Ministry of Defence memorandum in connection
with the Defence Committee's Fifth Report of 1996-97 (Heavy Lift
HC 233)
(1) The Government response (First Special
Report 1997-98, HC 153) to our Fifth report of 1996-97 (Heavy
Lift HC 233) notes initiatives then underway to secure more effective
requisitioning powers for transport aircraft, discussions taking
place with the airlines and the then Department of Transport to
make aircraft more readily available to support rapid deployments
and NATO wide work with similar remit (HC 153, para 15).
The Committee would like a memorandum updating
the position on these initiatives, and setting out briefly the
current position on securing access on-demand to commercial airlift
and sealift assets in emergency situations.
The Committee will wish to note that the Defence
Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA) was formed on 1 April 1999,
as a result of the SDR, which had concluded that operational benefit
would accrue from the formation of a single joint movements organisation.
DTMA is an operationally focused executive agency dedicated to
acquiring high quality, timely and good value transport and movements
services. Now an essential element in the projection of our Defence
capability, the DTMA provides a "one stop shop" for
all operational and administrative transport and movements on
a tri-Service basis. It has brought together the civil and military
aspects of the provision of airlift, sealift and surface movement
with great success and now provides the process to allow proper
analysis of the relative costs and merits of using either commercial
or military assets for each mode. Importantly, greater visibility
and coordination has been provided to meet the overall operational
requirement, such that delivery times are now met by the most
effective means. This was amply demonstrated during the KFOR deployment
when 13 ships' voyages, 625 aircraft sorties and 425 road haulier
deliveries were tasked by DTMA using civilian and military resources.
The air deployment of the UK Force contribution
to KFOR required 625 transport aircraft sorties at a total cost
of £18M. This included 6 USAF C-17 sorties flown during the
early stages of the deployment at a cost of £200K and 50
commercial charter flights that cost £6.8M. The deployment
underpinned the necessity, identified under the SDR, for enhanced
strategic airlift.
Subsequent to the Kosovo deployment, there have
been 186 transport aircraft sorties at a total cost of £4.9M
to sustain the UK Force up to the end of September 1999. Of these
sorties, 42 were undertaken by charters costing £2.7 M.
The Russian political control over the availability
of AN-124 aircraft had a direct effect on the Short Term Strategic
Airlift competition. As a result, it was adapted to explore arrangements
for more Assured Charter of the outsized capability that is currently
only available using AN-124 aircraft. A number of tenders have
been submitted to the MoD for the STSA competition and are currently
being assessed.
The Committee will also wish to note that two
Airline Seminars have been held on 11 September 1997 and 21 October
1998 in the DETR HQ on Marsham Street. Both seminars attracted
a wide cross section of interest from across the UK airline industry
and included airline representatives, brokers and the General
Secretary of the British Air Transport Association. Particular
interest was shown in the MoD's air movement processes and the
acquisition programmes for the Short Term Strategic Airlift, the
Future Transport Aircraft and the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft.
In addition, the industry continues to question the policy of
not restricting commercial charter to only UK carriers, as is
the case with many of our NATO Allies. Unfortunately, the Kosovo
campaign prevented a Seminar being held in 1999; however, as the
MoD place great value on their contact with the Airline industry,
a further Seminar is intended for 2000.
20 December 1999
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