Memorandum by Austrian Embassy
On 1 January 1995, Austria became a member of
the European Union. With this date, Austria accepted the entire
acquis of the European Union, as laid down in the Treaty
of Maastricht. Article J.4 of this treaty stipulates that: "The
common foreign and security policy shall include all questions
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing
of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common
defence". The referendum for EU-membership, which was mandatory
under Austrian constitutional law, resulted in an overwhelming
majority of nearly 2/3 of the population for EU-membership under
the conditions laid down by the Treaty of Maastricht.
A further major improvement with respect to
the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
was Art.17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. As a member of the EU,
Austria took part actively in the negotiations leading up to this
treaty.
The current Austrian government is therefore
of the opinion that the Federal Constitutional Law on Neutrality
will have to be redrafted to state clearly that it does not apply
to Austria's active participation in the development of the European
Union's Common European Security and Defence Policy. It would
equally not apply to its participation in a European community
of peace, security and defence, with equal rights and responsibilities,
in solidarity, including a guarantee of mutual assistance.
1. PROCEDURE
FOR INCORPORATING
DEFENCE INTO
THE EU
(a) It is proposed that the WEU will be integrated
into the EU. How can this be done? What are the main obstacles
to that goal?
The conclusions of the European Council of Cologne
and the European Council of Helsinki clearly state that WEU will
be obsolete in the near future. Certain of its institutionalised
structures, such as the Satellite Centre in Torrejon, the Institute
for Security Studies in Paris as well as existing expertise within
the Military Staff could be transferred from WEU to EU. These
structures could help EU to fulfil its future tasks in the security
and defence area.
Merging existing committees of WEU, like the
Permanent Council, the Secretariat, the Military Committee or
the Military Staff with the new EU-bodies in the framework of
the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) does not
seem appropriate, since the EU meets in the framework of 15 whereas
WEU-meeting take place at 21 or at 28.
(b) How do current proposals for integrating
defence into the EU differ from the agreement at the June 1996
NATO Berlin Summit that operations could take place under WEU
political strategic direction?
The European Councils of Cologne and of Helsinki
"underlined [the EU's] determination to develop an autonomous
capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged,
to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to
international crises". This capacity should cover the whole
range of Petersberg Tasks, up to the level of Kosovo-type missions.
As for the wording "autonomous", Austria understands
that it refers primarily to the political decision-making autonomy
of the EU. Although the EU is aiming at the development of the
necessary capacity to prepare and conduct larger military crisis-management
operations (upper Petersberg level) in the coming years, it seems
obvious that the EU will still rely on national and collective
assets and capabilities of NATO for quite some time. The Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF)-concept of NATO could serve as a basis
for such a co-operation.
(c) Is the timetable for the proposed new
arrangements realistic?
The timetable for the quantitative target (headline
goal)—"Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy
within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces
up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg
Tasks"—should be kept without any major problems.
A far more ambitious project is to meet the
qualitative targets (capability goals). The major focus has to
be laid on the fields of strategic air lift, intelligence, command
and control. Regarding the development of military capabilities
for autonomous EU-led crisis management operations, EU defence
ministers had an exchange of views on 28 February in Sintra/Portugal.
(d) How will the different memberships of
NATO and the EU affect the new security arrangements? At present,
4 EU Member States (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are
outside NATO. What affect will their status have? How will Turkey's
position be handled? How will NATO's non-EU European members be
handled?
The European Council meetings of Cologne and
Helsinki laid down qualitative and quantitative targets as well
as arrangements which are valid for all EU-Member States. Hence,
Austria will not only be represented within the new EU political
and military bodies and structures but will also share the military
burden to meet the headline goal. Austria supports institutionalised
contacts and co-operation between EU and NATO to create synergies
and avoid unnecessary duplications and frictions. Bearing this
in mind, Austria supports the idea of taking advantage of existing
NATO assets and capabilities, the Defence Planning Process (DPP),
the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) and the Planning and Review
Process (PARP). Joint exercises, mirroring the recent joint NATO/WEU-exercise
CMX/CRISEX 2000, between NATO and EU could be held. The EU (within
CESDP) and NATO pursue complementary goals.
While the EU builds a fine-meshed net of co-operation
and consultation with NATO, the 6 Non-EU-NATO-Member-States should
have the possibility to contribute to EU-led military crisis-management
while respecting EU's decision-making autonomy.
SUBSTANCE OF
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
(b) Under the new proposals, NATO is to guarantee
European security while the EU may conduct the Petersberg Tasks
of crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Is
this a practicable and desirable division of responsibility?
The European Council of Helsinki underlined
its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions
"where NATO as a whole is not engaged". The relationship
between NATO and EU should therefore be characterised by the phrase
"mutual reinforcement". From the Austrian point of view,
the purpose of developing EU-military capabilities is not only
to entrust the EU with a military crisis-management capacity but
also to strengthen European defence capabilities and the European
pillar within NATO. Both goals are complementary and compatible.
We believe that strengthening the EU's military capabilities is
also positive for NATO.
(c) Is adequate provision being made for the
funding of the new defence arrangements? Is there any reason to
believe declarations on defence will translate into actions and
expenditure? How will national commitments be scrutinised to ensure
all governments are meeting their obligations? Is there a review
mechanism and an agreed timetable?
All EU-Member States have committed themselves
at the European Council of Helsinki to fulfil the Headline Goal
by 2003. This also implies that their national assets must be
made more compatible. All efforts have to be made in a spirit
of solidarity.
