Select Committee on Defence Second Report


PEOPLE

Undermanning

106. The other side of overstretch is undermanning. The table below gives details of total trained strength of the three Services against trained requirement, untrained strength and total UK regular forces.

 Figure 5: Strengths and Requirements of UK Regular Forces
 
1997
1998
1999
Naval Service
 Trained Requirement
 Total Trained Strength
 Untrained Strength
 Total Regular Force
 
42,900
41,700
3,500
45,200
 
41,900
40,400
4,100
44,500
 
40,900
39,000
4,600
43,700
Army
 Trained Requirement
 Total Trained Strength
 Untrained Strength
 Total Regular Force
 
106,400
101,500
11,200
112,700
 
105,800
101,100
12,600
113,700
 
105,300
99,700
13,700
113,300
RAF
 Trained Requirement
 Total Trained Strength
 Untrained Strength
 Total Regular Force
 
56,400
54,200
2,700
56,900
 
54,500
52,700
3,200
55,900
 
53,000
51,800
3,500
55,200

Notes:  (1) Figures are individually rounded to nearest hundred and may not sum precisely to the totals shown.
(2) Army figures include Gurkhas.

Source: Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998/99, Table 3

107. Manpower shortages against trained establishment for the three years were therefore as follows:

Figure 6: Manpower shortages in trained strength against requirement
   
1997
1998
1999
Naval Service
1,200 (2.8%)
1,600 (3.8%)
1,900 (4.6%)
Army
4,800 (4.5%)
4,700 (4.4%)
5,600 (5.3%)
RAF
2,200 (3.9%)
1,800 (3.3%)
1,200 (2.3%)

Source: Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998/99, Table 3

108. For the Navy and the Army, the undermanning situation is worse than before the SDR, and the small improvement in the overall manpower figures for the RAF over the last three years masks specific problems. Most worrying is the shortage of Fast Jet Pilots. The RAF is short of 95 Fast Jet Pilots, almost 20 per cent of its total requirement.[251] Projections indicate that, without remedial action, this shortage would worsen by a further 40 personnel in the next three years.[252] Air Marshal Bagnall, the Air Member for Personnel, gave details of some of the steps the RAF was taking to address the shortage. These included encouraging pilots to extend their service by 6 or 12 months; increasing the number of direct entrants so that recruits enter flight training at a younger age; moving trained pilots to flying posts from posts which can be filled by other people; and increasing flexibility to take account of such issues as working wives and the resulting need to extend postings.[253] The Royal Navy is similarly affected, with a shortage of 19 Sea Harrier pilots against a requirement of 64, a shortfall of almost 30 per cent. The critical improvements needed are to increase recruitment and improve retention. The latter problem is the more pressing, and it appears the more intractable.

RECRUITMENT

109. Each of the Services has undertaken vigorous recruitment campaigns in the last few years and 1998/99 saw marked increases in recruitment over previous years.[254] Improvements in total intake for the three Services in the past three years are shown below.

Figure 7: Intake to UK Regular Forces
  
1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
Naval Service
3,959
4,600
4,767
Army
15,522
15,379
16,963
RAF
2,684
3,526
4,246

Source: Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998/99, Table 4

As well as recruiting sufficient numbers of people, the Services need to ensure they recruit appropriate people who will be an asset to the Armed Forces and contribute to them over a period of time. For the Army, the MoD reports improved recruitment over the past few years 'culminating, in 1998/99, in the best achievement level for 10 years'.[255] The Adjutant General was confident that the Army was achieving this goal—

    This year I expect to meet virtually 100 per cent of my recruiting targets both for officers and men and between 95 and 100 per cent of my output training targets.[256]

But the Army have been forced to cast their net fairly widely to do so, including seeking recruits in Fiji as well as, controversially, from within the UK prison population.[257] It is clear that a career in the Army is far from being the first choice for a significant number of readily accessible and appropriately qualified young men and women. We explore below the importance of ensuring equal opportunities provisions are fully implemented by the Services to ensure successful recruitment and retention.

RETENTION

110. The SDR set the following manning targets—

The Army's establishment was to be increased by 3,300 personnel which was why it was given longer than the other two Services to achieve the full manning target.[259] 'Around 2004' could have meant late 2003, but in oral evidence, we were told that the target date is now 31st March 2005.[260] We conclude that slippage has occurred and urge the MoD to concentrate on finding solutions rather than on redefining targets.

