Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80
- 99)
WEDNESDAY 16 FEBRUARY 2000
THE RT
HON GEOFFREY
HOON AND
MR RICHARD
HATFIELD
Chairman
80. I am not one of them.
(Mr Hoon) It is a slightly strange idea,
it is totally inconsistent with the established opinion of the
main political parties, but I recognise that some people have
those rather curious views.
Dr Lewis
81. I did not realise that you had that view,
Chairman.
(Mr Hoon) It is part of what makes democracy
such an exciting but, I accept, at times frustrating experience,
that there is such a range of views. There is that range of views
in the United States about these issues and I would expect to
find those different opinions. Can I just emphasise the very strong
support that the administration have given to this. On a number
of occasions people have made it clear how much the US supports
it. I will quote, as I have done on a number of occasions, Strobe
Talbot, a more recent quotation. What he has said more recently
is "There should be no confusion about America's position
on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against. We are
not ambivalent. We are not anxious. We are for it. We want to
see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or,
if NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period. End of debate".
I could not have expected a clearer setting out of the views of
the United States administration than that. I hope that this argument
that somehow the US are less than supportive can finally be laid
to rest.
Mr Hood
82. You did not answer my question about the
intelligence issue.
(Mr Hoon) I was going on to it. I think
it is important that for the avoidance of doubt the position of
the US administration is made clear. Clearly the European Union
would require effective intelligence to be able to deal properly
with a developing crisis. We would not, for example, allow our
forces to be engaged in operations where there was not effective
intelligence available to them, that would be to put them at a
risk that I would not tolerate. We need to support the decisions
that we take, the deployments that we make, by effective intelligence.
That is part of the process that we are engaged in as to how best
to deliver this capability. How best do we secure appropriate
intelligence to EU forces if that actually was a situation where
NATO was not engaged? I think the most likely outcome, frankly,
sitting here today, is to say that we would look to NATO to provide
that intelligence which it would provide today for a NATO led
operation. It is part of that process of exchanging of information
that I see as being the way in which the two institutions would
work very closely together.
Chairman
83. Have you in the Ministry or Defence or in
the Foreign Office embarked on any strategy of going out to the
United States to talk to various congressional committees to allay
any fears that NATO is about to collapse? Or perhaps you could
send Mr Hatfield along to Boise, Idaho, which appears to be the
MoD's policy to transmit information to a wider audience. Maybe
somebody could go out, if they have not already done, and say
"Look, this is the reality, a European Security Defence Identity
is not going to be followed by `Thank you, Americans, stay back
home'."
(Mr Hoon) There is no strategy as such.
No planning needs to go into this in the sense that I have set
out very clearly the US views. Certainly I would expect when I
meet representatives of the administration in Washington to also
similarly meet significant Members of Congress. Indeed, three
or four weeks ago I met a number of senators, a number of congressmen,
and indeed have regularly met them in the course of visits to
Europe either in London or, very recently, at a Security Conference
at Munich. There is a regular exchange of views. I assure you
that we take every opportunity of making sure that there is a
proper understanding of what it is that we are engaged on.
84. But in the mind of a backwoodsman, or perhaps
it is disparaging to call my fellow Congressmen backwoodsman,
but for those who may not be going along to functions at the British
Embassy and do not get invited to Vancouver, is there any attempt
to solicit invitations to the various committees to say "this
is the score, please do not get too alarmed about it"?
(Mr Hoon) Certainly we have set out our
position on a number of occasions. For example, I have written
articles in the American press explaining what it is that we are
engaged on. We have sought to reach a wider American audience.
As I said earlier, there are backwoodsman in the United Kingdom
who do not seem to recognise the reality of our membership of
the European Union. We cannot always reach every part of the body
politic but we certainly do our best.
Laura Moffatt
85. Can I finish by asking have we heard anything
from the presidential contenders at all on this particular issue?
(Mr Hoon) Certainly I am not aware that
they have said anything specific on this particular subject. I
am not aware that they have expressed any particular concerns.
There was an article written in the Financial Times by
Robert Zellick who I understand is an adviser to George W Bush
in which, again, he made it clear that he wanted to see Europe
develop a more effective capability and that he was supportive
of the efforts that we have made. I do not see this as being a
very big political issue in the primaries on either side of the
political divide of the United States.
