Select Committee on Defence Second Report


STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The Defence Missions

53. Britain's armed forces are experiencing both a wider and a more frequent range of operational demands. We can expect a further increase in 'operations other than war' (what the Ministry of Defence now term 'Other Operations').[120] Our defence strategy must continue to be developed with this increased range and frequency of possible challenges in mind. Above all, the force structure must be sufficiently flexible to cope with a wide range of demands while retaining the essential focus on retaining our warfighting abilities. The Secretary of State said in his evidence to us—

    Of course, events have moved on since the SDR. I am clear that they have done so in a way that reinforces the underlying judgments the government took at the time. We need to be able to make long term commitments to peace keeping and we need at the same time to be able to deploy significant forces on shorter, war fighting operations. Experience in the Balkans confirms these judgments. It has also confirmed the SDR's emphasis on maintaining and developing war fighting skills as the best basis for peace keeping.[121]


Figure 2: The Defence Missions

Peacetime security
Security of overseas territories
Defence diplomacy
Support to wider British interests
Peace support and humanitarian operations
Regional conflict outside the NATO area
Regional conflict inside the NATO area
Strategic attack on NATO




54. The force structure announced in the SDR was driven by eight Defence Missions (see above) and 28 associated Military Tasks.[122] These were in turn derived from the foreign policy baseline. However, the foreign policy baseline was never formally articulated in any government document.[123] It is the defence missions therefore that provide the crucial link between security policy, strategy and force structure in the SDR. These Missions are not set out in the 1999 White Paper. They continue to guide Government policy, however, and are reiterated in the Performance Report,[124] where they must now be read against the MoD's 'mission statement' called, somewhat confusingly, 'The Defence Mission'.[125]

55. Not all of these eight missions carry equal weight. The threat of a strategic attack on NATO is deemed at present to be remote and a lengthy warning period is assumed in which forces may be built up. What was clear from the SDR however, was the expectation that most future operations will be expeditionary (and multinational) in nature. As the previous Secretary of State wrote in his introduction to the SDR, 'we must be prepared to go to the crisis rather than have the crisis come to us'.[126] This expeditionary strategy had the major influence over the SDR's choice about force structure in terms of readiness, deployability, sustainability and theatre defence.

The Expeditionary Strategy

READINESS

56. The strategy demands that forces must be kept at a high state of readiness to respond promptly to a crisis. Often this does not mean a single surge response, but the ability to increase force levels as the situation develops. The SDR set a series of readiness targets for all force elements including, for the Army, 30 days for a brigade and 90 days for a division. We accepted that these targets were reasonable, but indicated our intention to monitor whether they were manageable.[127] The 1999 White Paper does not discuss readiness, nor is the situation analysed elsewhere. We discuss below delays in the implementation of the Army's Formation Readiness Cycle, which is a key element in ensuring that forces are available for deployment. The Performance Report has no clear single analysis of the Department's success in achieving its readiness targets. This contrasts somewhat with its two page assessment of its achievements against standards for its 'Interface with the public' (an important but definitely subsidiary task).[128] We recommend that future Performance Reports have a much clearer analysis of readiness and training levels.

DEPLOYABILITY


Figure 3: Key Equipment Elements in the SDR
  • Aircraft Carriers—two new carriers in 2012/2015.
  • Sealift—4 Ro-Ro ships, in addition to two already entering service.
  • Airlift—4 C-17 aircraft, or their equivalent, to meet short-term needs; and replacement of the remaining C-130Ks and VC10/Tristar tanker aircraft in the longer term.
  • Intelligence, Surveillance Target-acquisition and Reconnaissance—the ASTOR and TRACER projects
  • Tomahawk—TLAMs to be fitted to all 10 remaining attack submarines.
  • Amphibious assault ships—the two 'Landing Platform Dock' vessels to be replaced.
  • Submarines—two further Astute submarines, in addition to three already planned.




57. Addressing the major inadequacies in strategic lift was identified as a 'high priority' in the SDR.[129] To meet short-term strategic airlift (STSA) needs, the SDR announced the proposed acquisition of four C-17 aircraft or equivalent; in the longer term, it proposed the acquisition of four roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) container ships to supplement the two already on order as well as a replacement for the remaining C-130K Hercules transport aircraft[130] and the VC-10/Tristar air-to-air refuelling fleet.[131] In our Report on the SDR we welcomed these announcements, but identified unresolved questions over the future replacement of our heavy aircraft fleet.[132] The White Paper admits that deployment remains a problem and that—

    ... we cannot at present deploy the Joint Rapid Reaction Force quickly enough to meet the likely requirements of the new strategic environment.[133]

