CHECHNYA
25. In addressing its treaty obligations, Russia's
main act of omission is in not meeting its Article V equipment
limits within its southern flank zone. This has been exacerbated
by its operations in Chechnya (part of the zone), which have been
widely condemned for their apparently disproportionate brutality.
The consequences of those operations in terms of the CFE Treaty—the
focus of this report—have been a significant increase in
the scale of Russia's non-compliance. It now holds 400 excess
tanks, 2,600 excess ACVs and 600 excess artillery pieces in its
southern flank zone.[65]
Russia's flank territory was central to the negotiations on the
Adaptation Agreement, which will raise the number of ACVs Russia
can deploy there from 1,380 to 2,140 (the numbers of tanks and
artillery permitted will remain the same).[66]
Without significant further equipment reductions, however, Russia
will continue to breach its equipment ceilings: both those of
the original treaty and the new limits of the Adaptation Agreement.
26. We understand that the Russian preference, not
surprisingly, is likely to be for the Adaptation Agreement to
enter force early so that these agreed higher limits can help
to legitimise its deployment in Chechnya.[67]
The UK authorities anticipate receiving further information on
the levels of Russian equipment in Chechnya later this year, which
will give some indication of how serious Russia is, under its
new president, about bringing its equipment levels in the region
within the Treaty's limits, as the Russian government has indicated
that it wishes to do.[68]
27. Russian action in Chechnya, as the Foreign Affairs
Committee concluded in a recent report, is 'the most severe impediment
to good relations with Russia at this time'.[69]
Realistically, however, it would not be sensible to expect Russia
to comply with its treaty obligations if it considered that its
operations in Chechnya continued to require it to use more equipment
than permitted by the Treaty. Major wars may be less likely and
more clearly heralded because of the CFE Treaty, but because the
Treaty still allows meaningful quantities of equipment to be held
it cannot prevent less significant operations and internal upheavals
like the current conflict in Chechnya, whether or not they use
equipment in numbers that breach the Treaty's limits. The challenge
presented by Russia's actions in Chechnya, and its failure
to observe its treaty obligations there, is not sufficient to
damn the Treaty in its entirety. This problem, however, demands
continued diplomatic attention.
65 Ev p 28, Table 2 Back
66 Ev
p 21, paras 7, 8 Back
67 Ev
p 27, para 40(b) Back
68 Q
3 Back
69 Third
Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, Relations
with the Russian Federation, HC 101, para 20 Back
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