Memorandum by Dr Gülnur Aybet, Department
of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF THE ESDI
During the Political Union negotiations which
led up to the Maastricht treaty launching the European Union,
the most contentious debate focused on the nature of the European
Security and Defence Identity and the future of the WEU. That
is why in the Maastricht treaty the future of the WEU and its
relation with the EU was left vague to be decided later. However,
one aspect of the Maastricht treaty left the status of the European
Security and Defence Identity edging closer to a link between
the WEU and the EU. This was the decision to give the automatic
right to all EU states to become members of the WEU. Of the then
EU members, Greece chose to activate this provision in its case
and became a full member of the WEU in 1992.[1]
This equation of EU membership to WEU membership
was the first step in the direction of eventually absorbing the
WEU into the EU structures. Since 1991, this has generally been
viewed within NATO as a long term project, and the details of
how this absorption would actually take place were not a subject
under serious discussion for a long time, given the contentious
nature of the issue among NATO member states.
This undecided factor over the WEU-EU relationship
continued until 1996, when at the Berlin ministerial meeting of
NATO, the future of the European Security and Defence Identity
was more clarified. According to the Berlin decisions, the ESDI
would from now on be developed within NATO, not outside it. This
was the turning point in making ESDI a reality rather than a futuristic
scenario for European security. Furthermore, the finer points
on the use of NATO assets to make this possible were put forward
for the first time.
What caused this departure in the course of
events? First, after the war in Bosnia, it became evident that
the Europeans were incapable of any meaningful military intervention
without the leadership and help of the United States, even when
they had the political will to do so. Therefore, the legacy of
the Cold War framework was continuing. Second, it became evident
for the United States, that much as they felt uncomfortable about
the Europeans creating a separate defence identity, there may
be crises in which the US might not wish to take a lead or commit
forces. If these crises were occurring in a geographic proximity
to Europe and the US and its European allies shared the same interests,
then it might be viable to let the Europeans conduct such operations,
or share a greater burden in joint operations of this kind. Suddenly,
the prospect of making the ESDI practical and capable in playing
a role in missions of joint US-European interest seemed to be
a very good idea. The fact that it dawned as a good idea to both
Britain and the United States—two NATO allies who up to
that point had not been very enthusiastic about the ESDI project—changed
the political impetus for making ESDI a reality.
Furthermore, the value of NATO's integrated
military structure, its "know how" in conducting joint
military operations, its transfer of that "know how"
to non NATO member states who wished to participate in joint peacekeeping
operations, and its ability to conduct and co-ordinate an operation
like Deliberate Force during the Bosnian war and SFOR, after the
war, were all aspects which gradually emerged as the Bosnian war
ensued. Since ESDI at the time was only a concept, and the WEU
although an organisation, had no "teeth" in terms of
military capability, any development of WEU/ESDI operational capability
had to be developed within and through NATO. This was the decision
reached at the North Atlantic Council's Berlin summit in 1996.
The issue of absorbing the WEU into the EU which
was born around the time of the Maastricht summit was never quite
resolved. However, since then the invaluable status of NATO's
integrated military structure and its input into the ESDI through
NATO's working relationship with the WEU emerged. The EU's Amsterdam
treaty of 1997 had already fine tuned the original ESDI sections
of the Maastricht treaty, leaving the way for the absorption of
the WEU into the EU clear. The Amsterdam Treaty left open the
absorption of the WEU into the EU pending of a EU Council decision.
However, it also stated that the EU would draw with the WEU "arrangements
for enhanced co-operation" between the two organisations
within a year of entry to force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.[2]
However, the activation of these provisions
and the finer details of the institutional arrangements of this
absorption became a reality after the turning point of the British-French
Declaration on European Defence at St Malo on 4 December 1998.
Two things emerged from the St Malo decisions. First that the
WEU will be absorbed into the EU and that it will be placed under
the second Pillar of the EU structure which is the Common Foreign
and Security Policy. Second, that the collective defence provision
of Article V of the Brussels treaty will be retained. Another
significant aspect emerging from the St Malo declaration was that
the EU, could have two types of "recourse to suitable military
means: European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European
pillar or national or multinational European means outside the
NATO framework".[3]
This indicated a departure from the Berlin decisions of "separable
but not separate" military capabilities and the development
of ESDI within NATO. It also indicated a departure from the close
working relationship established between NATO and the WEU.