Mr Cann
86. Number one: is Luxembourg really going to
spend more money on this business or is it better to try to look
at reform? Number two: how are we going to measure the progress
that people say they are going to make up until the start date?
Number three: how will the SDR be affected, if at all? Number
four, and crucially: will we end up paying most of it as usual?
(Mr Hoon) The general answer to that
is having set out a specific headline goal it is for each country
to determine how it satisfies that aspiration or ambition, target,
goal, whatever word you want to use although I think they are
all applicable. My recollection is that there are only something
like 220,000 registered voters in Luxembourg of a population of
maybe 400,000. If I am getting them wrong I apologise. Inevitably
their contribution is going to be more limited. That is one of
the reasons why I mentioned the close co-operation that exists
between commando forces of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
I actually think that there is a lot of scope for developing those
kinds of mutual arrangements between larger countries and smaller
countries. It is certainly something that I would like to see.
As far as the progress is concerned, there will be a very careful
development of each country's contribution. This is an essentially
practical exercise and as we go along we will be monitoring very
closely the way in which this works because we want to make sure
that this is an effective contribution and not simply one that
is available on a piece of paper somewhere in a filing cabinet.
So we will be looking very cautiously and very critically at the
ways in which each country makes its contribution to satisfying
the headline goal. As I said earlier, that might lead to the need
in other countries to go through the kind of process that we went
through with the Strategic Defence Review. Indeed, that has happened
in France and it is happening in Germany. I think there is a clear
recognition that in order to satisfy this goal, even if more money
totally is not spent then certainly the money that is available
already has to be spent in a different way. I have to say that
we will not be spending all of Britain's defence contribution
in this way. We clearly have had lessons to learn in ensuring
that we are capable as a country of delivering rapid deployment
and there are still further lessons, as I indicated earlier, that
we have to learn from the experience in Kosovo and we are determined
to do that. In a sense what we are looking for, if I can put it
in a short and rather headline way, is for Europe to have an SDR
of its own. What we are looking for is Europe to think through
the implications of the changes that occurred after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and apply them collectively to the kind of
capability that we will require to meet a much more challenging
and uncertain world.
Mr Cann
87. One last question to Mr Hatfield. You mentioned
ARRC earlier as an example of how these things can be organised
and units can be in different places and be brought together.
ARRC looks beautiful on a piece of paper, ten divisions, one and
a half of them British, but when you actually try to pull it together,
the Greeks cannot work with the Turks, you cannot have the Italians
anywhere in the Balkans, the Germans cannot go anywhere, and at
the end of the day you do not seem to be able to deploy anybody.
This thing is not going to be like that, is it? Please tell me
that it is not going to be like that.
(Mr Hatfield) I could describe ARRC in
a different way. If I could take a politician's type of answer
to this in role reversal. The ARRC, as a formation, is NATO's
most effective military formation to date. Despite its shortcomings
it is what NATO deploys first in a crisis, and has done so twice
in the last five years. It is not that bad a model.
88. It is usually British troops.
(Mr Hatfield) Oh, no, it is not. They
are there but they are not the only people there.
89. They are usually the first in.
(Mr Hoon) Could I just add this point.
I also share Richard's view that the ARRC is an extremely successful
organisation but what we actually want to see is the development
of similar operations that we can use in more than one crisis
because, frankly, one of the experiences we have had is that we
have not had the ability to deploy to more than one crisis. That
was something we faced in the Balkans and it is something that
we have to learn from. Therefore, the more capability of this
kind that can be developed the better. I accept that there are
going to be problems in achieving it but this is the kind of world
we live in and, therefore, we have got to find ways of developing
this kind of facility.
Mr Gapes
90. Can I take you back to the Finnish Presidency
Report, Secretary of State.
(Mr Hoon) I would be delighted to.
91. On 24 November last year it was adopted and
it includes paragraph 23 which talks about, as an interim measure,
two bodies which were going to be set up as of the beginning of
2000. They were the interim Political and Security Committee and,
reporting to that, the interim Committee of Military Representatives.
