Presidency Report on Strengthening of
the common European policy on security and defence
1. Introduction
The Treaty of Amsterdam which entered into force
on 1 May provides for the enhancement of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), including the progressive framing of a
common defence policy as provided in Article 17 of the TEU. The
Treaty also provides for the possibility of integrating the WEU
into the EU, should the European Council so decide.
The European Council in Vienna welcomed the new impetus
given to the debate on a common European policy in security and
defence. It considered that in order for the EU to be in a position
to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must
be backed by credible operational capabilities. Furthermore, it
welcomed the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998
in St. Malo. The European Council invited the German Presidency
to pursue this debate and agreed to examine the question again
at the European Council in Cologne. To this end Foreign Ministers
discussed the subject at their informal meeting in Reinhartshausen
on 13/14 March and at the General Affairs Council on 17 May.
The NATO Washington Summit welcomed the new impetus
given to the strengthening of a common European policy on security
and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and confirmed that a stronger
European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance
for the 21st century. The NATO summit furthermore stressed that
the development of a CFSP, as called for in the
Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common
security and defence policy established within the framework of
the Washington Treaty. This process will lead to more complementarity,
cooperation and synergy.
At the WEU Ministerial Council on 10 and 11 May this
question was also discussed on the basis of the informal reflection
which was initiated at the Rome Ministerial Council. Member States
will undertake efforts in line with the conclusions of the ongoing
WEU Audit of European defence capabilities.
2. Guiding Principles
The aim is to strengthen the CFSP by the development
of a common European policy on security and defence. This requires
a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military
capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. Decisions
to act would be taken within the framework of the CFSP according
to appropriate procedures in order to reflect the specific nature
of decisions in this field. The Council of the European Union
would thus be able to take decisions on the whole range of political,
economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding
to crisis situations. The European Union is committed to preserve
peace and strengthen international security in accordance with
the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of
the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris,
as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU.
The Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg
tasks ("humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making")
into the Treaty.
The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure
that the European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities
(including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for
effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope
of the Petersberg tasks. This is the area where a European capacity
to act is required most urgently. The development of an EU military
crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity within
the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU) and as a part of
the progressive framing of a common defence policy in accordance
with Article 17 of the TEU.
The Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation of the
collective defence of its Members. The commitments under Article
5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty
will in any event be preserved for the Member States party to
these Treaties. The policy of the Union shall not prejudice the
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain
Member States.
3. Decision Making
As regards EU decision making in the field of security
and defence policy, necessary arrangements must be made in order
to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led
Petersberg operations so that the EU can decide and conduct such
operations effectively.
Furthermore, the EU will need a capacity for analysis
of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant
strategic planning.
This may require in particular:
- regular (or ad hoc) meetings
of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence
Ministers;
- a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security
Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise;
- an EU Military Committee consisting of Military
Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security
Committee;
- a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;
- other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute
for Security Studies.
Further institutional questions may need to be addressed.
Decisions relating to crisis management tasks, in
particular decisions having military or defence implications will
be taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty on European
Union. Member States will retain in all circumstances the right
to decide if and when their national forces are deployed.
4. Implementation
As regards military capabilities, Member States need
to develop further forces (including headquarters) that are suited
also to crisis management operations, without any unnecessary
duplication. The main characteristics include: deployability,
sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility.
For the effective implementation of EU-led operations
the European Union will have to determine, according to the requirements
of the case, whether it will conduct:
For EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European
means pre-identified by Member States. This will require either
the use of national command structures providing multinational
representation in headquarters or drawing on existing command
structures within multinational forces. Further arrangements to
enhance the capacity of European multinational and national forces
to respond to crises situations will be needed.
For EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the
main focus should be on the following aspects:
- Implementation of the arrangements
based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO
summit decisions of April 1999.
- The further arrangements set out by NATO at its
summit meeting in Washington should address in particular:
- assured EU access to NATO
planning capabilities able to contribute to military planing for
EU-led operations;
- the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified
NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.
5. Modalities of participation and cooperation
The successful creation of a European policy on security
and defence will require in particular:
- the possibility of all
EU Member States, including non-allied members, to participate
fully and on an equal footing in EU operations;
- satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members
who are not EU Member States to ensure their fullest possible
involvement in EU-led operations, building on existing consultation
arrangements within WEU;
- arrangements to ensure that all participants in
an EU-led operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct
of that operation, without prejudice to the principle of the EU's
decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to
discuss and decide matters of principle and policy;
- the need to ensure the development of effective
mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO
and the EU;
- the consideration of ways to ensure the possibility
for WEU Associate Partners to be involved.
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