Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100 - 112)

WEDNESDAY 1 MARCH 2000

MR BRIAN HAWTIN, MR PAUL SCHULTE, COLONEL JOHN ELIOT AND MR OWEN JENKINS

  100. The point I am making is that if the provisions are there for us, within the NATO context, to deploy to Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland, equally the Russians could deploy to other countries. Whether or not there is a Warsaw Pact is irrelevant because the Warsaw Pact and NATO are not mentioned as such within the context of this Treaty. That is true, is it not?
  (Mr Hawtin) That is true. The exceptional temporary deployment applies on both sides.[7]

  101. Finally, is it possible now that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are not party to this agreement for a country to be a member of NATO through enlargement but not covered by the CFE Treaty? Would that mean that excluding the country from this Treaty could in itself prevent it from joining NATO?
  (Mr Hawtin) No.

  102. So countries could join NATO and not be in the CFE Treaty?
  (Mr Hawtin) Yes. There is an expectation. All members of NATO are participant states parties in the CFE arrangements but there is no provision that says, "You have to be a participant in CFE before you can become a member of NATO." Indeed, were there to be such a provision it could amount to a Russian veto, which is clearly unacceptable.

Mr Hancock

  103. Can you answer my question about the effect of the Russian attitude to the Americans pursuing the anti-ballistic screen to protect all 50 states and the effects that will have? The Russians see that as a very destabilising thing as far as they are concerned. What is the effect of that on Treaties like this?
  (Mr Jenkins) Yes, they are deeply concerned about the possible national missile defence and they have said it will impact on their capacity to sign up to other arms control treaties. As I said before, we have not seen that feed through to their attitude to the CFE Treaty yet, they are still very positive about that in our discussions with them. That is not to exclude that their view may change in the future but it has not so far.

Mr Viggers

  104. The failure to include the Baltic States—Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia—is perhaps most regrettable in the sense it poses the biggest problems with the exclave of Russia beyond Lithuania. What were the problems in including the Baltic States? Was it opposition on the Russian side, within the Baltic States themselves or was there a special problem?
  (Mr Jenkins) It is really an historical reason, I think, for them not being included. As Mr Hawtin pointed out, the existing Treaty did not include any clause which would allow new states to accede, because it was negotiated very much in a strategic Cold War context, so at that point the only blocs which were seen to matter were NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Baltic States did not accede to the international obligations of the former Soviet Union because it was never accepted they had been legally included within the Soviet Union, and therefore they did not accede to the obligations under CFE. The adaptation process did not include additional states parties to CFE, it adapted it under the current circumstances and it introduced an accession clause which the Baltic States may if they wish now use to accede. That was the background to the Baltic States not being party.

Laura Moffatt

  105. Which countries are in breach of the current CFE Treaty?
  (Mr Hawtin) Russia.

  106. Only Russia?
  (Colonel Eliot) We assessed its overall limits from their information exchange and other CFE data they have provided; it exceeded the overall limit by 21 pieces of artillery. They are, of course, considerably more in breach of their specific flank limits within that.

  107. I would like to explore that. So all of the other nations which were quoted as being in breach—Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia—are now compliant?
  (Colonel Eliot) There are minor technical breaches or features but I think, if I may, it would be necessary to produce a note for you.

  108. We would very much appreciate that. You have mentioned Russia and clearly this Committee has concerns about the action in Chechnya. What is the point of the Treaty if they continue to be able to breach the CFE Treaty in Chechnya? What purpose does it have then?
  (Mr Jenkins) I think there are two parts to the answer to that. The first is the one which Mr Hawtin raised earlier, which is that if there is a problem with compliance then the CFE Treaty mechanisms are transparent through the Joint Consultative Group and are able to draw the attention of the whole European community in the widest sense to that non-compliance and discuss it and examine it and get much more transparency into exactly what is going on. That would not be possible without the Treaty.

  109. It does not actually influence behaviour, does it? It may have that very effect of transparency, but it does not influence behaviour.
  (Mr Jenkins) The second point that I would raise in that context is the statement which the Foreign Secretary made at Istanbul. I think his words were very carefully chosen and he talked about the credibility of the Treaty being undermined if it were to enter into force when countries were substantially in breach of it. I think that goes to your question, that the credibility of the Treaty would be undermined in that case. It still has a great deal of value for the reasons we have outlined earlier but I think that question of credibility, you are quite right, is key.
  (Mr Schulte) Could I add an additional point to the question, what is the point of the Treaty at the moment if the Russians are violating it in Chechnya? It still, nonetheless, provides a great deal of transparency and understanding of what is going on and an obligation to report force levels and to accept international surveillance of behaviour which is unique in European history. We have never reached this stage before and it is part of the evolution towards a further, tighter, more transparent arrangement which we will get in the Adapted Treaty, if and when it is ratified, and which will then involve successive review conferences every five years, which I think may deal with some of Mr Hancock's points. This Treaty needs to tie in to the process to catch up with more and more of the changing strategic realities, but there is an expectation that the process will do that and there is built into it a succession of opportunities for review conferences to bring that about. But even without any of that, just as it stands, Europe is safer because we know better what is going on and what other countries are capable of because of the transparency provisions.

Mr Gapes

  110. I understand that Vladimir Putin did not go to the Istanbul Summit at which this Adaptation Agreement was signed last November. How committed does the Government think that Mr Putin will be to the Agreement if he is elected as Russian President? Linked to that, given the politics of the new Duma which probably, with six parties, is more convivial than the previous one, will there be potential conflict between Mr Putin and his parliament on this issue?
  (Mr Jenkins) I go back to what I said earlier, that all the indications we have had from the Russian side are that they are positive about this. That includes large sections of the Duma although clearly there is opposition there. We are not aware of opposition from Acting President Putin, quite the opposite. CFE was discussed during the Foreign Secretary's visit last week and we certainly picked up no indication he was opposed to the Adapted Treaty.

  111. That is very welcome. If the West had resisted this flank agreement sought by the Russians, could the two Chechnyan wars have been avoided?
  (Mr Hawtin) Speaking personally, and I will invite Mr Jenkins to come in, I would have thought no, in the sense that the Russians view that as an internal security issue. They would have done whatever they decided they needed to do to meet their particular objectives.

  112. Regardless of what the Treaty might say?
  (Mr Hawtin) In this particular instance, yes.
  (Mr Jenkins) I can only agree with that.

  Mr Viggers: Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed. It is clear that the Treaty is limited in the sense that classes of weapons are crudely defined, that being historically based the Treaty is geographically limited and the sanctions are moral and ethical. It is also clear from what you have said that it has had value and provides the basis for further productive discussion and agreement. This Committee will be producing a report based on the evidence you have given us today and in written submissions, and we are very grateful to you for appearing before us today.





7   Note by Witness: And as noted in Q.80, Basic and Exceptional Temporary Deployments can only be made at the request of, and with the agreement of, the receiving state. Back


 
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