NATO's Washington summit declaration and the
Strategic Concept adopted at the same summit, acknowledged a continuation
of the Berlin decisions, including the implementation of CJTFs
and the creation of CJTF nuclei HQs and role of Deputy SACEUR
in overseeing the use of NATO assets by WEU led operations. In
terms of the WEU using NATO assets there was not a great deal
of change coming out of the NATO summit. However, the NATO summit
documents did acknowledge that the EU might at some point take
over the role of the WEU in the existing NATO-WEU framework planning
capabilities.[4]
In terms of the deadline of this absorption,
the EU Cologne summit of 4 June 1999 indicated that all the necessary
decisions for this to happen would be taken by the end of the
year 2000. The Cologne summit declaration on the ESDI also emphasised
the two ways in which the EU could implement Petersberg tasks.
One by using NATO assets, which would be in accordance with the
Berlin decisions of 1996, and the other, the implementation of
EU led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.[5]
The planning of an EU led operation without
recourse to NATO assets has been worked out in a French proposed
concept of Framework nation. Under a Framework Nation operation,
the EU can without recourse to NATO assets, launch an operation
under the leadership of an EU country which can organise the mission
from the basis of a national HQs, which can then be deployed to
the theatre of operations. At the moment within the EU, only Britain
and France have the capability of national deployable HQs.[6]
Although under such a mission, because there would be no recourse
to NATO assets, the decision to act would not go through the North
Atlantic Council, but nevertheless, there would be nothing to
exclude NATO member states who are not EU members to also take
part in a Framework Nation type of operation. What is not clear
is the consultation mechanism in place between the EU and non
EU member NATO states. In fact, once the WEU becomes absorbed
into the EU, any consultation mechanism which existed for Associate
members of the WEU also disappears.
This is where the position of the now six NATO
states who are not members of the EU but associate members of
the WEU falls into muddy waters. This opens up serious questions
over the participation of these countries in the preparation,
planning and conduct of such Petersberg operations. On the other
hand, it is hard to see an independent EU military operation on
a large scale at least for the foreseeable future, since a major
operation would be impossible to achieve without recourse to US
intelligence and lift capability, in which case the EU would have
to request NATO assets and the decision would have to come to
the NATO Council. However, another unsettling departure has been
the EU's recent move in requesting automatic access to NATO planning
capabilities and presumption of availability of forces. This is
to involve the non NATO EU states Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria
in NATO planning mechanisms. The presumption of availability of
forces means that if the EU should decide on an operation, there
will be a previously decided list of national forces assigned
to NATO, which are also assigned to the EU by states who are members
of both organisations. Therefore the position of the six non EU-NATO
states becomes more precarious as they seem to be sidelined from
all the decision making and decision shaping and planning mechanisms
of an ever growing ESDI reaching fruition.
Since the end of the cold war, the primary focus
in all NATO and WEU endeavours has been the motto that European
security is indivisible. This is why the three eastern European
partners of NATO were invited to become full members at the first
opportunity. Yet, the recent institutional developments of ESDI
since the St Malo declaration by Britain and France, which depart
from the logic of the Berlin decisions of 1996, seem to be creating
divisibility in European security for NATO members. What could
be the rationale for creating a European Union caucus within NATO,
leaving other NATO members outside the decision making and planning
mechanisms over issues of a direct relation to European security?
Surely, this detracts from the motto that European security is
indivisible? Has the United States viewed the development of the
ESDI too much within the context of "burden sharing"
to have allowed the ESDI to deviate this much from the Berlin
decisions?
As for the European Union, already acting as
if the absorption of the WEU into the 2nd pillar is practically
complete, (indeed, in most circles in Europe, WEU bodies are now
being referred to as EU bodies) there is a great deal of uncertainty
as to how the WEU will actually be absorbed into the EU, and what
will happen to the status of the associate WEU states. The key
consideration at first was which of the acquis of the WEU
will be absorbed in to the EU. The least problematic of these
seemed to be incorporation of the Brussels Treaty. In the EU Amsterdam
Treaty, the Petersberg tasks of the Brussels Treaty are incorporated
but not Article V which is the collective defence measure. The
EU neutral states can thus sign onto an agreement for the EU to
take over the functions of the WEU, but not the Brussels Treaty
itself. Therefore, the neutral EU states will not be bound by
Article V but the original full members of the WEU in the EU will
continue their Article V commitments.
On the other hand there is also the Framework
Agreement between the WEU and NATO. WEU officials state that the
Framework Agreement is not a legally binding document and therefore
the legal liabilities and financial provisions in the agreement
can be taken over by the EU. All EU states for the early part
of 1999 seemed to be in agreement that the acquis generated
between the WEU and NATO would be maintained once the EU took
over the functions of the WEU. On the institutional structure
of the EU, there has been a common agreement amongst EU states
that the WEU will be absorbed under the 2nd Pillar of the EU structure
which is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The major institutional
structural changes have already been taking place within the EU
Council. For example, present WEU staff in the Secretariat will
not be moving to other EU bodies like the Commission, but are
expected to work within the Council. The CFSP unit within the
Council will be more structured and is heading in that way already
with the appointment of a High Representative (who is incidentally
the former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana) and the creation
of a policy planning and early warning unit. These are likely
to be bodies to liaise with current NATO-WEU structures once the
WEU becomes absorbed into the EU.[7]
All of this is expected to be built on the present structure of
the COREPER and Political Committee, with the Political Committee
being the main body responsible for the CFSP. Above that there
is the General Affairs Council of Foreign Ministers. It is likely
that after the absorption of the WEU, the General Affairs Council
would include Defence Ministers, or have joint meetings with Foreign
and Defence Ministers.
