DEPLOYABILITY
Figure 3: Key Equipment Elements in the
SDR
- Aircraft Carrierstwo new carriers in 2012/2015.
- Sealift4 Ro-Ro ships, in addition to two
already entering service.
- Airlift4 C-17 aircraft, or their equivalent,
to meet short-term needs; and replacement of the remaining C-130Ks
and VC10/Tristar tanker aircraft in the longer term.
- Intelligence, Surveillance Target-acquisition
and Reconnaissancethe ASTOR and TRACER projects
- TomahawkTLAMs to be fitted to all 10 remaining
attack submarines.
- Amphibious assault shipsthe two 'Landing
Platform Dock' vessels to be replaced.
- Submarinestwo further Astute submarines,
in addition to three already planned.
57. Addressing the major inadequacies in strategic
lift was identified as a 'high priority' in the SDR.[129]
To meet short-term strategic airlift (STSA) needs, the SDR announced
the proposed acquisition of four C-17 aircraft or equivalent;
in the longer term, it proposed the acquisition of four roll-on
roll-off (ro-ro) container ships to supplement the two already
on order as well as a replacement for the remaining C-130K Hercules
transport aircraft[130]
and the VC-10/Tristar air-to-air refuelling fleet.[131]
In our Report on the SDR we welcomed these announcements, but
identified unresolved questions over the future replacement of
our heavy aircraft fleet.[132]
The White Paper admits that deployment remains a problem and that
... we cannot at present
deploy the Joint Rapid Reaction Force quickly enough to meet the
likely requirements of the new strategic environment.[133]
58. The problem of long-term strategic airlift
is compounded by the failure to make any progress on the short-term
strategic airlift programme. None of the bids received by
the Ministry of Defence proved acceptable. The White Paper notes
the recent difficulties with the airlift programme, stating that
as a result of the competition 'none of the five bids received
were judged to offer an acceptable solution at an affordable cost'.[134]
The competition was terminated and the MoD is now "urgently
pursing other options". We explored some of the difficulties
involved with the Chief of Defence Procurement and the Secretary
of State.[135]
CDP told us that the MoD has had to cancel the competition because
... the most capable solution
was too expensive and the least expensive solution was not good
enough to be useful as an aircraft that we had permanently on
lease or on ownership. Given that situation, we decided it was
not sensible to continue the competition because we needed to
look really at two very different things. A hugely capable aircraft
that would satisfy nearly everything you could ever imagine you
wanted is clearly going to be expensive and, for that, we would
need to be very close to the contractor to understand how we might
reduce the cost.[136]
... We simply could not do that if we were running a
normal, arm's length competition because the other bidder would
want to know what we were doing with these people, so we separated
them.[137]
59. CDP explained how the Department are seeking
to run these short-term and longer-term airlift competitions in
parallel to avoid the short-term solution prejudicing the other
deal.[138]
Whatever the long term solution, however, our witnesses from the
MoD perceived the need for at least some aircraft to cater for
"outsized dimension" lifts.[139]
CDP spelt out the risks, as he saw them, of using Antonov aircraft
to meet the MoD's strategic airlift requirements, including the
possibility of the Russian and Ukrainian authorities withholding
flight clearance[140]
or, if bought outright, having to take total responsibility for
their airworthiness.[141]
In a separate memorandum, the Ministry of Defence responded to
the Committee's enquiries by stating that
The aim remains to announce
a decision on the way ahead for [short term strategic airlift]
in the early part of next year [2000], at the same time as the
decision on the longer term requirement to replace the balance
of the Hercules fleet.[142]
On our recent visit to Washington, we were told by
Boeing that they had offered the US Department of Defense a 25%
discount for a package of 60 C-17 aircraft and that they were
discussing the possibility of a similar discount with the MoD.
Since the Department of Defense's order has not yet been placed,
such a discount cannot be guaranteed, but we were told by the
Chief of Defence Procurement that
We are not going to get a
price that is cheaper than the United States Government pays for
these aircraft, but we are not going to get a price that is a
single cent more expensive either.[143]
This is an important promise by CDP. But it seems
likely that the longer the MoD dithers over the choice of new
heavy lift aircraft, the less likely the UK is to be able to reap
the benefits of the manufacturer being able to plan for a larger
and longer guaranteed production run, and the through-life savings
potentially available from better planning for spares. However,
we remain of the view that competition, rather than individual
agreements with a particular producer, is the best way to achieve
savings. Now that normal competition procedures have been put
to one side for the short-term airlift programme, it is important
that the MoD carefully weighs all the options available.
60. We also note that in the 1998 Public Service
Agreement, the Ministry of Defence identified a target availability
date of 2000 for the ro-ro ships, but that the White Paper states
that the Department now only hopes to place a contract
in spring 2000. The White paper does not, however, mention the
very recent extension of the bidding phase of this PFI competition.[144]
The MoD's press notice issued at the time of this announcement
states that 'adding time at this stage will not push out the planned
contract date of July 2000, as it is intended to use smart procurement
to reduce time and bidding costs'. The explanation offered
for the extended bidding phase was that the Department 'has to
be satisfied that we had viable entrants into the competition'.[145]
61. The MoD's strategic deployability also depends
on new air-to-air refuelling aircraft. The MoD is pursuing a Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) solution for thispotentially worth
£2.5 billionwith a contract to be placed in 2002.
The ro-ro sealift programme is similarly pursuing PFI options.
