Select Committee on Defence First Special Report

ANNEX F

Committee Recommendations: Progress
SESSION 1998-99
First Report: The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army Restructuring (HC 70) Published: 22 February 1999 Government Reply: Second Special Report, Session 1998-99 (HC 417) Published: 5 May 1999
	Recommendations and undertakings	Government Response	Committee Response/Follow-up	Further GovernmentAction	Notes
1.	That the forthcoming review of the Territorial and Auxiliary Volunteer Reserve Associations should be used as an opportunity to demonstrate that the MoD is genuinely seeking opinions on its proposals (paragraph ?).	The Government considered the Committee's criticism of the consultation process as misplaced.
2.	That the MoD monitors closely the impact of the proposed new structure on training, and if it becomes apparent that the proposed structure is failing to deliver effectively, undertakes to increase the establishment of individual units to such a level that can (paragraph ?).	The Government noted the committee's concern. The MoD was confident that the proposed new structure would enable training to be carried out effectively and doubted that an increase in the establishment would increase the efficiency of training. However the MoD did agree to monitor the situation and ensure that infantry companies are recruited to a level that would ensure effective training
3.	That the position in relation to the establishment of Permanent Staff Instructors be regularly reviewed and that should it become clear that training is falling below levels necessary for the effectiveness of the TA to be maintained, it will be increased (paragraph ?).	The Government that the new structure would provide sufficient numbers of PSIs. The MoD would continue to monitor training and where training standards are not being achieved that they would be corrected.
4.	That the MoD ensure that the military training given to Sponsored Reserves is appropriate and relevant to the task; in particular with regard to their proximity to the front line (paragraph ?).	The Government stated that the military training given to Sponsored reservists would be appropriate and relevant to the task they are to perform
5.	To provide evidence of thorough consultation between the two organisations during the establishment of the Sponsored Reserves (paragraph 59).	The Government stated that each of the three Services is receiving advisory and support services from the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets, which encompasses the NELC secretariat
6.	To monitor closely the recruited strength of the medical services to see if the MoD are successful in their objectives (paragraph ?).	The Government shared the Committee's concern about the challenge involved in expanding the volunteer medical services.	See Seventh Report, Recommendation 9
7.	That the MoD be responsive to TAVRA advice on the disposal of TA centres, and where that advice is found to be valid for it to be acted upon by the MoD, even if this involves reconsidering individual sites earmarked for sale, and that the Minister be able to defend choices made on 'political' rather than commercial grounds (paragraph ?).	The Government reviewed those cases where it appeared that a decision was made on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information. A few decisions were subsequently overturned
8.	That control of the £12 million allocated to the Cadets should be given to the TAVRAs, and that they should be free to invest any savings accrued from this programme in upgrading and refurbishing existing accommodation for the Cadets (paragraph ?).	The Government accepted the spirit of the Committee's recommendation, reaffirmed its commitment to spend £12 million on the Cadets, but did not state explicitly that the TAVRAs would have control of the allocation.
9.	That in reforming the TAVRAs, the MoD must not lose sight of the fact that the Associations are independent volunteer Associations and as such must be given the opportunity to organise their own affairs by their own lights to deliver what the Chain of Command asks from them. Imposing co-terminous boundaries with the Regional Command on the Associations will, we believe, serve to undermine the independence of the TAVRAs and make them less efficient. We can see no benefits to the TAVRAs in such a proposal (paragraph ?).	The Government decided not to make the TAVRAs boundaries co-terminous with those of the Regional Command. Instead, the TAVRAs boundaries were aligned with the those of Government Offices and the Regional Development Agencies. This has resulted in a reduction of TAVRAs from 14 to 13.
10.	Budgetary independence is a cornerstone of the TAVRAs' independence and should not be diminished. (Paragraph ?).	The Government announced that each TAVRA would have its own budget and would be responsible for the management of that budget
11.	That the budgeting system for the TAVRAs allows them to retain for their own use at least 50% of any efficiency savings made on their annual budget and 100% of accruals from other income generating activities (paragraph ?).	The Government refused to let the TAVRAs recoup efficiency gains from public funds.
