Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20
- 39)
WEDNESDAY 1 MARCH 2000
MR BRIAN
HAWTIN, MR
PAUL SCHULTE,
COLONEL JOHN
ELIOT AND
MR OWEN
JENKINS
20. Have we done the same in some instances?
(Colonel Eliot) We have never refused any legitimate
inspection request.
Mr Hancock: What does that mean?
Mr Viggers
21. One man's legitimate is another man's force
majeure.
(Colonel Eliot) In January of this year we did turn
down a Russian request to inspect British forces in Germany simply
because our passive quota in Germany had already been expended,
so that was not a legitimate request. We turned it down.
Dr Lewis
22. That means that they used up their allocation?
(Colonel Eliot) The allocation had been fully used
up, yes.
Chairman
23. Perhaps we should work out how many times
our legitimate requests have been turned down. It is quite a lot
actually, including who were the Clerks and the Chairmen of the
Committees investigating different aspects of the SDR, a perfectly
legitimate request which was rejected. I empathise with those
who get the treatment. As you say, it is a very rare occasion.
(Colonel Eliot) It is a rare occasion.
24. Is there any appeal mechanism? How do you
take it further?
(Colonel Eliot) If one is not satisfied with one's
treatment then one raises it in the Joint Consultative Group in
Vienna. That is the body which is represented at ambassadorial
level at which one takes up complaints.
25. Have there been any cases of "appeals"
being upheld?
(Colonel Eliot) Oh yes.[1]
Chairman: Mind you, whatever has been
hidden will then be removed, I presume, so you are just going
to find an empty bunker where maybe you anticipated something
more serious was held.
Mr Hancock
26. I just wanted to follow up what you said
about passive requests. There is a quota of passive requests.
When does that status change and under what circumstances does
it change when the request becomes something that cannot be refused?
(Colonel Eliot) Sorry: I have misled you, I suspect,
with CFE jargon. We are talking about two aspects here. Firstly
there is the obligation of a state party to receive an inspection,
and the number of inspections it must accept in each year is defined
essentially by the spread, the deployment, of its forces. In treaty
terminology these are divided up into a number of Objects of Verification.
Depending on how many Objects of Verification a particular country
has that will define what its passive quota is, its passive declared
site inspection quota. That is the number of inspections it must
receive. The converse of that is the active quota and, for example,
in an alliance like NATO we meet together and there is a co-ordinating
process to decide in each year which Ally is going to inspect
which other countries basically in an attempt to de-conflict.
Out of that flows an allocation, or if you like, a number of active
quotas. So the United Kingdom will have an active quota for this
coming inspection year of the number of inspections we are allowed
to undertake. The passive quota is the number of inspections we
must receive or any other state party. Does that make it clear?
27. Yes.
(Mr Schulte) On the general approach to verification
perhaps I could make a few comments. It is not like other arms
control treaties, so the term "challenge inspection",
which comes from the Chemical Weapons Convention, is not absolutely
appropriate and it is not a case of going inside bunkers and poking
around to find some evidence of prohibited weapon types. It is
not stocktaking. It is not an opportunity to count every single
weapon system every year. It is the opportunity to build up a
picture of the overall patterns and changes in those patterns
of other states' military deployments using experience and continuity.
That is why it is important that it runs for years. It is a politico-military
process so that in military terms yes, the Russians have shown
that you can claim force majeure and you can stop inspectors
going into places where you are embarrassed, for whatever reason,
to do with your operations there. But that leads to political
consequences. When you do that you spotlight that place and that
event. The issue gets raised in the Joint Consultative Group and
Europe as a whole collectively takes note of that and if this
pattern were to intensify and worsen the continent as a whole
and military players in it and the political overlords begin to
take appropriate notice and respond at diplomatic and other levels.