58. The problem of long-term strategic airlift is compounded by the failure to make any progress on the short-term strategic airlift programme. None of the bids received by the Ministry of Defence proved acceptable. The White Paper notes the recent difficulties with the airlift programme, stating that as a result of the competition 'none of the five bids received were judged to offer an acceptable solution at an affordable cost'.[134] The competition was terminated and the MoD is now "urgently pursing other options". We explored some of the difficulties involved with the Chief of Defence Procurement and the Secretary of State.[135] CDP told us that the MoD has had to cancel the competition because—

    ... the most capable solution was too expensive and the least expensive solution was not good enough to be useful as an aircraft that we had permanently on lease or on ownership. Given that situation, we decided it was not sensible to continue the competition because we needed to look really at two very different things. A hugely capable aircraft that would satisfy nearly everything you could ever imagine you wanted is clearly going to be expensive and, for that, we would need to be very close to the contractor to understand how we might reduce the cost.[136] ...     We simply could not do that if we were running a normal, arm's length competition because the other bidder would want to know what we were doing with these people, so we separated them.[137]

59. CDP explained how the Department are seeking to run these short-term and longer-term airlift competitions in parallel to avoid the short-term solution prejudicing the other deal.[138] Whatever the long term solution, however, our witnesses from the MoD perceived the need for at least some aircraft to cater for "outsized dimension" lifts.[139] CDP spelt out the risks, as he saw them, of using Antonov aircraft to meet the MoD's strategic airlift requirements, including the possibility of the Russian and Ukrainian authorities withholding flight clearance[140] or, if bought outright, having to take total responsibility for their airworthiness.[141] In a separate memorandum, the Ministry of Defence responded to the Committee's enquiries by stating that—

    The aim remains to announce a decision on the way ahead for [short term strategic airlift] in the early part of next year [2000], at the same time as the decision on the longer term requirement to replace the balance of the Hercules fleet.[142]

On our recent visit to Washington, we were told by Boeing that they had offered the US Department of Defense a 25% discount for a package of 60 C-17 aircraft and that they were discussing the possibility of a similar discount with the MoD. Since the Department of Defense's order has not yet been placed, such a discount cannot be guaranteed, but we were told by the Chief of Defence Procurement that—

    We are not going to get a price that is cheaper than the United States Government pays for these aircraft, but we are not going to get a price that is a single cent more expensive either.[143]

This is an important promise by CDP. But it seems likely that the longer the MoD dithers over the choice of new heavy lift aircraft, the less likely the UK is to be able to reap the benefits of the manufacturer being able to plan for a larger and longer guaranteed production run, and the through-life savings potentially available from better planning for spares. However, we remain of the view that competition, rather than individual agreements with a particular producer, is the best way to achieve savings. Now that normal competition procedures have been put to one side for the short-term airlift programme, it is important that the MoD carefully weighs all the options available.

60. We also note that in the 1998 Public Service Agreement, the Ministry of Defence identified a target availability date of 2000 for the ro-ro ships, but that the White Paper states that the Department now only hopes to place a contract in spring 2000. The White paper does not, however, mention the very recent extension of the bidding phase of this PFI competition.[144] The MoD's press notice issued at the time of this announcement states that 'adding time at this stage will not push out the planned contract date of July 2000, as it is intended to use smart procurement to reduce time and bidding costs'. The explanation offered for the extended bidding phase was that the Department 'has to be satisfied that we had viable entrants into the competition'.[145]

61. The MoD's strategic deployability also depends on new air-to-air refuelling aircraft. The MoD is pursuing a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) solution for this—potentially worth £2.5 billion—with a contract to be placed in 2002. The ro-ro sealift programme is similarly pursuing PFI options. More generally, the 1998-99 Performance Report[146] notes that some £332m of PFI contracts have been signed and that there is potential for a further £6 billion (including the air-to-air refuelling project). A report by our predecessor Committee on heavy lift[147] raised concerns about the availability of the necessary assets, and the MoD has recently provided further information.[148] This includes the MoD's acknowledgment of the need the secure more Assured Charter for outsized loads because of the influence of Russian political control over the availability of AN-124 aircraft.[149] As regards sealift (a topic which has concerned the Defence Committee for many years[150]), the MoD will seek to balance an assurance that four ro-ro ships will be always available against the opportunity for value for money by letting the contractor generate third-party incomes from the other two.[151] CDP also assured us that contracts will contain provisions that ensure the assets revert to the MoD if the contractors were to go bust.[152]

62. The SDR committed the UK to force projection strategy. If we lack the ability to 'project' force, many very expensive assets are wasted. We view the lack of adequate deployability, particularly with regard to strategic airlift, with grave concern and will follow developments closely.

