Memorandum by G W Hopkinson, Deputy Director
and Director of Studies, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, London
PROCEDURES FOR
INCORPORATING DEFENCE
INTO THE
EU
1. The current proposals differ from those envisaged
at Berlin in as much as formal direction would be by the Council
of Ministers of the EU not by the WEU Council. That in turn has
implications for the provision of advice to the members of the
Council, both as regards the EU itself, and as regards the staffs
of ministries in capitals. The EU has to establish its own machinery,
either by incorporating parts of the WEU, or by new creation,
to ensure that the Council has appropriate security, including
military, advice. In a number of capitals the officials advising
on EU matters are not well integrated with those advising on defence
issues. That too should receive attention.
2. In substance, the changes may not be
all that great. Not only is there substantial overlap in membership
of the two institutions but leadership in matters of hard security
policy is likely to be framed, in the first instance, by the same
limited number of major nations.
3. The timetable for establishing the new
procedures and most of the structures is realistic, especially
if the focus can be kept upon practicalities rather than matters
of institutional nicety. (The creation of effective, deployable,
European forces will take longer; that will be true whether those
forces are considered in NATO or EU roles.) The most significant
new machinery required by the EU at this stage will be: (a) a
source of advice on military strategy and operations, and (b)
an effective link between the Council and any forces which it
is directing. The experience of NATO with its Military Committee,
and of WEU with its less well developed machinery will be relevant.
4. Current thinking apparently envisages
the incorporation of the WEU directly into Pillar 2. There are
good arguments for that. There are also good arguments, however,
for taking it into a new Pillar 4. Essentially those are that
the whole WEU acquis could be taken in, dealing in an appropriate
way with the differing degrees of membership, the question of
Turkey, and so on. However the change is effected, it will be
important to preserve the substance of the arrangements for the
different classes of WEU membership. Renegotiating all that, and
the relationship to other parts of the EU machinery, in which,
eg, WEU Observers were full members could be time-consuming and
contentious.
5. The problems of differing memberships
of institutions raise some real difficulties of responsibilities
and obligation. However, in substance, in present circumstances,
the fact that some nations are covered by the Article 5 commitment
of the Washington treaty (NATO), some of them by the Article V
commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty (WEU), and some by
neither is unlikely to affect what is done to aid a participant
in an operation. The real problems are more likely to arise from
unfortunate playing of politics over the use of NATO assets, or
the rights to be given to non-EU members. Greek-Turkish tensions
could be very relevant there.
6. It will be important that all nations
contributing forces to an operation have a real voice in its conduct.
(That will be as true of participation of non members in NATO
operations as of that of non EU members in European ones.) The
formal direction may rest with the EU members, but they will have
to accept substantive participation by others. A distinction between
a decision to mount (or cease) an operation and ones on its conduct
may help distinguish the roles to be played by different members
or associates, but such a distinction is likely to become blurred
in the complex processes of consultation involved in crisis management.
7. The major problem in all of this is likely
to arise from the US desire for leadership. The Americans will
resent EU members caucusing before NATO meetings; they will be
reluctant to cede political engagement and interference when the
EU is in the lead. Moreover, there could, in future, if there
were substantial European capabilities, be real tensions even
if NATO takes the lead. As over Kosovo in the early stages, there
may be European enthusiasm for engagement and US reluctance. In
NATO, the US may prevent engagement or insist on a particular
strategy even in cases where the Europeans are willing and able
to follow a different approach.
SUBSTANCE OF
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
8. The division of responsibility between
NATO, to which is given sole responsibility for collective territorial
defence of its members, and the EU is necessary for the present,
both to sustain US interest in Europe in a practical way and because
of the commitment of a number of non NATO members to concepts
of territorial self defence. The division is not absolute, both
institutions may be involved in crisis management not involving
an attack of allied territory. For the present, there are severe
limits to what the EU is capable of undertaking. As Europe becomes
able to do more without US support the balance will change. In
the long term, the US may disengage from European territorial
defence. That will depend, in part, on what it judges will best
serve its own strategic interests. It is not an issue at present.
9. There are three aspects to the resource
question: getting very much better value for money spent; providing
an adequate level of military effort of the right sort at national
level, whether the forces and headquarters are then deployed in
a NATO, national, or an EU context; providing the modest level
of investment necessary for support of the EU Council, for command
and control etc.
10. Better value for money involves longer
production runs, less protection of national industries, and more
effective procurement procedures. It also means standardisation
not so much in tanks and artillery as in trucks and consumable
stores. The EU countries together could exercise great power in
procurement of such things. They would also greatly simplify the
administrative and logistic burden if equipment were more standardised.
11. An adequate level of military effort
means moving from immobile, non deployable, forces to ones which
are flexible, usable, have equipment suitable for a range of tasks,
and which can be sustained in the field for months at a time.
