Examination of Witnesses (Questions 780
- 799)
WEDNESDAY 19 JANUARY 2000 [Afternoon]
THE RT
HON GEOFFREY
HOON MP, MR
KEVIN TEBBITT,
MR RICHARD
HATFIELD, AIR
MARSHAL SIR
JOHN DAY,
AIR MARSHAL
MALCOLM PLEDGER
AND MR
JOHN HOWE
780. That was the response?
(Mr Hatfield) In a sense, there is not very much to
clarify. My own personal feeling is that it is partly, what is
now the standard term, "sub-strategic" which leads to
the problem. It suggests, as it were, these might be tactical
weapons used for war fighting. That has never been the case, at
least not for about 20 years even in theory. The point of sub-strategic
weapons is to give you an option in extreme circumstances other
than going straight for a full-scale nuclear exchange. Those circumstances
are even more remote for this country at the moment than they
were in the past but you can never rule them out.
781. The previous Secretary of State gave an
answer to a question on 26 March last year, Column 433, in which
he referred to, "In extreme circumstances of self-defence,
a capability for the more limited use of nuclear weapons would
allow us to signal to an aggressor that he has miscalculated our
resolve, without using the full destructive power which Trident
offers."
(Mr Hatfield) That is a more elegant description of
what I just said.
782. I was wondering whether what you had said
and the speech in September to which you have referred—
(Mr Hatfield) March.
783. No, you referred to a speech made in September
by the previous Secretary of State.
(Mr Hatfield) No, it was March. March 7 I think[2].
Mr Gapes: The Aberdeen speech was in
March, so that is around the same time.
Chairman
784. Did you write it, Mr Hatfield?
(Mr Hatfield) I contributed!
Mr Gapes
785. What I am trying to get at is the circumstances
in which Trident would be used as a sub-strategic nuclear system
and a clear definition of where we are with regard to our nuclear
strategy. I would be grateful for some clarification. If there
is not time now, you might want to write to us but I would be
grateful to have some clarity about where we are today, in the
year 2000, as opposed to a year ago. Linked to that is one final
area I want to probe, which relates to paragraph 8 of the Defence
White Paper, which is the whole question of the American testing,
or the failed testing I suppose you could say, of anti-ballistic
missile systems. Clearly that has enormous implications for not
just our own future but also future European security. The statement
in paragraph 8 is, "... it would be premature to decide on
acquiring a ballistic missile defence capability."
(Mr Hoon) That remains the position.
786. Can I put it to you that I think that is
rather weak? Defending the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has considerable
benefits for this country so it may not just be premature, it
actually might be very dangerous to our national security. I would
welcome your response to that statement.
(Mr Hoon) I do not accept it. I think we have to have
regard to developments—
Mr Cohen
787. The Prime Minister does. He has called
on the United States to protect the ABM Treaty and abide by it.
(Mr Hoon) That is not quite the point which Mike was
making, with respect. What we have to do is have regard to developments
which are occurring around the world without necessarily questioning
the validity of the existing treaties. We cannot simply ignore
the developments which are occurring and obviously in looking
at them we have to be ready to respond if necessary, but that
does not in any way qualify either what the Prime Minister said
about existing treaties or indeed undermine our support for them.
Mr Gapes
788. So when are we going to see the outcome
of this re-thinking which is going on on these matters?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think that depends on any particular
calendar date or any particular period of time which will have
to elapse. It depends entirely on the nature of the threat and
the nature of those developments.
789. So it does not depend on what the Americans
decide and whether the Americans decide to go ahead and then their
negotiations with the Russians and the Russians saying, "No
way are we prepared to accept change in the ABM Treaty" and
then we have a crisis between America, Europe within NATO and
with Russia?
(Mr Hoon) On the contrary, these are matters which
will have to be carefully considered amongst our allies and it
is those kinds of discussions which I was alluding to when I talked
about developments. This is not a matter peculiarly for the United
Kingdom, it is a matter which NATO will have to look at very carefully,
and we have very considered discussions on these kind of developments.
(Mr Hatfield) Could I also clarify one point? There
are two forms of ballistic missile defence being discussed in
paragraph 8, only one of which concerns the American's National
Missile Defence programme and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
The other is Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence which is a separate
issue, which does not conflict with the ABM Treaty even in principle,
which several countries, not only the United States, are developing
or thinking of buying into. That is a second issue which was discussed
in the Strategic Defence Review and which we would also judge,
for the moment at least, as premature for this country in relation
to its particular circumstances.
790. Perhaps it would have been helpful if the
paragraph had been split because it would have made clear that
distinction. As it is worded at the moment, I think there is a
certain ambiguity in the paragraph. Leaving that aside, there
is one other point which is the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention.
What progress is there on having an enhanced protocol on that
matter? Is there anything positive you can report? There was a
proposal, was there not, to have a conference in London this year.
Where are we on that?
(Mr Hoon) We have certainly played a major role in
that process and indeed, as you say, we have offered to provide
a venue at which a concluded treaty might be signed, but that
does not entirely depend on our decision-making.
791. Where is the obstacle?
(Mr Hoon) There are a number of discussions which
still have to take place.
(Mr Tebbit) The main difficulty is a verification
regime which works. It is no good having arms control treaties
without that.
792. That is a problem with the existing biological
weapons one.