Folding of the WEU into the above Council structure
seems straightforward from the point of view of EU member states.
However, the status of WEU Associate Member states who are not
EU members is unclear. At the moment the Associate Members fully
participate in the WEU Council. But once the WEU Council ceases
to exist and the WEU's functions are transferred to the EU Council,
it is not clear if WEU Associate Members will have any input into
the decision making process if any, or even if they will be consulted
at any stage of EU ESDI deliberations. What is uncertain also
is what is likely to happen to the political and legal acquis
the associate members of the WEU have generated within the WEU.
For example, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and Eurocom
were originally bodies within NATO which became transferred to
the WEU. Once these institutions of the WEU become absorbed into
the EU, will the legal acquis of the non EU states which
participate in these bodies cease to exist?
Therefore, the absorption of the WEU into the
2nd Pillar of the EU presents problems regarding the status of
the legal and political acquis of associate members within
the WEU. However, for the EU states, it is more or less settled
that the WEU will be absorbed into the 2nd Pillar. For some EU
states like Britain a possible solution is envisaged in having
tiers of participation in the 2nd Pillar. The first tier is thought
to be on the level of the EU Council, after which a 2nd tier involving
non EU members wishing to participate in ESDI operations. What
is not clear is if the 2nd tier will be permanent or not or if
it will meet on a regular basis and what the status of the Associate
WEU members will be in such an arrangement. Recently within EU
circles, the view has been to present the WEU as a moribund institution,
therefore discouraging the non EU-NATO members from trying to
hold on to their acquis in the WEU. The EU would like to
see Turkey—which has probably been the only state among
the "six" non EU-NATO states to voice its objections
to the jettisoning of all its acquis in the WEU over the
years—to forget about its WEU past and turn to make a more
"positive" contribution to the now new developing ESDI
within the EU. The problem is—to make a positive contribution
to what? The shape of the ESDI, its decision making mechanisms
are all far from being settled and are very unclear.
"Wiping the slate clean" by getting
rid of the WEU acquis altogether by forming a direct relationship
between NATO and the EU is a new development since the Helsinki
summit in December 1999. Up to that point, the absorption of the
WEU acquis was still under discussion within WEU bodies. What
is of concern here to non EU-NATO member states is not the development
of the relationship between NATO and the EU, but the vagueness
of the position and role of the six non EU-NATO member states.
What is needed is clarity. Otherwise there is no objection to
the process itself. What these states are unsure about is how
they will be expected to make a contribution to EU-led operations
in the future, which might have a direct bearing on their own
security interests as well as their position as NATO member states.
This indeed creates a divisibility in security matters within
NATO itself—something which neither the US, nor its EU member
allies in NATO would like to see happen.
The seriousness of this deficiency in the ESDI's
development was emphasised by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson:
"we must ensure . . . that the question of the participation
of non EU-European allies in EU-led operations is resolved in
ways that are satisfactory to all (emphasis added). This is not
just a cosmetic matter. The support of Turkey, Norway and Poland
for an EU-led operation is as important politically as it could
be militarily. This is especially true if the EU wants to use
NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations".[8]
In essence, the underlying objective has not
changed since the Berlin decisions of 1996, that is to make sure
that forces contributing to military operations using NATO assets,
whether they be EU-led or NATO-led, are interoperable, flexible,
mobile and sustainable in the theatre of operations. In fact,
the non EU-NATO allies have supported from the very beginning,
the development of the efficiency of these forces in that direction.
It is the unclarity of their position as to which level they will
participate or make their contributions in EU-led operations that
has caused some concern. However, if all NATO allies share in
the same objective of making forces more flexible in order to
be more effective in meeting crisis management, peacekeeping and
peace enforcement tasks, then the modalities of decision shaping
and decision making are political issues which need to be clarified
at the political level by an institutional forum comprising NATO
and the EU.
