The Transatlantic Debate
27. The ESDI then is most often presented by the
government as a way of getting Europe to shoulder more of NATO's
burden. The transatlantic debate within NATO over 'burden-sharing'
between the US and Europe is as old as the Alliance itself. In
the aftermath of the Second World War, some elements in the US
political establishment recognised pragmatic as well as altruistic
grounds for investing in stability in Europe. The foundation of
NATO, effectively the first peacetime military alliance joined
by the USA, was a demonstration of the assessment that the balance
of advantage outweighed the cost of commitment. Even then, it
was only after some soul-searching that the long-term deployment
of US forces in Europe was agreed as a defence against potential
Soviet aggression. That transatlantic bargain, marked by some
grumbling from both sides, endured through the Cold War. But the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the consequential draw down of US
forces in Europe (they have fallen from 320,000 in 1989 to a limit
currently set by Congress at 100,000[50])
and the rapid change in the culture of NATO in the past decade,
have all changed the terms of the debate.
28. The burden-sharing debate has continued to be
fuelled by international crises since then, especially the catastrophic
consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulting in
the subsequent NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well
as the 1991 Gulf conflict and continuing problems in that region.
During this period NATO has come to accept 'new missions' which
are essentially about security rather than collective defence,
about projecting stability rather than force. In its new Strategic
Concept, promulgated at the Washington Summit, the Alliance declared
that—
In pursuit of its policy
of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and
stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO
will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent
conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective
management, consistent with international law, including through
the possibility of conducting nonArticle 5 crisis response
operations ... Taking into account the necessity for Alliance
solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or
mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance
with national constitutions.[51]
The new Strategic Concept also declared the Alliance's
collective support for the further development of the ESDI, stating
that—
The Alliance, which is the
foundation of the collective defence of its members and through
which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible,
remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership.
The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume
greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in
order to enhance the peace and stability of the EuroAtlantic
area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions
taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the
European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed
within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between
NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.
It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and
effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance
as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce
the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European
Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness
of the Alliance, on a casebycase basis and by consensus,
to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in
which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political
control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise
agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European
Allies if they were so to choose.[52]
29. The decision of the Helsinki Summit to adopt
the proposals set out in the Finnish Presidency's Progress Report,
and the further progress in their implementation made since then,
suggest that there is now a greater consensus on this side of
the Atlantic that the European powers have to address the question
of their deployable defence capabilities and the circumstances
in which they might be used. Within NATO, the European powers
account for more than 60% of the Alliance's population and over
60% of its armed forces' personnel. On paper, European-NATO countries
collectively spend on defence the equivalent of around two thirds
of the US defence budget (although it is important to note that
proportionately more of the European spend is allocated directly
to NATO).[53]
Yet it is still the case that the European Allies can deploy much
less than the capability of the US, partly because of the duplication
of capabilities between European states. The capacity for expeditionary
deployments is particularly limited, a legacy of Cold War strategic
planning. The EU's External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten
recently claimed that Europe's capacity to project military force
was 10-15% of that of the USA.[54]
There are also major deficiencies in terms of interoperability
(within Europe as well as with the US) and in the provision of
some key assets (such as strategic intelligence) which have traditionally
been left to the US to provide. The emphasis on NATO's new missions,
brought into stark relief by Kosovo and Operation Allied Force,
means the calculation of burden-sharing will no longer revolve
around the performance of a single major Alliance function. But
as the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, has said,
it—
... is a fundamental and
enduring truth: the well-being of the United States depends in
large measure on what happens in Europe: the US will not prosper
without an economically vibrant Europe; the US will not be safe
without a secure and peaceful Europe.
