| Debate
|
| (1)
| We recommend an annual debate on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls and reports thereon by Select Committees, to be held on a substantive Motion (paragraph 3).
|
| |
|
| Scott Report legislation
|
| (2)
| We are dismayed that the Government should not have afforded greater priority to bringing forward a Bill to implement the recommendations made four years ago in the Scott Report (paragraph 4).
|
| |
|
| Result of scrutiny
|
| (3)
| Were Parliament to establish a committee with the remit of examining export licences, it would no doubt wish to seek a view of the detailed assessments made available to Ministers on individual licences; without such information individual grants of licences cannot be described as having been scrutinised as fully as they have been within the machinery of Government. In the absence of the detailed papers and records of inter-departmental consultations on these licences, we cannot judge whether or not the decisions taken by Ministers were reasonable. Only a Committee with a specific remit to pursue individual licences could do that (paragraphs 7 and 21).
|
| |
|
| Parliamentary scrutiny
|
| (4)
| The publication of Annual Reports such as these cannot demonstrate the absence of errors of judgement; indeed it would be a bold Minister who would want to defend with the benefit of hindsight every licence given, amended or refused. We can however report that from our sampling we have found grey areas which would benefit from more stringent and consistent parliamentary scrutiny, as our more detailed examination of licences for Indonesia has revealed (paragraph 21).
|
| |
|
| (5)
| At this stage we would not want to rule out either the practicality or the possible desirability of prior parliamentary scrutiny of export licence applications. We will seek to come to conclusions on this issue in our next Report (paragraph 85).
|
| |
|
| (6)
| We are unanimous in our conviction that the scope and character of strategic export licensing, which regularly arouses public and parliamentary concern, requires vigilant and thorough scrutiny. We have referred the question of future scrutiny of the Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls to the Liaison Committee, and will be making our own proposals to the Committee in due course based on our experience to date (paragraphs 81 and 86).
|
| |
|
| Indonesia
|
| (7)
| We obtained from the Government a list of all the licences valid as of May 1997 for export to Indonesia, numbering around 125. It does not take long to review this list. Other things being equal, it would have been entirely practical to have reviewed the 125 outstanding valid licences for Indonesia. It is by no means clear that there was in 1997 a sufficiently radical shift in policy towards the supply of arms to Indonesia, beyond a heightened distaste for such exports in Government, to have survived legal challenge to the revocation of an individual licence. We regret that, despite several requests, the Government has not made available to us the legal advice provided to it on this point, either before the 3 November hearing as we asked or thereafter. We conclude that it would have been practicable to have reviewed all valid licences for the export of arms to Indonesia; but that, in the absence of any radical and demonstrable change in the Government's policy towards supply of arms to Indonesia which would have stood up to judicial scrutiny, and possibly in the light of other commercial factors, Ministers were persuaded that revocation would be imprudent (paragraphs 22 to 24).
|
| |
|
| Licensing of spares
|
| (8)
| The Government should now draw up and publish guidelines governing the extent to which the UK feels bound to licence spares for existing UK-supplied equipment (paragraph 27).
|
| |
|
| Grounds for refusal
|
| (9)
| These provisions [in the national criteria and EU Code of Conduct] seem to fall some way short of a system whereby a licence can be refused simply because of pervasive abuse of human rights in the country to which arms are to be exported. We would welcome reassurance that Ministers are confident that the new national criteria on arms sales and the EU Code of Conduct do not prevent the exercise of their discretion, without fear of judicial review, to refuse licences on broad grounds of public policy, not explicitly covered by the criteria (paragraph 28).
|
| |
|
| Lessons of Indonesia
|
| (10)
| We recommend that the Government examine the issues raised to identify lessons of general application which can and should be learned (paragraph 32).
|
| |
|
| Pakistan and EU
|
| (11)
| We urge the Government to initiate discussions with our EU partners to establish a common position on defence and defence-related exports to Pakistan, so that there can be no question of advantage being taken by other member states of the suitably cautious approach being taken by the UK (paragraph 38).
|
| |
|
| Evidence on Pakistan and Zimbabwe
|
| (12)
| In the three months since our oral evidence session with the Foreign Secretary in November 1999, serious questions have arisen in respect of the application of strategic export controls over defence equipment destined for Pakistan and Zimbabwe, raising wider issues of public policy. In neither case have we had the opportunity of raising these issues with Ministers. We have therefore invited the Foreign Secretary to appear before us to give evidence on these issues (paragraph 40).
