NATO
43. The initiative to adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect
post-Cold War Europe came originally from Russia, as early as
1993.[110]
Russia had concerns about the equipment limits in its southern
flank, as we described above, but it also sought to address its
perceived worsening position against NATO, particularly in view
of Russia's 'decaying' force structure[111]
and its loss of influence over former Warsaw Pact allies and their
potential realignment under NATO's banner. One observer has noted
that 'containing NATO enlargement was a constant theme of the
various Russian proposals [to adapt the Treaty]'.[112]
NATO governments sought to avoid any direct linkage between NATO
enlargement and the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, although in
practice NATO had to strike a balance internally between seeking
equipment ceilings that were sufficiently high for the peace of
mind of its new members and sufficiently low to allay Russian
concerns.[113]
44. We questioned our government witnesses on the
concessions made and gains won by both Russia and NATO in the
terms of the Agreement. Russia, we were told, would have preferred
to have seen tighter constraints, both on NATO's ability to station
forces on the territory of its new members and on the Allies'
ability to make temporary deployments.[114]
As a unitary nation with a long frontier with NATO states, and
potential new NATO members, Russia can readily redeploy its forces.
For NATO's collective defence, however, the Allies need to be
able to move forces between countries to reinforce one another.[115]
We were assured that the arrangements for 'exceptional' and 'basic'
temporary deployments (paragraph 34) would allow NATO to fulfil
its collective security guarantee to its new members,[116]
and that the deployment flexibilities of the Adaptation Agreement
were—
... consistent with the SDR [and] the NATO Strategic
Concept, and they tied in nicely with the CJTF concept. From that
point of view, we felt we had fully achieved our objective. There
was, however, a price to pay for that and that came in the form
of the transparency measures that one now sees written into the
adapted treaty, specifically for the temporary deployments. That
in itself did not cause us too much difficulty, because one of
our objectives for Treaty adaptation was to improve the level
of transparency.[117]
... the Treaty [provides for a possible deployment]
of two divisions, ... which we regard—and NATO regards—as
entirely satisfactory for carrying out the [NATO] Article 5 collective
security guarantees for the new [NATO members]. That was one of
NATO's priorities, and it is something that the Russians have
accepted (and it is consistent with the terms of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act). Without that assurance we would have had a major
problem which we were not prepared to accept.[118]
45. Unlike the original Treaty, under the Adaptation
Agreement it will be possible for European states which are not
currently parties to it to accede to the revised Treaty.[119]
States wishing to do so would of course have to negotiate their
terms with existing members.[120]
Bearing in mind that the Baltic countries, for example, are currently
excluded from the CFE Treaty, we asked our witnesses whether this
potential veto by CFE Treaty members could also be used to hinder
further NATO enlargement. We were assured that—
All members of NATO are ... parties in the CFE arrangements,
but there is no provision that says: "You have to be a participant
in CFE before you can become a member of NATO." Indeed, were
there to be such a provision it could amount to a Russian veto,
which is clearly unacceptable.[121]
110 Sharp, op cit Back
111 Third
Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, op
cit, para 57 Back
112 Sharp,
op cit Back
113 Sharp,
op cit Back
114 Q
69 Back
115 ibid Back
116 Q
13 Back
117 Q
69 Back
118 Q
70 Back
119 Ev
p 21, para 13 Back
120 As
accession by new states will also bring new territory into the
area covered, such ceilings will increase the total amount of
equipment permitted by the Treaty. (Ev p 21, para 13). Back
121 Q
103 Back
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