Memorandum by Dr Andrew Cottey, Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford/Department of History,
University College, Cork
INTRODUCTION
1. The European Union's efforts to develop
a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) take place
at the same time as the Union is embarking on an historic enlargement
into Central and Eastern Europe. Although these two processes
are developing in parallel, there is no formal linkage between
them and has been little discussion of the implications of enlargement
for the EU's emerging defence role or vice versa.
2. In the next decade, the relationship
between eastward enlargement and the development of an EU defence
role is likely to raise a number of challenges but also opportunities
for the EU. The eastward enlargement of the EU will add new dimensions
to the "membership overlap" problem created by the divergent
memberships of the EU and NATO. The combination of enlargement
and an EU defence role will impact upon relations between the
EU and the former Soviet republics and could generate tensions
between the EU and Russia. The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe also face significant problems in reforming their armed
forces and integrating them with NATO and the EU. Despite this,
the Central and Eastern European states are already actively contributing
to the NATO-led missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and have the potential
to contribute significantly to the overall military forces available
to the EU and NATO, particularly in the longer term.
EU ENLARGEMENT AND
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
3. The eastward enlargement of the EU and
the development of an EU defence role, combined with the possible
further enlargement of NATO, is likely to produce a complex pattern
of involvement in European defence structures which will evolve
over time. The EU is currently engaged in membership negotiations
with 10 Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia) plus Cyprus and Malta and possibly in future
Turkey. Seven Central and Eastern European states (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) are Associate
Partners of the Western European Union, which allows them to participate
in WEU meetings and planning for WEU operations. The Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland are, since March 1999, members of NATO and
Associate Members of the WEU (like the other non-EU European members
of NATO). NATO is due to discuss possible further enlargement
by 2002, but whether, and if so which, new countries may be invited
to join the Atlantic Alliance remains unclear.
4. Given the current speed of accession
negotiations and related reforms to EU structures and policies,
the first Central and Eastern European members may join the EU
in approximately 2004-06. The "fast track" countries
of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have
been involved in EU accession negotiations since 1998, but exactly
which countries will join the Union first and when remains uncertain.
Latvia, Slovakia and possibly Lithuania may quite quickly catch
up with their "fast track" neighbours. It may be some
time longer, perhaps a decade more, before Bulgaria and Romania
are in a position to join the EU. Croatia, which is currently
not an Associate of the EU and has not yet been invited to begin
EU accession negotiations, could move quite rapidly towards EU
membership—if democratic and economic reforms proceed.
5. The CESDP is unlikely to include the
extension of a security guarantee (ie, a collective defence commitment)
to EU members, at least in the short-to-medium term. Current discussions
suggest that all or most of the WEU's operational functions may
be integrated into the EU, but that the treaty basis of the WEU—the
1954 modified Brussels Treaty, which includes a security guarantee—will
remain separate from the EU. NATO members are wary that giving
the EU a collective defence, as distinct from a crisis management,
role could undermine the Atlantic Alliance's own collective defence
function. The EU's non-NATO members (Austria, Finland, Ireland
and Sweden) are concerned that an EU security guarantee would
undermine their policies of neutrality. Most observers also accept
that the EU does not have the military forces to credibly implement
an EU security guarantee and that it will not do so even if current
plans for a 50-60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force are implemented.
Finally, the United States has made clear that it does not want
to be drawn into a "back door" security guarantee, whereby
it might be called upon to help implement a security commitment
made by the EU to which it was not a party.
6. At least in the short-to-medium term,
the eastward enlargement of the EU is likely to reinforce the
distinction between the EU's crisis management role and the NATO
collective defence function. The issue of EU security guarantees
is unlikely to arise in the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, since these countries are already members of NATO
and will probably also become signatories of the WEU Treaty once
they join the EU. Unless NATO enlarges quite rapidly and quite
widely, however, EU membership is likely to be extended in the
next few years to Central and Eastern European countries which
are not yet and may perhaps never become members of NATO, in particular
the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and perhaps
also Slovakia and Slovenia. Although such countries would welcome
an EU security guarantee, it is unlikely to be forthcoming. Given
the possibility of being called upon to honour a security guarantee,
EU members states are unlikely to extend a guarantee they cannot
credibly implement while the US is likely to remain opposed to
being drawn into a "back door" security commitment.
7. Although the CESDP is unlikely in the
short term to include the extension of a formal EU security guarantee,
enlargement will raise the issue of the security commitment of
EU states to one another (including to new Central and Eastern
European members). The EU is based on implicit "political
solidarity" between its members. Some observers suggest that
it is inconceivable that member states would not act if another
EU member faced a serious military threat to its national territory.