12.	That the MoD implement our proposed system of reporting on the effects of the restructuring process from March/April 1999 (paragraph 48).	The Government agreed to the Committee's proposed system of reporting	See Sixth Report
Second Report: The Appointment of the new Head of Defence Export Services HC 147 Published: 31 March 1999 Government Reply: Fourth Special Report, HC 512 Published: 21 June 1999
1.	That the MoD provide a more systematic and detailed assessment of the full costs and benefits of defence exports for the UK. (Paragraph 12)	MoD have set this work in hand, and will inform the Committee of its conclusions when completed (para 6).	Not received, to be pursued		See paragraph 19 of this Report
2.	That Ministers and DESO do all they can to persuade DESO's counterparts in other collaborative countries to shoulder a fair share of the export marketing effort. (Paragraph 25)	Collaborative export support varies according to the type of programme, and the balance of resources available to DESO and its counterparts (para 9).
3.	That the resources needed by DESO should be reassessed by the MoD. Any significant changes proposed should be notified to the Committee. (Paragraph 28)	MoD undertook to notify the Committee of any significant changes in DESO resources (para 10).		No notification received
Third Report: The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit HC 39 Published: 13 April 1999 Government Reply: Third Special Report, HC 459 Published: 21 May 1999
1.	That Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate this issue in advance of the departure of Ministers to the Washington Summit. (Paragraph 8)	No debate took place.
2.	The new Strategic Concept must outline a new direction for NATO for the years ahead. New roles must be outlined and prioritised. NATO must retain its military capability to fulfil Article 5 tasks, however remote such threats may seem. (Paragraph 29)	The government agrees and the new Concept recognises this (HC 459, paragraph 7)
3.	That we must retain the capability to engage in high-intensity warfare as well as to participate in less intensive operations. (Paragraph 31)	The government agrees (see HC 459, paragraph 10)
4.	The new Strategic Concept must provide a clear steer as to the capabilities required by the Alliance over the next ten to fifteen years. (Paragraph 33)	The government agrees, and believes the new Concept does so (HC 459, paragraph 11)
5.	That greater nuclear transparency by NATO could only be beneficial. (Paragraph 40)	The government aims to be as open as possible (HC 459, paragraph 14)
6.	The new Strategic Concept must clearly outline NATO's competences for peace support operations and its plans for cooperation with other organisations to pursue lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The work being done by NATO on Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning in working with humanitarian aid agencies and relevant government agencies, should be pursued further. (Paragraph 44)	See HC 459, paragraphs 16-18
7.	NATO must be aware of the limitations of its role in counter-proliferation: its principal objective in this area should remain the more even-handed prevention, or reversal, of proliferation through diplomatic means and the support, rather than duplication, of the work of other international organisations. (Paragraph 46)	NATO's intention is not to duplicate the valuable work of other institutions (see HC 459, paragraphs 19 and 20).
