House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Twelfth Report

The 1996 Flank Agreement

10. The CFE Treaty set a 40-month 'reduction period', during which the signatory nations were required to deal with any holdings in excess of their allowances. By 16 November 1995—the end of the reduction period—nearly 50,000 pieces of equipment had been destroyed (and more than 2,300 verification inspections had been conducted) but some countries were unable to comply by that date. Azerbaijan, Belarus[27] and Armenia still had outstanding reduction liabilities. Ukraine (which had been engaged in lengthy negotiations with Russia about ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and its facilities) had failed to meet its share of reduction obligations relating to 'naval infantry' and 'coastal defence forces' attached to the Fleet. Most significantly, Russia and Ukraine did not comply fully with Article V of the Treaty, which limits the number of tanks, ACVs and artillery pieces that may be deployed in the flank zone—notably Russia's Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts,[28] and Ukraine's Odessa military district.

11. Russia argued that, because of increased 'security concerns' in the Caucasus, the flank limits laid down in Article V—700 tanks, 580 ACVs and 1,280 artillery pieces in active units—were insufficient for it to maintain internal security.[29] In discussions with NATO in July 1995, Russia suggested the creation of an area in its North Caucasus military district, where the deployment of treaty-limited equipment might not count against its flank limits. NATO tabled alternative proposals to reduce the size of the flank regions, redraw the flank map and to remove five oblasts (regions) and krays (smaller districts) from Russia's flank zone, and an oblast from the Ukrainian flank region.[30] NATO also urged the Russians to take full advantage of flexibility permitted by the Treaty's existing provisions to help them comply with their flank limits. These flexibilities allowed countries to make 'temporary deployments' of additional treaty-limited equipment; Russia could have armed some of its units in the flanks with lighter equipments than those covered by the Treaty; it could also have made more use of designated permanent storage sites which had their own equipment allowances; it could have subordinated some armoured combat vehicles to internal security forces; and it could have taken up unused equipment quotas from neighbouring countries (with their consent).[31] In response, the Russians presented their own suggestions for a change to the map to remove some strategic areas from the southern and northern flanks, which would mean that equipment in these areas would be covered only by the higher limits of the Treaty's other (larger) zones. None of Russia's proposals were acceptable to NATO, however, and in the absence of any agreement Russia was in breach of the Treaty's flank limits when it came into effect on 17 November 1995.

12. At the time of the first CFE Review Conference in 1996, a year after the end of the 'reduction period', four countries were still exceeding their equipment ceilings—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus and (in the flank zone) Russia.[32] The Conference noted Russia's particular difficulties in the Caucasus, and adjustments to the flank limits and boundaries were able to be agreed at the Conference, which were to come into effect in May 1999.[33] The legally binding 'Flank Agreement'[34] made changes to the boundaries of some oblasts within the Russian and Ukrainian parts of the flank zone[35] and obliged Russia to contain its holdings there, by 31 May 1999, to 1,800 tanks, 3,700 armoured combat vehicles and 2,400 artillery pieces. Ukraine was similarly limited to 400 tanks, 400 ACVs and 350 artillery pieces. The Flank Agreement also placed specific limits on the levels of equipment held in each oblast in the flanks, and enhanced transparency measures in the regions removed from the flank zone through the provision of further data on forces present and more inspections.[36] Though born out of Russia's inability, or unwillingness, to comply fully with the original Treaty, the Flank Agreement nevertheless reflects adjustments that Russia clearly saw as essential for its security interests in the Caucasus. Russia has, in any case, not been prepared to let the Treaty's provisions stand in the way of its military operations in Chechnya, and against that background the negotiation of the Flank Agreement was a sensible measure to preserve Russia's confidence in the Treaty.