111. Recruitment policies, no matter how successful, will not on their own provide a solution to manpower shortages. The Armed Forces need to retain the personnel in whose training they have invested considerable resources. The problem of outflow remains serious, as the Table below demonstrates.

Figure 8: Outflow of Regular Service Personnel
(including untrained personnel)
   
1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
Naval Service
7,131
5,271
5,531
Army
15,354
14,378
17,015
RAF
10,515
4,609
4,889

Source: Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998/99, Table 5

In 1998 there was a net loss of 100 people a month from the Army (the equivalent of two battalions over the year). The figures have recently improved, reflecting improved recruitment, to a net inflow of 24 personnel a month in November and December. But this inflow rate is not sufficient: the Army needs to recruit an additional 9,000 people in the next five years to meet its SDR target of 105,000 by 2004/05. The Adjutant General confirmed that, at the current net inflow rate, this would actually take 31 years.[261]

112. The Services clearly need to do more to address the issue of Premature Voluntary Retirement (PVR). There are specific problem areas as well as the more general ones. We have highlighted above our concerns about Fast Jet Pilots (see paragraph 108). The retention issue here is clearly to do with the availability of better paid civilian jobs for trained pilots and the difficulties for the RAF and the Navy in retaining personnel in this market.[262] Other categories of RAF and Navy pilots who are also well-qualified for civilian jobs, such as C-130, VC10 and Nimrod pilots, do not seem to be affected by the same shortages as Fast Jet Pilots. It may be productive for the Services to examine why this is so. There are other areas where commercial companies draw on trained Service personnel rather than carrying out their own training. For example, IT companies can offer trained communications personnel attractive salaries, which has resulted in serious shortages in this area, and the Forces are currently relying heavily on reservists to fulfil these functions in the Balkans.[263]

113. It is difficult for the Armed Forces to compete with the private sector simply on pay, but they can do much to enhance the complete package offered to Service personnel and their families. Air Marshal Bagnall told us—

    We have to convince them that [the Armed Forces] remains a career of first choice, with through-life career development, sensible promotion prospects, sensible accommodation and sensible pay ...We have to look at the whole package of opportunity that we give our people and their families in order that they stay with us.[264]

This package includes new schemes introduced as part of the SDR. One of these is the Service Families Task Force, which aims to address particular problems arising from Service families' lifestyle, in areas such as education and health, by working with other government departments and agencies.[265] The Army Families Federation commented—

    We are delighted that the Service Families Task Force is starting to make progress on issues that we have raised over the year.[266]

The White Paper notes Task Force successes to date, such as work with the DfEE resulting in new statutory guidance on schools admission policy which recognises the needs of Service children; representatives of Service Children's Education (the responsible defence agency) being represented on admission forums in local authorities which have high numbers of Service children; and enhanced nursery provision for the children of Service personnel in Northern Ireland.[267] Securing the welfare of their families is absolutely fundamental in persuading people to stay in the Services. We value the improvements made in this area and look forward to further positive change.

114. Another example is the Learning Forces Initiative, which involves a series of measures intended to 'give our people the skills they need to make the best possible contribution to the Armed Forces, and equip them to return to civilian life'[268] by 'providing increased funds for the education and personal development of Service personnel at all levels from recruits upwards'. The key elements are: availability of enhanced learning facilities including distance learning, interactive centres and use of the Internet; measures to improve basic skills such as numeracy and literacy; the opportunity for all non-commissioned personnel to reach a minimum of S/NVQ level 2 or equivalent in a discipline relevant to their Service trade; facility to reclaim money spent on educational self-development up to a limit of £175 per year; and partial funding for academic or vocational qualifications whilst in Service and for 10 years afterwards.[269] The Initiative is in its early stages and it is not yet clear what the take-up or resulting benefits will be. We will monitor the progress of the Learning Forces Initiative with interest.

115. Our Armed Forces personnel and their families are entitled to expect their own education and that of their children to be as good as any available to civilians. It is essential that these initiatives are pursued with real commitment.

Single Living Accommodation

116. The Committee expressed concern about the poor quality of single living accommodation in its Report on the SDR and concluded—

However, there is only a brief reference to accommodation in the White Paper in the list of steps taken by the MoD to implement the "Policy for People". The MoD has indicated elsewhere that a survey to assess the condition of single living accommodation was completed in May 1999, and agreement on a public-private partnership was being sought in order to carry out the work identified as needed. Written evidence from the MoD showed that to date the Navy has upgraded 202 single living bed spaces with a further 102 in hand; the RAF has completed work on 524 bed spaces with a further 764 in hand; and the Army is currently improving 4,441 bed spaces.[271] But no indication was given of how this impacts on the total programme of work.