The extension of EU membership, especially to states which are
not members of NATO and in particular to the Baltic states, will
involve an implicit albeit undefined commitment to the security
of new Central and Eastern European members.
8. In the longer term, enlargement, combined
with a number of other trends, could result in renewed debate
on a possible EU security guarantee. First, if the processes of
NATO and EU enlargement converge, the future eastern boundaries
of NATO and the EU may become the same, thereby removing many
of the problems of divergent memberships. Second, as the EU enlarges
eastward, taking in a number of potentially vulnerable states,
pressures for a formal EU security guarantee may grow. Third,
if the EU develops greater defence capabilities it may become
more credible for the EU to extend and if necessary implement
a security guarantee for its members.
9. Aside from the sensitive issue of security
guarantees, enlargement will also have other implications for
the EU's CESDP. In particular, enlargement may impinge on decision-making
within the CESDP. At present, EU member governments, including
the British Government, argue that the defence matters should
remain subject to unanimous agreement—as opposed to qualified
majority voting (QMV)—within the Council of Ministers. As
the EU enlarges to perhaps twenty-five or more members in the
next decade or so, the risk of the CESDP being frozen by the veto
of one or a small number of member states may increase. Certainly,
there may be circumstances where the majority of EU member states
want to take military action even without the support of all their
EU partners.
10. A number of solutions to the issue of
decision-making for the CESDP in an enlarged Union may be possible.
First, as is effectively already the practice within NATO, decisions
on whether and what forces to contribute to specific military
operations are likely to remain the prerogative of the EU's member
states. Second, as is also the practice within NATO, member states
wary of or reluctant to contribute forces to a particular military
operation may, in the interests of unity, allow the other members
to proceed with that operation (for example, through "constructive
abstention", "footnoting" minority positions or
similar devices). Third, in order to prevent the possibility of
one state vetoing EU military action, new voting arrangements
might be introduced for certain elements of the CESDP in an enlarged
Union. Although QMV might theoretically be introduced for the
CESDP, this would likely be perceived as too great an infringement
on state's sovereignty in this area and perhaps also set too low
a threshold for decisions to take military action. "Consensus
minus one/two" decision-making, as is already the case for
some Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
decisions, might therefore be a more viable model.
INTEGRATING CENTRAL
AND EASTERN
EUROPE INTO
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
STRUCTURES
11. The Central and Eastern European states
have the potential to contribute significantly to European defence
capabilities and operations, particularly in the longer term.
A number of Central and Eastern European states have long-standing
records as significant contributors to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping
operations. All of the EU's Central and Eastern European Associates
have contributed ground forces to NATO's operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo. In the specifically European context, the Central
and Eastern European Associate Members and Associate Partners
have already worked close with the WEU in its operational missions
in supporting the enforcement of economic sanctions in the Adriatic
and on the Danube, in Bosnia (the WEU's police contingent in Mostar),
in Albania (the Multinational Advisory Police Element—MAPE)
and in Croatia (the WEU Demining Assistance Mission—WEUDAM).
Through NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and their Associate
relations with the WEU, the Central and Eastern European states
also co-operate closely with NATO/WEU in planning and training
for crisis management operations.
12. The Central and Eastern European states
are all reforming their armed forces in directions which will
enable them to contribute on a larger scale to international peacekeeping
and crisis management operations. They have reduced their armed
forces from Cold War levels and are developing smaller, more mobile
and more rapidly deployable forces. After large reductions in
defence spending in the early 1990s, and in order to reform their
armed forces and prepare for NATO membership, the majority of
Central and Eastern European states have also introduced limited
increases in defence spending since the mid-to-late 1990s. Nevertheless,
they face significant obstacles in reforming their armed forces
which will limit their ability to contribute to possible NATO/EU
missions in the short-to-medium term. Economic circumstances mean
that, even with increases in defence spending, reforming Central
and Eastern European militaries will be a slow process. The transition
from conscript to professional forces, the procurement of new
equipment, improved training, maintaining higher levels of readiness
and the development of inter-operability with Western militaries
are all proving difficult, time-consuming and relatively expensive.
