CRITERIA TO BE USED IN CONSIDERING LICENCE
APPLICATIONS FOR THE EXPORT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS STATEMENT BY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 28
JULY 1997
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
Mr Stephen Timms (East Ham)(L):
To ask the Secretary of State what criteria
will be used by the Government in considering licence applications
for the export of conventional arms; and if he will make a statement.
(5493)
Answer (The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs):
The Government is committed to the maintenance
of a strong defence industry which is a strategic part of our
industrial base, as well as of our defence effort. Defence exports
can also contribute to internartional stability by strengthening
bilateral and collective defence relationships in accordance with
the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter. But arms
transfers must be managed responsibly, in particular so as to
avoid their use for inernal repression and international aggression.
It will be important to avoid a situation in
which our policy of seeking to prevent certain regimes from acquiring
certain equipment is undermined by foreign competitors supplying
them. We will therefore work for the introduction of a European
Code of Conduct, setting high common standards to govern arms
exports from all EU member states.
Licences to export strategic goods are issued
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the Export
Control Organisation of the DTI is the licensing authority. All
relevant individual licence applications are circulated by DTI
to other Government departments with an interest, as determined
by them in line with their policy responsibilities. These include
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and
the Department for International Development.
The present Government was not responsible for
the decisions on export licences made by the previous Administration.
We do not, however, consider it would be realistic or practical
to revoke licences which were valid and in force at the time of
our election.
The criteria set out below will be used when
considering all future individual applications for licences to
export goods entered in Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of
Goods (Control) Order 1994), and exisiting licence applications
on which a decision has not yet been made. The criteria will also
be applied when considering advance approvals for promotion prior
to formal application for an export licence, and licence applications
for the export of dual-use goods when there are grounds for believing
that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or the
internal security forces of the recipient country.
The criteria will constitute broad guidance.
They will not be applied mechanistically and judgement will always
be required. Individual applications will be considered case-by-case.
CRITERIA USED
IN CONSIDERING
CONVENTIONAL ARMS
EXPORT LICENCE
APPLICATIONS
1. An export licence will not be issued
if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply
with the UK's international obligations and commitments, or by
concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or
international aggression, or by the risks to regional stability,
or other considerations as described in these criteria.
The United Kingdom's international obligations
2. An export licence should be refused if
approval would be inconsistent with:
(a) the UK's international obligations and
commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, together
with any national embargoes or other commitments regarding the
application of strategic export controls;
(b) the UK's international obligations under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the UK's commitments to the international
export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar
Arrangement);
(d) the EU Common Criteria for Arms Exports,
the Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent
Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles
Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;
(e) the UK's commitment not to export all
forms of anti-personnel land mines and their component parts.
The United Kingdom's national interests
3. Full weight should be given to the UK's
national interests when considering applications for licences,
including:
(a) the potential effect on the UK's defence
and security interests and those of allies and EU partners;
(b) the potential effect on the UK's economic,
financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests
in having stable, democratic trading partners;
(c) the potential effect on the UK's relations
with the recipient country;
(d) the potential effect on any collaborative
defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
(e) the protection of the UK's essential
strategic industrial base.
Human rights and internal repression
4. The Government:
(a) will take into account respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country;
(b) will not issue an export licence if there
is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might
be used for internal repression.
5. For these purposes equipment which might
be used for internal repression will include:
(a) Equipment where there is clear evidence
of the recent use of similar equipment for internal repression
by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe
that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or
end-user and used for internal repression;
(b) Equipment which has obvious application
for internal repression, in cases where the recipient country
has a significant and continuing record of such repression, unless
the end-use of the equipment is judged to be legitimate, such
as protection of members of security forces from violence.
6. The nature of the equipment proposed
for export will also be carefully considered. Certain goods have
more obvious potential for use in internal repression than others,
such as armoured personnel carriers specially designed for internal
security. In other cases, there may be prima facie reasons
for believing that a particular equipment might be used in such
roles in certain circumstances. Any proposed export which is to
be used by the recipient country for internal security purposes
should be considered particularly carefully.
7. Internal repression includes extra-judicial
killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, suppression or major violation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In some cases, the use
of force by a government within its own borders does not constitute
internal repression. The use of such force by governments is legitimate
in some cases, eg to preserve law and order against terrorists
or other criminals. However, force may only be used in accordance
with international human rights standards.
International aggression
8. The Government will not issue an export
licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the intended
recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another
country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a
purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might
be used in the future against another state will not of itself
lead to a licence being refused.
9. When considering the risk that the country
for which arms are destined might use them for international aggression,
the Government will take into account:
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed
conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring
country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened
to pursue by means of force;
(c) whether the equipment would be likely
to be used other than for the legitimate national security and
defence of the recipient.
Regional stability
10. The need not to affect adversely regional
stability in any significant way will also be considered. The
balance of forces between neighbouring states, their relative
expenditure on defence, and the need not to introduce into the
region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased
tension, will all be taken into account.
Other criteria
11. In assessing the impact of the proposed
export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods
might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will
be considered:
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security
interests of the recipient country, including any involvement
in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient
country to use the equipment;
(c) whether the purchase would seriously
undermine the economy of the recipient country, taking into account
its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic
and social development and any IMF/World Bank sponsored economic
reform programme;
(d) the risk of the arms being re-exported
or diverted to an undesirable end-user, including terrorist organisations
(anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration
in this context).
12. The following factors will also be taken
into account:
(a) the risk of use of the goods concerned
against UK forces;
(b) the need to protect UK military classified
information and capabilities;
(c) the potential for the equipment to be
a force multiplier in the region;
(d) the risk of reverse engineering or technology
transfer.
13. In the application of all the above
criteria, account should also be taken of, for example, reporting
from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies,
intelligence, and information from open sources and non-governmental
organisations.
REPORTING TO
PARLIAMENT
To ensure full transparency and accountability
to Parliament the Government will report annually on the state
of strategic export controls and their application, thereby providing
for parliamentary consideration of the application of the criteria.
the Government will also inform Parliament of any changes to the
criteria.
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