Dr Lewis
28. Just for the avoidance of doubt, what I
think Colonel Eliot was saying was that whereas the Russians have
actually turned down a couple of our legitimate requests for inspection,
we have only once turned down one of theirs and that was because
they were trying it on asking for one more than they were entitled
to. Is that correct?
(Colonel Eliot) Correct.
29. My question is going to focus on aspects
of the territorial ceilings but I hope as a preliminary you will
indulge me, as the newest and therefore the most junior member
of this Committee, if I ask a more general question about the
existing Treaty before amendment. Am I right in thinking that
the existing Treaty, whereas it covers the entirety of the territory
of, shall we say, the NATO participants in the NATO countries
participating in the scheme, only covers part of the territory
of Russia—namely that part west of the Urals? Is that correct?
(Mr Schulte) It is from the Atlantic to the Urals.
30. So in a sense there is an asymmetry both
with the original Treaty and with the Treaty as amended, in that
the Russians have the option that they can transport or transfer
forces, equipment and personnel between that part of their territory
which is covered by this arrangement and a large hinterland which
is not?
(Mr Hawtin) The United States and Canada are also
excluded from the area, but may I ask Colonel Eliot to answer
you?
Dr Lewis: And of course there is the
small matter of the Atlantic Ocean separating them from Europe.
Chairman
31. The Russians were caught in 1990 and 1991,
were they not, with shifting 50,000 items of equipment east of
the Urals and they were spotted and had to destroy most of them?
(Mr Hawtin) Yes. There are something like 50,000 items
of Treaty limited equipment that Russia has Russia-wide and they
are split roughly half west of the Urals and half to the east.
A lot of the equipment to which you refer, Chairman, is rusting
in depots. It is not combat effective, has not been maintained,
does not have the spares support, and frankly is not something
that poses a problem or a threat to us.
Mr Brazier
32. Where east of the Urals? I am intrigued.
Where have they got these huge camps east of the Urals?
(Mr Hawtin) At a number of sites east of the Urals
I think is the answer but we can provide you with more information.
Chairman
33. This was the question that I was very anxious
about that Dr Lewis has raised, a bit of trickery by the Russians
shifting it east of the Urals and therefore if the time came when
they required additional tanks they could just drive them over
the mountain peaks and into Turkey or whatever. You are not at
all anxious about that possibility or likelihood?
(Mr Hawtin) We are not concerned about the use of
equipment we have discussed in that way. It is not combat effective.
34. So it is not a threat?
(Mr Hawtin) No. Just to illustrate this point, the
forces that they have been deploying to Chechnya for example come
from their active units east of the Urals,[2]
not from the stockpile of weapons that we have just been discussing.
(Colonel Eliot) May I just add to one
or two points that Mr Hawtin has made? It is worth noting that
of that equipment which was moved east of the Urals before the
Treaty entered into force, Russia did come up with additional
political agreements to destroy a major portion of it, as you
have recognised, Chairman. They have agreed to the attendance
by inspectors from other states parties at the reduction of that
equipment. They have provided considerable transparency. As far
as equipment nipping backwards and forwards across the Urals is
concerned, again they are, under the Treaty transparency regime,
required to report such movements and they are doing so, and certainly
in the case of Chechnya those forces that they did take from east
of the Urals to deploy into Chechnya was reported on the CFE system.
Dr Lewis
35. Why I have raised this matter is because
I am trying to get the concept clear as to what it is we should
be expecting from a treaty like this. I think I know what it is
but I want to ask you if I am right. Could I give you an analogy?
If one considers the United Nations Organisation, what one would
say is that if people are determined to do each other down the
United Nations is not really going to be effective in stopping
them doing that. But if people wish to co-operate, the existence
of the United Nations is very useful because it gives them the
framework in which to realise the fruits of their wish to co-operate.
Am I right in thinking that when we look at a treaty like this
there is some sort of analogy and that, if you want to cheat you
can, particularly if you are a Russian, for the reasons we have
been discussing; and am I right in thinking that perhaps we should
not be talking about this Treaty ensuring military stability in
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but assisting the realisation
of military stability when the countries concerned wish to co-operate
with each other. Thus, it is something that facilitates but not
something which can be relied upon to ensure stability?