8.	To monitor the developments in Kosovo carefully and to ask the government to give a considered view at the end of NATO offensive action and after the first six months of any peace enforcement deployment on how the arrangements have worked in practice. To take evidence, inter alia, on the military advice given to the North Atlantic Council, the military assessment provided to UK ministers and the coordination of political objectives and military strategy. (Paragraph 57)	Accepted (HC 459, paragraphs 25 and 26)	Inquiry undertaken during 1999-2000
9.	That the new Strategic Concept gives a clearer indication of NATO's view of its global role. (Paragraph 61)	Government sees flexibility on this point as desirable (HC 459, paragraphs 27-29)
10.	In formulating the arrangements for a strengthened ESDI, there must be no decoupling of the transatlantic alliance which would alienate our North American Allies. There must be no duplication of NATO resources. And there must be no discrimination amongst the European countries on the basis of their differing relationships with the EU and the Alliance. (Paragraph 68)	The government agrees with these aims (HC 459, paragraph 31)
11.	Under no circumstances must the development of the ESDI, now or in the foreseeable future, be seen to be an attack on the transatlantic nature of the Alliance. (Paragraph 71)	The government strongly agrees (HC 459, pargraph 35)
12.	That the UK should press for a clear statement of support for the development of the ESDI to be included in the new Strategic Concept. (Paragraph 90)	Accepted (see HC 459, paragraph 42)
13.	That the Washington Summit will produce a convincing plan, based on the findings of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, to bring our European Allies' force structure into line with NATO's new missions. (Paragraph 92)	The government agrees (HC 459, paragraph 43)		New Eurocorps initiative announced November 1999
14.	That the Washington Summit will lay the foundations for a mature reconsideration of measures to improve complementarity and interoperability amongst the European Allies' armed forces, and will embody a recognition that this will involve further pooling of national resources, with the trade-offs that such a development implies. (Paragraph 92)	The government agrees (HC 459, paragraph 43)
15.	That the Washington Summit produce a clear statement of NATO's view on the proposed integration of the WEU and the EU. (Paragraph 93)	The government considers this premature (HC 459, paragraph 45)	To take evidence on development of the ESDI on 16 February 2000.		Proposals of the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 includes proposals for institutional change for EU/WEU.
16.	That the commitment that NATO has no plan, no intention and no reason to station forces (either conventional or nuclear) in the new members' territories, and should be embodied in the new Strategic Concept. (Paragraph 106)	Both policy statements remain valid, but not appropriate for inclusion in new Concept (HC 459, paragraph 51)
17.	That the programme to assist former military personnel return to civilian employment be funded and improved, should serve as a model for other initiatives for practical, grass-roots cooperation with Russia in resolving the problems of the legacy of the Cold War. (Paragraph 111)	Noted, options for extending and expanding programme under consideration (HC 459, paragraph 58)
18.	NATO will need to give clarity to its policies and goals, especially when they diverge from Russia's, and develop relationships with individuals and institutions who see the value in practical, case-by-case cooperation. (Paragraph 116)	See HC 459, paragraph 65
19.	To ensure that NATO-Ukraine relations are improved. (Paragraph 129)	Accepted, see HC 459, paragraph 71
20.	Further enlargement should be based on an assessment of the benefits and costs for both existing and potential new members. (Paragraph 154)	Agrees that caution is merited (see HC 459, paragraph 76)
21.	NATO must make the criteria upon which membership will be offered clear and intelligible, without offering any guarantee of automatic membership, and offer candidates assistance in meeting those criteria where appropriate. (Paragraph 163)	See HC 459 paragraphs 79 to 81
22.	A 'Madrid plus' package for membership candidates should include clear targets in those areas and strategies for achieving them in collaboration with the Alliance. (Paragraph 168)	Launched at the summit (see HC 459, paragraph 82).
23.	That further enlargement should be limited, gradual and conducted on a case-by-case basis. (Paragraph 169)	See HC 459 paragraphs 83 to 85.
24.	That the attitude of Russia—and the security of Ukraine—are factors that must be taken into account. (Paragraph 170)	See HC 459, paragraph 85
Fourth Report: Draft Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of Law) Order 1999 and the Draft International Headquarters and Defence Organisations (Designations and Privileges) (Amendment) Order 1999, HC 399 Published: 23 April 1999
1.	That both draft Orders should be approved by the House. (Paragraph 7)	Not required			Both Orders debated in Standing Committee on 18 May and approved by House on 19 May.
