Memorandum by Malcolm Chalmers, Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this paper is to highlight
some of the key issues relevant to the development of the European
Union's Common Policy on Security and Defence (CPSD). It begins
by addressing in broad terms the political purposes and military
tasks for which the Policy may be appropriate. It then discusses
some aspects of the practical implementation of the policy.
PURPOSES
2. During the Cold War, NATO was never intended
to be the main vehicle for military operations outside its core
function: organising the collective defence of Western Europe.
Individual European member states were involved in a large number
of military operations outside Europe during 1949-1990, many of
them as a result of colonial or post-colonial commitments. Many
European member states also made significant contributions to
UN peacekeeping operations during this period. But NATO as an
organisation restricted its role to preparation for the potential,
but thankfully unrealised, threat of "World War Three".
3. NATO's refusal to be involved in limited
conflicts outside Europe was a result of fundamental differences
in approaches to defence by its five leading members. First, for
historical reasons, Germany and Italy were not prepared to commit
their forces for any operations outside direct self-defence.[12]
Second, although the US, United Kingdom and France often deployed
their armed forces on operations outside Europe, they seldom did
so together. In many of the violent crises and wars that punctuated
Cold War history—from Suez and Algeria in the 1950s, to
Vietnam and the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s and Central
America in the 1980s—the three leading NATO powers often
found themselves pursuing very different political and military
objectives. The Desert Storm coalition of 1990-1991 was seen at
the time as the harbinger of a New World Order, in which all the
UN's major powers would work together to protect global norms.
Ten years later, the Gulf War appears more an exception than a
precedent.
NATO's leading members disagree fundamentally
on what policies should be pursued in the region, with the US
and the United Kingdom gaining little support from other NATO
members for their continuing bombardment of Iraq.
4. In contrast to continuing differences
outside Europe, the 1990s have seen a convergence between NATO
members in their policies towards south-eastern Europe. Initial
responses to war in Croatia and Bosnia varied enormously, with
only France and the United Kingdom (of NATO's five leading powers)
contributing forces to the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. Once
NATO took responsibility for organising military operations in
1995, however, all five major powers committed substantial contingents
of troops on the ground. This precedent was subsequently deepened
in the participation of all NATO's leading states in military
operations against Serbia in 1999, and the subsequent deployment
of KFOR in Kosovo. NATO is now involved, for the first time in
its history, in the organisation of actual military operations.
Perhaps of equal significance for the future of European defence,
Europe's leading "civilian powers"—Germany and
Italy—are now engaged in their first substantial military
commitments outside national territory since 1945.
5. The events in the Balkans have effectively
redefined the distinction between European and "out-of-area"
operations. Until the early 1990s, the "in-area" was
the territory of NATO member states, and NATO's collective commitment
was limited to an obligation to come to each other's assistance
if any part of this area came under attack. In 2000, by contrast,
the "in-area" appears to be broadening to include all
those territories adjacent to Europe that are potential members
of the EU and/or NATO. The exact extent of this area is unclear,
as is the depth of the commitment to collective action. The new
"in-area" includes most if not all of the twelve candidate
members of the European Union and may in time be extended to others.
It is clear, however, that the "in-area" does not include
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia. It is still
difficult to see either NATO or the EU playing a significant role
in organising collective military operations in these "out-of-area"
regions.
6. This effective redefinition of "in-area",
as I have defined it, has important implications for the transatlantic
division of labour, and thus for the NATO/EU relationship. The
US's vital interests were at stake in the defence of Europe's
heartland from possible Soviet hegemony. Conflict in former Yugoslavia,
by contrast, is of much greater concern to Europe than it is to
the US. This basic divergence in "stake" between the
US and Europe is at the heart of many of the burdensharing tensions
that have been seen in recent years. It helps to explain the greater
willingness of US politicians to contemplate military withdrawal
in the short term, and may have some role in explaining the common
perception that US armed forces are more risk-adverse than some
of their European counterparts. This difference in stake also
explains why European states are unhappy about relying so heavily
on the US in the region. For the potential consequences of NATO
withdrawal from the region for Europeans—including refugee
flows, increased drug trafficking, economic disruption, etc.—would
be much greater than for the US. European leaders still attach
considerable importance to US involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo.
In adopting the CPSD, however, they are also signalling their
clear desire to reduce the extent of their dependence on this
involvement. The intention is to ensure that the EU can conduct
limited operations in Europe's "backyard"—with
the US if possible, but without the US if necessary.
7. Further major NATO military operations
in the Balkans remain a real possibility. Even if deterrence can
avoid further major conflict, however, there is likely to be a
requirement for stationing a substantial military garrison in
the region for some years to come. It is unrealistic to expect
the US to take the leading role in supporting this garrison. If
the CPSD is to mean anything, European states will have to be
prepared and able to take on this leading role themselves.
8. Yet the Balkan Wars have thus not only
emphasised the need for Europe to have a greater capability for
autonomous military action. They have also made the development
of such a capability more plausible. Other EU member states do
not yet have the capabilities of France and the United Kingdom
for interventionary operations. Yet recent operations have already
resulted in substantial changes in military culture and policy,
especially in Germany and Italy. A continuation of this convergence
of approach within the EU will be crucial for the success of the
CPSD. Indeed the encouragement of such convergence should be one
of the central goals of the Policy.
RISKS AND
LIMITS
9. Some of the most difficult debates on
the CPSD relate to boundaries: where should European defence co-operation
play a key role, and where should it not? The definition of "in-area"
has changed as a consequence of the Balkan wars of the 1990s,
and continues to broaden in response to the prospect of NATO/EU
enlargement to include, potentially, all of Europe. Yet the outer
boundaries of the new "in-area" are not clearly defined.