... We're in favour of ESDI. We want there to be
a capability within the Alliance whereby the European members
can address and solve problems without always requiring US combat
involvement. That's in everyone's interest ...[55]
But he has also warned—
... as with every aspect
of modernizing and adapting NATO, this particular innovation,
ESDI, carries with it risks and costs; and it carries with it
an obligation for the highest possible degree of transparency
and consultation. If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled,
it could create the impression—which could eventually lead
to the reality—that a new, European-only alliance is being
born out of the old, transatlantic one. If that were to happen,
it would weaken, perhaps even break, those ties that I spoke of
before—the ones that bind our security to yours.[56]
30. US policy-makers within the Executive appear
to view the enhancement of the ESDI as a positive advantage in
the transatlantic burden-sharing debate[57]
while, for some Europeans, it represents the prospect of greater
military competence in operations that they may see as vital to
their interests.[58]
However, although many in the US appear to have been reassured
that a more energetically pursued ESDI will not undermine NATO
and will not serve to exclude the US and other Allies from key
decision-making ("no discrimination ... no decoupling"),
opinion in Congress and elsewhere appears more divided and sometimes
hostile.[59]
In a paper presented to a joint meeting of the NATO and WEU parliamentary
assemblies in December 1999, Congressman Douglas Bereuter commented—
The strategic perspectives
that may be elaborated as part of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, or the ESDI, should be harmonized with and not contradictory
to those of NATO ... there should be complete transparency and
coordination with NATO so that the guiding strategic precepts
of the CFSP do not differ from those of NATO. If a serious gap
between the strategy of NATO and the EU were to arise, it would
have destructive, and perhaps dire consequences for the trans-Atlantic
relationship.
It needs to be clear to our European allies that
the creation of competing institutions in Europe that detract
from NATO's capabilities and solidarity would endanger public
and Congressional support in the United States for its commitment
to the North Atlantic Alliance, and over time perhaps lead to
greater friction between North America and Europe. The process
of creating the ESDI needs to be managed in such a way that it
does not strengthen those forces on both sides of the Atlantic
and elsewhere that want a decoupling of the US from Europe. Participants
in the discussion and decisions on ESDI and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy within the EU need to understand that there
is a very sizable US audience listening in order to hear a justification
for the United States to disengage from Europe.
Even if located in the European Union, the ESDI should
be institutionalised within NATO. That is perhaps the only way
to ensure that it remains fully imbued with and continuously demonstrates
a trans-Atlantic perspective.[60]
These concerns in the US are largely fuelled by a
suspicion that the EU's CESDP will increasingly diverge from NATO's
ESDI in the direction of an alternative and autonomous European
defence structure outside NATO.
31. The St Mâlo Declaration of December 1998
between France and the United Kingdom—the two most important
European military players in this debate—stated that—
... the European Union will
also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European
capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national
or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).
That phrase 'multinational European means outside
the NATO framework' stirred up anxieties about the relationship
between the CESDP and the ESDI and reminds us that a key element
in this debate will be France's role within NATO. There is no
objective reason why France should not re-enter the Integrated
Military Structure (IMS) and resume its place as a full Alliance
member. Prior to 1997, such re-integration was regarded as inevitable.
The dispute over command of NATO AFSOUTH in the autumn of 1996,
however, has effectively ruled out any formal re-entry of France
into the IMS or the Nuclear Planning Group,[61]
before the next French Presidential election at least. In strictly
military terms this problem may be more apparent than real. French
defence ministry officials are keen to set in place procedures
and mechanisms that would improve its armed forces' co-operation
within the NATO structure.[62]
However, suspicions exist—and not only in the US—that
France may still be attached to a view that the development of
the ESDI, and now the CESDP, is more about separate development
of European defence than reinforcement of the transatlantic Alliance.
While the trap of supposing that there is an entirely consistent
'French' attitude to NATO and the CESDP should be avoided, a high-ranking
French diplomat did tell us that the ESDI represented a 'Copernican
Revolution' in European defence (perhaps suggesting that it will
be discovered that the Alliance does not revolve around either
the USA or Europe).[63]
Such Gallic enthusiasm worries those who prefer cautious evolution.
Differences between French and American perceptions of NATO's
future are likely to remain for some time to come, and have the
potential to cause the Alliance major problems.