|
| |
|
| Brokering and trafficking
|
| (13)
| We support a more stringent national policy on brokering and trafficking, which could act as a spur to international action. We look to the 1999 Annual Report to make some specific reference to the Government's view of the way forward on this issue (paragraph 46).
|
| |
|
| Licensed production overseas
|
| (14)
| The most desirable solution [to the problem of licensed production overseas] would indeed be a multilateral one and it should be vigorously pursued in the appropriate international fora. The issue of licensed production overseas must be given a far higher priority by the Government, if necessary by the passage of legislation (paragraph 47).
|
| |
|
| Joint production
|
| (15)
| We recommend that the 1999 Annual Report covers in full the implications for strategic export controls of detailed agreements reached as a result of the July 1998 Letter of Intent, and ask that it be demonstrated that there is nothing in those detailed agreements which undermines the UK or the EU regime on the control of the export of arms (paragraph 48).
|
| |
|
| End-use
|
| (16)
| We look to the next Annual Report to address the concerns over end-use, if possible by reference to measurement of the effort being devoted to improved monitoring, and setting out the prospects for the creation of a reinforced multilateral system (paragraph 51).
|
| |
|
| Small-arms
|
| (17)
| We welcome the Government's emphasis in both Annual Reports on small arms as a policy issue of concern. We recommend that future Annual Reports continue to review progress on small arms initiatives within multilateral fora and to provide details of activities funded by the Government in this area (paragraph 52).
|
| |
|
| EU Code of Conduct: transparency
|
| (18)
| Our first experience of the operation of the Code leads us to believe that some of the confidentiality surrounding the denials system is misplaced, and that the UK should press our EU partners to consider at least the publication of figures on the number of recognised cases of undercutting, preserving if necessary the anonymity of the countries concerned (paragraph 54).
|
| |
|
| EU Code of Conduct: changes
|
| (19)
| We would like to see the Code strengthened in several respects, including the introduction of a minimum level of transparency EU-wide. Should there be changes formally proposed to the Code, we would expect the Government's recognition of the high level of parliamentary interest in the development of the Code to lead to such changes being subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We also recommend that the Annual Report on the EU Code of Conduct be reproduced as part of the UK's Annual Report (paragraph 55).
|
| |
|
| EU Code of Conduct: USA
|
| (20)
| We wholeheartedly endorse the encouragement given by the Foreign Affairs Committee to the Government to work with the US Administration to develop an effective EU-US Code. We note that Canada has aligned itself with the principles of the Code; we recommend that the Government take every opportunity to press the USA to follow suit (paragraph 56).
|
| |
|
| EU Code of Conduct: applicant states
|
| (21)
| We consider that an applicant state's proven willingness to conform with the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct and comply with its operative paragraphs should be regarded as a precondition for its accession to the EU and for membership of European defence organisations including the Western European Union and the Western European Armaments Group (paragraph 58).
|
| |
|
| Developmental criteria
|
| (22)
| It may be necessary to revise the national — and in the fulness of time the EU — criteria to ensure that, where there is a consensus among Ministers that the cumulative impact of defence expenditure by a poor country is such as to threaten damage its economy, and where they wish on those grounds to refuse one or more export licences which even if singly or together would not be regarded as damaging, they would be free to do so without the threat of legal challenge being held over them (paragraph 63).
|
| |
|
| DfID and Annual Report
|
| (23)
| DfID has, in the past, raised concerns on licence applications which may well have resulted in licences being refused. DfID should be accountable and responsible for a licensing process of which it is an integral part. We recommend that future annual reports are also signed by the Secretary of State for International Development (paragraph 61).
|
| |
|
| Delay |
| (24)
| The delay in publication of the 1997 Annual Report was unacceptable. We propose a target for future Annual Reports to be available within four months of the end of the year to which they relate (paragraph 65).
|
| |
|
| Accuracy
|
| (25)
| If we had not sought more detailed information on certain licences, it can only be assumed that significant errors in compilation and listing would have remained undiscovered. It is essential that users of the report have confidence in its accuracy; we look to those responsible to ensure a high standard of accuracy in future (paragraph 68).
|
| |
|
| Presentation: country tables
|
| (26)
| We recommend publication of a table for each country combining to a greater degree than at present information currently spread through several tables of the Annual Report, including information on actual exports (paragraph 66).