(Mr Hawtin) I will ask others to come in but it is
actually slightly more than you suggest, Dr Lewis. The first point
I would emphasise is that for example all 30 states parties have
spent a lot of time negotiating this and making sure that their
particular interests and their overall interests are recognised.
Secondly, it is an extremely important mechanism for delivering
that increased security and it does so and its length is well
over 100 pages. It has a vast amount of detailed reporting and
mechanisms in it ranging from, for example, the ceilings on national
and territorial limits, the movements across state boundaries,
the inspection arrangements and the notification arrangements.
All of that is extremely intrusive. It makes it very difficult
to cheat in any way that enables you to undertake surprise attacks
or to mount major offensive operations. That is in a sense the
key objective.
36. But on that point it is physically impossible
to in a sense rip it up. You will not have surprise. You will
see them doing it; but what I have in mind is the answer to a
written question put in by the Committee earlier where it was
pointed out that, whereas national ceilings cover all five categories
of equipment, territorial ones cover only the three ground categories
because the helicopters and the aircraft are so easy to move from
one area to another quickly. What I am trying to get at is that,
because of the asymmetry with Russia having this hinterland outside
the area covered by these arrangements, even the ground categories
could easily be moved in—okay, not with surprise, but they
could be moved in if the confidence and the wish to co-operate
broke down. Is that correct?
(Mr Hawtin) In theory it is correct. In practice I
think the scenario you have described is an extremely unlikely
one.
(Mr Schulte) Perhaps I could comment. The asymmetry
you mention needs to be rather carefully examined. The Urals are
a long way from Russia's border with western countries. Moving
forces from there would not be a quick or easy process. It would
certainly be an observed one. The reconstitution of those forces
which we mentioned are beyond the Urals (and incidentally remember
that beyond the Urals is most of the land territory of the Russian
Federation) it is not a sinister suggestion necessarily that there
are enormous camps just beyond the line of the highest peaks of
the Urals. There is legitimate Russian interest in having forces
on their borders with turbulent central Asian states and China.
Air forces and TLE of course can move, but the Russians point
out, reasonably enough, that that is something which NATO and
other western countries can benefit from at least as much as they
can. No treaty can prevent war. That is obviously correct, but
the CFE Treaty, with its enhanced verification, makes preparation
for war much easier to determine. It does deliver the fruits of
co-operation, stability and security at lower force levels that
this reduction process has delivered to pretty much everyone's
economic benefit in the region. The Treaty, though, enables the
transition between that stable state of co-operation and preparation
for war to be very apparent.
37. So it reduces the surprise factor?
(Mr Schulte) And it also therefore reduces the incentives
for going to war. It takes away many military options for quick
successful offensive action. One analogy would be a board game
whose rules deprived any player of the possibility of a winning
gambit and make cheating instantly visible to all the other players.
38. But if large armaments were being created
outside the area covered, that could be done in secret without
us knowing.
(Mr Schulte) I think that is an extremely hypothetical
suggestion given the existing state of the Russian economy and
military machine. If you are envisaging enormous cavernous underground
arms factories, of course that is a hypothetical possibility,
but I think it is only that.
39. I think all future military planning is
hypothetical.
(Mr Hawtin) I do not want to go into detail, but the
issue of surveillance and technical means for verifying what is
going on do come into play in the situation you have described.
1 Note by Witness: but not in the case of the
six inspections mentioned on page 16. The Joint Consultative Group
operates by consensus and deals with a wide range of implementation
and adaptation issues, where appropriate, seeking outcomes to
disputes/disagreements acceptable to the 30 States Parties. Back
2
Note by Witness: though most of the Russian forces deployed
into Chechnya came from west of the Urals. Back
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