117. The Secretary of State told us—

    I am as concerned as you are about the condition of some of the estate which is really pretty poor ... for a very, very long time service accommodation has not been properly funded. We have committed ourselves to a programme which could ultimately cost in the order of £1.8 billion, because that is the kind of money which would be required in order to ensure we have decent accommodation for our people to live in ... [272]

On the detail of the timescale for the project and the annual level of expenditure, the Permanent Secretary told us—

    When we were first looking at it, we hoped to do it by 2003. It became inevitable when we realised how much there was to be done that it had to be stretched to 2005. Already we are spending more year on year. This year we are spending twice as much as last year. It is not enough. I wish I could promise that by the end of the five years we would have spent £1.8 billion, but I cannot do that, obviously. All I can say is that it is a very, very high priority ...[273]

We welcome the clear commitment to improving single accommodation. We would like to see, in future Performance Reports, detailed figures on expenditure on programmes to improve accommodation, as well as quantitative figures of work achieved and planned, so that we can judge for ourselves whether the MoD is making sufficient progress in this priority area.

Married Quarters

118. Our predecessors in the last Parliament concluded, in their Report on the sale of the married quarters—

In 1996, the then government promised to make £100 million available from the proceeds of the sale to Annington Homes of the married quarters estate in England and Wales to supplement the £370 million already earmarked for upgrades of the estate. From a subsequent 100 per cent stock survey, it became clear that an additional £112 million would be necessary, making a total of £582 million, to bring the whole of the married quarters estate in the UK up to Grade One standard (except properties which were to be vacated in the next few years). Given the additional work required, the timescale for completion of the programme was extended from 2003 to 2005.[275] We discussed our concerns about possible slippage in the programme with Mr Balmer, the MoD's Principal Finance Office, who indicated that about £11 million had been taken out of the budget in the current year but said that this "was a timing effect rather than an effect on the total."[276] We sought to clarify this in subsequent oral evidence. Air Marshal Pledger told us that—

    The balance between the various years has been affected by a reduction of £11 million this year but the total programme is still intact.[277]

To date 7,958 homes, 14 per cent of the total, have been upgraded and a further 23,514, (42 per cent), are "close to this standard".[278] The Minister confirmed that the programme was still on target for completion in 2005. In this financial year, 1,450 properties would be upgraded and "at least £60 million" would be spent on the programme in the next financial year.[279] When the married quarters estate was sold amidst great controversy, £100 million was ring-fenced as the sum needed to bring all of the estate up to Grade One condition within a period dictated only by the practicalities of undertaking the work. That principle must continue to be honoured, whatever the assessment of the cost might now be.

119. The Defence Housing Executive, re-established as an MoD Agency in April 1999, is responsible for married quarters (though it does not own them). We raised concerns that had been expressed to us by Service personnel about the service they and their spouses received from the DHE.[280] If a Service man or woman is deployed overseas for six months, the last thing they need is the additional burden of worrying about the way their family's accommodation is being dealt with at home. Dissatisfaction with accommodation has been cited as one of the most important reasons for personnel leaving the Services.[281] We have set as one of our objectives examining two MoD agencies a year[282] and we intend to include the Defence Housing Executive as part of this programme of work.

120. We are not convinced that the MoD is addressing, as a matter of sufficient urgency, the necessary improvements to single and married quarters. We have been provided with insufficient evidence for us to be sure that this area is not subject to budgetary squeeze simply because it is an easy target.

Reserve Forces

121. The Committee is requiring the MoD to provide regular quarterly reports on recruiting, retention and other key measures relating to the Reserve Forces. It is too early, following the upheaval of SDR, to comment on success in manning of reserve units (not least as many still have a post SDR reduction "bulge") but one issue critical to the retention of good middle ranking officers is emerging—the still further decline in the number of commanding officer slots held by territorials. The MoD has still not furnished us with the figures for this but has revealed that in the latest quarter the number of command slots in territorial units held by regular officers has risen by a further three in just three months (there are less than a hundred such slots across the whole reserve forces).