|
| |
|
| Presentation: Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)
|
| (27)
| OIEL information is by its nature complex. Some further consideration must however be be given to presenting it more clearly, perhaps by reference to the OIEL itself rather than by countries of destination, and possibly by limiting the information provided on the bulk of OIELs which are granted for exports to NATO and other allied states (paragraph 67).
|
| |
|
| Difficult licences
|
| (28)
| We recommend that the Annual Report records the number of licence applications whose complexity or sensitivity required inter-ministerial discussion or correspondence (paragraph 62).
|
| |
|
| Refusals
|
| (29)
| We recommend that henceforth summary descriptions be published of Military List goods for which a licence has been refused (paragraph 69).
|
| |
|
| Reasons for refusal
|
| (30)
| The details on refusals and revocations in 1997 and 1998 seem to reflect the entry into force of tighter criteria on the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression. They also demonstrate that the criteria on protection of the UK's national interests and regional security are capable of being implemented, in the latter case in relation to a relatively small amount of light weaponry. We recommend that future Reports should return to the practice of the annual ECO Reports and record by category the reasons for refusals and revocations of standard and open licences, and reductions in the coverage of OIELs, as we have above, since this provides an instructive analysis of the nature of decisions taken (paragraph 16).
|
| |
|
| Appeals against refusal
|
| (31)
| We recommend that summary details of appeals against refusals of a licence be published in the Annual Reports, showing in each case the outcome and the time elapsed between receipt of information from the appellant and determination of the appeal, as well as a brief description of the goods and end-user (paragraph 20).
|
| |
|
| Volume
|
| (32)
| We recommend that in the next Report some indication be given of the numbers of items for which a licence has been given, if necessary as an approximation. For major systems whether or not covered by the UN Register an exact number should normally be given. The principal criterion for determining whether to provide such figures should be the avoidance of misunderstanding, particularly where the decision on the grant of the licence was or might reasonably have been influenced by the quantities concerned, and where there are no obvious grounds of commercial confidentiality. We would be prepared to see this introduced first for licences for non-NATO countries (paragraph 72).
|
| |
|
| Values
|
| (33)
| We recommend that the total value of licences issued in respect of each non-NATO country be given for each calendar year, founded on the values given on the applications, with an exception where the number is so small as to risk a breach of reasonable commercial confidentiality: in other words where there are only a handful of licences granted. In these cases a "ceiling" figure, such as "under £1 million", should be provided (paragraph 73).
|
| |
|
| End-user
|
| (34)
| We recommend that end-user information be given unless either it is self-evident from the nature of the goods or there is good reason to believe that the licence would have been granted to other end-users in the country concerned (paragraph 74).
|
| |
|
| Export statistics
|
| (35)
| We would welcome a degree of co-ordination between EU Tariff codes and the emergence of a common EU Military List of goods so that readers of the Annual Reports — and indeed other similar European documents — could have a greater feeling of well-founded confidence in the figures of defence exports (paragraph 75).
|
| |
|
| Government sales etc
|
| (36)
| The Reports should in future contain details of sales and other permanent or temporary transfers by Government and its agencies, and also an explicit account of exemptions from the licensing regime (paragraph 76).
|
| |
|
| Exports from subsidiary jurisdictions
|
| (37)
| We recommend that the Annual Report contain details of the volume and nature of exports which have been licensed from overseas territories and Crown dependencies (paragraph 43).
|
| |
|
| ECO |
| (38)
| We recommend that future Annual Reports include more data on the administrative performance of the Export Control Organisation and the other departments involved in the export licensing process, including the pre-licensing process. We hope that these figures show continuing improvement (paragraph 8).
|
| |
|
| ECGD |
| (39)
| We recommend inclusion in the Annual Reports of details of ECGD support for defence exports in the most readily available period of 12 months (paragraph 77).
|
| |
|
| DESO |
| (40)
| We recommend that the Annual Report include a report of the activities over the year under review of the Defence Export Sales Organisation (paragraph 78).
|
| |
|
| Transparency and defence exports
|
| (41)
| Transparency about arms exports is therefore an important element of our overall aim of securing a safer world. At the same time, however, it should be noted that none of our European competitors have achieved the UK's current level of transparency. There must be limits to the extent to which it can be expected that the UK should go in disclosing information about arms exports when others show little or no sign of following suit. It is important that we do not damage the competitive position of UK defence exporters in world markets. We do not think our proposals for greater transparency need do so (paragraph 79).
|
