WEU Audit of Assets And Capabilities For
European Crisis Management Operations Recommendations For Strengthening
European Capabilities For Crisis Management Operations
Luxembourg, 23 November 1999
At their meeting in Rome in November 1998, WEU Ministers
expressed the wish that a process of informal reflection be initiated
at WEU on the question of Europe's security and defence. As part
of this process, they decided to conduct a WEU audit of assets
and capabilities for European crisis management operations. This
audit included Member States, Associate Members and Observers.
The results of this audit show that Europeans, in
principle, have the available force levels and resources needed
to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range
of Petersberg tasks, i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping
tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking.
The general report prepared by the Luxembourg Presidency
has identified a number of gaps and deficiencies, as well as areas
where these European assets and capabilities should be strengthened
to attain a higher level of operational effectiveness in crisis
management.
Despite the measures which are already being examined
by Europeans and the possibility of using Alliance assets and
capabilities, considerable efforts are still needed to strengthen
European capabilities.
Implementation of the recommendations presented in
this document would contribute to overcoming gaps and deficiencies
and to reinforcing European capabilities.
Whilst underlining the need to define priorities
for the actions to be taken, the most urgent efforts should be
focused:
- with regard to collective capabilities, on the
following areas:
- strategic intelligence;
- strategic planning;
- with regard to forces and operational capabilities,
on the following areas:
- availability, deployability, strategic mobility,
sustainability, survivability and interoperability and operational
effectiveness;
- multinational, joint Operation and Force HQs,
with particular reference to C3 (command, control and communications)
capabilities and deployability of Force HQs.
Strengthening collective capabilities for crisis
management operations
With respect to the gathering and management of information
and intelligence and the analysis of crisis situations, it is
recommended to set up a more coherent strategic intelligence and
information pooling and management policy. In a crisis situation,
this policy should allow a careful in-depth analysis at strategic
level to be made. Access to classified sources should be covered
by more precise agreements. Improved WEU Satellite Centre access
to commercial - and, above all, military - high resolution satellite
imagery should be fostered. Procedures for cooperation between
the Satellite Centre and other international organisations, particularly
the European Union and NATO, should be clarified.
With respect to capabilities for the preparation
and planning of crisis management operations, strategic planning
capabilities should be considerably strengthened. Planning architecture,
procedures and terminology should be harmonised with those used
in NATO. Work should continue on the procedures and criteria for
identifying and selecting national or multinational HQs capable
of serving as Operation or Force HQs .
With respect to political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, WEU should produce a single,
consolidated crisis management manual containing all the various
texts on crisis management procedures and replacing existing documents
in this field. Clear and straightforward standard operating procedures
should be developed. The force activation and generation procedures
should be harmonised with the mechanisms currently used by NATO.
WEU's communications and information systems (CIS) should continue
to be improved.
Reinforcement of force capabilities and operational
capabilities
With regard to availability of forces, forces and
force packages should be available at shorter notice. Thus, certain
of these forces should be available for immediate reaction and
rapid reaction.
With regard to the deployability and strategic mobility
of forces, capabilities for projecting forces to theatres of operations,
even distant ones, should be improved. For operations at the higher
end of the Petersberg task spectrum, military air and sea transport
assets and capabilities should be considerably reinforced. A common
European approach could be adopted. A number of ideas have been
raised in this regard, for example a "Eurolift" force
or a structured European transport capability. Even for cases
where recourse to civilian assets may be inevitable, the capability
for strategic projection within short time-frames should be maintained.
Coordination, designed to make optimum use of existing assets
and capabilities, both military and civilian, should be stepped
up. At the tactical level, mobility, particularly in-theatre helicopter
transport capability, should be improved.
With regard to sustainability and survivability of
forces, nations should reinforce their logistics capacity to support
their forces once they have been deployed and should improve their
capabilities for establishing supply lines. The capability for
sustaining forces in the theatre of operations over a long period
should be improved. In this respect, it may be beneficial to make
greater use of task-sharing between nations in order to improve
logistics and resupply capabilities.
With regard to interoperability of forces, WEU nations
should continue to make efforts to improve interoperability between
their forces, making use of all appropriate mechanisms.
With regard to communications and information systems
(CIS), it is advisable to dispose of a consolidated, high-performance,
strategic and tactical communications and information system for
the rapid exchange of classified documents. The capacity to conduct
electronic operations should be enhanced, particularly in the
area of offensive operations and suppressive electronic countermeasures.
This is particularly true for air forces. For special operations,
search and rescue (SAR) capabilities should be capable of covering
a hostile environment. Real combat capability should be built
up in this area.
With regard to medical support to forces, efforts
should be made in the field of long-haul medical evacuation and
in the NBC area, particularly in the provision of aid to the civilian
population. Capacities in the area of Civil-Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) should be improved. All nations should continue their
efforts to develop or reinforce their capabilities, in the light
of the EU's work on the enhancement of non-military tools for
crisis management.
The national and multinational HQs should be capable
of operating in joint and/or combined configurations and be capable
of serving as Operation or Force HQs for operations across the
whole range of Petersberg tasks. Efforts should be envisaged on
force build-up times, interaction with politico-military structures
and on deployability of Force HQs.
As far as forces are concerned, the structure of
land forces should be further adapted to allow operations in a
non-static environment. The organic air assets of maritime forces
should reinforce their air defence and offensive capability. Air
forces need to strengthen their C3 (command, control and communications)
and electronic operations capabilities. The capability to conduct
integrated air defence and air operations using precision-guided
munitions should be developed.
It may be useful to make wider use of the framework
nation concept and of task-sharing between nations in order to
enhance operational capabilities. Depending on their capabilities,
nations could concentrate on providing specialised units.
Final remarks
In the context of the Cologne European Council, the
German Presidency Report on strengthening of the common European
policy on security and defence stated that the European Union
Member States would "undertake efforts in line with the conclusions
of the ongoing WEU Audit of European defence capabilities".
In this connection, WEU, with its whole range of capabilities,
remains at the European Union's disposal for any additional work
should the EU consider that useful.
The strengthening of assets and capabilities for
European crisis management operations depends on the continuation
of sustained and structured defence efforts and the implementation
of the necessary adaptations. Such a strengthening could be facilitated
through flexible mechanisms which would identify common goals
and criteria for these goals, encouraging nations to indicate
how they could be fulfilled. Wherever possible, the nations concerned
will also make full use of the NATO mechanisms and processes in
which they already participate (defence planning, Defence Capabilities
Initiative, Planning and Review Process (PARP)).
In pursuing their efforts to develop their military
capabilities in the fields identified, the nations concerned will
be able to contribute to the reinforcement of the European pillar
of the Alliance.
In continuing its work, WEU will maintain full transparency
and the necessary consultations with the Atlantic Alliance.
Follow-up
The WEU Military Staff, as part of its general responsibilities
vis-àà-vis national and multinational forces, is
tasked with:
- taking advantage of the audit work to achieve
better coverage of the issue of capabilities of forces answerable
to WEU;
- using the audit work to assess the time constraints
in the build-up of ad hoc Operation and Force HQs (immediate reaction
and rapid reaction) based on relevant force packages;
- integrating the lessons learnt from recent military
operations.
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