European forces in general, even when assigned to NATO meet those
criteria all too little. A shift from conscript forces to smaller
professional but better equipped ones is a necessary step, irrespective
of the EU's responsibilities.
12. Europe spends barely enough on defence;
however, the scope for increases is very limited. The objective
must be to ensure a much more efficient laying out of money. Part
of that must be achieved by effective force planning, for the
most part through the NATO force planning procedures (directly
for members) or through their adaptation and application to the
EU (for others). National systems also need to be improved, and
arrangements made so that what the EU does builds upon the NATO
routines.
13. The creation of a European defence capability
does not, of itself, require the creation of a European arms industry.
It does require more rational procurement, and that in turn will
provoke a rationalisation of European defence industries. In practice,
there is likely to be a substantial measure of cooperation across
the Atlantic. The real need is to ensure a truly two-way street.
14. Common operating procedures are in themselves
highly desirable, and NATO and PfP, will have a major role to
play there. There is no technical reason why over time it should
not be possible to move to commonality with consequential savings
in training and communications.
15. A common procurement policy would also
be desirable but will take a long time to achieve, partly because
of the protection of national industries, partly because of differing
national priorities and requirements. As US experience has shown,
different Armed Services within a country may have differing views.
Different countries at different stages of their procurement cycles
and with different views of threats and how to meet them will
find it even more of a problem.
FORCE STRUCTURE
16. A European capability needs command
and control, logistics and frontline elements. Part of the command
and control, much of the logistics, and all the frontline elements
will come from national sources. A small amount of new dedicated
command and control will have to be established to connect the
Council to the forces under its direction. There is scope for
a common provision of logistics, including airlift, common stores
for certain items, and common training.
17. The front line development will be essentially
ensuring that ground force elements, ships and air formations
are deployable, sustainable, and able to cooperate with those
of other nationalities. They must also be suited to the tasks
likely to confront them. That will require flexibility. For most
European states there is a great deal to do, as regards both personnel
and equipment.
18. For most of the things which the EU
will tackle in the near term satellite intelligence is not so
important as the sort of material which can be gathered from aircraft,
manned or unmanned, or by Special Forces, or by electronic means.
European states have capabilities in all these areas and the expenditure
required to expand them is limited. There is also a limited satellite
capability, and some more can be acquired commercially. Transport
is more likely to be an early need. The United Kingdom and some
other European nations have started to improve their capabilities
there.
19. A move to professional forces is essential
if Europe is to be a serious military player. There are obvious
political difficulties in sending conscripts into danger. Moreover,
they will lack the skills for the difficult operations which may
be involved in peace enforcement and similar operations. Depth
of experience and maturity are important elements there which
may be lacking in conscript forces.
20. A force of 60,000 is realistic. It may
never be deployed as such, but the ability to deploy one division,
and have one in reserve for any escalation or other contingency,
and one for roulement after six months is sensible. Neither
politically nor militarily would it be sensible to aim for a European
standing army. Defence is still very much the business of national
governments, acting, if need be, in concert with others.
GENERAL
21. A defence capability will add to the
credibility of the EU as a political actor. It will enable it
as an institution to be a partner in crisis management which would
be difficult for any one European state acting alone. At the same
time, the credibility of European states as a whole and individually
will be enhanced by the improvements in capabilities brought about
for the European Defence role.
22. In principle, the present intergovernmental
model is no different from that of NATO. In both institutions
decision taking can be painfully slow and tedious. NATO has the
advantage of practice in defence matters and skilled staffs. There
is no reason to believe that EU practice could not be built up.
The one significant difference is that the EU has no equivalent
of the US, a predominant power usually able to get its way if
it insists. Over time there may be a move away from intergovernmental
decision taking but that will lie in the distant future so far
as defence is concerned.
23. The new arrangements will affect relations
with the US in several ways. In so far as Europe is a more coherent
and capable actor, able to do more in the security sphere, the
US will welcome the changes. In so far as they increase Europe's
independence of decision taking, and lead to a demand for a greater
share of influence in security matters there will be resentment
and tensions. The US will, in any case, be fragmented in its reactions
to these developments as to many situations.
24. Russia has hitherto generally welcomed
EU expansion, or at least seen no reason to challenge it. If it
comes to see a strong military arrangement whose members include
eg the Baltic States, there will be some adverse reaction. Russia
is very weak and certain elements will fear encirclement. There
will, however, not be the same visceral reaction as to NATO expansion.
25. In Eastern Europe, there is unlikely
to be any adverse reaction unless it is felt that the developments
signal or will provoke a withdrawal of US interest in the area.
In the Middle East and North Africa there may be a sense of fear
or resentment. However unreasonably, some elements there may feel
threatened. On the other hand, those same elements will welcome
any diminution of US presence.
26. The current proposals should provide
a further incentive to European states to develop a better capability.
They should certainly enhance the ability on non-NATO members
to add to that capability. Reduced reliance on the US should foster
better provision of the elements required for mobility and sustainability.
29 February 2000
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