Fifth Report: Security of Supply and Future of Royal Ordnance Factory Bishopton (HC 274) Published: 28 May Government Reply: Sixth Special Report (HC 725) Published: 14 July 1999
1.	In times of crisis the supply chain from industry ought to assume less importance, because war stocks should already be in place to support operations, and the opportunities for resupply from industry—even from UK industry—would have limited scope to influence matters before the resolution of the crisis. The experience of Kosovo, however, may force a re-examination of this assumption. (Paragraph 31)	MoD is considering the feasibility of regeneration from industry as an alternative to stockpiling.MoD is examining the experiences of Kosovo, which will be subsumed in the 'Stockpile Planning Guidance' study, the results of which will be sent to the Committee.
2.	That the MoD's Stockpile Planning Guidance review of war stocks levels, needs not only to readdress in a fundamental way the requirements of the post-Cold War security environment but also to take into account the lessons of NATO's operations in Bosnia and now in Serbia. (Paragraph 36)	MoD is examining the experiences of Kosovo, which will be subsumed in the 'Stockpile Planning Guidance' study, the results of which will be sent to the Committee.This MoD study is validating the assumptions behind war stock calculations using military judgement panels, and 'different stockpiling principles might [then] be applied'.
3.	That a more rigorous and honest assessment needs to be made of the expenditure of ammunition in war time, and war stock requirements should be adjusted upwards to reflect any reduction in security of supply (including that flowing from the closure of Bishopton). (Para 38)	The MoD Stockpile Planning Guidance study is validating the assumptions behind war stock calculations using military judgement panels, and 'different stockpiling principles might [then] be applied'.
4.	To be informed of the results of the MoD study examining war stock requirements as soon as they are ready. (Para 38)	An 'overview' of the study's results will be provided in due course.
5.	To develop means of auditing, on an annual basis, the adequacy of stocks against requirements. (Paragraph 38)	The MoD study is addressing the need for routine and regular audit of stockholdings.
6.	That some way of keeping Bishopton open might be found, and that Ministers retain an open mind to any opportunities that might give Bishopton and other Royal Ordnance factories a more secure future, taking into account not just any cost premium that might be involved but also the flexibility and other potential security of supply benefits. (Para 46)	MoD/RO discussions continue, centred on formulating a possible partnering arrangement that will give MoD value for money yet give RO the security of business that would allow it to invest for the future.			In December 1999, MoD and Royal Ordnance concluded a partnering agreement which would provide at least £100m a year of work to RO, for ten years, to help it plan in the longer term. The company's plans remain that Bishopton will close.
7.	That the MoD monitor the market for signs of restricted sources of animation propellant supply (para 46)	MoD remain convinced that there are sufficient reliable ammunition propellant suppliers in friendly countries to ensure future supply.
8.	That the MoD identify the manufacturing capabilities that fall into the category of those which it is strategically necessary to retain in the UK, and takes action with the private sector to ensure their retention (paragraph 47).	There are few capabilities considered strategically necessary to be maintained in the UK. In the majority of cases, full competition remains the best way to secure top quality equipment.
Sixth Report:The Reserves Call Out Order 1999 and Progress of Territorial Army Restructuring (HC 860) Published: 8 November 1999 Government Reply: Second Special Report, Session 1999-2000 (HC 220) Published: 15 February 2000
1.	That the on-going process of improvements in the administration of the mobilisation should be continuing. That the MoD set itself qualitative targets for improvements in the areas of pay administration and training,, and to report its progress in achieving them to us. (Para 8)	Accepted in part—declined to provide progress reports (paragraphs 2-6).
2.	That the capacity of the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre be increased. (Para 13)	Examining expansion requirements (paragraph 8).
3.	That further flexibility in the lengths of call outs should be encouraged, across the services. (Para 16)	Accepted (paragraph 11).
4.	That an assessment of the progress in achieving the restructuring of the Territorial Army be provided annually to Parliament, either to this Committee or in a separate section of the annual Defence White Paper. (Para 21)	Under consideration (paragraph 13).