122. We were relieved to received written assurance recently from the last Secretary of State that all of the small number of one-star posts in the reserve forces will continue to be manned on a part time basis, including the critical position of Director of Reserves and Cadets, currently ably filled by Brigadier Richard Holmes. Successive Defence Committees have pointed out the importance in motivating TA officers of maintaining a good pyramid of promotion opportunities for territorials and volunteer reservists.[283]

Equal Opportunities

123. Equal opportunities policies have a significant bearing on both recruitment and retention. The White Paper states—

and—

As the Minister for the Armed Forces put it—

    I would stress that this is not about political correctness or anything like that. This is about securing the best young people for the Armed Forces and broadening the pool from which we are drawing in order to get those best young people.[285]

Air Marshal Bagnall told us that "There is a very clear system now available to report and deal with any harassment".[286] The Tri-Service Equal Opportunities Training Centre at Shrivenham now provides mandatory equal opportunities training to all officers at brigadier level or equivalent emphasising their leadership responsibilities in this area. All other personnel also receive equal opportunities training. Each of the three Services have made it clear in directives that there will be zero tolerance of any form of harassment.[287]

ETHNIC MINORITIES

124. The Defence Committee has been pressing for an adequate system of ethnic monitoring in the Services for fifteen years at least.[288] The White Paper sets out goals for recruitment from ethnic minorities of 3 per cent for 1999/2000, rising annually by 1 per cent, to 5 per cent by the end of 2001/2002.[289] Current recruitment to the Armed Forces from ethnic minorities averages 1.8 per cent for the year to the end of March 1999, an increase from 1.3 per cent in the previous year.[290] The breakdown between the three Services is as follows:

Figure 9: Service Recruitment from Ethnic Minorities
  
1997/98
1998/99
1999/2000
  
Achievement
Target
Achievement
Target
Naval Service
0.9%
2.0%
1.6%
3.0%
Army
1.4%
2.0%
2.0%
3.0%
RAF
1.0%
2.0%
1.4%
3.0%

Source: Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998/99, Table 7 and Defence White Paper, page 38.

Only the Army achieved the 2 per cent target for recruitment from ethnic minorities last year. It seems to us very optimistic to aim for 3 per cent in the current year across the Armed Forces, given that this would require the Navy and RAF broadly to double their present performance. The Minister for the Armed Forces told us that the Armed Forces were making "major strides" in this respect and that the most successful means of attracting recruits from ethnic minorities was to involve serving personnel from those minorities in the recruiting campaigns. They were also keen to convince parents that the Armed Forces offered good career prospects.[291] There was no visible retention problem with serving personnel from the ethnic minorities; the problem was still "external perception as a hurdle for people coming in rather than internal perceptions".[292] The MoD, we were told, now had an excellent relationship with the Commission for Racial Equality, which had acknowledged the progress made by the Armed Forces in changing attitudes within the Services.[293] We are disappointed at the failure of the Navy and RAF to meet their targets for ethnic minority recruitment. We will be looking closely to see whether all three Services meet their 3% target next year, which we would expect them to do, and look forward to evidence of real success in recruiting from ethnic minorities in the near future.

WOMEN

125. The White Paper tell us—

The MoD provided us with a detailed breakdown of women personnel by rank in each of the three Services and for the Services overall which shows an increase in the number of women officers and other ranks in all three Services from April 1998 to April 1999.[295] This can be summarised as follows:

Figure 10: Number of women in the Armed Forces
  
As at 1 April 1998
As at 1 April 1999
  
Officers
Other Ranks
Total
Officers
Other Ranks
Total
Naval Service
453
2,809
3,262
467
2,868
3,335
Army
 1,172
6,260
7,432
1,187
6,461
7,648
RAF
939
4,067
5,006
1,003
4,161
5,164
All Services
2,564
13,136
15,700
2,657
13,490
16,147

Source: MoD memorandum, Ev p 159-160

Numbers of women in all three Services have increased whilst total Force numbers have declined. The percentage of women serving in the Armed Forces has risen as follows:

Figure 11: Women in the Armed Forces as percentage of total UK regular forces
    
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Officers
7.3
7.3
7.3
7.3
7.9
8.2
Other ranks
6.9
7.1
7.0
7.0
7.4
7.6