In fact the underlying objective of making forces
more flexible and effective, which is in essence a military objective
has been the only aspect of ESDI to have reached some clarity
both on the part of NATO and the EU. The way EU states have envisaged
their contribution to this ongoing process of making forces more
effective has been with the announcement of the "headline
goal" at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. This envisages
the development of a 50,000-60,000 strong EU force by 2003, with
the capability to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least
one year in the theatre of operations to carry out specifically
"the full range of Petersberg tasks".[9]
This seems compatible with NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative
(DCI) launched at the Washington summit in April 1999. The DCI's
goals complement the rationale behind the Berlin decisions to
build ESDI in NATO, that is, to make all multinational operations
effective by improving interoperability within the forces of the
alliance and between the forces of its partner states. The emphasis
has been particularly how to make these forces more effective,
mobile and flexible for non-article 5 type operations, which essentially
means peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and crisis management—the
same as the Petersberg tasks outlined by the EU. Therefore, for
EU states to start a process to improve their defence capability
efforts is compatible with NATO's DCI. Therefore, militarily,
within NATO and the EU, the underlying goals are the same. It
is the decision-making patterns at a time of crisis that are unclear.
The Helsinki conclusions also acknowledge this: "appropriate
arrangements will be defined that will allow, while respecting
the Union's decision-making autonomy, non EU European NATO members
and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis
management".[10]
It is this particular paragraph of the Helsinki conclusions which
requires clarification sooner than later. For example, the non-EU-NATO
member states would like to know what is meant by the "Union's
decision making autonomy" and whether "other interested
States" not only refers to the United States but also Russia.
The underlying goals are clear and so are the envisaged necessary
improvements in military capabilities set forth in detail both
in NATO and the EU, to launch more effective, multinational, flexible
military formations to carry out collective security tasks. It
is the vagueness of the mechanism which defines at which point
an operation will be NATO led or EU led, how that decision will
be reached, how the EU will have recourse to NATO assets, and
how the non-EU NATO members may contribute to this mechanism,
which requires clarification before the WEU becomes merged into
the EU in the latter half of 2000.
Defining the non-EU member states' position
within this new institutional development is not just a matter
of institutional membership status. There are also practical considerations
over security interests—particularly for Turkey. In Petersberg
type operations, it is likely that for the foreseeable future,
any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of close proximity
to Turkey, as Turkey's geo-strategic setting is surrounded by
turbulent regions, from the Balkans, the Caucasus to the Middle
East. Therefore, any Petersberg type operation to be deliberated
within the EU Council in relation to these regions, will have
a direct bearing on Turkey's national security interests. This
is an important point of consideration. Already there is a feeling
in Turkish decision making circles that NATO's European Allies
are less sensitive to Turkish security concerns than the United
States. For example there is less sympathy from Northern Europe
to the threats Turkey faces from regional proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, whereas the United States has been more responsive
to Turkey's demands for Allied support and co-operation in this
context.[11]
Another problem is one of timing. In terms of
working out the institutional structures for the WEU-EU merger,
sometime in 2000, is somewhat short notice. There are all many
details to be worked out, not just the status of WEU Associate
members like Turkey, but the NATO-EU working relationship, which
may or may not take on board the WEU acquis. It seems that
for the time being the EU is not ready to enter into a "Framework
Agreement" with the NATO of the same kind that exists between
NATO and the WEU, and which may cease to exist once the WEU becomes
absorbed into the EU. The position of non NATO EU states like
Sweden in a direct relationship between NATO and the EU is also
unclear. As to whether the EU neutrals take part in NATO military
planning and whether this will be automatic or not are also issues
to be worked out.
March 2000
1 See Declaration of the Member States of the WEU issued
at Maastricht, Atlantic News, No 2387, 13 December 1991. See Also
"Treaty on Political Union", Maastricht, Europe Documents,
No 1750, 13 December 1991. Back
2
Amsterdam Treaty 2 October 1997, Protocol on Article J7 and Article
J7 paragraph 1. See also Declaration adopted by the WEU Council
of Ministers on 22 July 1997, and attacked to the Final Act of
the Intergovernmental Conference concluded with the signature
of the Amsterdam Treaty, 2 October 1997. Back
3
Declaration on European Defence, British-French summit, St Malo
3-4 December 1998. Paragraph 3. Back
4
The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NAC-S (99)65. Washington 25
April 1999, paragraph 30 and the Washington Summit Communique,
NAC-S (99)64, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10. Back
5
Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the Common
European Policy on Security and Defence. Cologne European Council,
3 and 4 June 1999. Back
6
Operation Alba in this sense was a Framework Nation operation
with Italy as the Framework Nation. Similarly the Kosovo Extraction
Force in Macedonia was French led. Back
7
Interviews with WEU officials, 22 January 1999. Back
8
NATO Secretary Lord Robertson's speech at the Defence Week Conference,
Brussels, 31 January 2000 Back
9
Helsinki European Council, Presidency's Conclusions, 11 December
1999, paragraph 28. Back
10
Ibid. Back
11
Interviews with Turkish delegation NATO HQ, 20 January 1999. Back
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