5.	That reductions in the trained strength of the Territorial Army should be suspended until the MoD can demonstrate that the regular army, supported by the Reserve Forces, is able to undertake all of its commitments without the overstretch and extended tour cycles currently being experienced. That greater emphasis be placed on the training of territorials, and if assessment levels do not improve, that the MoD acts on its assurances that the levels of training support will be reviewed and revised. (Para 23)	Accepts need for flexibility in transitional period (paragraph 18).
6.	That the MoD demonstrate that the post-SDR establishment of the TA can successfully accommodate the compulsory call out of formed units. (Para 24)	Compulsory mobilisation not yet necessary—will keep under review (paragraph 20).
Seventh Report: The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services (HC 447) Published: 4 November 1999 Government Reply: Third Special Report, Session 1999-2000 (HC 221) Published: 15 February 2000
1.	That this will be the last review of the DMS for some time. (Para 18)	The government agrees that uncertainty has had a damaging effect (paragraph 2).
2.	That the main Estimates for the next financial year include an explanatory note making clear the effects of changes in the arrangements for funding MDHUs on the MoD's and Department of Health's budgets. (Para 29)	There was a transfer of £3.4 million (at 1998 prices) from MoD to DoH in each year from 1999/2000 to 2001/2002 (paragraph 4).
3.	That the Secretaries of State for Health and Defence restate the propriety, indeed desirability, of recognising the special needs of armed forces personnel. (para 36)	Accepted in part (paragraph 6).
4.	That the new Centre for Defence Medicine receives the money and long-term commitment which Haslar has not received in the past. (para 60)	The MoD is fully committed to making the CDM a success (paragraph 8).
5.	That the MoD develops a convincing strategy outlining how the DMS intends to staff the new Centre for Defence Medicine We expect the MoD to show an absolute commitment to making a success of the Centre for Defence Medicine. (Para 65)	The MoD is fully committed to making the CDM a success (paragraph 8).
6.	That the MoD take steps to encourage the selection of current service men and women with the potential ability to be placed as mature students in medical schools and other training establishments, even if they do not have the usual formal qualifications. (Para 70)	Not accepted (paragraph 9).
7.	That the MoD to come up with a far more convincing set of proposals to enhance recruitment. (Par 73)	Under examination (paragraph 10).
8.	That the decision on not backdating new pension arrangement be reconsidered At the very least, consideration of some form of loyalty bonus for staff who remain in the DMS until retirement age or for a minimum of 30 years. (Para 80)	Being pursued as a matter of priority (paragraph 12).
9.	That the MoD should give more thought as to how the requirements of the medical Reserve can be better tailored to the specific needs of NHS personnel give active political support to a campaign to persuade Health Authorities and NHS Trusts that the pursuit of the goals of the DMS is an appropriate priority in their work, and that they have a duty to actively support the development of the medical reserve. (Para 87)	Work being taken forward (paragraph 15)
Eighth Report: Major Procurement Projects Survey: The Common New Generation Frigate Programme (HC 544) Published: 10 November 1999 Government Reply: Fourth Special Report, Session 1999-2000 (HC 222) Published: 15 February 2000
1.	That the next defence equipment debate should take place in early June 2000, and that the MoD provide its next progress report before Easter 2000 (para 2).	Accepted.
2.	That the MoD disseminate the lessons of the CNGF programme identified to all project teams, and applies the lessons with more conviction (Para 24).	'Lessons learned' paper has been produced. MoD is communicating the lessons across the Department.
3.	That to facilitate competition for the (Type-45) prime contractor, all contenders should be given access to the results of the Project Definition and Phase 1 work already undertaken (Para 26).	The Type-45 prime contractor was appointed on 23 November 1999.
4.	That in trading off cost and capability for the Type-45, the MoD does not jeopardise the enhancements in naval air defence capability, which we will still need to have early in the next century (Para 29).	MoD will ensure that cost/capability trade-offs provide Type-45 which is affordable and value-for-money through its life, yet also ensures an enhanced maritime air defence capability well into the new century.
