Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100
- 112)
WEDNESDAY 1 MARCH 2000
MR BRIAN
HAWTIN, MR
PAUL SCHULTE,
COLONEL JOHN
ELIOT AND
MR OWEN
JENKINS
100. The point I am making is that if the provisions
are there for us, within the NATO context, to deploy to Hungary,
the Czech Republic or Poland, equally the Russians could deploy
to other countries. Whether or not there is a Warsaw Pact is irrelevant
because the Warsaw Pact and NATO are not mentioned as such within
the context of this Treaty. That is true, is it not?
(Mr Hawtin) That is true. The exceptional temporary
deployment applies on both sides.[7]
101. Finally, is it possible now that NATO and
the Warsaw Pact are not party to this agreement for a country
to be a member of NATO through enlargement but not covered by
the CFE Treaty? Would that mean that excluding the country from
this Treaty could in itself prevent it from joining NATO?
(Mr Hawtin) No.
102. So countries could join NATO and not be
in the CFE Treaty?
(Mr Hawtin) Yes. There is an expectation. All members
of NATO are participant states parties in the CFE arrangements
but there is no provision that says, "You have to be a participant
in CFE before you can become a member of NATO." Indeed, were
there to be such a provision it could amount to a Russian veto,
which is clearly unacceptable.
Mr Hancock
103. Can you answer my question about the effect
of the Russian attitude to the Americans pursuing the anti-ballistic
screen to protect all 50 states and the effects that will have?
The Russians see that as a very destabilising thing as far as
they are concerned. What is the effect of that on Treaties like
this?
(Mr Jenkins) Yes, they are deeply concerned about
the possible national missile defence and they have said it will
impact on their capacity to sign up to other arms control treaties.
As I said before, we have not seen that feed through to their
attitude to the CFE Treaty yet, they are still very positive about
that in our discussions with them. That is not to exclude that
their view may change in the future but it has not so far.
Mr Viggers
104. The failure to include the Baltic States—Estonia,
Lithuania and Latvia—is perhaps most regrettable in the
sense it poses the biggest problems with the exclave of Russia
beyond Lithuania. What were the problems in including the Baltic
States? Was it opposition on the Russian side, within the Baltic
States themselves or was there a special problem?
(Mr Jenkins) It is really an historical reason, I
think, for them not being included. As Mr Hawtin pointed out,
the existing Treaty did not include any clause which would allow
new states to accede, because it was negotiated very much in a
strategic Cold War context, so at that point the only blocs which
were seen to matter were NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Baltic
States did not accede to the international obligations of the
former Soviet Union because it was never accepted they had been
legally included within the Soviet Union, and therefore they did
not accede to the obligations under CFE. The adaptation process
did not include additional states parties to CFE, it adapted it
under the current circumstances and it introduced an accession
clause which the Baltic States may if they wish now use to accede.
That was the background to the Baltic States not being party.
Laura Moffatt
105. Which countries are in breach of the current
CFE Treaty?
(Mr Hawtin) Russia.
106. Only Russia?
(Colonel Eliot) We assessed its overall limits from
their information exchange and other CFE data they have provided;
it exceeded the overall limit by 21 pieces of artillery. They
are, of course, considerably more in breach of their specific
flank limits within that.
107. I would like to explore that. So all of
the other nations which were quoted as being in breach—Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia—are now compliant?
(Colonel Eliot) There are minor technical breaches
or features but I think, if I may, it would be necessary to produce
a note for you.
108. We would very much appreciate that. You
have mentioned Russia and clearly this Committee has concerns
about the action in Chechnya. What is the point of the Treaty
if they continue to be able to breach the CFE Treaty in Chechnya?
What purpose does it have then?
(Mr Jenkins) I think there are two parts to the answer
to that. The first is the one which Mr Hawtin raised earlier,
which is that if there is a problem with compliance then the CFE
Treaty mechanisms are transparent through the Joint Consultative
Group and are able to draw the attention of the whole European
community in the widest sense to that non-compliance and discuss
it and examine it and get much more transparency into exactly
what is going on. That would not be possible without the Treaty.
109. It does not actually influence behaviour,
does it? It may have that very effect of transparency, but it
does not influence behaviour.
(Mr Jenkins) The second point that I would raise in
that context is the statement which the Foreign Secretary made
at Istanbul. I think his words were very carefully chosen and
he talked about the credibility of the Treaty being undermined
if it were to enter into force when countries were substantially
in breach of it. I think that goes to your question, that the
credibility of the Treaty would be undermined in that case. It
still has a great deal of value for the reasons we have outlined
earlier but I think that question of credibility, you are quite
right, is key.
(Mr Schulte) Could I add an additional point to the
question, what is the point of the Treaty at the moment if the
Russians are violating it in Chechnya? It still, nonetheless,
provides a great deal of transparency and understanding of what
is going on and an obligation to report force levels and to accept
international surveillance of behaviour which is unique in European
history. We have never reached this stage before and it is part
of the evolution towards a further, tighter, more transparent
arrangement which we will get in the Adapted Treaty, if and when
it is ratified, and which will then involve successive review
conferences every five years, which I think may deal with some
of Mr Hancock's points. This Treaty needs to tie in to the process
to catch up with more and more of the changing strategic realities,
but there is an expectation that the process will do that and
there is built into it a succession of opportunities for review
conferences to bring that about. But even without any of that,
just as it stands, Europe is safer because we know better what
is going on and what other countries are capable of because of
the transparency provisions.
Mr Gapes
110. I understand that Vladimir Putin did not
go to the Istanbul Summit at which this Adaptation Agreement was
signed last November. How committed does the Government think
that Mr Putin will be to the Agreement if he is elected as Russian
President? Linked to that, given the politics of the new Duma
which probably, with six parties, is more convivial than the previous
one, will there be potential conflict between Mr Putin and his
parliament on this issue?
(Mr Jenkins) I go back to what I said earlier, that
all the indications we have had from the Russian side are that
they are positive about this. That includes large sections of
the Duma although clearly there is opposition there. We are not
aware of opposition from Acting President Putin, quite the opposite.
CFE was discussed during the Foreign Secretary's visit last week
and we certainly picked up no indication he was opposed to the
Adapted Treaty.
111. That is very welcome. If the West had resisted
this flank agreement sought by the Russians, could the two Chechnyan
wars have been avoided?
(Mr Hawtin) Speaking personally, and I will invite
Mr Jenkins to come in, I would have thought no, in the sense that
the Russians view that as an internal security issue. They would
have done whatever they decided they needed to do to meet their
particular objectives.
112. Regardless of what the Treaty might say?
(Mr Hawtin) In this particular instance, yes.
(Mr Jenkins) I can only agree with that.
Mr Viggers: Gentlemen, thank you very
much indeed. It is clear that the Treaty is limited in the sense
that classes of weapons are crudely defined, that being historically
based the Treaty is geographically limited and the sanctions are
moral and ethical. It is also clear from what you have said that
it has had value and provides the basis for further productive
discussion and agreement. This Committee will be producing a report
based on the evidence you have given us today and in written submissions,
and we are very grateful to you for appearing before us today.
7 Note by Witness: And as noted in Q.80, Basic
and Exceptional Temporary Deployments can only be made at the
request of, and with the agreement of, the receiving state. Back
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