Russia and its Neighbours
46. Russia's aim in its negotiation of the Adaptation
Agreement was to legitimise its current deployments and to constrain
those of others as far as possible.[122]
For successful completion of the negotiations, it was of course
necessary to achieve an outcome in which no party to the Treaty
felt its security had been unacceptably compromised. The MoD told
us that the NATO Allies recognised Russia's security concerns
in the North Caucasus to be legitimate, and that higher limits
in the flank zones under the Agreement would contribute to the
level of confidence sought by Russia.[123]
The Adaptation Agreement has two particular benefits for Russia:
it puts a cap on the size of the forces that NATO will be able
to deploy to the territory of its new members,[124]
and Russia will have a significantly higher ceiling for its armoured
combat vehicles in the flank zone—up from 1,380 to 2,140
(Figure 7 overleaf). Although at current force levels it would
still be significantly in breach of the Treaty (even on its own
reckoning), the extent of its excess holdings of ACVs would at
least be cut (by 30%).[125]
Because of these more generous ceilings in the flank zones for
Russia, we were told, it attaches much importance to early ratification
of the Agreement[126]—
One of the objectives the Russians secured from the
adaptation of the Treaty was higher levels in the Caucasus, and
that is a very important objective for them. We would hope and
expect that that is something they would wish to see formalised
and would wish to bring into play as soon as was possible.[127]
... The Russians are very positive. They see their
limits as satisfactory. They believe they can conduct the military
operations they need within those limits, and they are also pleased
with the elements affecting NATO states and others ... I think
across the political and military community there is fair consensus
that the CFE is a good thing for Russia.[128]
47. Russia continues to station treaty-limited equipment
in Moldova and Georgia in contravention of the original CFE Treaty,[129]
which requires host states to have given their agreement to such
deployments before they can fall within its terms. The negotiation
of the Adaptation Agreement presented these countries with an
opportunity to get firmer commitments from Russia about ending
this problem. At the insistence of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan
and Moldova, the Agreement emphasises the need for a host state
to give its 'express consent' for foreign forces being deployed
in its territory. In what appears to be the result of some last-minute
brinkmanship at the OSCE Istanbul Summit last November, at which
the member countries were due to agree a raft of other measures,[130]
Georgia also extracted a Russian agreement to cut its equipment
stationed there to the level of a 'basic temporary deployment'
under the Treaty—153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems—by
31 December 2000, and to close two of its four bases there by
1 July 2001. Russia also agreed to remove all its treaty-limited
equipment from Moldova by the end of 2001, and to completely withdraw
its troops by the end of 2002.[131]
The Adaptation Agreement works to the advantage of Russia's
less powerful neighbours.
122 Ev p 30, para 14 Back
123 ibid Back
124 Q
13 Back
125 Ev
p 28, Table 2 Back
126 Q
8 Back
127 Q
9 Back
128 QQ
57, 58 Back
129 Article
IV Back
130 Including
the 'Charter for European Security', which subsumed the CFE Treaty's
Adaptation Agreement Back
131 Ev
p 26, para 40; Ev p 31, para 16 (c) Back
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