32. Although the German government appears to be
fully signed-up to the ESDI/CESDP, it also has its own emphases.
From its perspective, European security has three essential elements:
the political; the military; and the industrial. We were told
by German diplomatic sources that Kosovo had brought home the
need for political structures to enable integrated crisis management.
But the German commitment to the more immediately deployable military
elements set out in the headline goal will be tested when the
Commission reviewing the structure of the Bundeswehr reports shortly.
Those restructuring proposals will have to deliver a proportionate
contribution to the 60,000 strong rapid reaction force, and more
especially the assets to back it up and sustain it, and that may
well involve increased expenditure.[64]
33. The Germans still see the creation of a rationalised
and competitive European defence industry as an essential third
element of the ESDI/CESDP (alongside the military and political
integration). The Declaration of the June 1999 Cologne European
Council highlighted—
... the need to undertake
sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological
defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We
are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence
industries amongst those States involved. With industry we will
therefore work towards closer and more efficient defence industry
collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation
of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms,
as Member States consider appropriate.
The Finnish Presidency's Progress Report to the Helsinki
European Council claimed that—
Encouraging progress has
been made towards the restructuring of European defence industries,
which constitutes an important step forward and contributes to
strengthening the European industrial and technological bases.
Such developments call for increased efforts to seek further progress
in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning
and procurement of arms between the Member States.[65]
All those whom we met on our visit to Bonn in 1999,
whether from government or industry, emphasised this industrial
element of the ESDI.[66]
34. In the intensified European discussion of the
development of the ESDI over the past two years, the UK government
has always preferred to concentrate on the capabilities side of
the question, and latterly to emphasise the initiative's links
with measures to implement the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative
(DCI). The Secretary of State again stressed on 16 February that—
Our main focus ... has consistently
been on strengthening Europe's military capability, not on constitutional
and organisational change.[67]
The DCI was formally announced at the Washington
Summit last April (although it had been under way for some time
before that).[68] The
DCI seeks to improve alliance capabilities and inter-operability—themes
given added weight by the examinations of performance by the Alliance
in the Kosovo campaign.[69]
The Initiative looks to make improvements in key areas of identified
weaknesses, which include—
- rapid deployment
- extended sustainment of deployed forces
- protection of forces
- command and control, and IT systems
- inter-operability generally, including the need
for common doctrines, training and operational procedures.
The process is being carried forward by a High Level
Steering Group within NATO. More specific details of capability
improvements have yet to be published, but reports have singled
out as priorities a new NATO C3 systems architecture;
more and better precision-guided munitions for European aircraft;
and more large airlift and sealift assets.
35. Related to this NATO initiative is a recently
completed (November 1999) European 'audit' by the WEU of its members'
assets and capabilities.[70]
In its written evidence to our inquiry into the 1999 Defence White
Paper, the MoD told us—
Work on European defence
continues to be focused on means to strengthen Europe's defence
capabilities, for use in NATO operations or in EU-led operations.
The final report of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities for
European operations was presented at the Luxembourg WEU Ministerial
meeting in November. It highlighted the need to improve collective
capabilities and operational forces, placing a particular emphasis
on the need to improve availability, deployability, strategic
mobility, sustainability, survivability, interoperability and
operational effectiveness. ... Specific targets for readiness
and sustainability were also set [at Helsinki] and the European
Council agreed to develop collective capability goals in the fields
of command and control, intelligence, and strategic transport,
shortfalls that had been identified by the WEU audit. Finally
the Council agreed to develop a method for reviewing progress
against all of these goals, which will capitalise on existing
defence planning procedures, including those available in NATO
and, for non-Allies, in the Planning and Review Process of the
Partnership for Peace.[71]
36. Having sketched in the background to the document
we have been asked to consider by the European Scrutiny Committee,
we now offer the Opinion they have requested on the matters of
principle and policy it raises, and on other more practical questions
arising in connection with it.
45 ibid, Q 318 