More generally, the 1998-99 Performance Report[146]
notes that some £332m of PFI contracts have been signed and
that there is potential for a further £6 billion (including
the air-to-air refuelling project). A report by our predecessor
Committee on heavy lift[147]
raised concerns about the availability of the necessary assets,
and the MoD has recently provided further information.[148]
This includes the MoD's acknowledgment of the need the secure
more Assured Charter for outsized loads because of the influence
of Russian political control over the availability of AN-124 aircraft.[149]
As regards sealift (a topic which has concerned the Defence Committee
for many years[150]),
the MoD will seek to balance an assurance that four ro-ro ships
will be always available against the opportunity for value for
money by letting the contractor generate third-party incomes from
the other two.[151]
CDP also assured us that contracts will contain provisions that
ensure the assets revert to the MoD if the contractors were to
go bust.[152]
62. The SDR committed the UK to force projection
strategy. If we lack the ability to 'project' force, many very
expensive assets are wasted. We view the lack of adequate deployability,
particularly with regard to strategic airlift, with grave concern
and will follow developments closely.
SUSTAINABILITY IN THEATRE
63. Forces in theatre require both an efficient logistics
chain and adequate supplies of ammunition and spares if they are
to maintain their operational capability. The SDR announced a
number of changes to the logistics support structure, including
the establishment of a new post of Chief of Defence Logistics.
A new tri-service organisation, the Defence Logistics Organisation
(DLO) has also been formed. From April 1999, it has budgeting
and management responsibility for the three single-Service support
areasChief of Fleet Support, Quartermaster-General and
Air Member for Logistics. The DLO will be fully operating, with
its own HQ, from April 2000.[153]
We discuss its plans and achievements so far below.[154]
64. The SDR also promised the capability for separate
lines of communication for two concurrent "medium scale"
operations.[155]
We were told that establishing the new lines of communication
are still on target for 2001 and 2003 and will greatly assist
in the support of British forces.[156]
They were not in place for Operations Allied Force and Joint Guardian
and we will be reporting on the support of British forces
in these operations as part of our inquiry into the Kosovo crisis.
We also note that the specific enhancements required to enable
the RAF to sustain operations over a longer period of time are
in hand and that the majority will be completed by 2002-03.[157]
65. In a separate inquiry[158]
we received confidential information about UK stockholdings of
certain key ammunitions. Stockpiles are still governed by NATO's
Cold War guideline of 30 days of war stocks. It is clear that
in some areas current stockpiles fall short of the 30 day requirement.
In any event, continuing to use a Cold War guideline may no longer
be appropriate (Operation Allied Force, for example, lasted 12
weeks). An ammunition war stocks review is under way and should,
we were told, be completed within the next six months.[159]
We believe that there is an urgent need to reappraise stockpile
and regeneration requirements in the light of the changed operational
circumstances. We look forward to the outcome of the review.
THEATRE DEFENCE
66. In our Report on the SDR we considered the attention
given to theatre defence against threats from ballistic missiles
and from nuclear, chemical and biological attack to be inadequate.[160]
The White Paper identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery as being of 'notable concern'[161],
but offers nothing new in terms of defence against this threat.
The Department continues to monitor developments in ballistic
missile defence[162]
and in April 1999 a Joint NBC Regiment[163]
was established, as proposed in the SDR. These are pretty much
the minimum plausible responses to the threat, and in evidence
the Policy Director reiterated the view that any change would
be 'premature' for the UK 'in relation to its particular circumstances'.[164]
We shall continue to press for this area to be reconsidered in
the future.
120 Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit,
para164 Back
121
Q 685 Back
122
Cm 4520, Annex F Back
123
Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 54 Back
124
Cm 4520, Annex F Back
125
ibid, Annex A Back
126
The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, p 2, para 6 Back
127
Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para.187. Back
128
Cm 4520, para 61 Back
129
SDR Supporting Essay 6, para17 Back
130
The first half of the RAF's C130K fleet are already being replaced
by C130Js Back
131
Cm 3999, p 24 Back
132
Eighth Report, Session 1997-8, op cit, para191 Back
133
Cm 4446, para 40 Back
134
Cm 4446, para 42 Back
135
QQ 490-503 and Q 705 Back
136
Q 490 Back
137
Q 495 Back
138
Q 498 Back
139
Q 501 Back
140
Q 491 Back
141
Q 492 Back
142
Ev p 153, para 17.15 Back
143
Q 495 Back
144
MoD press notice 437/99, 13/12/99 Back
145
Cm 4520, p E-3; Cm 4446, para. 41, Q 485 Back
146
Cm 4520, p 32 Back
147
Fifth Report, Session 1996-97, Heavy Lift, HC 233 Back
148
Ev p 190 Back
149
ibid Back
150
See eg Sixth Report, Session 1994-95, Defence Use of Civilian
Transport Assets and Personnel, HC 86 and Fifth Report, Session
1996-97, Heavy Lift, HC 233 Back
151
Q 489 Back
152
Q 504 Back
153
Cm 4446, para 105 Back
154
See paras 135-139 Back
155
SDR Supporting Essay 11, para 31; and Cm 4446 op cit,
para 44 Back
156
Q 461 Back
157
QQ 462-6 Back
158
Fifth Report, Session 1998-99, Security of Supply and the Future
of Royal Ordnance Factory Bishopton, HC 274 Back
159
Q 473 Back
160
Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, paras 206-8 Back
161
Cm 4446, op cit, para 8 Back
162
QQ 787-9 Back
163
Providing nuclear, biological and chemical defence in theatre
for land forces Back
164
Q 789 Back