CONCLUSION
84. It suits both the proponents and the opponents
of enhanced European cooperation in security and defence to overstate
the significance of what has happened in this area of policy over
the last eighteen months to two years. Some of those who oppose
the present initiative have expressed concern about possible future
change, rather than present actuality or what is likely to be
realised in the immediately foreseeable future. And while there
is an undoubted case for greater European effort and cohesion
in defence, some of those who express support for the latest initiative
undoubtedly have their own agenda in seeking a diminution of US
involvement and what they see as US domination.
85. The case for a more capable and more coherent
European contribution to the military potency of the North Atlantic
Alliance is difficult to contest, other than from a standpoint
from which NATO is viewed as a malign or unnecessary phenomenon.
It is a case which has been made since 1949, and which has been
consistently championed by UK governments of different political
positions. It is a case which has been made with increasing insistence
since the end of the Cold War. The experience of Kosovo appears
to have brought a new sense of urgency to the efforts of European
governments to address this issue.
86. The Western European Union, the chosen vehicle
for the ESDI to be carried through up till now, cannot be said
to have turned around European security and defence investment,
coordination or activity. The rationalisation of European security
structures is overdue. There should be fewer, not more. Nonetheless,
the decision to remove the European pillar of the North Atlantic
Alliance from the WEU and locate it within the EU will create
its own set of problems to replace the problem of institutional
inertia which beset the WEU. Some advocates of the CESDP give
the impression that its very announcement has been a step forward.
This is not the case. An increased European dimension to NATO
will be a step forward if, and only if, it includes a greater
commitment (including, where necessary, greater financial commitment)
by the participants, and a better use of resources through better
coordination. The latest initiative should be judged by its fruits—if
the Helsinki aspirations on deployable military capability
are realised by the end of 2002, this will be real move forward
for European security—but it will only be a first step.
If the EU provides the political energy to achieve this goal,
then it will deserve some congratulations.
87. Fundamental to the success of this latest attempt
to rejuvenate European military capability will be the holding
together of the North American and European wings of the North
Atlantic Alliance. This is not a new problem, but the new arrangements
will create their own new set of tensions. There must be absolute
transparency between the EU military element and NATO at all times
and in all circumstances. There must be no secrets between them,
but each must be able absolutely to rely on the other. Javier
Solana and George Robertson face a considerable challenge in building
this relationship.
88. The non-EU European NATO Allies must be treated
as equal partners in the enterprise and all the institutional
arrangements must reinforce this. The new arrangements must also
embrace effectively the aspirant members of both the Union and
the Alliance. But the status of full members of either or both
should be fully and distinctively recognised within the European
Security and Defence Identity.
89. The idea of a 'European Army' has made regular
appearances in discussions about European defence over the last
fifty years. The term is misleading, since all European armed
forces are national forces, and seem likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future. The notion of a European Army suggests the
prior existence of a sovereign European state which could employ,
equip, deploy and command it. The present reality is that the
only armed forces from which the Europeans can draw, whether for
national, NATO, or European purposes are the forces under the
control of the governments (and sometimes parliaments) of each
of the member states.
90. The EU is not a defensive, military alliance
and is unlikely to become so. The new arrangements are nothing
to do with collective defence, and there needs to be clarity about
their extent, even though such clarity can only be theoretical
until faced by a crisis. The Helsinki proposals are about improving
Europe's capability in the military aspects of crisis management
and are not about enabling Europe to go to war as a bloc. If the
new arrangements enable the better integration of the instruments
of civilian and military crisis management it will be a great
potential benefit. We hope our colleagues on other select committees
will examine the implementation of the proposals for improved
civilian crisis management within the EU.
91. We are grateful to our colleagues on the European
Scrutiny Committee for having referred this document to us. We
hope that we have made it clear that, in our opinion, the future
development and implementation of the EU's Security and Defence
Policy within NATO's European Security and Defence Identity is
a matter of fundamental importance to the UK. This House should
keep a close watch on its progress over the next two years, and
should debate it regularly. We hope the European Scrutiny Committee
will recommend other documents to form the focus of these debates.
We intend to play our part as well in holding the European Council
to its promises made at Helsinki.
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