(Mr Tebbit) That remains the obstacle. Can I just
go back to one of your earlier points about nuclear weapons, because
I think there is a mystique developing which is not here? The
fundamental principle of nuclear deterrents is uncertainty and
uncertainty in the mind of the potential aggressor about the precise
way in which he might be attacked in a way which makes the damage
disproportionate to any gain he might wish to have but certainty
that if he did miscalculate the consequences of our action would
be devastating on him. Trident is a very good system in both cases
but it does not help to say precisely the circumstances in which
we might use Trident in a sub-strategic way, it is sufficient
for the potential aggressor to know that if it were used it would
outweigh any benefit he might wish to gain. That is a fundamental
principle of deterrentce and it remains exactly the same.
793. I am aware of the formulation. It has been
there since Sir Michael Quinlan and—
(Mr Tebbit) It remains the same in this context.
794. Nevertheless, Committees have consistently
asked those questions over the years and I am sure they will continue
to do so.
(Mr Tebbit) And I think you will continue to get the
same answer, which is why I thought it worthwhile to give it to
you now. So the precise target and the precise circumstances are
not that different from the aircraft which used to deliver the
W-177 bombs but delivery through Trident makes it the more determined
and effective.
Mr Cohen
795. But the problem is that it is almost certainly
not a proportionate response. For example, you are prepared to
use this against non-nuclear powers. If it was about a more limited
use of nuclear weapons, this is still a massive increase over
what was said at Washington, for example.
(Mr Hatfield) We have not said that. What I was trying
to explain earlier was that it is a weapon we would use in very
extreme circumstances. I think the answer to the question, "What
has changed", not only over the last "year but the last
ten years", is the degree of risk of those circumstances
arising. The circumstances in which you would wish to rely on
it are when the country has not got any other option and in the
current strategic environment that seems very unlikely. You could
argue the Russians have gone through exactly the opposite process,
which is why they invented a doctrine which is rather similar
because they now regard themselves as conventionally weak. If
nobody threatens us in a way which threatens our vital interest,
we will not use Trident, and the whole point of it is not to use
it.
Chairman
796. Thank you. Mr Hatfield, you made a remark
about Aberdeen University. Were you being frank and totally serious?
Was that the response we asked for, a speech delivered in Aberdeen?
With all due respect to an ancient and venerable university, is
that the Ministry of Defence's response to our request for greater
clarification on policy? I do not speak as any member of CND or
ex-CND, I have never worn the badge, either in front or behind,
but I think it does require greater clarification and perhaps
you could at least send us a copy of your—sorry, Lord Robinson's—presentation
please, but I do not think that is quite what we had in mind.
(Mr Hatfield) Chairman, I am afraid I was responding
to the exact quote which was from our side of the table, which
was that we were looking for an opportunity to say something on
public record about this. That was the Aberdeen speech. I entirely
accept that this Committee also likes to have an answer and indeed
the rather more precisely worded answer was the parliamentary
answer. I think part of the problem which we have been grappling
with today is that I think the Committee is looking for a long
and detailed explanation on this point when actually we do not
think there is a long and detailed explanation. It is a very simple
point which I have just been trying to convey to you and I hope
I have done better at this attempt than I did last time.
(Mr Tebbit) That is why the Permanent Secretary intervened,
to try to make that point, and I am impressed and flattered that
you should have linked me to Michael Quinlan.
Mr Cann
797. I detect in paragraph 126 a certain amount
of frustration about the misunderstandings about what defence
diplomacy means and does not mean. Would you like to take this
opportunity verbally to say what you think it does mean and how
much progress has been made to change the quantity and focus of
our activities to go along with that?
(Mr Hoon) I do not want to simply repeat the words
which are set out in the paragraph before but the purpose of adding
defence diplomacy as an explicit responsibility of the Ministry
of Defence was to try to draw together a number of separate activities
which in the past have been looked at in a rather incoherent way.
Supporting arms control, outreach to Central and Eastern Europe
and the other activities, some of which have been touched on already,
are now explicit responsibilities within the Department and people
are within the Department responsible for carrying through those
activities in a way which, as I indicated earlier, also involves
other departments and means we are working in a very joined-up
way in this particular area of activity.
798. Does that mean we have just put them all
into the same file or are we doing anything new?
(Mr Hoon) I have mentioned already some of the new
things we are looking at but I think it is inherent in defence
diplomacy that it is sometimes, in the short term at any rate,
difficult to see a precise result. It is something we can point
to and say, "Look, we have managed to prevent this kind of
conflict or that kind of conflict." It is a process of trying
to ensure a process of educating people from other countries.
We are committed to ensuring that those countries which are appropriate
should have the benefit of the kind of military courses which
are available to people here, which are frankly the admiration
of many places around the world. Part of what that instils is
a commitment to democracy, for example, and not simply emphasising
the purely military aspects but putting the military implications
into a constitutional context which in the longer term—and
I cannot prove this and it would be absurd if I was going to try—might
well mean that someone who rises to a very senior military position
might be, because of the course he or she had undertaken very
many years before, less likely to resort to military action in
defiance of, say, a democratically elected government. These are
very long term considerations.
(Mr Hatfield) I can actually list the activities we
are doing, even though I cannot—
799. Are they new?
(Mr Hatfield) I will only list the new ones. For example,
we have at the moment six military and six civilian advisers attached
to governments around Central and Eastern Europe; we have several
short term training teams in Eastern Europe; we are establishing
a military training team in the Czech Republic which will be based
there permanently but will also train some of the other countries
in the region, and that will probably be about 25 people strong
when it gets into place very shortly; we have already mentioned
defence attachés where we are putting extra people into
this area. So I think there is quite a lot we are doing. In one
sense you can measure what we are doing because we are gradually
spending some more money on it.
2 1 March 1999. Back
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