I would like to ask have we yet designated our UK representatives
to these interim bodies and, if so, who are they? Secondly, will
these people on these committees be double-hatted from other comparable
posts, or are they single appointments? Thirdly, how long is "interim"?
(Mr Hatfield) The answer to your first
question is yes, we have designated our appointments, the key
appointments. We have designated our current UK military representative,
Admiral Haddacks. He is also our current WEU representative. He
will be the representative on the European Union Military Committee.
92. So he is not going to be schizophrenic, he
is going to be split into three?
(Mr Hatfield) At the end of the transition
period the WEU hat disappears. That is one of the good outcomes.
I hope the transition period is short, eighteen months maximum,
or a bit less if we are lucky, for that. For the interim Political
and Security Committee I believe a Foreign Office official by
the name of Mr David Richmond has been designated.
93. Is he currently in Brussels?
(Mr Hatfield) No, I think he is currently
in New York.
94. Is he going to be double-hatted?
(Mr Hatfield) There is nothing to double-hat
on the—
95. He is not part of our representation to NATO?
(Mr Hatfield) No. This is the Political
Committee, not the Military Committee.
(Mr Hoon) That would not be appropriate.
(Mr Hatfield) You asked about double-hatting in general
I think?
96. Yes.
(Mr Hatfield) My current expectation
is that in the interim phase all but two nations who are in NATO
and the EU will be double-hatting. I think the French have decided
not to double-hat in the interim phase but are reserving a decision
on the permanent phase. The Belgians I do not think have taken
a final decision but may be going to put separate people in the
Military Committee.
Mr Blunt
97. Can I just ask you about paragraphs 34 and
35 of the Presidency Progress Report and the problem that in paragraph
35 it says "the decision to end an operation will be taken
by the Council after appropriate consultation with other participating
states", whilst on the ad hoc committee set up at
the PSC level, the political and security level, paragraph 34
has everybody on it who is taking part in the operation who may
be non-NATO members and maybe non-EU members. Is there the potential
for a clash of interests on that committee amongst those nations
who might be on that committee by virtue of being in the EU but
who are not taking part in the operation?
(Mr Hatfield) No. The distinction here
is essentially that the formality, the very important formality,
of launching an operation, or ending it, in the EU's name has
to be a decision of the EU. Clearly it is a matter of constitution
if you like. Equally clearly, if other people are participating
in the operation you have to make arrangements for consulting
them and involving them in the decisions and you cannot say "by
the way, the EU left, would you, Turks, stay behind?" In
the conduct of the operation all participants have equal rights
whether or not they are actually members of the EU.
(Mr Hoon) We have made it quite clear to the six that
we would want to see them fully involved in this process. Clearly
the technical point at which the decision is taken will be a decision
for the 15 but the reality is we want as much involvement as possible
from non-EU allies and we have worked very closely with them in
discussing the kinds of ways in which that will be possible. We
are still working on that and there are areas that we want to
see developing.
98. I presume that it takes unanimity to initiate
an operation. What happens when the Council wants to come to end
an operation, does it require one state to say "enough"
or has everybody got to say "enough"?
(Mr Hatfield) I think the answer to that
is if you can answer how NATO comes to that conclusion you have
also answered how the EU comes to that conclusion. The procedure
is exactly the same in formal terms. For the purpose of an operation
you have an alliance of X nations and how they collectively take
such a decision in practice is a mystery in advance. The formal
position will be exactly the same as for NATO ending a collective
major operation.
99. So what is the position if, during the course
of an operation, one country is content to go with the flow at
the beginning of the operation and does not wish to veto it but,
let us say, with Kosovo, for example, the Greek Government collapsed
and a new government came in saying "we are absolutely opposed
to this operation, we will do everything we institutionally can
to stop it", in that sort of circumstance what would happen?
(Mr Hatfield) The position is exactly
the same for EU as for NATO. If a NATO member at some stage in
the operation formally opposed it you would no longer have a NATO
operation. Equally, you might find a NATO nation, or an EU nation,
finding it was no longer possible to participate for whatever
reason but supported the continuation of the operation. There
is absolutely no difference in the make-up of the question whether
it is addressed to the EU or NATO.
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