Source: UK Defence Statistics 1999, Table 2.19

126. In the SDR, the MoD announced that "work is under way to establish a system of monitoring gender related issues including recruiting and maternity related aspects".[296] We understand that no specific system of monitoring has yet been implemented although recruiting data records information about gender, and standard statistical reports and analysis can also record information in this way. The information the MoD has provided on the representation of women in the Armed Forces[297] provides a useful snapshot. It is equally important to ensure that the career progress of Service women compares well with their male counterparts. The Minister told us that there were increasing numbers of women at NCO, officer and command levels[298] and Air Marshal Bagnall told us that in respect of the RAF, women "feel that they have genuinely equal opportunities today".[299] Its achievements in recruiting women to all areas of the Armed Forces is one of the MoD's success stories and we hope to see evidence of its continued success in future.

HOMOSEXUALITY

127. The Secretary of State announced the outcome of the review on the policy on homosexuals in the Armed Forces in a Statement to the House on 12 January.[300] The review arose from the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in September. As the existing policy was judged to be not legally sustainable, a new Code of Conduct has been introduced to regulate the personal behaviour of those serving in the Armed Forces. The Secretary of State told the House that with the introduction of the Code "there is no longer a reason to deny homosexuals the opportunity of a career in the Armed Forces .... with effect from today, homosexuality will no longer be a bar to service in Britain's Armed Forces."

128. The Code says that 'it is not practicable to list every type of conduct which might constitute social misbehaviour'. It will therefore rely on Commanding Officers when assessing personal behaviour applying the test: 'Have the actions or behaviour of an individual adversely impacted or are they likely to impact on the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the Service?' We were concerned that Commanding Officers should be adequately supported by their superiors when making decisions in these sensitive areas, and questioned the Minister for the Armed Forces about this. He told us that any problems in this area would be dealt with "within the normal procedure of redress of grievance."[301] It remains to be seen how this significant change, which the Armed Forces have been forced to make, will affect them in practice. It is one thing to change policy. It is quite another to change entrenched views amongst those serving in the Armed Forces, and yet another to assess the implications for operational performance of this policy. This issue needs careful handling at all levels and we will be following developments in the next few years with interest.


251   Q 607 Back

252   Q 613 Back

253   Q 610; Q 614 Back

254   Ev p 162 Back

255   Ev p 162 Back

256   Q 622 Back

257   QQ 623-629 Back

258   SDR Supporting Essay 9, para 13 Back

259   SDR Supporting Essay 9 para 10 and para 13 Back

260   QQ 563, 619-622 Back

261   QQ 615-618; Cm 4520, para 24; RUSI Journal article, Turning the Tide: Addressing Army Personnel Issues, December 1999 Back

262   Q 604 Back

263   Q 605; Q 646 Back

264   Q 605 Back

265   SDR Supporting Essay 9, para 35 Back

266   Letter to the Chairman from the Army Families Federation, 15.7.99 Back

267   Cm 4446, para 73; HC Deb. 24.01.2000, col 54w Back

268   Cm 3999, para 130 Back

269   Cm 4446, para 74 Back

270   Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 369 Back

271   Ev p 160 Back

272   Q 810 Back

273   Q 811 Back

274   First Report, Session 1996-97, Sale of the Married Quarters Estate, HC 94, para 23  Back

275   HC Deb., 17.1.2000, c 285W Back

276   Q 350 Back

277   Q 638 Back

278   HC Deb., 24.1.2000, c 9 Back

279   Q 636 Back

280   QQ 353-355 Back

281   Q 602 Back

282   First Special Report, Session 1998-99, Annual Report of the Committee for Session 1997-98, HC 273, para 4 Back

283   See eg Twelfth Report, Session 1994-95, The Reserve Forces, HC 65, paras 25-26 Back

284   Cm 4446, p 38 Back

285   Q 658 Back

286   Q 660 Back

287   SDR Supporting Essay 9, paras 38-44 Back

288   See eg First Report, Session 1987-88, Ethnic Monitoring in the Armed Forces, HC 391 Back

289   Cm 4446, p 38 Back

290   Ev p 158 Back

291   Q 658 Back

292   Q 661 Back

293   Q 659-660 Back

294   Cm 4446, p.39 Back

295   Ev pp 159-160 Back

296   SDR Supporting Essay 9, para 40 Back

297   Ev pp 159-160 Back

298   Q669 Back

299   Q670 Back

300   HC Deb. 12.1.2000, cc 287-301 Back

301   Q676 Back


 
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