Despite some discussion of collective EU military action in Africa,
for example, such action would first have to overcome the continuing
commitment of some European states (especially France and the
United Kingdom) to national spheres of influence in the continent.
An even more difficult challenge would be to persuade other EU
states to match British and French commitments to Africa that
are currently made by France and the United Kingdom. A start can
be made in relation to relatively uncontroversial areas, such
as capabilities for humanitarian relief. The more that other forms
of military intervention are considered, however, the more difficult
it is likely to be to establish common approaches.
10. Problems also exist at the boundary
between limited military operations ("Petersberg tasks")
and major armed conflict. Military operations against Serbia in
1999 appear to fall into the second category, not least because
of the evident risk of escalation to a wider conflict with Russia.
Even in more limited operations, an awareness of the potential
for escalation is likely to weigh heavily in any European Union
decision on military operations outside the NATO framework.
11. The development of a military role for
the EU might also create the impression that EU membership brings
with it security guarantees. Indeed this possibility was raised
explicitly by President Prodi's reported declaration (during a
visit to Latvia in February 2000) that "any attack or aggression
against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against
the whole EU, which is the highest guarantee".[13]
Ensuring that NATO and the EU enlarge together can help to minimise
the potential for misunderstanding in this regard. The three Baltic
states may, however, prove an exception to this rule. In order
to reassure Russia of NATO's intentions, there is a strong case
for denying NATO membership to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at
present, even once they are accepted as EU members. Yet the closeness
of the political ties between EU member states is such that the
actual consequences of a Russian invasion of a member state would
be extremely far-reaching. The development of the CPSD is likely
to further blur the distinction between NATO and the EU in this
regard.
IMPLEMENTATION
12. The key to the success of the CPSD will
be whether it has a significant effect on European military capabilities.
Will it increase the EU's ability to take military action independent
of the US? Will it increase the contribution that EU member states
can make to operations in which the US is involved? It is unrealistic
to expect many EU states to increase their defence budgets from
current levels. Yet this need not necessarily be a problem. The
abolition of conscription (currently in progress in France, Italy,
Spain and Portugal) provides an opportunity for reorienting European
military forces away from territorial defence towards the new
missions already identified as priorities by NATO and the EU.
The EU can further assist this process of restructuring by setting
clear targets for the defence outputs that will be necessary.
A good start has been made with the agreement in Helsinki on the
2003 "headline goal" to:
"Be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain
forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks . . . including
the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15
brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily
self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence
capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally,
as appropriate, air and naval elements . . . Should be able to
deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to
provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable
at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment
for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of
deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness
to provide replacements for the initial forces".
13. The EU should continue to reject targets
for defence inputs (such as aggregate defence spending or equipment
spending). Such targets would be an invitation to inefficiency
and creative accountancy. The next priority should instead be
to ensure that the EU-wide output target cited above is broken
down on a country-by-country and function-by-function basis. Processes
then need to be put in place to monitor progress towards these
specific goals, for example through peer review and regular reports
to Ministers. Comparative figures on the progress of member states
should also be reported to national parliaments, providing an
opportunity for the cross-questioning of governments unable to
meet targets to which they have previously agreed.
14. As Commissioner Patten has made clear,
it is also important that "headline goals" be set for
the non-military contributions of member states to common defence
and security policies. For the EU to play an effective role in
Kosovo or elsewhere, it needs to do much more to supply police
and judicial services, capabilities for emergency humanitarian
assistance, and a host of other services. This is an area, moreover,
in which the EU should have a clear comparative advantage over
NATO.
15. Military commitments to the CPSD will
be funded primarily from national defence budgets. Yet there may
be some benefit to be gained from thinking creatively about whether
some specific capabilities could be funded on a collective basis.
In return for guarantees of availability for EU-sanctioned operations,
for example, a common EU defence budget could provide part-funding
of specific high-cost capabilities (such as heavy lift or AWACS
aircraft). The capabilities would remain under national control,
but with a much greater degree of assurance of availability for
collective operations than exists at present.
16. The success of the CPSD will depend,
inter alia, on the extent of convergence in the policy
approaches between Member States. As part of the process of encouraging
such convergence, the EU should consider what measures could be
taken to increase levels of trust between their national armed
forces. In the case of the United Kingdom, some lessons for intra-European
relations might be learnt from the longstanding "special
relationships" between the Unite Kingdom and US armed services.
17. One possibility might be to examine
seriously the possibilities for greater mobility of personnel
between the armed forces of EU member states. The United Kingdom
allows citizens of other Commonwealth countries, and Ireland,
to serve in it armed forces. Citizens' freedom to move to employment
in other member states is, moreover, already a fundamental principle
of the European single market. Application of similar principles
to military employment, perhaps with exemptions for particularly
sensitive areas, might be a concrete demonstration of member states'
commitment to a common approach to defence.
18. Closer co-operation in analysis and
intelligence will be vital in the process of confidence-building
between EU member states. The building of effective systems of
co-operation will take time, and the bulk of analytical resources
are likely to remain at national level. But greater co-operation
in this area could play a crucial role in encouraging convergence
in both security policy culture and in policies themselves. The
establishment of the EU's Policy Unit is a useful first step in
this regard.
22 March 2000
12 Italy followed a policy of strict military non-involvement
outside the NATO area until 1981, when it agreed to commit forces
to UN peacekeeping missions in Sinai and Lebanon. But overseas
deployments remained limited, totalling only 177 personnel in
1990. Back
13
"Diplomatic Blitzkreig: The West Responds to Russia's Assertiveness",
STRATFOR Global Intelligence Update, 11 February 2000.
Available on http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/ Back
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