The new Austrian Government has therefore decided
that "in addition to territorial defence tasks, international
missions of solidarity, disaster relief operations and assistance
operations of the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) for civilian authorities
will gain in importance. The AAF must be prepared for all the
above missions, including the whole spectrum of European crisis
management (Petersberg Missions) and for tasks with respect to
stabilisation and European solidarity. These include the participation
in multinational units for activities of international crisis
management like the Eurocorps as well as an active role in the
evolving EU military structures of the EU".
To achieve these tasks, the AAF will reorganise
their prepared units (VOREIN). They should be able to cover the
full spectrum of Petersberg Missions and to be integrated within
multinational units. It is envisaged to reorganise the Austrian
Army to become a professional force with a strong reserve element.
The commission of experts, set up to study the matter is due to
submit its report by the end of 2000. The defence budget will
be increased, new helicopters acquired and the existing interceptor-fleet
replaced.
(d) Now that the EU is committed to creating
a European defence capability, does this require the creation
of a European armaments industry, a common procurement policy
and standard military operating procedures and methods? If so,
is this technically feasible?
The European Council meetings of Cologne and
Helsinki reaffirmed the EU's will to strengthen the European defence
industry as well as to increase the importance of the industrial
and technological defence industry basis.
The new Austrian Government envisages participating
to the fullest extent in the emerging European Armaments Co-operation
and in the joint efforts to strengthen the industrial basis of
European defence. The Federal Legislation governing imports, exports
and transits of armaments will have to be modified accordingly.
Austria will accept the invitation to join the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG) as a full member.
(e) How is parliamentary accountability best
assured in this policy sector?
The Treaty of Amsterdam lays down the obligation
that the EU-Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on
the main aspects and the basic choices of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and shall ensure that the views of the European
Parliament are duly taken under consideration. Furthermore, the
European Parliament shall be kept informed by the Presidency and
the Commission. The European Parliament may also ask questions
or make recommendations.
On a national basis Art.23e of the Austrian
Constitution stipulates, that "the competent member of the
Federal Government shall without delay inform the Nationalrat
and the Bundesrat [the two Chambers of Parliament] about all projects
within the framework of the European Union and afford them the
opportunity to give their opinion".
FORCE STRUCTURE
(c) How can a European Union capability be
developed in practical terms? How will the required satellite,
transport and intelligence capacity be achieved?
All EU Member States have accepted the political
obligation to meet the capability goals. In any case, the main
input has to be provided by the EU Member States with the strongest
defence industry. Reaching the capability goals should neither
pose a major technical problem, nor a serious financial one. This
question is merely one of political will.
(d) At present, most European armed forces
rely heavily on conscription. How will this affect their ability
to perform their new obligations?
Around half of the EU Member States have considered
to reorganise their armies, switching from conscription to a professional
army. Austria also envisages to turn the Austrian Army into a
professional force with a strong reserve element. Although the
existing Austrian conscript army has a long history in participating
in international missions under UN-leadership or lately SFOR and
KFOR, a professional force with specialised training and an adequate
legal framework might be more suitable for international duties.
(e) Steps are being taken to provide for a
European rapid-response force of 60,000. Is this the right approach
and will this be adequate for future needs? Should there be provision
for a standing European army?
Currently, the EU is aiming at achieving the
capability for autonomous EU-led crisis-management. The development
of a standing European Army should not be excluded as a long-term
perspective, depending on the future integration of the EU.
The present priority lies in the setting-up
of a Rapid Response Force as well as the opening-up of other multinational
forces for crisis management. These forces should be capable of
fulfilling the whole range of Petersberg Tasks.
Austria has expressed its intention to participate
in multinational units for crisis management operations and would
also be very interested in joining the Eurocorps as soon as it
opens to new members.
GENERAL
(d) Defence is part of the core sovereignty
of a national state. What does the addition of a defence capability
imply for the broader development of the European Union as an
international organisation?
The addition of a defence capability to the
European Union is another major step to foster European integration.
Austria understands that some Member States could see a loss of
sovereignty in this development. In this respect, Art.23 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam provides that "Decisions under this Title
shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions
by members . . . shall not prevent the adoption of such a decision".
Austria considers the provisions of Art.23 as sufficient.
(e) Can the current intergovernmental model
of decision making preserve national interest and at the same
time deliver efficient decision-making? Is the intergovernmental
model durable?
In the coming months, discussions will take
place on how national interests can be preserved within the present
intergovernmental model of decision-making. Any new decision-making
structures should in any case take the coming accession of new
EU-Member-States into account.
(f) How can the new arrangements affect relations
with (a) the United States, (b) Russia and (c) Europe's "near
abroad"?
The European Council of Helsinki has already
set up the necessary arrangements for relations with third countries.
Non-EU-NATO-Member-States and other interested States will be
able to contribute to EU military crisis-management, while respecting
the Union's decision-making autonomy.
(g) Do current proposals make a qualitative
difference to the development of a European capability?
As military crisis management is growing ever
more costly, a specialised international force seems to be a more
economical and more effective way of responding to a crisis than
an ad-hoc set of national forces.
It was also laid down, in the sense of burden
sharing, that WEU and now EU should—for the time being—cover
the Petersberg Tasks whereas NATO will carry out the task of territorial
defence of its Member States.
March 2000
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