SUSTAINABILITY IN THEATRE

63. Forces in theatre require both an efficient logistics chain and adequate supplies of ammunition and spares if they are to maintain their operational capability. The SDR announced a number of changes to the logistics support structure, including the establishment of a new post of Chief of Defence Logistics. A new tri-service organisation, the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) has also been formed. From April 1999, it has budgeting and management responsibility for the three single-Service support areas—Chief of Fleet Support, Quartermaster-General and Air Member for Logistics. The DLO will be fully operating, with its own HQ, from April 2000.[153] We discuss its plans and achievements so far below.[154]

64. The SDR also promised the capability for separate lines of communication for two concurrent "medium scale" operations.[155] We were told that establishing the new lines of communication are still on target for 2001 and 2003 and will greatly assist in the support of British forces.[156] They were not in place for Operations Allied Force and Joint Guardian and we will be reporting on the support of British forces in these operations as part of our inquiry into the Kosovo crisis. We also note that the specific enhancements required to enable the RAF to sustain operations over a longer period of time are in hand and that the majority will be completed by 2002-03.[157]

65. In a separate inquiry[158] we received confidential information about UK stockholdings of certain key ammunitions. Stockpiles are still governed by NATO's Cold War guideline of 30 days of war stocks. It is clear that in some areas current stockpiles fall short of the 30 day requirement. In any event, continuing to use a Cold War guideline may no longer be appropriate (Operation Allied Force, for example, lasted 12 weeks). An ammunition war stocks review is under way and should, we were told, be completed within the next six months.[159] We believe that there is an urgent need to reappraise stockpile and regeneration requirements in the light of the changed operational circumstances. We look forward to the outcome of the review.

THEATRE DEFENCE

66. In our Report on the SDR we considered the attention given to theatre defence against threats from ballistic missiles and from nuclear, chemical and biological attack to be inadequate.[160] The White Paper identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as being of 'notable concern'[161], but offers nothing new in terms of defence against this threat. The Department continues to monitor developments in ballistic missile defence[162] and in April 1999 a Joint NBC Regiment[163] was established, as proposed in the SDR. These are pretty much the minimum plausible responses to the threat, and in evidence the Policy Director reiterated the view that any change would be 'premature' for the UK 'in relation to its particular circumstances'.[164] We shall continue to press for this area to be reconsidered in the future.


120   Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para164 Back

121   Q 685 Back

122   Cm 4520, Annex F Back

123   Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 54 Back

124   Cm 4520, Annex F Back

125   ibid, Annex A Back

126   The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, p 2, para 6 Back

127   Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para.187. Back

128   Cm 4520, para 61 Back

129   SDR Supporting Essay 6, para17 Back

130   The first half of the RAF's C130K fleet are already being replaced by C130Js Back

131   Cm 3999, p 24 Back

132   Eighth Report, Session 1997-8, op cit, para191 Back

133   Cm 4446, para 40 Back

134   Cm 4446, para 42 Back

135   QQ 490-503 and Q 705 Back

136   Q 490 Back

137   Q 495 Back

138   Q 498 Back

139   Q 501 Back

140   Q 491 Back

141   Q 492 Back

142   Ev p 153, para 17.15 Back

143   Q 495 Back

144   MoD press notice 437/99, 13/12/99 Back

145   Cm 4520, p E-3; Cm 4446, para. 41, Q 485 Back

146   Cm 4520, p 32 Back

147   Fifth Report, Session 1996-97, Heavy Lift, HC 233 Back

148   Ev p 190 Back

149   ibid Back

150   See eg Sixth Report, Session 1994-95, Defence Use of Civilian Transport Assets and Personnel, HC 86 and Fifth Report, Session 1996-97, Heavy Lift, HC 233 Back

151   Q 489 Back

152   Q 504 Back

153   Cm 4446, para 105 Back

154   See paras 135-139 Back

155   SDR Supporting Essay 11, para 31; and Cm 4446 op cit, para 44 Back

156   Q 461 Back

157   QQ 462-6 Back

158   Fifth Report, Session 1998-99, Security of Supply and the Future of Royal Ordnance Factory Bishopton, HC 274 Back

159   Q 473 Back

160   Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, paras 206-8 Back

161   Cm 4446, op cit, para 8 Back

162   QQ 787-9 Back

163   Providing nuclear, biological and chemical defence in theatre for land forces Back

164   Q 789 Back


 
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