13. Against this background, it is important
that the Central and Eastern European states are firmly integrated
into the EU's emerging CESDP. The Central and Eastern European
states' Associate relationships with the WEU should be integrated
into the EU's emerging defence dimension in order to ensure that
existing co-operation is maintained and built upon. Given the
Central and Eastern European states' potential to contribute to
EU defence capabilities, the EU should work with its Associates
to help them develop long-term defence plans which will facilitate
military reforms and maximise their contribution to EU (and NATO)
missions in future. NATO is already engaged in this work through
its integration of the three new Central European members and
its PfP and Membership Action Plan (MAP) ties with the other Central
and Eastern European states. The EU should reinforce this process
and include these states in specifically European defence planning.
The WEU's recent audit of assets and capabilities for European
crisis management operations included Associate Members (including
the three new WEU Associate Members, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland), but did not include WEU Associate Partners (the seven
other Central and Eastern European states). Consideration should
be given to extending this audit process to the WEU's Associate
Partners, in order to maximise their integration with the emerging
EU defence identity and assess their potential contributions to
EU operations. As the EU develops its own defence planning process,
the Central and Eastern European states should be integrated as
fully as possible into that process.
14. There is also discussion of possible
"convergence criteria" for EU defence policies (such
as allocating a specific percentage of GDP to defence, making
a certain proportion of armed forces available for EU missions,
contributing to common defence assets, etc.). The development
of such criteria could have implications for the Central and Eastern
European states and the enlargement process. The involvement of
Central and Eastern European states in developing and implementing
such criteria could both help these states in reforming their
armed forces and enhance their potential to contribute to EU defence
capabilities. To the extent that defence convergence criteria
are developed before the Central and Eastern European states join
the EU, however, they could become an additional pre-requisite
for—and potentially an obstacle to—membership of the
Union. The Central and Eastern European states argue that the
EU is already a "moving target". EU defence convergence
criteria, if established, should not create an additional obstacle
to the membership of Central and Eastern European states. The
Central and Eastern European states should therefore been involved
to the greatest extent possible in any EU effort to develop defence
convergence criteria or similar national and/or collective EU
defence planning goals.
15. The integration of the Central and Eastern
European states into European defence structures also raises the
question of inter-operability with the armed forces of current
EU members. The Central and Eastern European states operate successfully
alongside Western militaries in the NATO operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo. The development of inter-operability between NATO
members, non-NATO EU members and Central and Eastern European
states is already one of the goals of NATO's PfP. The extent of
the inter-operability problem faced by the Central and Eastern
European states can also be exaggerated since existing NATO/EU
members face problems in this area and inter-operability does
not necessarily require the procurement of expensive Western platforms
(aircraft, tanks, etc). The Central and Eastern European states,
however, do face real problems in developing inter-operability
with their new NATO/EU partners (for example, in terms of communications
equipment, command and control procedures, the training of personnel,
etc.). The three new NATO members—as well as some long-standing
NATO members—were not able to contribute significantly to
NATO's air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) in spring 1999. Building on the experience of PfP and working
with NATO/PfP, one of the goals of the EU's CESDP should be to
increase the inter-operability of the armed forces of both existing
EU members and the Central and Eastern European states. The development
of inter-operability, further, should focus not only on relatively
low-tempo operations (such as the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo) but also on higher-tempo peace enforcement and war-fighting
operations (such as NATO's air campaign against FRY).
RELATIONS WITH
RUSSIA, UKRAINE
AND THE
FORMER SOVIET
REPUBLICS
16. The combination of enlargement and the
development of the CESDP may also have implications for the EU's
relations with Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics.
To date, in contrast to its strong opposition to NATO enlargement,
Russia has been relatively sanguine about the eastward enlargement
of the EU. As the EU develops a defence dimension and enlarges
eastward, Russia may become more wary of the EU in general and
its enlargement in particular—although the EU does not have
the "historic baggage" of the Cold War associated with
NATO in many Russian eyes. At minimum, Russia and other former
Soviet republics will have to consider the EU more seriously as
a defence actor.
17. In order to avoid undermining relations
with Russia and other former Soviet republics, it will be important
for the EU to maximise transparency with regard to the CESDP in
its dealings with these states. The former Soviet republics' Partnership
and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) with the EU could be used to
discuss security and defence issues, in particular to inform these
countries on the evolution of the CESDP.
18. The development of a defence role may
also provide new opportunities for co-operation between the EU
and former Soviet republics, particularly Russia and Ukraine.
Russia and Ukraine may be able to provide equipment to the EU
in areas where it is currently deficient, in particular long-range
heavy transport aircraft (for example, by loaning/leasing such
aircraft to the EU or its members). There may also be possibilities
for defence industrial co-operation between the EU and Russia
and Ukraine.
6 March 2000
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