5.	That the MoD should explore the opportunities for designing the Type-45 to allow maximum flexibility for potential capability enhancements, in particular to examine carefully the scope for designing-in the ability to fit a wider range of missile types including the sort of Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM) (Para 31).	Using 'smart procurement' principles, MoD is exploring opportunities for designing-in flexibility for capability enhancements.
6.	That the MoD keep an open mind on potential bids for the Type-45 from the existing tri-national Horizon consortia and other foreign systems-integration firms, as well as from UK suppliers, but maintain the policy not to allow warship building to go overseas (Para 34).	MoD would not expect consideration of Type-45 equipment to be limited to the former CNGF partners, although selection would be a matter for the Type-45 prime contractor.MoD has no plans to extend competition for warship construction to overseas yards.
7.	To monitor whether the national warship programme will end up costing the UK more overall than its Horizon predecessor (Para 39).	MoD is confident that Type-45 cost will be within target cost for the former Horizon programme.
8.	That the MoD re-examine the Type-42s' decomissioning schedule, to avoid reducing the overall number of hulls available at any one time for UK anti-air operations (Para 42).	The decommissioning programme will be managed to ensure that the required number of frigates/destroyers is available for CinC Fleet.
9.	The Committee to monitor the Type 45 programme (Para 45.)	-
Ninth Report: Defence Research (HC 616) Published: 10 November 1999Government Reply: Fifth Special Report, Session 1999-2000 (HC 223) Published: 16 February 2000
1.	That the MoD do more to protect the research budget (Para 18).	MoD intends to continue to invest substantial sums in research.
2.	That the Department's intelligent customer capability will need to be sufficiently strong to sift out any bias in the expert advice produced by vested commercial interests, be they those of industry or a commercialised DERA (Para 49).	MoD accepted the continued need for a strong and independent intelligent customer function. This did not preclude others taking the lead in research into some areas of technology.
3.	That the formulation of a European research strategy be given immediate impetus (Para 50).	The need for this was fully endorsed by the MoD, who would continue to press for a European strategy.
4.	That the formulation of a more coherent strategy for defence research is carried through in a logical manner, with funding following the strategy, in particular, recognising the need to preserve direct access to the technologies needed in the long term for our armed forces to maintain their operational effectiveness face, and it must recognise that in some areas research undertaken by the Department itself will be the only way to provide that assurance. Once its research strategy is completed we look to the MoD to produce a clear statement for the Committee of the technologies and research it needs to remain within its control (paragraph 51).	MoD's research strategy allows for industry to lead in some technologies, but the MoD undertaking work in some areas itself will be the best way to ensure access to certain technologies.
5.	That if research budgets are a critical constraint on DERA's operations, the MoD raise them to a more healthy level by re-prioritising its expenditures (Para 59).	Reprioritising funds cannot be achieved without detriment to other areas of defence.
6.	In promoting defence diversification, that those dealing with industry on the Department's behalf must be clearly independent of vested commercial interests of their own. (Para 70)	The positioning of the Defence Diversification Agency within DERA was an interim arrangement. The final PPP solution will have to address how defence diversification will be supported.
7.	That the MoD retain the Agency's trading fund status and raise its borrowing limits (para 79).	Borrowing limits are not the issue; rather an environment, under a PPP, that encourages DERA to use its capital more flexibly under private sector disciplines.
8.	That the MoD be able to insist that DERA retain essential national assets, or at least to have first refusal to bring them back into MoD ownership (Para 80).	MoD's special shareholding under a PPP would prevent the loss of strategically important DERA facilities.
9.	That without clear and genuine acceptance by the US, the public-private partnership for DERA must not proceed (Para 102).	MoD aims to maintain collaborative relationship with the US. MoD is considering how international concerns can be addressed in the PPP.
10.	That the proposals for the future structure of DERA contained in the consultation document are fatally flawed and should not proceed (para 121).	The MoD are taking into account the Committee's views, along with those of all stakeholders.

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Prepared 16 February 2000