output terms what I am responsible for delivering in terms of material and commodity support during the next year. These CSAs deal with timeliness, quality, quantity and cost. Although this is ground breaking work, and this is the first year in which these CSAs have actually been written with the degree of rigour that is necessary, a great deal of progress still has to be made. I am satisfied that they are bringing a degree of accountability and also a change in the relationship between front line command and the support area in a discipline that might not have been there before and, advantageously, is very much putting the customer—in my case, Commander in Chief Fleet, Strike and Land—in the driving seat in terms of determining his priorities based on the amount of resource that we have available to support what he specifies as his needs. The delivery of those outputs as specified in those CSAs absolutely makes me accountable.


1   See p. 145. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries

© Parliamentary copyright 2000
Prepared 10 February 2000